Butler v. Hinds County, Mississippi et al

Filing 37

ORDER granting 34 Motion for Summary Judgment as stated in the Order. The remaining parties are directed to contact the chambers of United States Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball within 10 days to set the case for a status or case-management conference, as appropriate. Signed by Chief District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on March 20, 2020. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
REGINALD BUTLER AND
JACOBS JOHNSON
V.

PLAINTIFFS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-326-DPJ-FKB

HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
AND TYRONE LEWIS IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
Defendant Tyrone Lewis seeks summary judgment on the sole remaining claim against
him in this false-arrest § 1983 case. Mot. [34]. Because the Court finds no genuine issue of
material fact as to Lewis’s personal involvement in Plaintiffs’ arrest, his motion is granted.
I.

Facts and Procedural History
On May 3, 2015, three inmates escaped from the Hinds County Detention Center in

Jackson, Mississippi. Plaintiffs Reginald Butler and Jacobs Johnson, both employees of the
Hinds County Sheriff’s Department, were on duty on that date. On May 20, 2015, Hinds County
officers arrested Butler and Johnson for aiding and abetting the escape of prisoners under
Mississippi Code section 97-9-39. Ultimately, the charges against Butler and Johnson were
dropped, and they filed this lawsuit against Hinds County and Lewis on May 20, 2018.
On September 17, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part Lewis’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Following that ruling, the only pending claim against Lewis is a
false-arrest claim asserted against him in his individual capacity.
The parties engaged in limited immunity-defense discovery, after which Lewis moved for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs did not respond to Lewis’s motion within the time permitted by
local rules, and on February 10, 2020, the Court entered a Show-Cause Order directing them to

“either respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment or notify the Court that they do not oppose
the motion on or before February 18, 2020.” Order [36]. The Order further warned Plaintiffs
that “[f]ailure to respond to this Order may result in an order granting Lewis’s motion with no
further notice.” Id. The Show-Cause Order’s deadline has come and gone with no response
from Plaintiffs.
II.

Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) when

evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The
nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence,
factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the court may “not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and
legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a

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genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.
2002); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993).
In this case, Plaintiffs filed no response, but that alone will not justify granting Lewis’s
motion under Rule 56. See L.U. Civ. R. 7.2(b)(3)(E) (stating that only non-dispositive motions
may be granted as unopposed). As explained by the Fifth Circuit, district courts must first
consider the record.
[I]f the moving party fails to establish by its summary judgment evidence that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment must be denied—even
if the non movant has not responded to the motion. But where the movant’s
summary judgment evidence does establish its right to judgment as a matter of
law, the district court is entitled to grant summary judgment, absent unusual
circumstances.
McDaniel v. Sw. Bell Tel., No. 92-2433, 1992 WL 352617, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 19 1992) (per
curiam) (citations omitted) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to file timely
response); see also Sanders v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 199 F. App’x 309, 310 (5th Cir.
2006) (holding that record supported summary judgment where non-movant failed to respond).
III.

Analysis
Lewis argues that the false-arrest claim against him fails because the unrebutted evidence

shows that he had no personal involvement in either the decision to charge Plaintiffs or their
arrests.
Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of
subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability. However, a supervisor may be
held liable if there exists either (1) his personal involvement in the constitutional
deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s
wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.
Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.3d 298, 303–04 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
At the pleading stage, the Court found sufficient allegations of Lewis’s personal
involvement as Plaintiffs averred that the deputy who filed the affidavits against them,
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Investigator Kimera Boykins, told Butler “that former sheriff Tyrone Lewis told her to blame
Mr. Butler for the recent escapes” and “apologized to Mr. Johnson for having to put him through
all of this, [saying] that she didn’t have a choice, due to the fear of retaliation by Tyrone Lewis,
if she refused.” Am. Compl. [2] ¶ 13. But Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony does not support their
allegations that Boykins claimed Lewis was involved in the decision to charge Plaintiffs.
Specifically, Butler testified that Boykins apologized to him after the charges were
dropped and said, “This wasn’t my doing. This came from administration.” Butler Dep. [34-2]
at 20. But she never said “who she was talking about when she said ‘administration.’”
Id. Johnson testified that Boykins “didn’t feel right about . . . pinning these charges on us for
something that we didn’t do,” but “[s]he didn’t say who [wanted her to pin charges on them] as
far as a specific person.” Johnson Dep. [34-3] at 47, 49. Neither stated that Lewis was present
when they were arrested. Id. at 46; Butler Dep. [34-2] at 28.
For his part, Lewis testified that he “had no part in [the] criminal investigation” leading to
Plaintiffs’ arrests. Lewis Dep. [34-6] at 57. And he denied that he “order[ed] Kimera Boykins to
arrest Mr. Butler and Mr. Johnson.” Id. at 80. He also confirmed that he was not present when
either Butler or Johnson were arrested. Id. at 81.
Plaintiffs point to no evidence indicating that Lewis was personally involved in their
allegedly unconstitutional arrests. As such, he can have no individual liability under § 1983.
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments. Those not addressed would not have changed

the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Tyrone Lewis’s Motion for Summary Judgment [34] is
granted. The remaining parties are directed to contact the chambers of United States Magistrate

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Judge F. Keith Ball within 10 days to set the case for a status or case-management conference, as
appropriate.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 20th day of March, 2020.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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