Turner v. G.E.O. et al
Filing
22
ORDER granting Defendant's 20 Motion for Summary Judgment. Final Judgment in favor of Defendant shall be entered, and the Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 7/17/12. (ACF)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES TURNER, #31933
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:09-CV-102 -LRA
WARDEN D. CASKEY
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Warden Dale Caskey,1 requesting that the Complaint filed against him by
Charles Turner, Plaintiff, be dismissed with prejudice. The Court has considered the
pleadings, Turner’s sworn testimony given at the omnibus hearing,2 and the applicable
law. This review compels the Court to find that Defendant is entitled to a judgment at
law, as there are no genuine issues of material fact. The Motion for Summary Judgment
shall be granted.
FACTS
Jurisdiction of this case is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Turner’s sworn
testimony at the omnibus hearing, in conjunction with the written evidence submitted by
Defendant,3 reveal the following relevant facts. Turner is incarcerated as a convicted
felon in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections ["MDOC"] at the East
Mississippi Correctional Facility [“EMCF”] in Meridian, Mississippi. His Complaint is
quoted as follows:
G.E.O. E.M.C.F. security officer using cruel and unusual
punishment against me. By putting my life in danger by
1
ECF No. 20, filed April 24, 2012. Warden Caskey is the retired Senior Warden
of the East Mississippi Correctional Facility [“EMCF”].
2
ECF No. 20-1, Transcript of omnibus hearing conducted 4/12/2010, Exhibit 1.
3
Defendant’s Exhibit 2 to the motion is the Affidavit of Warden Dale Caskey,
dated April 24, 2012, ECF No. 20-2.
making me stay at G.E.O. E.M.C.F. in the cell with other
mental inmate[s] that threatening me. Using deliberate
indifference standard against me. When I have ask the
Warden D. Caskey to transfer me to another prison. But they
would not protect me by the law.
...
ECF No. 1.
Turner explained his allegations under oath at the omnibus hearing.
He charged that Defendant Warden Caskey failed to protect him from attacks by other
inmates. He is housed with mentally ill inmates who are dangerous, and he wishes to be
transferred to a facility near his family in Greene County. Plaintiff testified that he has
not talked to Defendant Caskey personally. He has written Caskey and asked to be
moved from EMCF.
According to Plaintiff, he was lying in his bed when another inmate came in with
a padlock and hit him in the head with it. Turner could not identify the inmate but
described him as a “little old short guy.” ECF No. 20-1, p. 5. The guy told Turner that
he had been instructed to beat him up by a woman officer. Turner could not identify the
officer and never saw her. He was taken to Rush Hospital and treated; the wound
required 19 stitches. Turner had no prior problems with this inmate and had no idea that
he would be attacked by him.
While in Housing unit 4, he was jumped on again by an inmate who threatened to
stab him with a shank. He was not injured, however. According to Turner, he fears for
his safety and wants to be transferred to Greene County, near his home. Turner explained
that Defendant Caskey did nothing wrong other than not letting him be transferred.
When asked by this Court why he wanted to be moved, he testified that Greene County
was “where [his] home is.” ECF No. 20-1, p. 9.
2
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that
summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The United States Supreme Court
has held that this language “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient
showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). The substantive law establishes those elements on which a plaintiff
bears the burden of proof at trial; only facts relevant to those elements of proof are
considered for summary judgment purposes. Id. at 322. There is a genuine factual
dispute between the parties only “when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners
from violence by other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Cantu v.
Jones, 293 F.3d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 2002). To establish a failure-to-protect claim under
section 1983, Plaintiff must show that he is/was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to
his need for protection. Newton v. Black, 133 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 1998); Neals v.
Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, to act with deliberate indifference,
"the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must draw the inference." Newton, 133
F.3d at 308 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Whether a prison official had the
3
requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact. Neals, 59 F.3d at 533.
Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal
actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Board of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty v. Brown, 530 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).
Defendant Caskey has submitted an Affidavit which has not been rebutted by
Turner. ECF No. 20-2, Exhibit "2" to Motion to Dismiss. According to Caskey,
he was the senior Warden of the EMCF and had overall supervisory responsibility for its
operation, including the approval of its written policies. He had an extensive staff to
assist in the day-to-day operation of the prison. Defendant Caskey affirms that he did not
directly supervise inmate Turner, or any inmates, as he had security staffing with several
supervisory levels between his position as warden and the correctional officers who
worked directly with the inmates on a daily basis.
Defendant Caskey does recall that Turner was involved in an incident with another
inmate which resulted in Turner being treated for a cut above his eye. Prior to that attack,
Defendant Caskey affirms that he had no knowledge that another inmate planned to
attack Turner. At no time prior to the incident did Turner, or anyone else, tell Defendant
Caskey that Turner needed or wanted protection from another inmate. Further, Caskey is
not aware of any evidence that indicates any staff member knew or had reason to know
that another inmate wished to harm Turner.
Plaintiff’s testimony at the omnibus hearing did not conflict with Defendant
Caskey’s except that Plaintiff testified that he had written Defendant letters requesting to
be moved to Greene County. Defendant does not deny or admit whether he received
such letters. Accordingly, the assertions in Defendant’s affidavit remain largely
unrebutted.
As stated, Turner has a constitutional right to be safe while in MDOC custody, and
prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect him from violence
4
from other inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. However, "[n]ot every injury by one
prisoner at the hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison officials
responsible for the victim's safety." Id. at 834. To state a constitutional case against
Caskey, Turner must plead or articulate enough specific facts, not conclusory
allegations,4 to show that Caskey was aware that Turner faced a “substantial risk of
serious harm” from the unnamed inmate or guard. He has failed to do so.
A prison obviously houses many violent offenders; being housed with offenders
who have mental illnesses does not automatically mean that the ill prisoners are more
violent.5 Warden Caskey was not responsible for the MDOC’s housing decision
regarding Turner. No liability could be found unless he was aware of a specific risk of
serious danger to Turner and he failed to intervene. He was not personally responsible
for the decision to house Turner with the unknown inmate in the first place.
Turner has failed to assert facts which would establish “deliberate indifference” to
his safety on the part of Caskey. “Deliberate indifference” is a question of fact, and may
be proved from circumstantial evidence.” Newton, 133 F.3d at 308. However, Caskey
must have been aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of harm to Turner existed, and he must also have actually drawn the inference.
Turner admits he did not fear this inmate, or know that he was going to be attacked by
him. He admits that he never personally told Defendant that he feared other inmates. He
simply alleges that he wrote Defendant requesting to be moved near his home, to Greene
4
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (§1983
plaintiff must plead specific facts, not “conclusory allegations”).
5
As the Court noted in Newton, 133 F.3d at 307, Parchman is “a dangerous place,”
with 80% of its 6,000 inmates being “violent offenders.” The Court still found that an
officer was not aware that “a substantial risk” of harm existed simply because a prisoner
reported a threat by another inmate and asked to be moved; threats are part of the
penitentiary’s daily fare. A similar analysis could be applied to EMCF.
5
County. Turner’s own testimony establishes that Caskey was not aware of facts which
might have made him realize that Turner was in danger.
The Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact in analyzing
the claims against Caskey, and Caskey is entitled to a judgment at law. Turner’s
contention that the attack occurred because Caskey failed to move him is at most a claim
of negligence, and negligence cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. Daniel v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (negligent acts of official do not amount to deprivation of
due process).
“A supervisory official is not liable for the actions of subordinates on a theory of
vicarious liability." Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 187, 292 (5th Cir. 2005).
See also Ashcroft v. IQBAL, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) citing Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978) (Government officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a “supervisory
liability” or respondeat superior theory; term "supervisory liability" a "misnomer").
Each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, must
have violated the Constitution; they are not held accountable for the misdeeds of their
agents. Id. at 1948-49. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official is liable for
his or her own misconduct. Id.
Fifth Circuit precedent requires either personal involvement by an individual
Defendant in the alleged violation, or the enforcement of some policy or practice
resulting in the constitutional deprivation. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's
Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). If no personal involvement
exists, then a causal link between their actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation
must be shown. Roberts, 397 F.3d at 292.
Turner's claim against Caskey is not based on his personal involvement in the
incident; Turner did not notify Caskey personally that he feared for his safety. Caskey
6
was not responsible for a "policy" or "custom" which caused Turner's injury. Turner's
allegations are insufficient to establish supervisory liability against Caskey based on a
failure to train or a failure to supervise theory of liability.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in this case
regarding Turner’s claims that Defendant Caskey is liable to him for the injuries he
sustained in the attack by the unidentified prisoner, at the direction of an unidentified
EMCF officer. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to a judgment at law, and his Motion
for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 20] is hereby granted. Judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby entered in favor of
Defendant Caskey; Final Judgment shall be entered on this date.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this the 17th day of July, 2012.
/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?