McDaniel v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

Filing 37

ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 35 Motion in Limine. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 09/06/2011 (WB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
TOMMY R. MCDANIEL

PLAINTIFF

V.

CAUSE NO. 4:10-CV-00154-CWR-LRA

TYSON FARMS, INC.

DEFENDANT
ORDER

The above-styled cause is before the Court on the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment,1 and after considering both parties’ arguments and the subject matter at hand, the
Court concludes that the motion must be granted.
The central question presented by this case is, as even the plaintiff admits,2 a simple one.
Tommy R. McDaniel (hereinafter “McDaniel”) worked under contract as a “broiler producer” for
Tyson Farms, Inc. (hereinafter “Tyson”). Under the terms of the contract, McDaniel would
receive chickens and raise them to a specified size and weight in chicken houses on his property,
and when the chickens reached the desired maturity, Tyson would send someone to retrieve the
birds.
Gill Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter “GEI”) worked under a separate contract with Tyson to
collect chickens from various producers for processing.3 On June 19, 2008, pursuant to its

1

Tyson Farms, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 27] (hereinafter “the
Motion”).
2

Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Response to Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment
[Docket No. 31] (hereinafter “McDaniel’s brief”) at 3 (“This entire case truly revolves around the
definition of the term ‘representative.’”).
3

See Exhibit D to Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 27-4] (hereinafter
“McDaniel depo”) at 13.
1

contract, GEI was collecting chickens on McDaniel’s property4 when McDaniel found that an
important water valve had been turned off.5 Irritated by the discovery, McDaniel told the chicken
catcher “that I was going to shoot the next one that touched anything in my house besides the
chickens.”6
McDaniel then returned to his home on his all-terrain vehicle, “[g]ot my pistol and put it
in my ATV and drove back” to the chicken house,7 where GEI’s employees still were collecting
chickens. With his pistol collected, McDaniel parked his ATV at the site where his argument had
taken place and “sat in that ATV till they were finished and gone”8 with the pistol in plain view
on the seat.9 The chicken collection concluded without further incident.
The next day, several Tyson employees met with McDaniel to discuss the previous day’s
altercation.10 At the time of the episode, the contract under which Tyson and McDaniel operated
contained a default provision that permitted Tyson to terminate the agreement for “[u]se of

4

The record contains no hint that GEI’s arrival was unexpected. In an affidavit supplied
by Tyson, the company’s Live Complex Manager described GEI’s operation on McDaniel’s
property “a routine catch.” Exhibit A to Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 27-1] at 2.
McDaniel himself testified at his deposition that when GEI’s employees arrived, he was “there to
greet them[.]” Exhibit D to Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 27-4] (hereinafter
“McDaniel deposition”) at 15.
5

McDaniel deposition at 19-20.

6

McDaniel deposition at 20.

7

McDaniel deposition at 23.

8

McDaniel deposition at 23.

9

McDaniel deposition at 23-24.

10

McDaniel deposition at 31.
2

abusive and threatening language with or threat of physical harm to [Tyson]’s representatives.”11
McDaniel did not deny his role in the incident12 but apologized.13
By letter dated June 25, 2008, Tyson terminated McDaniel’s contract.14
On September 13, 2010, McDaniel brought suit against Tyson in United States District
Court for (1.) tortious breach of contract, (2.) detrimental reliance, (3.) express breach of
contract, (4.) violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act, and (5.) intentional and/or negligent
infliction of emotional distress.15
Tyson moved for summary judgment on June 15, 2011.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although motions for summary judgment are filed frequently, not every case is suitable
for such disposition. Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”16 When confronted with these motions, this Court focuses on “genuine” disputes of
“material” facts. An issue is genuine “if the evidence supporting its resolution in favor of the
party opposing summary judgement, together with an inference in such party’s favor that the

11

Exhibit C to Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 27-3] (hereinafter “the
Contract”) at 2.
12

McDaniel deposition at 31.

13

McDaniel deposition at 38.

14

McDaniel deposition at 39-40.

15

Complaint [Docket No. 1].

16

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
3

evidence allows would be sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the party.”17 A fact is material
if it is one which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Factual disputes
that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be considered.18 Likewise, unsubstantiated assertions
are not competent summary judgment evidence.19
The jury has the responsibility to assess the probative value of the evidence. As a
consequence, a court must step back and refrain from making credibility determinations, and it
must not weigh evidence or draw from the facts legitimate inferences for the movant.20 This
Court is ever mindful that although a useful device, summary judgment “must be employed
cautiously because it is a final adjudication on the merits.”21
But in the case at bar, the parties’s dispute regards the interpretation of a contract, and so
long as the provisions concerned are not ambiguous, such disagreements present questions of
law.22

17

Zisman v. Mason, 2008 WL 879726, *3 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (citing Amant v. Benoit, 806
F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987).
18

Id.

19

Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994).

20

Strong v. Dept. of Army, 414 F. Supp. 2d 625, 628 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

21

Jackson v. Cain, 865 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir. 1989); Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929
F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1991).
22

Dennis v. Searle, 457 So. 2d 941, 945 (Miss. 1984). See also Coleman v. Acceptance
Indem. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1873742, *3 (S.D. Miss. 2009) (insurance contract’s interpretation
presents question of law); Avatar Exp., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320 (5th Cir.
1991) (summary judgment an appropriate tool for dispute regarding terms of a lease agreement).
4

JURISDICTION
Because the questions now before the Court present issues arising purely under
Mississippi law, a short comment regarding jurisdiction is appropriate.23
When McDaniel filed his Complaint, he invoked this Court’s jurisdiction because his
claim rested in part on the provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act.24 Although the
remainder of his claims took root in state law, their character was “so related to claims in the
action within [the Court’s] original jurisdiction that they form[ed] part of the same case or
controversy,”25 and supplemental jurisdiction properly extended thereto. For that reason, original
jurisdiction over the entire matter properly lay in federal court.26
However, as this Order discusses infra, McDaniel abandoned his Packers and Stockyards
Act claim in response to Tyson’s motion for summary judgment. “Ordinarily, when the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, the pendent state claims should be dismissed as well.”27 But
pendent jurisdiction may be exercised properly when such a decision is the result of “balancing
the values of economy, convenience, fairness, federalism, and comity.”28 If the crossroads at
which this case now finds itself not so deep into the litigation, or if any remaining matter posed a

23

It is well established that federal courts must consider the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction even if not raised by the parties, as is the case in the matter at hand. Howery v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 919 (5th Cir. 2001).
24

7 U.S.C. § 181, et seq.

25

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

26

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

27

Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989).

28

Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992).
5

novel issue of state law, then this Court might be more hesitant to address the matter further.
However, none of these issues persuades in favor of dismissal of the case at hand, nor does the
goal of preserving judicial economy.29 For these reasons, the Court exercises its discretion30 to act
pursuant to its pendent jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
ANALYSIS
In his response to Tyson’s motion for summary judgment, McDaniel expressly concedes
the claims for detrimental reliance,31 intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional
distress,32 and violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act.33 The only remaining claims are
tortious breach of contract and express breach of contract.
The contractual provision in dispute between McDaniel and Tyson is the clause that
permitted Tyson to hold McDaniel in default for “[u]se of abusive and threatening language with
or threat of physical harm to [Tyson]’s representatives.”34
McDaniel does not address Tyson’s argument that McDaniel’s conduct was threatening in
character, and in his brief, McDaniel describes the argument in question as “a heated exchange
between a GEI employee and Mr. McDaniel where at one point Mr. McDaniel threatened the

29

Id. at 587.

30

Id. at 585.

31

Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgment [Docket No. 31] (hereinafter “McDaniel brief”) at 5.
32

McDaniel brief at 5.

33

McDaniel brief at 6.

34

Contract at 2.
6

employee of GEI.”35 Moreover, according to McDaniel, “[t]his entire case truly revolves around
the definition of the term ‘representative.’”36 Therefore, McDaniel does not appear to dispute that
his conduct amounted to “[u]se of abusive and threatening language with or threat of physical
harm.”37
The only question remaining, then, is whether GEI’s employees were Tyson’s
“representatives.” Both parties agree that the decision must be guided by the familiar rule that
courts “are bound to enforce contract language as written and [to] give it its plain and ordinary
meaning if it is clear and unambiguous.”38
Unlike the words “agent” or “employee,” the term “representative” is not a contractual
term to which a great deal of attention has been granted by Mississippi courts. That dearth of
authority leaves this Court with little choice but to resort to even more elementary interpretive
tools with which to define the word’s scope.
McDaniel offers a narrow view of the term in which GEI’s employees are not included.
According to McDaniel, the Encarta World English Dictionary of 2009 defines the term, among
other ways, as “somebody who speaks for others: somebody who speaks, acts, or votes on behalf
of others[.]”39 McDaniel goes on to recount that the Encarta entry for “representative” includes an
adjective for the word: “acting on somebody’s behalf: acting as somebody’s agent, deputy, or

35

McDaniel brief at 1 (emphasis added).

36

McDaniel brief at 3.

37

Contract at 2.

38

Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Britt, 826 So. 2d 1261, 1265 (Miss. 2002).

39

McDaniel brief at 3-4 (quoting Encarta World English Dictionary (2009)).
7

delegate.”40 In McDaniel’s view, “[m]erely because an entity enters into a contract with an
individual to perform an action for the entity’s benefit does not mean the individual is a
representative of the entity. It only means the individual has agreed to perform an action for the
entity’s benefit, and not necessarily in the place of or on behalf of the entity.”41
Tyson’s view of the term is more expansive. Tyson notes that the Seventh Edition of
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “representative” as “one who stands for or acts on behalf of
another,”42 and that Webster’s Dictionary paints the word “represent” as to “act in the place of or
for” another.43
The contract itself offers no self-contained definition of the term, and if any contract
between GEI and Tyson addressed the issue, then that evidence is not before the Court. However,
Tyson points to the contract’s occasional use of the term “employees” as proof that the term
“representative” should be broadly defined; in Tyson’s view, if the parties had meant to limit the
reach of the “threats clause” to those person on Tyson’s payroll, then the contract would have
used the word “employee” instead of “representative.” This is a persuasive argument.
Likewise, the Court is persuaded that the definitions offered by the parties – which,
despite the differences with which Tyson and McDaniel frame them, are substantially identical –
support Tyson’s broad view of the term “representative.” Each of the definitions memorialized

40

McDaniel brief at 4.

41

McDaniel brief at 4-5.

42

Memorandum in Support of Tyson Farms, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Docket No. 28] (hereinafter “Tyson brief”) at 8.
43

Tyson brief at 8.
8

by Black’s, Webster’s, and Encarta pays special attention to the representative’s acts on behalf of
another. The intricacies of expert chicken catching are, doubtlessly, incapable of being
crystallized in a few short words, but if only one thing can be said of one who catches chickens at
a company’s request, it is that the catcher acts on the company’s behalf.
A fourth dictionary definition, that encapsulated by the Oxford English Dictionary,
denotes an expansive view of the term; in the view of the OED’s drafters, “a person who stands
for, speaks or acts on behalf of another person or group of people, typically in an official
capacity,” is a representative. Obviously, GEI was not contracted to represent Tyson in an official
capacity, but the Oxford definition clearly provides for exceptions to that typical treatment.
McDaniel leans heavily on the appearance of the term “agent” in the Encarta definition. If
the Court agreed that the term “agent” was synonymous with the word “representative” as it is
used in the Contract, then McDaniel’s view might well carry the day.44 But ultimately, the
Contract itself persuades against such an interpretation: the drafter of the threats clause chose the
word “representative,” not “agent.” Without an indication that the parties intended to view the
terms synonymously, this Court cannot project one word’s meaning onto the other.
CONCLUSION
No provision within the four corners of the Contract suggests that GEI was not Tyson’s
“representative,” as that term is viewed within its plain meaning. Therefore, Tyson was fully
within its rights to hold McDaniel in default and to terminate the contract.

44

Johnson v. Rao, 952 So. 2d 151, 154 (Miss. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted)
(observing that the Mississippi Supreme Court “has defined the word agent to include only
agents vested with some general authority and discretion, and not to extend to mere employees
having no independent powers.”).
9

For that reason, Tyson’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and a Final Judgment
will be entered accordingly.
SO ORDERED this Sixth day of September 2011.

/s/ Carlton W. Reeves
Hon. Carlton W. Reeves
United States District Court Judge

10