Naylor v. Sollie et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Petitioner's request for habeas relief pursuant to Section 2241 is denied. Signed by District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr on 12/21/17. (copy mailed to plaintiff) (RRL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
MARVIN DEUANE NAYLOR

PETITIONER

VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-cv-760-WHB-JCG

BILLIE SOLLIE, et al.

RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal.

Petitioner

Marvin Deuane Naylor is presently incarcerated at the Lauderdale County Detention Facility,
Meridian, Mississippi.

Pet. [1] at 1.

The Court, having considered his pro se habeas petition,

amended petition [7], and the relevant authorities, finds that it should be dismissed for the
reasons that follow.
I.

Factual Background
Petitioner is challenging his current incarceration based on five criminal charges, case

numbers: 204-16, 264-16, 261-16, 262-16, and 263-16, that are pending against him in
Lauderdale County, Mississippi.

See Pet. [1] at 2.

claims that the confidential informant is unreliable.

As ground for habeas relief, Petitioner
Id. at 6-7.

Petitioner further states that his

constitutional rights have been violated because Petitioner has been subjected to an illegal search
and search.

Id. at 6.

Additionally, Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights of due

process and the right to a speedy trial have been violated.

Id.

As relief, Petitioner requests

that the Court
[i]nvestigate said charges[,] challenge search & seizure, due to the fact that property
was not and is not Def.[‘s][.] Also[,] challenge credibility of confidential informant
due to the fact he has caught other felon[ies] including[,] introduction of contraband
in Kemper County Detention Facility where he no[w] resides. Also[,] sup[p]ress
evidence[] obtained by him [the confidential informant].
Id. at 8.

II.

Analysis
While a pre-trial detainee like Petitioner has the right to seek federal habeas relief, the

availability of such relief is not without limits.
U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973).

See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410

“[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,’

to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of
conviction by a state court.” Id. at 489 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886)).
Furthermore, a petitioner is not permitted to derail “a pending state proceeding by an attempt to
litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.” Id. at 493.
The United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a pre-trial petitioner
seeking to “abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial
processes” and a petitioner seeking only to enforce the state’s obligation to bring him promptly
to trial.

Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-

90; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969)).

The Fifth Circuit has held that the distinction is

based on the type of relief requested by the petitioner.

Id.

If the petitioner is seeking to

prevent prosecution of the cases, then he is seeking to “abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the
orderly functioning of state judicial processes.” Id.

However, if the petitioner is attempting to

“force the state to go to trial,” then he is merely seeking to force the state to fulfill its obligation
to provide petitioner with a prompt trial.

Id.

through federal habeas corpus; the latter is.

The former objective is generally not attainable
Id.

Here, in liberally construing Petitioner’s request for relief, the Court finds that Petitioner
seeks the dismissal of his state criminal charges, and is therefore, attempting “to abort a state
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proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial processes” which is not available
through federal habeas corpus.

See Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir.1987)

(quoting Brown, 530 F.2d at 1283).

Thus, Petitioner cannot maintain these claims in a request

for federal habeas relief.
Additionally, to the extent Petitioner’s claims can be construed as a request to force the
State of Mississippi to bring him to trial, he is required to exhaust his claims in state court prior
to pursuing a federal habeas corpus petition.

See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228. The exhaustion

requirement gives “the State the ‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its
prisoner’s federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)).

In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement,

Petitioner must present his claims to the state’s highest court in a procedurally proper manner.
See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-840 (1999).
The State of Mississippi provides available remedies for a criminal defendant to assert that
his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.

See e.g., Reed v. State, 31 So. 3d 48,

56-57 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding criminal defendant may assert a demand for a speedy trial
in the trial court and then he is required to obtain a pretrial ruling on that motion).

Petitioner

has failed to demonstrate that he has exhausted his state-court remedies for the claims presented
in this Petition.

See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228 (finding inmate’s numerous preindictment

motions in the state court requesting that he be tried as soon as possible did not satisfy
exhaustion of speedy trial issue for federal habeas petition).

Furthermore, Petitioner does not

identify any special circumstances necessitating federal court intervene or disruption of the
state’s judicial process.

Petitioner’s claims can be resolved by a trial on the merits in state court

or by other procedures of the state court system.
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To allow Petitioner to “assert an affirmative

defense” to his pending charges prior to a judgment of conviction by the state court “would short
circuit the judicial machinery of the state courts.” Brown, 530 F.2d at 1283 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 490). The Court concludes that pre-trial habeas
corpus relief is unwarranted.

See id.; Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 227.

Petitioner’s request for

habeas relief pursuant to § 2241 is denied.
III.

Conclusion
The Court has considered the pleadings and applicable law.

For the reasons stated, this

pro se Petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is denied.

A final

Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dismissal will be entered.
SO ORDERED, this the 21st day of December, 2017.

s/William H. Barbour, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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