Epps v. Hazlehurst City School District et al
Filing
54
ORDER granting 44 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; finding as moot 53 Motion for Leave to File Signed by District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 03/14/2019 (Guirola, Louis)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
LATARSHA EPPS
PLAINTIFF
v.
CAUSE NO. 3:17cv918-LG-LRA
HAZLEHURST CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT; LISA DAVIS, in her
individual and official capacities;
KENNETH THRASHER, in his
individual and official capacities;
PAUL RHODES, in his individual
and official capacities; and JOHN
DOES 3-10
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
SECOND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
BEFORE THE COURT is the [52] Second Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings Based on Qualified Immunity filed by Defendants Lisa Davis, Paul
Rhodes, and Kenneth Thrasher. The Motion argues that Plaintiff’s Schultea reply
does not alleges facts to overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity, and that
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants in their individual capacities should
therefore be dismissed. The Motion is fully briefed. Having considered the
pleadings, Plaintiff’s Schultea reply, the submissions of the parties, and relevant
law, the Court concludes that Defendants’ are entitled to qualified immunity from
Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual allegations in this case have been previously summarized by the
Court in two Memorandum Opinions, and the Court finds it unnecessary to repeat
them here given that this ruling does not require a close inspection of the facts
newly alleged. In resolving the Defendants’ first Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings related to their asserted qualified immunity, the Court ordered Plaintiff
Latarsha Epps to respond to Defendants’ qualified immunity defense by means of a
reply pursuant to Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
(Mem. Op. & Order Granting in Part & Den. in Part Mot. J. Pleadings 10, ECF No.
39.) In her reply, Plaintiff was to 1) more specifically and clearly describe the
circumstances of her allegedly protected speech by identifying how, when, where,
and in what capacity she informed each of the defendants that their conduct ran
afoul of state laws; 2) consider and address the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sims v.
City of Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2018), insofar as the “clearly
established” prong of the qualified immunity doctrine is concerned; and 3) articulate
the legal basis for her failure-to-investigate claim against these defendants in their
individual capacities.
Plaintiff filed her Schultea reply on November 9, 2018, and Defendants filed
the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on November 29, 2018. The
parties competed briefing on January 29, 2018.
II. DISCUSSION
a. Standard of Review
“A Motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the
same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court accepts all well pleaded facts as
true and views them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Linicomn v. Hill, 902
F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2018). But “the complaint must allege more than labels and
conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,
and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Jabaco, Inc. v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 587 F.3d 314, 318
(5th Cir. 2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework,
they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
b. Qualified Immunity
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of an individual’s
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting
under color of state law. However, “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
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(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Accordingly, a
government official is entitled to immunity from suit unless (1) Plaintiff has made
allegations sufficient to show a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right
at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct. Id.
at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
“When a defendant pleads the defense of qualified immunity, the trial judge
should determine both what the current applicable law is and whether it was
clearly established when the action occurred.” Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432 (citing
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)). The plaintiff Acannot be allowed to rest
on general characterizations, but must speak to the factual particulars of the
alleged actions, at least when those facts are known to the plaintiff and are not
particularly within the knowledge of the defendants.@ Id. The plaintiff must
provide Aallegations of fact focusing specifically on the conduct of the individual who
caused the plaintiff=s injury.@ Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
c. Plaintiff’s Failure-to-Investigate Claim Against Davis, Rhodes, and
Thrasher
Plaintiff concedes, in her Schultea reply, that there appears to be no
constitutional basis for her failure-to-investigate claim alleged against Lisa Davis,
Paul Rhodes, and Kenneth Thrasher, in their individual capacities. Her failure-toinvestigate claims against these defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
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d. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim Against Davis, Rhodes,
and Thrasher
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s Schultea reply does not allege sufficient
facts to overcome their qualified immunity relative to her First Amendment claim
because 1) she does not detail the nature of her allegedly protected speech with
enough specificity and 2) her speech was unprotected because it was not made in a
public capacity. Additionally, and alternatively, Defendants contend Sims
establishes that, at the time of Plaintiff’s termination, it was not clearly established
that First Amendment liability could attach to public officials who did not make the
final decision to terminate.
Because Sims forecloses Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against these
Defendants on “clearly established” grounds, the Court need not address whether
her amended allegations state a claim. It is undisputed that the Board of Trustees
of the School District (“the Board”) terminated Plaintiff’s employment, and that only
the Board had the final decisionmaking authority to do so. While Davis – the
superintendent of the district – recommended Plaintiff’s termination to the Board,
nothing suggests that Thrasher and Rhodes – who are members of the Board – had
any role in Plaintiff’s termination other than to deliberate and vote in their
capacities as Board members. Thus, there is no viable individual capacity claim
against Thrasher and Rhodes.
Regardless, Sims – decided on June 28, 2018 – makes clear that whether a
city official who was not a final decisionmaker could be found individually liable for
First Amendment retaliation had not been clearly established in the Fifth Circuit at
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the time of Plaintiff’s termination on November 18, 2016. See Sims, 894 F.3d at
641-42. Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary miss the point and are unavailing.
Even assuming that the Plaintiff could present facts from which a jury could find a
constitutional violation, Davis, Thrasher, and Rhodes are entitled to qualified
immunity because it was not clearly established that they could be subject to
individual liability for allegedly causing Epps’ termination. Id. These claims must
therefore be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court has determined that Defendants Lisa Davis, Paul Rhodes, and
Kenneth Thrasher are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff Latarsha Epps’
individual-capacity § 1983 claims. Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation and
failure-to-investigate claims will be dismissed, and Defendants’ Second Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings will be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [52] Second
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Based on Qualified Immunity filed by
Defendants Lisa Davis, Paul Rhodes, and Kenneth Thrasher is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Lisa Davis, Paul Rhodes, and Kenneth
Thrasher are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ [53] Motion for Leave to File
Reply regarding their [52] Second Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Based on
Qualified Immunity is MOOT.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are directed to contact the
Magistrate Judge’s chambers within seven (7) days of this Order’s entry to schedule
a Case Management Conference.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 14th day of March, 2019.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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