Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 70

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 54 Report and Recommendations, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion to Reverse and Remand 39 is hereby DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Final Administrative Decision is AFFIRMED . IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that defendants Motion for Extension of Time to File Response 59 is hereby retroactively GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion to Strike 63 is hereby rendered MOOT and DENIED AS SUCH. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the complaint in this lawsuit is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the parties are to bear their own costs. Signed by District Judge Henry T. Wingate on 11/20/20 (MGB) Modified on 11/20/2020 (PG).

Case 3:18-cv-00462-HTW-JCG Document 70 Filed 11/20/20 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CHAKAKHAN R. DAVIS
vs.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION No.: 3:18-CV-462-HTW-JCG

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

DEFENDANT
ORDER

This matter comes on pursuant to the Report and Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo [Docket no. 54]. Magistrate Judge Gargiulo recommends that
plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse and Remand be denied and the Commissioner’s final administrative
decision be affirmed. According to Magistrate Judge Gargiulo’s report and recommendation, the
Administrative Law Judge followed the five-step sequential process to determine whether Davis
is entitled to Social Security benefits and found the following: (1) Davis had not engaged in any
substantial gainful activity since December 30, 2014, the date of her application; (2) that Davis has a
severe impairment of adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood; (3) that Davis did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one
of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. § 4041; (4) that Davis had no past
relevant work; and (5) that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Davis could perform.

Plaintiff filed her objection to the report and recommendation arguing grounds not
presented in her initial brief: the residual functional capacity assessment of the ALJ and the
ultimate step five (5) sequential evaluation finding. As defendant correctly noted in its response in

1

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. § 404 is the section of the administrative code that lists impairments for which
the Social Security Administration may award benefits and is so voluminous that this court will not replicate such in
this opinion.

1

Case 3:18-cv-00462-HTW-JCG Document 70 Filed 11/20/20 Page 2 of 3

opposition to plaintiff’s objection to the report and recommendation, Davis did not designate
specific issues in her appeal to this court. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Gargiulo interpreted her
notice of appeal to include one issue – whether her medical records from the Claiborne County
Medical Center would have changed the outcome of the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff failed in her
initial briefing to include any other legal arguments.
Plaintiff herein is acting pro se2. A pro se litigant “must comply with statutory obligations
and abide by the rules of this Court.” Legget v. PSS World Med., Inc., No. L-07-63, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15937, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2009) (Citing Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d
349, 354 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994)).
The United States Supreme Court specifically cautioned pro se litigants that:
District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.
In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183-184, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122, 104 S. Ct. 944
(1984), the Court stated that “[a] defendant does not have a constitutional right to
receive personal instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure” and that
“the Constitution [does not] require judges to take over chores for a pro se
defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of
course.” See also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528
U.S. 152, 162, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597, 120 S. Ct. 684 (2000)
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231, 124 S. Ct. 2441, 2446 (2004).
“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976) and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(f) (‘All pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice’).”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007).

2

pro se n. (1857): One who represents oneself in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer <the third case
on the court's docket involving a pro se>. — Also termed pro per; self-represented litigant; (rarely) pro se-er.
PRO SE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)

2

Case 3:18-cv-00462-HTW-JCG Document 70 Filed 11/20/20 Page 3 of 3

“Although we liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that
arguments must be briefed to be preserved.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993)
(Quoting Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988)).
Based upon the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge Gargiulo, the
submissions of the parties and the relevant case law, this court, having given full consideration to
such, finds the Report and Recommendation well taken. Therefore, the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo [Docket no. 54] is hereby
adopted as the order of this court.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of United
States Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo [Docket no. 54] is hereby ADOPTED as the order
of this court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse and Remand [Docket
no. 39] is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s Final Administrative Decision is
AFFIRMED.
IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File
Response [Docket no. 59] is hereby retroactively GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [Docket no. 63] is
hereby rendered MOOT and DENIED AS SUCH.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the complaint in this lawsuit is hereby DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE and the parties are to bear their own costs.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 20th day of November, 2020.
s/ HENRY T. WINGATE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
3