Whitfield v. Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics

Filing 58

Memorandum Opinion and ORDER Granting Defendant Officer Juan Chapa's Motion 38 for Judgment on the Pleadings; Dismissing Plaintiff Larry E. Whitfield, Jr's Claims Against Defendant Officer Juan Chapa in his Individual and Official Capacit ies with Prejudice; Denying Plaintiff Larry E. Whitfield's Motions 34 35 47 48 51 to Amend without Prejudice; Granting Defendant Officer D. Rice's Motion 45 to Strike Document 44 ; and Striking Document 44 . Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on February 13, 2019. (SSC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
LARRY E. WHITFIELD, JR.

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v.

MISSISSIPPI BUREAU OF
NARCOTICS; OFFICER D. RICE,
Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics; AND
OFFICER JUAN CHAPA, Hinds
County Sheriff’s Department

PLAINTIFF

Civil No. 3:17cv987-HSO-JCG

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
OFFICER JUAN CHAPA’S MOTION [38] FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS; DISMISSING PLAINTIFF LARRY E. WHITFIELD, JR.’S
CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT OFFICER JAUN CHAPA IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES WITH PREJUDICE;
DENYING PLAINTIFF LARRY E. WHITFIELD, JR.’S MOTIONS [34] [35]
[47] [48] [51] TO AMEND; GRANTING DEFENDANT OFFICER D. RICE’S
MOTION [45] TO STRIKE DOCUMENT [44];
AND STRIKING DOCUMENT [44]
BEFORE THE COURT are Defendant Juan Chapa’s Motion [38] for
Judgment on the Pleadings; Plaintiff Larry E. Whitfield, Jr.’s Motions [34] [35] [47]
[48] [51] to Amend; and Defendant Officer D. Rice’s Motion [45] to Strike Document
[44].

This suit arises out of a traffic stop conducted by Defendants, Officer D. Rice

and Officer Juan Chapa, following which Plaintiff was charged with possession of
drug paraphernalia. Plaintiff Larry E. Whitfield, Jr. alleges that during this traffic

1

stop Defendant Juan Chapa pulled a firearm and held it close to his face while
repeatedly shouting that he would shoot him, and that when he refused to allow
Defendants to conduct a cavity search, Defendant Officer D. Rice attacked him,
placed him in a chokehold causing him to lose consciousness, and stepped on the
back of his neck.
After due consideration of the record, Defendant’s Motion, and relevant legal
authority, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant Officer Juan Chapa’s Motion
[38] should be granted and that Plaintiff Larry E. Whitfield Jr.’s claims against
Defendant Officer Juan D. Chapa in his individual and official capacities should be
dismissed. The Court further finds that Plaintiff Whitfield’s Motions [34] [35] [47]
[48] [51] to Amend should be denied without prejudice. Plaintiff will, however,
be allowed to refile a motion to amend and submit a single proposed
amended complaint, stating all of his claims in one pleading, within thirty
(30) days of entry of this Order. Finally, the Court finds that Defendant Officer
D. Rice’s Motion [45] to Strike Document [44] should be granted in light of the
Court’s Order permitting Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings.
Document [44] will be stricken.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 7, 2017, Plaintiff Larry E. Whitfield, Jr. (“Whitfield” or
“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se Complaint [1] in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
naming the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics (“MBN”) as the sole Defendant. Compl.
[1] at 1. Without any explanation or setting forth any facts, Whitfield alleged that

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he was deprived of his right to a trial, endured torture and abuse, and was unjustly
imprisoned, including being placed in solitary confinement. Id. at 2. The Complaint
sought monetary damages for pain and suffering and lost wages. Id.
On February 7, 2018, Whitfield filed an Attachment to the Complaint,
purporting to add further factual allegations in support of his claims. Attach. [10] to
Compl. Whitfield claimed that he was pulled over by the MBN while driving in
Jackson, Mississippi, on June 28, 2017, and was arrested, placed in custody “of a
Sheriff Law Officer,” and transported to the Hinds County Detention Center. Id.
Whitfield subsequently sought permission to proceed in forma pauperis, at which
point the Magistrate Judge required him to answer a Questionnaire. On March 29,
2018, Whitfield answered the Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire and clarified his
claims. Pl.’s Resp. [17].
In an Order [26] dated April 27, 2018, the Magistrate Judge construed the
arguments, assertions, and legal bases presented in Whitfield’s Response [17] to the
Questionnaire as an amendment to his Complaint, Order [26] at 1, and ordered that
MBN Officer D. Rice (“Rice”) and MBN Officer Unknown be added as Defendants,
Order [26] at 1-2. On May 15, 2018, the MBN responded to the Magistrate’s Order
[26] indicating that it was unable to execute a waiver for MBN Officer Unknown
because he was not employed by the MBN; however, it identified the Officer
Unknown as “Juan Chapa, Hinds County Sherriff’s Department.” Resp. [29] to
Order [26]. The Court then added Officer Juan Chapa as a Defendant.
According to Whitfield’s Questionnaire [17], Officer Rice pulled him over after

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he swerved to miss a pothole. Plaintiff then consented to a search of his vehicle,
during which Officer Rice discovered drug paraphernalia. Pl.’s Resp. to
Questionnaire [17] at 2. Although Plaintiff was not under arrest, Officer Rice
allegedly gave Officer Chapa permission to perform a cavity search, but Whitfield
refused the Officers’ request for consent to search him. Id. at 3. Officer Rice then
allegedly “attacked him” and put “his hands around his throat.” Id. After losing
and then regaining consciousness, Whitfield alleges that Officer Chapa placed a
firearm to his head and repeatedly threatened to shoot him. Id. Whitfield was
placed under arrest, and while he was lying on his stomach, Officer Rice “stepped on
the back of [Whitfield’s] neck applying pressure.” Id. Whitfield was booked and
charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.
This Court previously granted the MBN’s Motion [21] to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and, in the Alternative, Failure to State a Claim, and
dismissed Whitfield’s claims against the MBN for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Order [32]. Officer Chapa has now filed a Motion [38] for Judgment on
the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Officer Chapa
argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s individual capacity
claims against him, and that Whitfield has failed to state a claim against him in his
official capacity. Motion [38]; Pl’s Mem. in Support [39].
Whitfield has filed many documents which all appear in some fashion to
attempt to add claims to the Complaint [1]. First, Whitfield filed Document [34] to
amend his Complaint “as a matter of right,” to add a claim of punitive damages.

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Subsequently, Whitfield filed numerous other Motions [35] [47] [48] [51].
Additionally, Whitfield filed Document [44] entitled “Pleadings,” which the Clerk
filed as a Rebuttal [44] to Officer Chapa’s Motion [38] for Judgment on the
Pleadings. In response to Document [44], Officer Rice filed a Motion [45] to Strike
Document [44], arguing that it should be stricken because Whitfield failed to seek
leave of Court to amend his Complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s Motions [34] [35] [47] [48] [51] to Amend should be denied without
prejudice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 allows a party to amend its pleading once

as a matter of course within either twenty-one days after serving the pleading or
within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or motion. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1). In any other instance, a party may amend its pleading “only with
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Courts, however, freely give leave to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.”
Id. In exercising its discretion to grant or deny leave to amend, a court may
consider whether the party seeking leave is doing so after undue delay, in bad faith,
or for a dilatory motive. See Jamieson By and Through Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d
1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). “It is within the district court’s discretion to deny a
motion to amend if it is futile.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863,
872-73 (5th Cir. 2000). Futility means “that the amended complaint would fail to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Id. To determine futility, the
court “appl[ies] the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule
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12(b)(6).” Id.
Whitfield filed his Complaint [1] on December 7, 2017. Two months later, on
February 7, 2018, he submitted Document [10], entitled “Attachment.” Despite that
Document’s title, it purports to elaborate on the factual allegations in the Complaint
[1] and was filed a full two months afterwards. Because Defendants had not yet
been served, the Court is of the opinion that this “Attachment [10]” constituted an
amendment to the Complaint [1] as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
A party may amend its pleading only “once as a matter of course.” Id.
Nevertheless, on May 24, 2018, Whitfield filed another Document [34] seeking to
amend “as a matter of right.” Although Whitfield filed this document within
twenty-one days after service of process upon Officers Rice and Chapa, Whitfield
was not entitled to amend his Complaint [1] a second time as a matter of course.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; Barksdale v. King, 699 F.2d 744, 747 (5th Cir. 1983)
(“[W]here some but not all defendants have answered, plaintiff may amend as of
course claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants.”). As such, the
Clerk properly docketed this Document as a Motion [34] to Amend.
In addition to this Motion [34] to Amend, Whitfield has filed numerous other
Documents [35] [47] [48] [51] purporting to assert new facts or causes of action, or
seeking leave of Court to amend. Some documents are styled as Motions to Amend
or specifically request an amendment. See, e.g., Mot. [35]. Others are styled as new
pleadings and appear to be submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(1) as a matter of course and without first seeking leave of Court. See, e.g.,

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[48]. The majority of these documents plead no new facts but list only criminal
statutes, the Restatement of Torts, or the numbers of certain Constitutional
Amendments. See [48] [51-1].
The Court is cognizant that leave to amend should be freely given “when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In this instance, given the sheer
number of documents submitted by Whitfield and for the purpose of clarity of the
record, the Court will deny these Motions without prejudice, but will permit
Whitfield thirty (30) days from the date of this Order in which to file a motion to
amend his Complaint, and attach a single proposed amended complaint stating all
of his claims in one pleading. See L.U. Civ. R. 7(b)(2) (“If leave of court is required
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, a proposed amended pleading must be an exhibit to a
motion for leave to file the pleading.”). Plaintiff is cautioned that he must do
more than provide the Court with a list of causes of action, and that his
proposed amended complaint must state in one document all facts and
causes of action he wishes to assert in this case. Plaintiff is further
cautioned that additional amendments may not be permitted by the Court.
In light of the foregoing, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motions [34] [35] [47]
[48] [51] without prejudice. Any arguments raised in Officers Rice’s and Chapa’s
Responses [49] [52] to these Motions may be reurged once Whitfield files a motion to
amend. The Court will defer consideration of these arguments until that time.
B.

Defendant Officer D. Rice’s Motion [45] to Strike Plaintiff’s Document [44]
should be granted.
Officer Rice has filed a Motion [45] to Strike Document [44], which Officer
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Chapa has joined. Joinder in Doc. [50]. Document [44], filed as a “Rebuttal” to
Officer Chapa’s Motion [38] for Judgment on the Pleadings, is entitled “Pleadings,”
and appears to seek to add new causes of action against Defendants. Pl.’s Doc. [44].
Officer Rice argues that this document should be stricken because Whitfield did not
request leave of Court or obtain the opposing parties’ written consent to amend his
Complaint [1]. Mot. [45] to Strike. Officer Rice also contends that Whitfield’s
attempt to amend the Complaint [1] with respect to the cited criminal statutes is
futile since these statutes do not allow for a private cause of action. Mem. in
Support [46] at 2 n.2. For the reasons stated by Officer Rice, and in light of the
Court’s Order providing Plaintiff thirty (30) days in which to file a motion to amend,
the Court will grant the Motion [45] to Strike Document [44] and it will be stricken.
C.

Defendant Officer Juan Chapa’s Motion [38] for Judgment on the Pleadings
should be granted.
1.

The parties’ arguments

Officer Chapa argues that Plaintiff’s claims against him are barred by
qualified immunity because Plaintiff has failed to meet the heightened pleading
standard required to assert claims against public officials in their individual
capacities, and that it is well established that neither verbal threats nor
brandishing a firearm give rise to constitutional liability. Def.’s Mem. [39]. Officer
Chapa contends that to the extent Whitfield is asserting claims against him in his
official capacity, such claims should be dismissed because Whitfield has failed to
establish a constitutional violation or identify any policy, practice, or custom of the
County that was the moving force behind any constitutional violation. Id. at 8-9.
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Plaintiff has responded, reiterating and clarifying the facts of his case.
Regarding Officer Chapa, Whitfield states only that he “pulled his fire arm [and]
began shouting [that he would] shoot [Whitfield] in the face many times.” Pl.’s
Resp. [42]. Officer Chapa has submitted a Reply [43] noting that Whitfield’s
Response [42] asserts no additional claims against him, and that he is entitled to
dismissal.
2. Standard of review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on
the pleadings after a response has been filed and the pleadings have closed. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion under Rule 12(c) for failure to state a claim is subject to the
same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 209-10 (5th Cir. 2010).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). “The court’s task is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally
cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of
success.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387
(5th Cir. 2010).

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In deciding whether a complaint states a valid claim for relief, a court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable
to plaintiff. King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir.
2015). However, the Court need not accept as true “conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484
F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007). Although pleadings drafted by pro se plaintiffs are
held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, “conclusory
allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice
to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378
(5th Cir. 2002).
In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a district court
generally may not “go outside the complaint.” Scanlan v. Tex. A & M Univ., 343
F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). However, where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, a
district court is “required to look beyond the [plaintiff’s] formal complaint and to
consider as amendments to the complaint those materials subsequently filed.”
Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983).
3.

Defendant Juan Chapa’s Motion [38] for Judgment on the Pleadings
should be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims against him in his individual
capacity.
a.

Section 1983 and qualified immunity

Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any . . . person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
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shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. §1983.
Qualified immunity protects governmental officials from individual liability
“as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the
rights they are alleged to have violated.” Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir.
2010). “[Q]ualified immunity generally protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)). Courts apply a two-step analysis to claims of qualified immunity.
First, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a
constitutional or statutory right. Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 599-600 (5th
Cir. 2016). If a violation is properly alleged, the Court then considers “whether the
allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the
incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively
unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of
Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998); see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
638 (1987) (finding that qualified immunity shields government officials provided
“their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they
are alleged to have violated.”).
To allege a constitutional violation means “that the plaintiff has stated a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 384
(5th Cir. 2011). A right is clearly established where it is “sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official” would comprehend his actions violate that right. Valdez, 845

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F.3d at 600 (quotation removed). “[I]n the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.” Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640 (1987).
In the Fifth Circuit, to survive a motion to dismiss a Section 1983 claim
against an individual, a plaintiff must allege the particular facts that form the basis
of his claim; this includes those facts which prevent the individual defendant from
successfully asserting qualified immunity. Wicks v. Miss. State Emp’t Servs., 41
F.3d 991, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1995). “Heightened pleading in qualified immunity cases
requires that plaintiffs rest their complaint on more than conclusions alone and
plead their case with precision and factual specificity.” Nunez v. Simms, 341 F.3d
385, 388 (5th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must allege facts that focus specifically on the
conduct of the individual defendant who caused that plaintiff’s injury. Reyes v.
Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
b.

Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendant Chapa

Officer Chapa asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Whitfield’s
individual capacity claims against him. Mot. [38]; Def.’s Mem. in Support [39].
Construing Whitfield’s Complaint liberally, he alleges that Officer Chapa violated
his Fourth Amendment right against being subjected to excessive force. The only
conduct that Whitfield alleges Officer Chapa engaged in is that Officer Chapa
waived a gun in Whitfield’s face and repeatedly shouted that he would shoot
Whitfield. Pl.’s Resp. to Questionnaire [17] at 3. Officer Chapa argues that because
neither verbal threats alone, nor pointing a weapon at a person, give rise to
constitutional liability, Whitfield has not shown that he violated a statutory or

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constitutional right. Def.’s Reply [43] at 3-4. Officer Chapa also contends that
Whitfield has failed to allege any facts tending to show that Officer Chapa’s conduct
was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Def.’s Mem. in Support
[39] at 6.
The Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive use of force during an
arrest. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In order to state a claim
for excessive force in violation of the Constitution, a plaintiff must allege (1) an
“injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly
excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively
unreasonable.” Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1993). The injury
necessary to establish a constitutional violation is directly related to the amount of
force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. Ikerd v. Blair,
101 F.3d 430, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1996). The injury must be more than de minimis,
“evaluated in the context in which the force was deployed.” Glenn v. City of Tyler,
242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001).
Under current Fifth Circuit precedent, an injury may be physical or
psychological. See Dunn v. Denk, 79 F.3d 401, 403-04 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(noting that a claim for excessive force may be satisfied by an alleged physical or
psychological injury); see also Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, Tex., 834 F.2d 1223, 123031 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to reach whether “some type of physical injury will in
every instance be necessary for section 1983 liability in a use of excessive force” but
noting that temporary emotional distress from an officer pointing a gun at a

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plaintiff was likely insufficient to support a jury’s verdict for the plaintiff). While
Whitfield has pled some indicia of physical injury as a result of Officer Rice’s alleged
conduct, he has not alleged any injury, physical, psychological, or otherwise, that he
suffered as a result of Officer Chapa pointing a gun at his face and repeatedly
shouting that he would shoot him. See id.; Compl. [1]; Pl.’s Resp. to Questionnaire
[17]. Even assuming this conduct may have caused some unstated, temporary
emotional injury, the Fifth Circuit has found this likely insufficient to support an
excessive force claim. See Hinojosa, 834 F.3d at 1230-31. Whitfield has failed to
allege that Officer Chapa violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory
right.
Additionally, Whitfield has not pled “facts sufficient to overcome the officer’s
qualified immunity defense.” Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t, 958 F.2d
616, 621 (5th Cir. 1992). He has not pled any facts regarding his own behavior or
what prompted Officer Chapa to draw his weapon. See id. (finding a failure to meet
the heightened pleading standard where a plaintiff did not plead “any facts
regarding his own conduct during the incident” or “any other factors relating to the
circumstances leading to and surrounding his arrest and the other actions
surrounding his arrest”). For this reason, Whitfield has failed to plead specific facts
sufficient to overcome Officer Chapa’s qualified immunity.
While “[d]ismissing an action after giving the plaintiff only one opportunity to
state his case is ordinarily unjustified,” Jacquez v. R.K. Procunier, 801 F.3d 729,
792 (5th Cir. 1986), Whitfield has had numerous opportunities to state his claims

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both through a series of purported amendments and directly in response to Officer
Chapa’s Motion [38] asserting qualified immunity, all of which this Court has
considered. Whitfield submitted an “Attachment” [10] to his Complaint, clarified
his claims in his Response [17] to the Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire and in
Response [42] to the present Motion, and has sought leave from this Court
numerous times to add to his Complaint [1], attaching many proposed amendments.
See Motions [34] [35] [44] [47] [48] [51]; Def.’s Resp. [42]. The Court has considered
all of these submission in resolving Officer Chapa’s Motion. Having filed numerous
documents with this Court, it is evident that Whitfield has pled his best case
against Officer Chapa. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999)
(“[I]f a complaint alleges the plaintiff’s best case, there is no need to remand for
further factual statement from the plaintiff.”).
Moreover, based on all of the facts alleged in each of Whitfield’s Motions [34]
[35] [44] [47] [48] [51], he has still failed to plead a constitutional violation or facts
sufficient to overcome Officer Chapa’s qualified immunity. See Jacquez, 801 F.3d at
792. “[I]f the protections afforded public officials are not to ring hollow, plaintiffs
cannot be allowed to continue to amend or supplement their pleading until they
stumble upon a formula that carries them over the threshold. Such a protracted
process is likely to disrupt public officials from their duties.” Id. Because Whitfield
has pled his best case, has not alleged a constitutional violation, and has not pled
facts sufficient to overcome Officer Chapa’s qualified immunity, Officer Chapa is
entitled to qualified immunity and the Court will dismiss Whitfield’s individual

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capacity claims against him with prejudice. 1
4.

Defendant Juan Chapa’s Motion [38] for Judgment on the Pleadings
should be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims against him in his official
capacity.

Officer Chapa asserts that the Court should also dismiss any claims against
him in his official capacity as a Hinds County Deputy because Whitfield has failed
to allege a constitutional violation or the existence of any policy, custom, or practice
of Hinds County which was the moving force behind such a violation. Def.’s Mem.
in Support [39]. Whitfield did not address any of these arguments in his Response.
See Pl.’s Resp. [42].
Suits brought against officers in their official capacities “generally represent
only another way of pleading [an] action against the entity of which an officer is an
agent.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Courts treat
such allegations as a suit against the entity itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985). A local governmental entity can be held liable under Section 1983
for violating a citizen’s constitutional rights, but only if “the governmental body
itself ‘subjects’ [that] person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be
subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011).
“[T]he unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality
through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions
The Court is of the opinion that a Schultea reply would be futile. Although “vindicating the
immunity doctrine [ ] ordinarily require[s] such a reply,” it is evident to the Court that Whitfield has
pled his best case. See Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 793 (finding that the individual circumstances of a case
may demonstrate that the plaintiff has pled his best case, making a Schultea reply futile). Despite a
multitude of attempts to amend both before and after the filing of the instant Motion [38], and after
filing a Response [42] to the Motion [38], Whitfield has not overcome Officer Chapa’s qualified
immunity.
1

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by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.” Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
To establish liability against a governmental entity, a plaintiff must
demonstrate proof of the existence of (1) a policymaker with final policymaking
authority who can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge; (2) an official
policy or custom; and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that
policy or custom. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247-49 (5th Cir.
2003). “Proof of an official policy or custom can be shown in several ways, including:
(1) formally adopted policies; (2) informal customs or practices; (3) a custom or
policy of inadequate training, supervision, discipline, screening, or hiring; or (4) a
single act by an official with final policymaking authority.” Thomas v. Prevou, 2008
WL 111293, at *3 (S.D. Miss. 2008).
As the Court has stated, Whitfield has failed to allege a constitutional
violation as to Officer Chapa. Moreover, Whitfield has not alleged the existence of
any policy or practice of Hinds County, formal or informal, that was the “moving
force” behind any constitutional violation. Neither Whitfield’s Complaint [1], his
Response to the Questionnaire [17], his many Motions [34] [35] [44] [47] [48] [51] to
Amend, nor his Response [42] to Officer Chapa’s Motion [38] state any facts
sufficient to allege the existence of a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation,
decision, widespread practice, or custom. Whitfield has also not alleged any facts
indicating a failure to train, supervise, or screen, and he has not identified any
policymaker. In short, Whitfield has not stated any facts which, even if taken as

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true, would show that Hinds County had any policy or custom that resulted in any
alleged constitutional violation. Whitfield’s claims against Officer Chapa in his
official capacity should be dismissed with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
To the extent the Court has not specifically addressed any of the claims in
Whitfield’s Motions [34] [35] [44] [47] [48] [51], it has considered them and
determined that, even accepting them as true, they would not alter the result.
The Court will grant Officer Chapa’s Motion [38] for Judgment on the
Pleadings and dismiss Whitfield’s claims against Officer Chapa in his individual
and official capacities. The Court will deny Whitfield’s Motions [34] [35] [47] [48]
[51] to Amend without prejudice. Whitfield will be allowed to refile a motion to
amend and attach a single proposed amended pleading setting forth all of his claims
in one document within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this Order. Finally,
the Court will grant Officer Rice’s Motion [45] to Strike Document [44].
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Defendant
Officer Juan Chapa’s Motion [38] for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, and
Plaintiff Larry K. Whitfield’s individual and official capacity claims against
Defendant Officer Juan Chapa are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff
Larry K. Whitfield’s individual and official capacity claims against Defendant
Officer D. Rice will proceed.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Plaintiff Larry K.
Whitfield’s Motions [34] [35] [47] [48] [51] are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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Plaintiff Larry K. Whitfield may submit a final motion to amend and attach
a proposed amended complaint, which incorporates all of his claims in one
pleading, within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order. Plaintiff Larry K.
Whitfield is cautioned that he may not assert any additional claims against
the dismissed Defendants, the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics and
Defendant Officer Juan Chapa, and that further amendments to his
pleadings may not be allowed by the Court.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Officer D. Rice’s
Motion [45] to Strike Document [44] is GRANTED, and Document [44] is
STRICKEN.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 13th day of February, 2019.

s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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