Harris et al v. Yazoo County Board of Education et al

Filing 5

ORDER denying 3 Motion for temporary restraining order, as set out herein. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 10/12/11 (LWE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
ROY LEE HARRIS

PLAINTIFF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:67CV1209TSL

YAZOO COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

DEFENDANT

VS.
YAZOO CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

DEFENDANT

REBECCA FISHER

PUTATIVE INTERVENOR
ORDER

This cause is before the court on the emergency motion of
defendant Yazoo County Board of Education for temporary
restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions
staying and enjoining state court proceedings.

This motion, filed

late yesterday, seeks to enjoin an evidentiary hearing scheduled
to occur in the Yazoo County Circuit Court at 9:00 this morning on
a petition contesting election results filed by the losing
candidate in the Democratic primary election for Superintendent of
the Yazoo County School District.

Having considered the motion,

the court is of the opinion that the requested relief is precluded
by the Anti–Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and that the motion
must therefore be denied.

The Anti-Injunction Act provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283.

The Act, “on its face, is an absolute

prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the
injunction falls within one of three specifically defined and
narrowly interpreted exceptions.”

Fulford v. Transp. Servs. Co.

Co., 412 F.3d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 2005).
The statute ... “is a necessary concomitant of the
Framers' decision to authorize, and Congress' decision
to implement, a dual system of federal and state
courts.” Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140,
146, 108 S. Ct. 1684, 100 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1988). And the
Act's core message is one of respect for state courts.
The Act broadly commands that those tribunals “shall
remain free from interference by federal courts.”
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398
U.S. 281, 282, 90 S. Ct. 1739, 26 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1970).
That edict is subject to only “three specifically
defined exceptions.” Id., at 286, 90 S. Ct. 1739. And
those exceptions, though designed for important
purposes, “are narrow and are ‘not [to] be enlarged by
loose statutory construction.’” Chick Kam Choo, 486
U.S., at 146, 108 S. Ct. 1684 (quoting Atlantic Coast
Line, 398 U.S., at 287, 90 S. Ct. 1739; alteration in
original). Indeed, “[a]ny doubts as to the propriety of
a federal injunction against state court proceedings
should be resolved in favor of permitting the state
courts to proceed.” Id., at 297, 90 S. Ct. 1739.
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375 (2011).
There is no intimation in the Board’s motion that it contends
the Act’s first exception, for injunctive relief specifically
authorized by Act of Congress, is applicable; and certainly it is
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not.

Further, while somewhat unclear, it does not appear the

Board contends the relitigation exception, which permits
injunctive relief where necessary to protect or effectuate the
federal court’s judgment, applies.
Board’s position, it is rejected.

To the extent this may be the
In Smith, supra, the Supreme

Court emphasized that
in applying this exception, we have taken special care
to keep it “strict and narrow.” Id., at 148, 108 S. Ct.
1684. After all, a court does not usually “get to
dictate to other courts the preclusion consequences of
its own judgment.” 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4405, p. 82 (2d ed.
2002) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). Deciding whether
and how prior litigation has preclusive effect is
usually the bailiwick of the second court (here, the one
in West Virginia). So issuing an injunction under the
relitigation exception is resorting to heavy artillery.
For that reason, every benefit of the doubt goes toward
the state court, see Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S., at
287, 297, 90 S. Ct. 1739; an injunction can issue only
if preclusion is clear beyond peradventure.
Smith, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375-2376 (2011).

The Fifth Circuit has

identified four requirements that must be met for the exception to
apply:

(1) the parties in the later action must be identical to

or in privity with the parties in the previous action; (2)
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action must have concluded
with a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or
cause of action must be involved in both suits.

See Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Gunderson, 387 Fed. Appx. 480, 486-487, 2010 WL
2852735, 5 (5th Cir. 2010).

The Board implies that the state court

petition which is set to be heard this morning involves the “same

3

claim or cause of action” as was at issue in Walker v. Poole, et
al., Civil Action No. 5:99CV80BrS (S.D. Miss.).

In Walker, Judge

Bramlette held, in an opinion dated May 20, 1999, that electors in
the Yazoo County School District, including the “reduced transfer
area” surrounding the Yazoo City School District, lack a
“substantial interest” in the operation of the Yazoo County School
District or election of its Superintendent of Education, and that
allowing residents in the City School District and “reduced
transfer area” to vote in the next election for Superintendent of
Education for the County School District under Mississippi Code
Annotated § 37-5-71 would violate the constitutional rights of
other voters in the County School District, but not within the
City District.

Judge Bramlette’s ruling obviously has a bearing

on the issues presented in the petition presently pending for
consideration in the state circuit court, which asserts, among
other bases for challenging the election results, infringement of
the voting rights of electors in the “reduced transfer area.”
However, while similar and undoubtedly related, it is not certain
the issues are the “same” to the extent required for application
of this exception.

And the parties are obviously not the same.

This exception therefore cannot provide a basis for an injunction.
The County Board does contend for application of the “in aid
of jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
In cases decided under [the “in aid of jurisdiction”]
exception, courts have interpreted the language
narrowly, finding a threat to the court's jurisdiction
only where a state proceeding threatens to dispose of
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property that forms the basis for federal in rem
jurisdiction, or where the state proceeding threatens
the continuing superintendence by a federal court, such
as in a school desegregation case. In no event may the
“aid of jurisdiction” exception be invoked merely
because of the prospect that a concurrent state
proceeding might result in a judgment inconsistent with
the federal court's decision. [Emphasis added.]
[Citations omitted.]
Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 960 F.2d 1286,
1298 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Board suggests that this exception is

implicated by the fact of this court’s continuing jurisdiction/
superintendence over the present school desegregation case pending
in this court.

However, they do not identify the specific manner

in which the current proceedings threaten this court’s continuing
superintendence over the desegregation case.

The state court

petitioner asserts, among other contentions, that this court’s
2005 agreed order approving the agreement between the County and
City School Boards for the transfer of students and payment in
lieu of taxes did not create a municipal separate school district
and did not provide for a change in the voting status of voters
located in the “reduced transfer area.”

However, the Board has

not demonstrated that the state court’s consideration of these
issues relating to the voting rights of individuals in the reduced
transfer area presents a threat to this court’s superintendence of
the desegregation case.

And, being mindful of the Supreme Court’s

admonition that “an injunction can issue only if preclusion is

5

clear beyond peradventure,” Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2376, the court
at this time concludes the Board’s motion should be denied.1
Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that the Yazoo County
School Board’s motion for temporary restraining order is denied.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of October, 2011.

/s/ Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

The court notes that it could not enjoin the state court
from proceeding with the hearing in any event, as the petition
challenges the results of the election on the independent ground
of irregularities and violations of state law in the manner in
which the election was conducted.
6