Securities and Exchange Commission v. Adams et al
Filing
408
ORDER granting 406 Motion for Attorney's Fees. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 2/27/24. (AC)
____________________
No. 3:18‐CV‐252‐CWR‐BWR
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARTHUR LAMAR ADAMS, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
ORDER APPROVING FEE APPLICATION
____________________
Before CARLTON W. REEVES, District Judge.
The Receiver has presented a Fee Application for the five
years of work her team put into Mills v. BankPlus, No. 3:19‐
CV‐196 (S.D. Miss.), Mills v. The UPS Store, No. 3:19‐CV‐364
(S.D. Miss.), and Mills v. Trustmark, No. 3:19‐CV‐941 (S.D.
Miss.). Docket Nos. 406‐07. These efforts resulted in a $19.2
million settlement that fully resolved the Receiver’s claims in
the BankPlus and Trustmark cases. The UPS Store case remains
pending as to the non‐settling defendants.
A previous Order established that the Receiver and her coun‐
sel would litigate these matters via a 33% contingent fee ar‐
rangement, with direct costs of litigation borne by the Estate.
Docket No. 154. That is a common structure in these matters,
since (among other reasons) it places the billable hours and
risks upon counsel rather than the victims of the underlying
Ponzi scheme, and aligns the incentives of counsel with those
of their clients. See Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc.,
669 F.3d 632, 643 (5th Cir. 2012). The resulting proposed attor‐
ney’s fee for this settlement is $6,399,936. The requested costs
for this settlement total $95,801.36.
Although no one has objected to the Fee Application, prece‐
dent indicates that the Court should evaluate the proposed
award against the familiar Johnson factors. Id. at 644. They are:
(1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty
of the issues; (3) required skill; (4) whether other em‐
ployment is precluded; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limita‐
tions; (8) the amount involved and the results ob‐
tained; (9) the attorneys’ experience, reputation and
ability; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the na‐
ture and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09‐CV‐
298‐N, 2018 WL 1558266, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2018) (citing
Johnson v. Ga. Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717‐19 (5th Cir.
1974)). The Court has therefore reviewed the record evidence
supporting the Receiver’s Fee Application with an eye toward
these factors.
2
Most of the Johnson factors support the award. These cases re‐
quired thousands of hours of work. The substance of the liti‐
gation was challenging in its applicable law and substantial
in its scope, reflecting the fallout from the largest Ponzi
scheme in Mississippi history. Many (if not most) attorneys in
this State would be unprepared or unwilling to litigate cases
of this complexity, given the risks and the anticipated length
of time they would take to conclude.
That is especially true when the defendants are taken into
consideration. Several of the settling defendants alleged to
have contributed to the scheme are well‐established entities
that hired experienced and expensive attorneys to press every
available defense at every stage of the proceedings. To illus‐
trate this point, counsel’s declaration reveals that during the
discovery disputes, one of the settling defendants sent the Re‐
ceiver a 62‐page good faith letter, while another settling de‐
fendant attached a 143‐page motion to compel. Docket No.
406‐1 at 12.
To this, the Receiver engaged a team of talented litigators with
decades of experience in trustee and creditor recovery. Led by
Brent B. Barriere at Fishman Haygood LLP, the team persisted
in the Estate’s claims for almost five years. The volume of
briefing and discovery these cases required often precluded
other employment, and recovery was not guaranteed. But the
Receiver’s team ultimately negotiated fair settlements in the
best interests of their clients, the victims of the Ponzi scheme,
without charging billable hours that would have depleted Es‐
tate assets. For this, the requested fee is entirely appropriate.
See Alʹs Pals Pet Care v. Woodforest Natʹl Bank, NA, No. 4:17‐
CV‐3852, 2019 WL 387409, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2019) (col‐
lecting cases with 33% awards).
3
The only Johnson factor irrelevant here is (11), the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client, which
has no bearing on the propriety of the award.
Finally, the Court finds the direct costs relatively modest, see
Jenkins v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 300 F.R.D. 291, 310 (S.D. Miss.
2014), and due to be awarded.
For these reasons, the Receiver’s Fee Application is granted in
the amount of $6,399,936 in attorney’s fees and $95,801.36 in
costs.
SO ORDERED, this the 27th day of February, 2024.
s/ CARLTON W. REEVES
United States District Judge
4
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