Palmer v. Town of DeKalb Municipal Court et al
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION that this case will be dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff's pursuit of these claims in his pending habeas corpus case, civil action number 4:13cv31HTW-LRA. Signed by District Judge Henry T. Wingate on 4/3/13 (TRS) (Main Document 11 replaced on 4/4/2013) (RRL).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN E. PALMER
VERSUS
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13-cv-33-HTW-LRA
TOWN OF DEKALB MUNICIPAL COURT, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff is an
inmate currently incarcerated in the Kemper County Jail, who filed this pro se Complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 On the same day Plaintiff filed this case, he also filed a Petition
for habeas corpus relief in this Court, which was assigned civil action number 4:13-cv-31-HTWLRA. Upon liberal review of the Complaint and subsequent pleadings, the Court has reached the
following conclusions.
I.
Background
Plaintiff claims that he is unlawfully incarcerated. He states that he has been incarcerated
several times in the “past years” based on “old fines” from the Town of Dekalb Municipal Court.
Compl. [1] at 4. Plaintiff believes that he should be released based on the time he has already
served and based on the amount of money he has paid towards his fines. As relief in this suit,
Plaintiff states that he is seeking “time served and these fine[s] gone.” Id. at 4.
Initially, the Court entered an Order [5] advising the Plaintiff that release from
incarceration is not available in a suit filed pursuant to § 1983. Plaintiff was advised that he
must pursue claims that affect his eligibility for, or entitlement to, accelerated release through
habeas corpus. The Court noted that Plaintiff is currently pursuing similar, if not identical,
1
Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis was granted on April 2, 2013.
claims in his pending habeas corpus case. The Order provided Plaintiff with the opportunity to
dismiss this § 1983 case or file a response stating that he wishes to continue with this case as it is
filed. Plaintiff filed a Response2 wherein he states that he wishes to continue with this § 1983
case and his pending habeas corpus case. Plaintiff explains this decision by stating that he is not
suing just to “get time-serve[d]” but that he would negotiate with the Court for a sentence that
releases him based on the amount of time he has already been incarcerated and based on
paperwork that can prove his fine is “gone.” Resp. [6] at 1. In this Response, Plaintiff continues
to challenge the validity of his current incarceration and asserts complaints that mirror the claims
he is pursuing in his pending habeas corpus petition.
II.
Analysis
As previously explained to the Plaintiff, “[s]ection 1983 is an appropriate legal vehicle to
attack unconstitutional parole procedures or conditions of confinement.” Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir.1994)(citations
omitted)(finding claims that would entitle prisoner to accelerated release are not properly
pursued in a § 1983 conditions of confinement case). Whereas habeas corpus provides the
exclusive federal remedy available to a state prisoner seeking a speedier or immediate release
from incarceration. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)(holding habeas corpus is
exclusive federal remedy available to state prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their
confinement and seeking speedier or immediate release from incarceration).
Plaintiff’s request for “time-served” is a request for release from incarceration and the
Court also construes Plaintiff’s claims regarding the validity of his incarceration as a request for
2
Plaintiff initially filed an unsigned Response [6] and later filed his signed Response [8].
2
release from incarceration. Clearly, Plaintiff’s claims do not challenge the conditions of his
current confinement, but instead challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, and thus are
habeas in nature. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005)(internal quotations
omitted)(finding a “prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or
duration of his confinement”). Plaintiff has not asserted any claims regarding the conditions of
his confinement in this case.
III.
Conclusion
As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot pursue claims that affect his eligibility for, or
entitlement to, accelerated release in a case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, this
§ 1983 case will be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff’s pursuit of these claims in his
pending habeas corpus case, civil action number 4:13-cv-31-HTW-LRA.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 3RD day of April, 2013.
s/ HENRY T. WINGATE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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