Papin v. University of Mississippi Medical Center et al

Filing 216

ORDER on Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Signed by District Judge Kristi H. Johnson on 9/1/2022. (KJ)

Case 3:17-cv-00763-KHJ-FKB Document 216 Filed 09/01/22 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH PAPIN
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-763-KHJ-FKB

UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL
CENTER

DEFENDANT

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Dr. Joseph Papin’s Trial Brief [212] asking the
Court to reevaluate whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over his breach-ofcontract claim against Defendant University of Mississippi Medical Center
(“UMMC”). UMMC responded with its own Trial Brief [214]. For the following
reasons, the Court continues to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim.
I.

Background
This proceeding has been before the Court for about five years. On September

20, 2017, Dr. Papin filed his Complaint [1] against UMMC, among others. Dr. Papin
twice amended his complaint. Am. Compl. [18]; Second Am. Compl. [50]. His Second
Amended Complaint, filed on March 18, 2019, brought claims against UMMC and
co-defendants for: breach of contract; violation of Section 213-A of the Mississippi
Constitution; state due-process violations; federal due-process violations brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and violations of Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. [50]. One breach-of-contract claim pertains to the House Officer

Case 3:17-cv-00763-KHJ-FKB Document 216 Filed 09/01/22 Page 2 of 6

Contract [144-3] (“Contract”) that Dr. Papin and UMMC entered. Dr. Papin
asserted the Court had federal-question jurisdiction over the federal claims. [50]
¶ 1. The Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because
they arose from the same case or controversy as the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367.
The Court dismissed on August 31, 2021, all but Dr. Papin’s claim against
UMMC for breaching the Contract. Order on Summ. J. [170] at 54–55. Accordingly,
that is the only remaining claim for trial. The Court continued to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the claim even though all federal claims had been
dismissed. Id. at 55. The Court entered an Order on September 22, 2021, limiting
Dr. Papin’s recoverable damages to the Contract’s one-year term. Order [192] at 12–
13.
This case has been stayed several times over the past five years. First, the
Court stayed proceedings in November 2019 when it allowed Dr. Papin’s attorney to
withdraw as counsel. Order [87]. It was stayed again in March 2020, rescheduling
trial for April 5, 2021, upon joint motion by the parties. Then, it was stayed a final
time in May 2021 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the parties
have completed discovery, and the Court has ruled on all dispositive and pretrial
motions.
Trial is scheduled for October 11, 2022. Almost one year after the Court
issued its Order dismissing all federal claims, Dr. Papin now requests—on the eve

2

Case 3:17-cv-00763-KHJ-FKB Document 216 Filed 09/01/22 Page 3 of 6

of trial—for the Court to reexamine its subject-matter jurisdiction over his
remaining breach-of-contract claim against UMMC. [212].
II.

Standard
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a federal court adjudicating a

case. E.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506–07 (2006). District courts
have original jurisdiction over civil actions: raising questions of federal law, 28
U.S.C. § 1331; and in which the parties are completely diverse and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
When a court has original jurisdiction over a claim and the plaintiff brings
additional state-law claims over which the court lacks jurisdiction, the question of
supplemental jurisdiction arises. See, e.g., Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
941 F.2d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 1991).
A district court possesses “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The inquiry is whether the claims “derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725 (1966).
Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right,”
however. Id. at 726. A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
state-law claim if: “[it] raises a novel or complex issue of State law”; “[it]
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court

3

Case 3:17-cv-00763-KHJ-FKB Document 216 Filed 09/01/22 Page 4 of 6

has original jurisdiction”; all other claims over which the court has original
jurisdiction have been dismissed; or “in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
As a “general rule,” a state-law claim should be dismissed when the federal
claim giving rise to the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction is dismissed.

Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir.
1992). That rule is not “mandatory” or “absolute,” however. Smith v. Amedisys Inc.,
298 F.3d 434, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding district court’s retaining
supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims not abuse of
discretion). For example, the Fifth Circuit has held a district court abuses its
discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims
after dismissing all federal claims if the court “invest[ed] a significant amount of
judicial resources in the litigation.” Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods.,

Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases explaining that district
courts abused discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
cases pending for three or four years). District courts should consider the above
§ 1367(c) factors “and the balance of the relevant factors of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity” in determining whether to continue exercising
supplemental jurisdiction. See Batiste v. Island Recs. Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

4

Case 3:17-cv-00763-KHJ-FKB Document 216 Filed 09/01/22 Page 5 of 6

III.

Dr. Papin’s Trial Brief

Dr. Papin contends the Court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his breach-of-contract claim because: the parties are not diverse
and the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000 after the Court’s Order
[192] limiting Dr. Papin’s damages; and all federal claims have been dismissed.
[212]. If this case is dismissed, Dr. Papin intends to re-file his suit against UMMC
in Jackson County Circuit Court. [212] at 2–3. UMMC maintains that the Court
may, and should, retain supplemental jurisdiction. Def.’s Resp. [213].
The Court need not dismiss Dr. Papin’s breach-of-contract claim because the
federal claims have been dismissed. Smith, 298 F.3d at 446–47. The 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) factors support the Court’s continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Dr. Papin’s breach-of-contract claim does not raise “a novel or complex” state-law
issue. Newport Ltd., 941 F.2d at 308. Nor does he show that “exceptional
circumstances” or “compelling reasons” exist for declining jurisdiction.
Judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity also support the Court’s
continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. This proceeding has been before the
Court for about five years, longer than cases in which district courts have abused
their discretion for dismissing state-law claims after investing significant resources
in the litigation. See, e.g., Brookshire, 554 F.3d at 602. Discovery is complete. All
outstanding motions have been ruled on by the Court. The pretrial conference is
tomorrow, and trial will begin next month. The Court and the parties have
expended time, money, and other resources in preparing for trial and marching

5

Case 3:17-cv-00763-KHJ-FKB Document 216 Filed 09/01/22 Page 6 of 6

through this five-year trek of litigation. The Court will not dismiss the breach-ofcontract claim now.
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments raised by the parties. Arguments not

addressed would not have changed the outcome of the Court’s decision. For these
reasons, the Court continues to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Papin’s
breach-of-contract claim against UMMC.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 1st day of September, 2022.
s/ Kristi H. Johnson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6