Smith v. Transamerica Corporation et al
Filing
90
ORDER - The Court GRANTS Penney OpCo and TAIC's 47 , 78 Motions to Dismiss without prejudice. The Court GRANTS TCS e-Serve's 49 Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. And the Court GRANTS Transamerica and AEGON's 55 Motion to Dismiss with prejudice as to Transamerica and without prejudice as to AEGON. Signed by District Judge Kristi H. Johnson on 2/5/2024 (VM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
VELMA SMITH, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated
V.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-357-KHJ-MTP
TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION, et al.
DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before the Court are four motions to dismiss by Defendants Penney OpCo
LLC (OpCo), [47]; TCS e-Serve International Limited (TCS e-Serve), [49];
Transamerica Life Insurance Company and AEGON Direct Marketing Services,
Inc., [55]; and Tata American International Corporation (TAIC), [78]. The Court
grants each motion and dismisses the [41] Amended Complaint.
I.
Background
This case arises from an insurance dispute. In 2013, JCPenney offered its
credit card holders an opportunity “to purchase a group hospital indemnity policy
issued by Transamerica” Life Insurance Company. [41] ¶ 15. The policy would cover
medical bills and out-of-pocket expenses if the insured met the following criteria:
(1) the insured was involved in an accident;
(2) the insured was injured in the accident;
(3) the insured was transported by emergency ambulance to a hospital
for care and treatment as a result of the accident;
(4) the insured was admitted to the hospital emergency room as a result
of the accident; and
(5) the insured was admitted to the hospital as a patient with an
overnight stay.
Id. ¶ 40; see also id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff Velma Smith accepted the offer and became an
insured under the group policy. Id. ¶ 16. Each month, Smith paid her premium
through her JCPenney credit card, which described her policy information as:
TRANSAMERICA LIFE PLANO TX
www.transamerica-jcp.com
HOSPITAL POLICY
POLICY # 74A04Q2649
Credit Card Statement [1-1]; see also [41] ¶¶ 16−17. The policy number shown on
the JCPenney-issued credit card statement, however, differed from the group policy
number listed in the Transamerica insurance contract. Compare [1-1], with Dec. 23,
2021, Correspondence [1-11] at 6. The contract listed the group policy number
issued to JCPenney as “25451 GC939” and Smith’s individual certificate number as
“74A04Q2649.” [1-11] at 6; see also [41] ¶ 28.
On May 26, 2021, Smith “sustained serious injuries” in a car accident. [41] ¶
20. Her injuries required “emergency transport” to a hospital “where she was
treated in the emergency room and admitted as a patient . . . for [an] overnight
stay.” Id. Appearing to satisfy each of the policy requirements, Smith “attempt[ed]
to make a claim under the group policy sometime on or before August 11, 2021,
using . . . Transamerica’s website.” Id. ¶ 22. She entered the policy number shown
on her JCPenney credit card statement—74A04Q2649—and her name. Id. The
system responded with the message “NOT RECOGNIZED.” Id. She then called the
phone number listed on her credit card statement, but the representative said that
2
both the group policy number and name “were ‘NOT RECOGNIZED.’” Id. ¶ 23. That
same day, she sent “written correspondence” to “Transamerica’s Claims Department
requesting recognition of the policy shown on [Smith’s] credit card statements,” that
Smith was “an insured thereunder, as well as a copy of her policy.” Id. ¶ 24 (citing
Aug. 11, 2021, Correspondence [1-2]). Smith says she received no reply. Id.
On September 20, 2021, Smith sent “written correspondence” to “the division
counsel listed on . . . Transamerica’s website, at the address shown . . . recapping
[her] prior efforts to make a claim under the policy.” Id. ¶ 25 (citing Sept. 20, 2021,
Correspondence [1-3]). Again, she received no response. Id. So “[o]n or about
October 25, 2021,” Smith made “an oral consumer complaint . . . to the Mississippi
Department of Insurance against” Transamerica concerning her “efforts to make a
claim under Group Policy Number 74A04Q2649.” Id. ¶ 27. On October 28, 2021, the
Mississippi Department of Insurance notified Transamerica of Smith’s oral
complaint. Id.
Five days later, Transamerica’s president mailed Smith her policy “contract
and a summary of the coverage[.]” Id. ¶ 28 (citing Correspondence [1-4]); see also
Dec. 7, 2021, Correspondence [1-9] (acknowledging receipt of the letter from
Transamerica’s president on November 2, 2021). On November 2, 2021,
Transamerica also sent Smith a “Statement of Insurance” to show “evidence that a
policy/certificate was issued by the Company.” Id. ¶ 29 (citing Nov. 2, 2021,
Correspondence [1-5]); [1-5] at 1. Transamerica explained:
[This Statement] is to provide you with important facts about your
policy/certificate and a summary of your benefit information. This
3
Statement does not change or modify the benefits, terms, or provisions
of your policy/certificate in any manner.
[1-5] at 1. The attached Statement of Insurance reiterated the same information
listed above and then identified the “principal insured” as “Velma Smith” and the
“policy number” as “74A04Q2649.” Id. at 2.
Three days later, on November 5, 2021, Transamerica sent Smith’s attorney
“written correspondence” listing information for filing a claim. [41] ¶ 30 (citing Nov.
5, 2021, Correspondence [1-6]). The letter included the following information:
November 5, 2021
Insured’s Name: Velma Smith
Policy Number: 74A04Q2649
Claim Number: n/a
Dear [Smith’s Attorney]:
This letter is in reference to my telephone conversation with [your office]
on November 4, 2021.
It is my understanding that your office would like to file a claim for our
above[-]named insured, Velma Smith. Please provide the following
information:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Completed claim forms
Copy of complete Policy/Accident Report
Proof of emergency treatment showing treatment date and
accident diagnosis
Proof of any dates of hospital confinement due to accident
Proof of any dates of Intensive Care Unit confinement due to
accident
Signed Medical Authorization Release
Upon receipt of the requested information, we will be glad to further
review the claim.
[1-6] at 1. The letter included blank forms for submitting a claim. See id. at 2−3.
On December 6, 2021, Smith submitted a “completed Consumer Complaint
Form” to the Mississippi Insurance Department. [41] ¶ 33 (citing Consumer Compl.
4
[1-8]). The next day, Smith sent her claim letter, completed claim forms, and
“supporting documents for her claim” to Transamerica. Id. ¶ 34 (citing [1-9]).
Transamerica then “sent a payment to [Smith] directly.” Id. ¶ 36.
Smith now brings claims on behalf of herself and a putative class for breach
of contract, negligence, bad faith, breach of duty to a third-party beneficiary, and
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. See id. ¶¶ 87−122. According to her:
[I]f Defendant Transamerica did not recognize group policy number
74A04Q2649 to be valid when efforts were made to file a claim on
Defendant Transamerica’s claims website; at the 800 telephone claims
number for Plano, Texas, shown on Defendant JCPenney’s credit card
billing statement; at the 888 telephone number for Transamerica claims
in Iowa; and when written correspondence was sent to the Transamerica
Claims Office in Iowa, with no response, and to its Corporate Counsel’s
Office, to the attention of Division Counsel, it appears that other
JCPenney credit card holders insured under Defendant Transamerica’s
group policy number 74A04Q2649 as well as other group policies likely
attempted to make legitimate claims, simply to be ignored like Plaintiff.
Id. ¶ 47. Defendants move to dismiss Smith’s Amended Complaint. As relevant
here, OpCo and TAIC move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of personal
jurisdiction. [47]; [78]. TCS e-Serve, AEGON, and Transamerica move to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. [49]; [55]. The Court briefly
addresses the class allegations before turning to each motion to dismiss.
II.
Class Allegations
Although Smith’s Amended Complaint raises class allegations, no party has
sought class certification under Rule 23(c)(1). And the Court need not address
certification before ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
5
A court should address class certification at “an early practicable time.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). “The word ‘practicable’ imports some leeway in determining
the timing of such a decision.” Danny B. ex rel. Elliott v. Raimondo, 784 F.3d 825,
837 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, “[i]t is well within a district court judge’s discretion to
dispose of a motion to dismiss before acting on class certification.” Lawson v. FMR
LLC, 554 F. Supp. 3d 186, 192 (D. Mass. 2021); see also Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d
656, 663–64 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant even
though no ruling had been made as to class certification); E.B. v. Landry, No. 19862, 2020 WL 6439503, at *2 (M.D. La. June 30, 2020) (finding that the plaintiffs’
motions to certify were premature because the court had not ruled on pending
motions to dismiss).
A court should consider two factors when deciding whether to rule on a
dispositive motion before addressing class certification. Lawson, 554 F. Supp. 3d at
192–93 (citing Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544−45 (9th Cir. 1984)). First,
“whether an early resolution on the merits ‘protect[s] both the parties and the court
from needless and costly further litigation.’” Id. (quoting Wright, 742 F.2d at 544).
“[A]nd second, whether the ruling would prejudice any of the parties.” Id.
Here, both factors are met. First, because Smith’s claims fail as a matter of
law, the costly and time-intensive determination of class certification is avoided for
both the Court and the parties. See id. at 193 (citing Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424
F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Second, Smith suffers no unfair prejudice
because, even if the Court certified the class, her claims would still fail as a matter
6
of law. And Defendants suffer no unfair prejudice because they have “effectively
consented to this approach by filing the[ir] motion[s] to dismiss . . . without
requesting class certification.” See id. (citing Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 790 F.2d
172, 175 (1st Cir. 1986)).
III.
Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
OpCo and TAIC move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [47]; [78].
Smith therefore “bears the burden of establishing the district court’s jurisdiction
over the defendant[s].” Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted). When a “district court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing,” a plaintiff need only make “a
prima facie case that personal jurisdiction is proper.” Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage
Grp., PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “In making its
determination, the district court may consider the contents of the record before the
court at the time of the motion, including ‘affidavits . . . or any combination of the
recognized methods of discovery.’” Id. at 344 (quoting Thompson v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985)).
The Court “must accept as true [the plaintiff’s] uncontroverted allegations,
and resolve in its favor all conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’
affidavits and other documentation.” Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d
208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, a district court sitting in diversity may assert
jurisdiction if (1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction
and (2) exercising jurisdiction does not exceed the boundaries of the Fourteenth
7
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 281
(5th Cir. 1997). The Court considers OpCo’s motion first.
A. OpCo
OpCo makes no argument for whether the Mississippi long-arm statute
applies. Instead, OpCo claims that exercising personal jurisdiction would be
unconstitutional. See [47] ¶ 2. The Court therefore assumes Mississippi’s long-arm
statute permits jurisdiction and considers only the constitutional component of the
personal jurisdiction analysis.
1. General Jurisdiction
“When determining the scope of general personal jurisdiction over a limited
liability company (‘LLC’), the Fifth Circuit conducts the same inquiry as it does for
corporations.” Laday v. Roderick, No. 1:22-CV-261, 2023 WL 2188706, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Feb. 23, 2023) (citing Frank v. P N K (Lakes Charles) L.L.C., 947 F.3d 331,
336–38 (5th Cir. 2020)). “‘[G]eneral jurisdiction’ allows all kinds of suits against [an
LLC], but only in States where the [LLC] is [organized] or has its ‘principal place of
business.’” Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 137 (2023) (citing Ford Motor
Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024−25 (2021)). Only in an
“exceptional case” may a court exercise general jurisdiction over an LLC in a
different forum. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017). To qualify as an
“exceptional case,” the party asserting jurisdiction must show that the LLC’s
“operations . . . [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to render the [LLC] at
home in that state.” Id. (quotation omitted). Proving such an exceptional case is
8
“incredibly difficult.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir.
2014).
It is undisputed that “OpCo is a Virginia limited liability company with a
principal place of business in Texas.” See [47-1] ¶ 3; [41] ¶ 6 (identifying OpCo only
as “a limited liability company admitted to do business in Mississippi”). So this
Court may only exercise general jurisdiction over OpCo if its “operations in
[Mississippi are] ‘so substantial and of such a nature as to render [OpCo] at home in
[Mississippi].’” BNSF Ry. Co., 581 U.S. at 413 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117, 139 n.19 (2014)).
Smith argues general jurisdiction is proper because:
OpCo is registered to do business in the state of Mississippi; it has a
registered agent for service of process in Mississippi; it owns/operates
six brick-and-mortar stores physically located in the state of Mississippi;
and those six stores are operated by OpCo employees who live in and are
stationed in Mississippi. Further, OpCo/JCPenney solicited Plaintiff to
obtain (1) a JCPenney credit card and (2) a group hospital indemnity
policy issued by Transamerica within Mississippi.
[73] at 8.1 The Court disagrees. These contacts do not support a prima facie case of
general jurisdiction because they do not render OpCo “at home” in Mississippi.
First, Smith relies on OpCo’s in-state registration and designation of an
agent for service of process for general jurisdiction. Id. It is true that, depending on
Smith did not include most of these facts in her Amended Complaint. She asserted
them in her response to OpCo’s Motion to Dismiss. Still, the Court considers these facts
because a “district court is not obligated to consult only the assertions in the plaintiff's
complaint in determining whether a prima facie case for jurisdiction has been made. Rather,
the district court may consider the contents of the record at the time of the motion . . . .” Paz
v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 445 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Quick Techs.,
Inc., 313 F.3d at 343).
9
1
a state’s law, a corporation may “consent to in-state suits in exchange for the rights
to exploit the local market and to receive the full range of benefits enjoyed by instate corporations.” Mallory, 600 U.S. at 130 (relying on Pennsylvania statutes to
support consent jurisdiction). But that rule does not apply here because Mississippi
expressly rejects this form of consent jurisdiction. Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme
Court recently held that Mississippi law “prohibits a finding of personal jurisdiction
merely because of the appointment and maintenance of a registered agent” and that
a corporate defendant does not “expressly or impliedly consent[] to general
jurisdiction when it register[s] to do business” in the state. K&C Logistics, LLC v.
Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 374 So. 3d 515, 525, 527 (Miss. 2023); see also
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-35-15. Accordingly, OpCo’s in-state registration and
designation of an agent for service of process are not prima facie evidence of general
jurisdiction.
Smith then points to OpCo’s six “brick-and-mortar stores physically located
in the state of Mississippi” and “operated by OpCo employees who live in and are
stationed in Mississippi.” [73] at 8. But these contacts also do not establish an
“exceptional case” for general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s rationale in BNSF
Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell gives insight here. 581 U.S. 402 (2017). There, the Court
considered whether a Montana court had general jurisdiction over a defendant who
had “over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees” in the state.
Id. at 414. The Court rejected general jurisdiction because “in-state business . . .
does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims . . . that
10
are unrelated to any activity occurring in” the state. Id. It explained that the
general jurisdiction inquiry “calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in
their entirety” because a “corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them.” Id. (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20). The
Court’s rationale in BNSF applies here. Smith recognizes that OpCo “operates over
650 JCPenney stores in the U.S.,” with only six stores in Mississippi. [73] at 5. Yet
she offers no reason why six stores in Mississippi—less than 1% of the 650 stores
nationwide— should subject this non-resident defendant to general jurisdiction.
Lastly, Smith claims OpCo solicited her to obtain a JCPenney credit card and
group hospital indemnity policy in Mississippi. Id. at 1. OpCo’s uncontradicted
Declaration shows otherwise. See [47-1]. And Smith offers no authority showing
that the solicitation of forum residents can establish all-purpose jurisdiction. In
short, these contacts do “not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction
over” OpCo for claims unrelated to its contacts with Mississippi. BNSF, 581 U.S. at
414.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction permits suits that “arise out of or relate to a corporate
defendant’s activities in the forum State.” Mallory, 600 U.S. at 166 (quotations
omitted). Thus, Smith must make a prima facie showing that this insurance dispute
“results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to” activities that OpCo
“purposefully directed” at the state of Mississippi. Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v.
11
Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Smith does not satisfy this burden.
OpCo does not dispute its license to do business in Mississippi or its
registered agent for service of process in the state. OpCo thus “purposefully
directed” activities at Mississippi. See Wilmington Tr., N.A. v. Lincoln Benefit Life
Co., 328 F. Supp. 3d 586, 590 (N.D. Miss. 2018) (holding nonresident insurer
purposely availed itself of the benefits of transacting insurance in Mississippi by
registering with the Commissioner of Insurance); Joshua Props., LLC v. D1 Sports
Holdings, LLC, 130 So. 3d 1089, 1095 (Miss. 2014). But specific jurisdiction fails
because Smith’s claims do not arise from or relate to those contacts.
Indeed, OpCo offers a sworn Declaration of its Secretary Dawn Wolverton
stating that OpCo:
•
is a Virginia LLC with a principal place of business in Texas;
•
was formed in October 2020—seven years after Smith obtained her
Policy—and was organized to buy assets from the bankruptcy estate
of J.C. Penney Company, Inc.;
•
is not an entity formerly known as “JC Penney, Inc.” and is not a
successor to J.C. Penney Company, Inc. or any of its subsidiaries,
including the entities in the J.C. Penney Company, Inc. bankruptcy
proceedings;
•
is not an insurance company or a third-party administrator of
insurance policies, and does not adjust insurance claims in
Mississippi or elsewhere;
•
had no involvement in Smith’s claim, has not sold a policy of
insurance in Mississippi or otherwise, did not sell or issue any policy
of insurance to Smith, and was not involved in any claim under the
Policy or any other policy of insurance; and
•
does not own, issue, or service the JCPenney credit card that Smith
allegedly used to pay her premiums for the Policy.
12
[47-1] ¶¶ 3−12. The Declaration then names Synchrony Bank as the entity that
“own[s], issue[s], and service[s]” the JCPenney credit card. Id. ¶ 13. Smith does not
offer a competing affidavit or declaration contradicting Wolverton’s testimony.
Instead, she relies on new, unsupported facts in her response. She claims OpCo:
•
operated and continues to operate JCPenney stores in Mississippi;
•
marketed, provided, and maintained JCPenney credit cards;
•
solicited Smith through correspondence to Mississippi for her to
become a member of the Group Policy, for which OpCo contracted
with Transamerica; and
•
continues to draw payments from Smith through the JCPenney
credit card it manages.
[73] at 9. But as the Court stated, when a defendant asserts “facts in their affidavits
that are only disputed by the plaintiffs’ allegations[ and are] not supported by facts
in an affidavit, then the defendant’s assertions are taken as fact.” Pace, 636 F.
Supp. 3d at 720 (citing Black, 564 F.2d at 681). The Court therefore accepts as true
OpCo’s assertions, including its claims that it: (1) did not exist at the time Smith
obtained the disputed policy; (2) has never sold an insurance policy in Mississippi or
elsewhere; (3) did not sell or issue an insurance policy to Smith; (4) was not involved
in adjusting any claim under the disputed policy or any other insurance policy; (5)
had no involvement in Smith’s claims; and (6) does not own, issue, or service the
JCPenney credit card that Smith used to pay her policy premiums. See [47-1].
Against these uncontradicted facts, Smith does not make a prima facie
showing that her insurance dispute arises out of or relates to OpCo’s contacts with
13
Mississippi. Accordingly, the Court grants OpCo’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
B. TAIC
TAIC also moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [78]. Like OpCo,
TAIC addresses only the constitutional part of the personal jurisdiction analysis.
TAIC Mem. [79] at 5. And Smith again claims general and specific jurisdiction
exists.
1. General Jurisdiction
Smith claims general jurisdiction is proper because TAIC (1) is registered to
do business in Mississippi and (2) has a registered agent for service of process in the
state. She relies on Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 125 (2023). But
these facts differ from those in Mallory.
In Mallory, a Pennsylvania statute required jurisdictional consent in
exchange for registration to do business in the state. Id. at 127. The Court
considered “whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits a State from requiring an out-of-state corporation to consent to personal
jurisdiction to do business there.” Id. Answering no, the Court relied on its prior
holding in Pennsylvania Fire and reaffirmed the validity of consent-based
jurisdiction. Id. at 138 (citing Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917)).
Mallory’s holding does not stretch to cover the facts before this Court. Unlike
Pennsylvania, Mississippi expressly rejects consent-based jurisdiction based on
14
registration to do business or designation of an agent for service of process. See
K&C Logistics, 374 So. 3d at 525–28; Miss. Code Ann. § 79-35-15. The Mallory
Court did “not speculate whether any other statutory scheme and set of facts would
suffice to establish consent to suit” because it was “enough to acknowledge that the
[Pennsylvania] law and facts before [it] f[e]ll squarely within Pennsylvania Fire’s
rule.” Id. at 135−36. Mississippi’s departure from this type of consent-based
jurisdiction places it outside Mallory’s holding. As with OpCo, TAIC’s registration
and designation of an agent for service of process within the state do not establish
general jurisdiction.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
TAIC does not dispute that it has a license to do business in Mississippi and
a registered agent for service of process there. These facts show TAIC “purposefully
directed” activities at Mississippi. See Wilmington Tr., N.A., 328 F. Supp. at 590.
Still, Smith does not show that this insurance dispute arises out of or relates
to TAIC’s contacts with the forum. TAIC offers a sworn Declaration of its Corporate
Counsel, Katelyn Cooper. [78-1]. According to Cooper, TAIC:
•
is not an insurance company, third-party administrator of insurance
policies, or adjuster of insurance claims;
•
has never sold or adjusted an insurance policy and did not sell, issue,
or adjust any insurance policy to Smith, including the policy in
dispute;
•
has no involvement in Smith’s claim and does not own, issue, or
service the JCPenney credit card Smith used to pay her policy
premiums.
15
See id. Smith does not offer a competing affidavit or declaration.2 The Court
therefore accepts TAIC’s uncontradicted allegations as true. See Pace, 636 F. Supp.
3d at 720.
TAIC argues that Smith “has alleged no connection between TAIC’s in-state
activities and her claims against TAIC.” [79] at 8. The Court agrees. Smith’s
Amended Complaint provides no prima facie evidence that this suit arises from or
relates to TAIC’s contacts with the forum. Indeed, Smith’s Amended Complaint
makes only minimal references to TAIC:
•
[TAIC] is a New York corporation that maintains its principal place
of business in New York City. Upon information and belief, [TAIC] is
a wholly-owned subsidiary of TCS, it is registered to conduct
business in Texas, and, on information and belief, maintains an office
[in] . . . Dallas, Texas 75234. [TAIC’s] registered agent is CT
Corporation System [in] . . . Dallas, Texas[.]
•
Defendants TCS e-Serve, TCS India[,] and [TAIC] regularly operate
under the name “TCS.” They use the same logo, and each Defendant
maintains the same office address in various cities, including Dallas
and New York. Upon information and belief, TCS e-Serve, TCS
India[,] and [TAIC] offer the same services and products, with TCS
e-Serve and TCS America acting as TCS India’s North American
affiliate.
[41] ¶¶ 9−10. These facts give no insight into how this insurance dispute arises out
of or relates to TAIC’s forum contacts. Given Smith’s sparse allegations and TAIC’s
uncontradicted Declaration, Smith has failed to establish a prima facie showing of
Instead, Smith attached to her response two documents: (1) TAIC’s registration to
do business in Mississippi; and (2) Transamerica’s press release on its partnership with Tata
Consulting Services. [85-1]; [85-2]. These documents supply little help here. The Court
already accepted as true that TAIC is licensed to do business in Mississippi. And the press
release includes no information relating to TAIC. See [85-2] (evidencing a partnership
between Transamerica and Tata Consulting Services and never mentioning TAIC).
16
2
specific jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court grants TAIC’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.
IV.
Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Transamerica and AEGON (collectively “Transam”), along with TCS e-Serve,
move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Amended Complaint as an improper
“shotgun pleading.”3 See Transam Mem. [56] at 3; [50] at 1−2 (joining Transam’s
facts and argument). They also argue that Smith did not plead plausible claims for
breach of contract, negligence, bad faith, breach of duty to a third-party beneficiary,
or declaratory relief. [56] at 16−32.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”
PHI Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 838, 841 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court views the facts “in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d
458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010)). But it will “not strain to find inferences favorable to the
plaintiff[]” or accept “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal
conclusions.” R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Mere “formulaic recitation
TCS e-Serve joins in Transam’s arguments but also separately moves under Rule
12(b)(6) to dismiss Smith’s contract, bad faith, and negligence claims. TCS e-Serve Mem. [50]
at 1−2.
17
3
of the elements” of a cause of action will not suffice. Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A court can consider “‘the contents of
the pleadings, including attachments thereto,’ in ruling on a motion under Rule
12(b)(6).” Berry v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, No. 3:14-CV-46, 2014 WL 1681329, at
*1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 28, 2014) (quoting Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224
F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000)).4
A. Shotgun Pleading
Transam and TCS e-Serve argue that Smith’s Amended Complaint is a
“shotgun pleading” that “fails to comply with federal pleading standards.” [56] at
14−15. “In adequately stating a claim against a defendant, a plaintiff may not
employ shotgun pleadings.” Magee v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 2:23-CV-64,
2023 WL 4568780, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 17, 2023). A shotgun pleading “fail[s] to
distinguish between the actions of named defendants.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Instead, it “lump[s] all Defendants together and makes no differentiation between
Defendants as to any action taken” with respect to a claim. Slocum v. Allstate Ins.
Co., No. 2:19-CV-153, 2020 WL 428021, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 27, 2020). Shotgun
pleadings are improper “regardless of any general allegation that the Defendants
‘acted jointly,’ which is merely conclusory.” Magee, 2023 WL 4568780, at *3.
4
Smith attached the insurance policy and other documents to her Original Complaint.
See [1-1−11]. She then relied on and cited to those documents in her Amended Complaint.
See [41]. The Court therefore considers Smith’s pleadings and attachments when considering
the motions to dismiss. Collins, 224 F.3d at 498.
18
Most of Smith’s Amended Complaint “lumps all Defendants together.” See
Slocum, 2020 WL 428021, at *6. Smith makes no well-pleaded allegations of
wrongdoing against AEGON. Instead, she includes only one paragraph of factual
allegations that reference AEGON:
In 2013, JC Penney, Inc., predecessor of JCPenney, and Transamerica
Life Insurance Company, through Transamerica’s subsidiary Aegon
Marketing Services, Inc., solicited JCPenney credit card customers to
purchase a group hospital indemnity policy issued by Transamerica. In
2020, JCPenney and related companies filed voluntary petitions for
relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Subsequently, Defendant Penney
OpCo and other buyers purchased the assets of JCPenney.
[41] ¶ 15. This paragraph does not include enough factual allegations “to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, the
Court dismisses without prejudice all claims against AEGON because Smith has
failed to state a claim.
Smith alleges more factual content against Defendants Transamerica and TCS
e-Serve. The Court therefore declines to dismiss her claims against those Defendants
on this basis alone. Instead, the Court will consider whether any well-pleaded
allegations support her claims against Transamerica or TCS e-Serve.
B. Breach of Contract
In Mississippi, “[a] breach-of-contract case has two elements: (1) ‘the
existence of a valid and binding contract,’ and (2) a showing ‘that the defendant has
broken, or breached it.’” Maness v. K & A Enters. of Miss., LLC, 250 So. 3d 402, 414
(Miss. 2018) (quoting Bus. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Banks, 90 So. 3d 1221, 1224 (Miss.
19
2012)).5 “Insurance policies are contracts that can be enforced through a breach of
contract action.” Brown v. ESAB Grp., Inc., No. 2:22-CV-155, 2023 WL 2656755, at
*3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2023) (citation omitted).
Smith does not allege “the existence of a valid and binding contract” between
her and TCS e-Serve. Maness, 250 So. 3d at 414 (quotation omitted). Thus, her
breach of contract claim against TCS e-Serve fails as a matter of law. See
Gulfstream Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alarm.com, Inc., No. 5:21-CV-52, 2022 WL
1541290, at *2 (S.D. Miss. May 16, 2022).
As for Transamerica, the parties do not dispute that a valid insurance policy
exists between them; the only question is whether Transamerica broke or breached
it. Smith argues that “Defendants breached their contractual duty” when they did
not recognize her “Group Policy Number 74A04Q2649” and name, as shown on her
monthly JCPenney credit card statements. [41] ¶¶ 16, 43, 92. According to her,
“Defendants claims handling practices . . . constitute[d] not only breach of contract,
but also breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” because they
“fail[ed] and refus[ed] to promptly pay the amounts individually owed to Plaintiff as
required by the terms of the Policy.” Id. ¶¶ 50, 94.6
The Amended Complaint asserts federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act, [41] ¶ 13, which is based on diversity jurisdiction, Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d
239, 248 (5th Cir. 2008). The Court therefore applies the substantive law of the forum state
to determine whether Smith stated a claim for breach of contract against Transamerica and
TCS e-Serve. See id.
6 Smith further contends that “arguments concerning breach are . . . premature as
discovery regarding its policies and procedures may further reveal breaches of contract.” [69]
at 12. This argument is unavailing. Smith must still allege enough facts that would permit
the Court to infer the Defendants are liable for a breach of contract. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
20
5
Transamerica disagrees and insists the breach of contract claim fails as a
matter of law because Smith “‘does not cite any specific provision of the’ contract
‘that was allegedly breached’ and ‘allud[es] only vaguely to some failure to perform’
responsibilities.” [56] at 17 (quoting Caldwell v. L-3 Vertex Aerospace, No. 3:13-CV123, 2013 WL 1768683, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 24, 2013)). And Transamerica argues
that the vague allegations of a failure to “timely adjust” or “promptly pay” are
“belied by [Smith’s] own allegations and the text of the policy.” Id.
The Court agrees that Smith’s Amended Complaint does not cite the policy
provision Transamerica allegedly breached. Instead, she argues Transamerica “did
not recognize her ‘Group Policy Number 74A04Q2649’” or “timely adjust” and
“promptly pay.” [41] ¶ 94. “‘Questions concerning the construction of contracts are
questions of law,’ and thus appropriate for resolution by the Court on this motion to
dismiss.” Stewart v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. 2:10-CV-149, 2011 WL 1296887, at *7
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2011) (quoting Wesley M. Breland, Realtor, Inc. v. Amanatidis,
996 So .2d 176, 179 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). The Court therefore turns to the policy’s
terms.
1. The Policy’s Terms
The “construction of an insurance contract is limited to examining the policy.”
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Natchez Steam Laundry, 131 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted). “The policy itself is the sole manifestation of the parties’ intent,
686 (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to
discovery.”).
21
and no extrinsic evidence is permitted absent a finding by a court that the language
is ambiguous and cannot be understood from a reading of the policy as a whole.” Id.
(quoting Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 921 F. Supp. 401, 406
(N.D. Miss. 1996)).
First, Smith appears to allege that Transamerica breached the policy when it
did not recognize “Group Policy Number 74A04Q2649.” See [41] ¶¶ 45−50. But the
unambiguous terms of the policy show otherwise:
CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE
GROUP ACCIDENT HOSPITAL INSURANCE
Person(s) insured and Schedule of Insurance are shown on the Schedule
of Insurance.
Transamerica Life Insurance Company (herein called, “we,” “us” or
“our[”]) has issued Policy No. 25451 GC939 to J. C. Penney Corporation,
Inc. (the J. C. Penney Credit Cardholder Group) . . . which makes
available accident hospital insurance for eligible persons.
We agree to pay the benefits herein provided with respect to the
person(s) insured hereunder, subject to all terms of the Policy.
...
SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE
CERTIFICATE NUMBER: 74A04Q2649
INSURED: MS VELMA SMITH
[1-11] at 6. The policy’s provisions then include:
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ENTIRE CONTRACT
Your Certificate is furnished in accordance with and subject to the terms
of the Policy. It is not part of the Policy, but it is evidence of the
insurance provided under the Policy. The Policy and any attachments
form the entire contract of insurance. No agent may change or waive any
provisions of the Policy under which this coverage is provided.
22
Id. at 9. Based on the policy’s clear language, Smith’s argument fails. The policy
differentiates between the “policy” number “25451 GC939” and Smith’s individual
“certificate” number “74A04Q2649.” Id. at 6. As alleged in the Amended Complaint,
Smith “entered ‘Group Policy Number 74A04Q2649,’” which was “not recognized.”
See, e.g., [41] ¶¶ 21−22, 27. But “74A04Q2649” is not her group policy number. And
it is reasonable to receive a “not recognized” message after inputting an incorrect
group policy number. The policy provisions also state that the document includes
the entire contract and that no agent can alter the provisions. [1-11] at 9. Smith
offers no reason why the JCPenney credit card statement alters the terms of the
policy contract. Indeed, Smith does not explain how Transamerica could be liable
based on a JCPenney-issued document at all. Without an explanation, Smith’s
Amended Complaint shows no entitlement to relief. In short, Smith’s allegations “do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” because
her “complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 (cleaned up).
Smith’s allegation that Transamerica breached its duty to “timely adjust” and
“promptly pay” also fails. [41] ¶ 94. The policy provisions provide a timeline for the
adjustment and payment of claims:
NOTICE OF CLAIM
Written Notice of Claim must be given to us within 30 days after any
loss covered under the Policy occurs or as soon as possible thereafter.
You may give the notice or may have someone do it for you. The notice
should include your name and Certificate Number as shown in the
Schedule of Insurance. Notice should be mailed to us at P.O. Box 869090,
Plano, Texas, 75086-9916.
23
CLAIM FORMS
When we receive the Notice of Claim, we will send the claimant forms
for filing Proof of Loss. If we do not send the forms within 15 days, the
claimant can meet the Proof of Loss requirement by providing us with a
written statement describing what happened. We must receive this
statement within the time given for filing Proof of Loss.
PROOF OF LOSS
Written Proof of Loss must be given to us within 90 days after the date
of the loss or as soon as possible thereafter. Proof must, however, be
furnished no later than one year from the time it is otherwise required,
except in the absence of legal capacity. . . .
TIME OF PAYMENT OF CLAIMS
Benefits payable under the Policy will be paid within 45 days after
receipt of due written proof of such loss. All accrued indemnities for loss
for which the policy provides periodic payment will be paid monthly. Any
valid claim not paid within 45 days after receipt of due written proof of
loss will be increased by interest at a rate of 1½% per month until the
claim is finally settled. If we fail to pay benefits when due, you may bring
action to recover such benefits and any other damages as may be
allowable by law.
[1-11] at 10. Smith’s Amended Complaint shows that, before December 7, 2021, she
did not follow the policy’s instructions for making a claim or providing proof of loss.
See, e.g., [41] ¶¶ 21−25. Contrary to Smith’s view, “the duty of good faith and fair
dealing is not breached when the contract authorizes the precise action (or inaction)
about which a party complains.” West v. Nationwide Tr. Servs., Inc., No 1:09-CV295, 2010 WL 3122801, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 2010). Smith’s Amended Complaint
“does not establish that [Transamerica] was required by the [policy] to act
differently than [it] did.” Id.
24
The policy required Transamerica to pay benefits under the policy “within 45
days after receipt of due written proof of such loss.” [1-11] at 10. Smith’s Amended
Complaint states that on December 7, 2021, she “sent a claim letter to Defendant
Transamerica with Transamerica’s claims form executed . . . and with supporting
documents for her claim.” [41] ¶ 34. She makes no allegation that Transamerica
failed to pay the benefits due under the policy within 45 days after she submitted
her claim and proof of loss on December 7, 2021. See Thomas v. Nationstar Mortg.,
LLC, No. 2:22-CV-88, 2023 WL 2780360, at *11 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 6, 2023) (finding
that the defendant had no obligations under the contract to promptly act until the
unambiguous term in the contract was satisfied). Instead, she concedes that
Transamerica paid the benefits owed. See [41] ¶ 36; [69] at 4, 11. Because Smith
“has not alleged conduct inconsistent with the parties’ rights and obligations under
the” policy, she has failed to plead a breach of contract. Thomas, 2023 WL 2780360,
at *13.7
C. Bad Faith
Smith seeks punitive and extracontractual damages for her bad-faith claim.
[41] ¶ 110 (seeking “actual, compensatory, consequential, bad faith, and punitive
damages, plus court costs, attorney’s fees, and pre- and post-judgment interest at
the legally allowable limit”). Count III does not specify which Defendant allegedly
Because Smith did not state a claim for breach of contract, her negligent breach
claim, Count II, also fails. “Put another way, the breach of a contract (whether described as
‘negligent’ or not) is not actionable in tort under an ordinary negligence theory unless
breaching the contract also breached a duty of care recognized by tort law.” Clausell v.
Bourque, 158 So. 3d 384, 391 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). The Court dismisses Count II.
25
7
acted with bad faith. The Court will assume she asserts the claim against
Transamerica. See [41] ¶ 45 (“By its responses, and lack of responses to Plaintiff’s
efforts made based on information contained on Plaintiff’s JCPenney credit card
statement, Transamerica . . . arbitrarily, in bad faith and/or in a grossly negligent
manner, effectively denied that Plaintiff was an insured or that the group hospital
indemnity insurance even existed, and delayed and in an untimely manner failed to
properly, fully and adequately adjust the claim.”).
In Mississippi, a plaintiff may pursue extracontractual and punitive damages
claims against an insurance provider for bad-faith refusal to pay. See State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simpson, 477 So. 2d 242, 250 (Miss. 1985). Bad-faith claims allow
the award of damages where an insurer has no arguable reason for failure to honor
a claim and the failure does not result from a clerical error or honest mistake.
Weems v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1222, 1227 (Miss. 1986) (citing Simpson, 477
So. 2d at 250). To succeed on a bad-faith claim for extracontractual damages, Smith
must first show a breach of contract. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Maas,
516 So. 2d 495, 496–97 (Miss. 1987); see also Rumbley v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., No. 3:21-CV-209, 2022 WL 1278091, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 28, 2022). As
explained, Smith did not plead a plausible breach of contract claim. Therefore, her
bad-faith claim necessarily fails. See id. The Court dismisses Count III.
D. Breach of Duty to a Third-Party Beneficiary
“[U]nder Mississippi law, a third party may maintain an action as a thirdparty beneficiary to enforce a promise made for their benefit.” Rein v. Benchmark
26
Constr. Co., 865 So. 2d 1134, 1145 (Miss. 2004) (citing Burns v. Wash. Sav., 171 So.
2d 322, 324 (Miss. 1965)). But the “right must ‘spring’ from the terms of the
contract.” Id. (citing Trammell v. State, 622 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (Miss. 1993)). “[A]
third-party beneficiary may sue for a contract breach only when the alleged broken
condition was placed in the contract for their direct benefit.” Id. “An incidental
beneficiary to a contract, however, does not acquire any rights under the contract
against the promisor or promisee.” Mortera v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 561 F.
Supp. 3d 684, 693 (S.D. Miss. 2021) (citing Rosenfelt v. Miss. Dev. Auth., 262 So. 3d
511, 519 (Miss. 2018)).
Smith argues that she “is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between
Defendants Transamerica and TCS[.]” [41] ¶ 113. But she gives almost no
information on the basis of her claim. Instead, she merely alleges:
Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Defendants
Transamerica and TCS and the class members. All Defendants acted in
concert with Defendant TCS related to the functions TCS performed
related to class members’ insurance policies and all Defendants asserted
control over Defendant TCS’s actions so as to make TCS a mere
instrumentality of the other Defendants.
Had Defendant TCS and the other Defendants acting in concert properly
performed the duties and functions of the contract between them and
Plaintiff and the class, rather than performing the wrongful actions and
omissions outlined in this complaint, Plaintiff and the class members
would not have been damaged by those wrongful actions and omissions
as they have been.
Id. ¶¶ 113−14. Smith offers only conclusory statements to support her third-party
beneficiary claim. Her Amended Complaint does not plead facts sufficient to show
“a promise made for [her] benefit.” Rein, 865 So. 2d at 1145 (citation omitted). Nor
27
does she show that her right to sue “springs” from a term of any contract, or that
the “alleged broken condition was placed in the contract for [her] direct benefit.” Id.
In short, Smith supplies no well-pleaded facts to support her third-party beneficiary
claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count IV.
E. Declaratory Judgment
Smith seeks “a declaration that Defendants[’] custom and practices in []
denying and delaying payment of claims is unlawful and in breach of contractual
duties owed to Plaintiff and the class.” [41] ¶ 120. “The Fifth Circuit has found that
the ‘Declaratory Judgment Act, which authorizes a federal court to declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, is
merely a procedural device and does not create any substantive rights or causes of
action.’” Foster v. Reliance First Cap., LLC, No. 1:19-CV-201, 2020 WL 5260768, at
*4 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 3, 2020) (quoting Smitherman v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC,
727 F. App’x 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2018)). “When an underlying claim for relief is
dismissed, it is appropriate to also dismiss a claim for declaratory relief.” Id.
Because the Court dismisses Smith’s other claims, it also dismisses her claim for
declaratory relief.
F. Injunctive Relief
Lastly, the parties dispute whether Smith has Article III standing to seek
injunctive relief. “To demonstrate standing, ‘a plaintiff must show (i) that he
suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
(ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury
28
would likely be redressed by judicial relief.’” Angell v. GEICO Advantage Ins. Co.,
67 F.4th 727, 733 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S.
413, 423 (2021)). “Plaintiffs seeking injunctive” relief must “demonstrat[e] a
continuing injury or threatened future injury.” Stringer v. Whitley, 942 F.3d 715,
720 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)). “The
threat of future harm must be ‘certainly impending’; mere ‘[a]llegations of possible
future injury’ do not suffice.” Attala Cnty., Miss. Branch of NAACP v. Evans, 37
F.4th 1038, 1042 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). “Past wrongs are relevant to
‘whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,’ but alone they
may be insufficient to establish standing for prospective relief.” Id. (quoting O’Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)).
Smith seeks “a preliminary and permanent injunction . . . against Defendants
. . . from engaging in each of the policies, practices, customs, and usages complained
of herein.” [41] at 29. According to her, “[i]t is reasonable to expect that Defendants
will continue to engage in the pattern and practice of denying the existence of group
policies and information on insureds’ names absent a decision by the Court.” Id. ¶
69. But this does not show a “continuing harm or a[n] . . . ‘immediate threat of
repeated injury in the future.’” Attala Cnty., 37 F.4th at 1042. Indeed, Smith does
not establish that she is likely to suffer another accident, much less one serious
enough to satisfy the policy’s criteria for filing a claim. See [41] ¶ 40 (requiring
claimant to be: (1) involved in an accident; (2) injured in the accident; (3)
transported by ambulance to hospital for treatment because of accident; (4)
29
admitted to emergency room because of accident; and (5) admitted to hospital as a
patient with overnight stay).
In short, Smith does not establish a real and immediate threat of similar
injury in the future. Smith therefore lacks standing to seek injunctive relief.
V.
Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments. Those not addressed would not have
changed the outcome. For the stated reasons, the Court GRANTS Penney OpCo and
TAIC’s [47], [78] Motions to Dismiss without prejudice. The Court GRANTS TCS eServe’s [49] Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. And the Court GRANTS
Transamerica and AEGON’s [55] Motion to Dismiss with prejudice as to
Transamerica and without prejudice as to AEGON. The Court will issue a final
judgment consistent with this Order.
SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 2024.
s/ Kristi H. Johnson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
30
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?