Magistrate Steven Boone et al v. Richard Amum'Ra Bey

Filing 16

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IN PART AND DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE: that Bey's motion to proceed in forma pauperis 2 is DENIED. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation 14 is ADOPTED to the extent that it is consistent with this order. This Court, though, has determined to dismiss this entire litigation for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Clerk's office is instructed to mail a copy of this order, and the accompanying Final Judgment, for notification purposes, to the Clerk of the Clinton Municipal Court, Clinton, Mississippi. Signed by District Judge Henry T. Wingate on 11/22/2024 (cwl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
MAGISTRATE STEVEN BOONE et al
V.

PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:21-cv-796-HTW-LGI

RICHARD AMUN’RA BEY

DEFENDANT

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IN PART
AND DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE
BEFORE THIS COURT is the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge
LaKeysha Greer Isaac [Docket No. 14]. In her Report and Recommendation, filed May 17, 2022,
Magistrate Judge Isaac recommended Richard Amun’Ra Bey’s (“Bey”), Motion for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis be denied. Magistrate Judge Isaac directed Bey to file any written
objections within fourteen (14) days. On May 24, 2022, Bey filed an Affidavit of Fact objecting to
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 15]. For the reasons stated herein,
this Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Isaac’s recommendation that Bey’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis should be denied.
Defendant Bey, acting pro se, initiated this civil action wherein it appears he attempted to remove
his traffic violations from Clinton Municipal Court to this Court [Docket No. 1-2]. In this purported
Notice of Removal, Bey labeled himself as the Defendant, and Magistrate Steven Boone, Phil Fisher
(Mayor), Kevin Roundlett (Prosecutor), Amanda Clark (Clerk), and Rachel Wilson (Executive
Director of Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance) (herein “Municipal Plaintiffs”), as the
Plaintiffs. Bey complains the Municipal Plaintiffs used an alternative name or misspelling of his

name as an alternative to his preferred name, violating his rights 1 [Docket No. 1]. Bey claims
$80,000,000.00 in damages. Id.

Bey seems to base much of his action on what courts have called “‘sovereign citizen’ theory,” an “indisputably
meritless legal theory” where proponents “take the position that they are not subject to state or federal statutes and
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On December 15, 2021, Bey moved to proceed in forma pauperis [Docket No. 2]. On May
11, 2022, Magistrate Judge Isaac entered an Order requiring Bey to “file a completed Form
AO239 Long Form Application for Leave to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or
Costs or pay the required filing fee of $400.00” [Docket No. 12]. On May 15, 2022, Bey filed a
long form application to proceed in forma pauperis; however, instead of completing the form as
required, Bey wrote “N/A” [Docket No. 13-1].
On May 17, 2022, Magistrate Judge Isaac entered her Report and Recommendation
[Docket No. 14], recommending this Court deny Bey’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis.
Magistrate Judge Isaac noted Bey “declined to provide the financial information necessary for
the Court to determine whether [Bey] qualifies for in forma pauperis status.” Id. Magistrate
Judge Isaac, thus, recommended that Bey’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be
denied and Bey be required to pay the filing fee. Id.
On May 24, 2022, Bey filed an objection to the Magistrate Judge’ report and
recommendation. Bey argues, inter alia:
For the Record, On the Record, and Let the Record show, I am a Moorish
National Aboriginal, Indigenous Natural Person, and not a nom-de-guerre, straw
man or any other artificial corporate construct as written in all CAPITAL
LETTERS, by the unclean hands of others. I am Sovereign to this Land and as
such, this Administrative Court does not have lawful jurisdiction to hear, present,
or pass judgment in any matter concerning my affairs under a quasi-criminal non
sanctioned tribunal of foreign private law process. […]
I Affirm, for the Record, I do not have, or possess, any gold or silver coins, as
prescribed by United States Constitution Law, which is lawful money, to pay the
restricting demands, conditionally commanded by Employees and Contractors of
the Court. The said restrictions, that you are imposing, are unconstitutional, and
proceedings.” See Barthelemy-Bey v. Louisiana, No. CV 19-12671, 2019 WL 5430594, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 1,
2019) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 19-12671, 2019 WL 5425433 (E.D. La. Oct.
23, 2019), order vacated on reconsideration, No. CV 19-12671, 2020 WL 703353 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2020).
Proponents will often, like Bey, refer to themselves as “descendants of the Moorish Empire” and cite a treaty
between the United States and the Kingdom of Morocco, in addition to calling government entities and others
“corporate entit[ies].” See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 832 F. App’x 876, 878 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020).
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arbitrarily hinders Due Process. Therefore, I submit this Writ “In Forma Pauperis”
being an enjoyment and exercise of my unconditional and Constitutionally –
Secured Rights (and not a Feudal Law – fee – burdened privilege), to timely and
speedily enforce Due Process of Law. […]
Clearly your demand for a “Financial Statement” is used as an instrument to deny
due process of Law and my right to free access to the Courts. I introduced an
Affidavit of Fact, marked as Evidence. Someone in the Courts tampered with that
Evidence and misrepresented it as a Motion. A Motion is discretionary and an
assumption that permission must be requested to exercise a Constitutionally
Secured Right. An exercise of a Right is not a Request, and your office knows this
to be “Stare Decisis” and the law of the Land. Tampering with Evidence is a
Federal Violation, and a clear corruption of the fiduciary duties of all requiring a
“Financial Statement, Financial Fee (Feudal Law)” or a “Motion” to exercise a
Constitutional Secured Right. Your demand is a violation of Amendment IX of the
United States Constitution and a violation of my Secured Right to Due Process.
[…]
I “OBJECT” to the Report & Recommendation of the Southern District Court of
Mississippi judges, its clerks, its officers, its agents, and the continuation of this
court. Tampering with court evidence. Anything done in “Color of Law” is
“VOIDED AB INITIO” and repugnant to the organic constitution of Article VI.
This Court, its clerks, its officers and its agents doesn’t have the authority to
render any decision and they’re fraudulently impersonating De Jure Government
Officials and all parties have “Failed” to produce their “Delegation of Authority”
and have “Defaulted” and all evidence has been filed with the court.
[Docket No. 15]. Bey provides no legitimate basis to allege this Court committed any fraud,
treason, or violations of due process. Nonetheless, this Court has liberally construed Bey’s pro se
filing as an objection to the entire Report and Recommendation, and this Court has conducted a
de novo review of same. 2
Magistrate Judge Isaac’s Report and Recommendation is sound and supported, and this Court
agrees with and adopts the recommendation to deny Bey’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis.
Based on the insufficient information Bey provided in his application, this Court has insufficient
2
Where a party timely serves and files written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations, a district court judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This
Court conducts such a review by “examin[ing] the record and mak[ing] an independent assessment of the law.”
Magee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-cv-188-LG-JMR, 2013 WL 4014986, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 6, 2013).

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information to grant his petition. When Magistrate Judge Isaac generously provided Bey an
opportunity to correct his omissions and submit the requisite information to this Court, Bey
chose not to do so. Bey has previously done this, and, thus, was aware of his obligations to
comply with Court orders and the consequences of failing to do so.
Although this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, that
Bey’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis should be denied, this Court declines nevertheless to
allow Bey thirty (30) days to pay all costs associated with the filing of this lawsuit. In reaching
its conclusion, this Court noticed in Bey’s affidavit of fact objecting to the Report and
Recommendation, Bey stated, “I am Sovereign to this Land and as such, this Administrative
Court does not have lawful jurisdiction to hear, present, or pass judgment in any matter
concerning my affairs […]” [Docket No. 15]. This statement causes the Court to question
whether federal court is the appropriate forum for the commencement of this suit.
This Court, thus, has considered whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action
and finds it does not. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having only the authority
endowed by the Constitution and that conferred by Congress.” Halmekangas v. State farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 603 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2010). As the party that removed 3 this dispute, Bey bears
the burden of establishing this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear that alleged dispute. See
Hummel v. Townsend, 883 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We begin with the well-settled rule
that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and that parties seeking to invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court have the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.”).

Richard Amun’Ra Bey initiated this civil removal action, listing himself as a “defendant,” supposedly accused by a
variety of “plaintiffs,” including officials of the City of Clinton, Mississippi. As described in greater detail herein,
this action does not originate from a state civil suit brought by the plaintiffs. The “plaintiffs” also have not yet
appeared in this action. This action was not removed pursuant to §§ 1442, 1442a, or 1443; rather, it was filed in
federal court and labeled as a Notice of Removal.

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Under ordinary circumstances this Court would require Bey to show cause as to why this
Court has jurisdiction; however, in this instance that is not necessary. To the extent Bey’s
objection claims this Court lacks jurisdiction over his dispute, this Court agrees.
Bey is aggrieved over his receipt of municipal traffic tickets in this civil removal action. Bey,
though, has not shown that these municipal proceedings fall under any of the categories of civil
actions or criminal prosecutions that may be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442,
1442a, or 1443. To the contrary, as stated before, Bey insists this court does not have
jurisdiction. See [Docket No. 15] (“This court, its clerks, its officers and its agents doesn’t [sic]
have the authority to render any decision […]”). This Court finds subject-matter jurisdiction is
lacking and removal of this action was improper. Accordingly, this Court holds that dismissal is
more appropriate than remand 4.
IT IS ORDERED that Bey’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Docket No. 2] is
DENIED. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 14] is ADOPTED
to the extent that it is consistent with this order. This Court, though, has determined to
dismiss this entire litigation for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Clerk’s office is
instructed to mail a copy of this order, and the accompanying Final Judgment, for notification
purposes, to the Clerk of the Clinton Municipal Court, Clinton, Mississippi.

SO ORDERED this the 22nd day of November , 2024.
/s/HENRY T. WINGATE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Because of the unusual posture of this case, this Court stresses that its order dismissing this case in no way
prejudices the rights, civil or otherwise, of the parties listed as plaintiffs in this matter.

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