Chestang v. Alcorn State University et al

Filing 83

ORDER granting 70 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b); denying 78 Motion to Alter Judgment Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 11/17/2011 (PL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
RUDY CHESTANG, III

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 5:10-cv-67-DCB-JMR

ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY; ALCORN
STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES;
AND DR. ALVIN SIMPSON, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This Cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff Chestang’s
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment [docket entry no. 78].

Chestang

asks the Court to amend its earlier Order [docket entry no. 69] in
which the Court granted Defendant Alvin Simpson’s request to
dismiss Chestang’s equal protection claim. Simpson opposes this
Motion as untimely and without merit. Having carefully considered
said Motion, Simpson’s response thereto, and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises, the Court finds and orders as follows:
I. Procedural History
This

Court

entered

an

Order

dismissing

Chestang’s

equal

protection claim on June 15, 2011 stating that he had failed to
show that Simpson acted with a discriminatory purpose--an element
crucial to his equal protection claim.1 Eight days later, Chestang
filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Rule 59(e) Motion

1

This Order was granted pursuant to Simpson’s Rule 59(e)
Motion to Alter or Amend, in which he correctly argued that the
Court had made a error in law by not dismissing Chestang’s equal
protection claim in its May 17, 2011 Order.

to Alter or Amend Judgment, and the Court granted that Motion in
its July 12, 2011 Order. Docket entry nos. 72, 77. Pursuant to that
Order, thirty days after the Court dismissed Chestang’s equal
protection claim, Chestang filed the present motion with the Court,
claiming, among other things, that the Court erred as a matter of
law in dismissing his final claim.
Initially, Simpson failed to object to Chestang’s request for
an extension of time to file his Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or
Amend.

However,

shortly

after

Chestang

filed

his

substantive

Motion, Simpson correctly pointed out that the Court should not
have granted Chestang’s request for an extension of time because
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) provides that a district
court must not extend the time period to file a Rule 59(e) Motion.
See also, e.g., Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1989). Simpson now suggests that the proper course is to treat
Chestang’s Motion as a Rule 60(b) motion and apply its more
stringent standard because, if the Court’s extension was void,
Chestang filed his Rule 59(e) Motion two days after the Rule’s
twenty-eight (28) day deadline had expired.
II. Rule 59(e) Motion or Rule 60(b) Motion
In his instant Motion, Chestang is essentially asking this
Court to reconsider its previous judgment dismissing his equal
protection claim. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
specifically provide for a motion for reconsideration, but the

2

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a district court may
entertain such a motion and treat it as a motion to alter or amend
under Rule 59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b). Williamson Pounders Architects, P.C. v. Tunica Co., 681 F.
Supp. 2d 766 (N.D. Miss. 2008)(citing Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc.,
933 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1991)). Previously, it was understood
that “[i]f the motion for reconsideration is filed and served
within ten days of the rendition of judgment, the motion falls
under Rule 59(e). If it is filed and served after that time, it
falls under the more stringent Rule 60(b).” Id. Recently, however,
Rule 59 has been amended to allow a movant twenty-eight (28) days,
not ten (10), to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment. See
FED. R. CIV . P. 59 (2009 Amendments). Accordingly, this Court
considers a motion for reconsideration to be a Rule 59(e) motion if
it is filed within that twenty-eight (28) day period, otherwise,
the Court will treat the motion as a 60(b) motion. See, e.g., Bush
v. Pearson, 2011 WL 2844192, at *1 (July 14, 2011).
There is no question that Chestang filed his Motion outside of
twenty-eight (28) days provided by Rule 59(e) and normally the
Court would not hesitate to consider the Motion under Rule 60(b).
The present circumstance is of course complicated by the fact that
Chestang relied on this Court’s representation, albeit granted
solely at Chestang’s instance, when he filed his Motion two days
late. Chestang advances the argument that the Court should uphold

3

its two-day extension under the “unique circumstances” doctrine,
which permits a district court to extend the deadline under 6(b)(2)
based on equitable tolling principles when a party reasonably and
in good faith relies on a district court error.2 See generally,
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1168.
Courts, however, have held that reliance on a district court’s
unauthorized extension of time is not reasonable because a litigant
could have noticed the mistake simply by scanning Rule 6. Pinion v.
Dow Chemical, 928 F.2d 1522, 1534 (11th Cir. 1991); Panhort v.
United States, 241 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2001); Fogel v. Gordon
& Glickson, P.C., 393 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2004). Chestang’s
present position is largely of his own making, as he should not
requested
therefore,
doctrine

an

extension

the
in

Court

this

of

time

declines

instance.

to
to

The

file
apply

the

present

unique

Plaintiff’s

motion;

circumstances

Motion

will

be

considered as Rule 60(b) Motion; however, this determination is of
little consequence because even under the more relaxed Rule 59(e)

2

The Supreme Court has limited the application of the unique
circumstances doctrine, stating even in the unique circumstance
that a party relies on a district court’s error, the Court may not
extend a deadline if that deadline is jurisdictional. See Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); see also United States v. Petty, 530
F.3d 361, 364 n.5 (5th Cir. 2008); Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1168 (2011 Supplement). In this
situation, however, the Court may at least consider applying the
“unique circumstances doctrine” as the disputed extension of time
does not implicate this Court’s jurisdiction and arises under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not a federal statute. See
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210-11.
4

standard, Chestang’s argument fails.3
III. Analysis
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)-(6) provides that a
district court can grant relief from an earlier order only under
limited, extraordinary circumstances. See Hernandez v. Thaler, 630
F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2011). Further, “a Rule 60(b) motion cannot
substitute for an appeal.” Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785 (11th Cir.
1987) (citing Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 1977)).
The

majority

of

Chestang’s

instant

Motion

oscillates

between

recounting the facts which underlie the Plaintiff’s basic complaint
and rehashing legal arguments that the Court has earlier rejected;
indeed, the Motion appears to be a last-ditch appeal for the Court to
reconsider the merits of his case, which was effectively ended against

3

There are three potential grounds for the Court to alter or
amend a judgment under Rule 59(e): “(1) an intervening change in
controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not
previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of
law or prevent manifest injustice.” Williamson Pounders Architects,
P.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d at 767. Chestang maintains that the Court
erred as a matter of law in dismissing his equal protection claim,
or alternatively, the Court should alter its decision to prevent
manifest injustice. Chestang, however, vaguely disputes the Court’s
earlier reason for dismissing the claim--that he failed to produce
evidence of discriminatory conduct--with the blanket assertion that
he could prove a pattern of discriminatory conduct if given the
opportunity. See docket entry no. 78 ¶ 15. This conclusory
statement is unsupported by his earlier pleadings.
There is
nothing in the record indicating that Simpson acted with a
discriminatory purpose, and the Court may not rely on Chestang’s
conclusory statements. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009). Chestang has not shown that this Court has
committed a clear error of law and has not shown that its decision
is manifestly unjust, and therefore, under the Rule 59(e) standard,
his request is meritless.
5

Simpson with the Court’s last Order.
In particular, Chestang has failed to show that any of the
specific circumstances warranting relief exist in the present case. He
has not alleged any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect, nor has he shown newly discovered evidence that could not
have been discovered in time to move for reconsideration under Rule
59. See FED . R. CIV . P. 60(b)(1)-(2). Chestang has not presented to the
Court any evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the
opposing party. See FED . R. CIV . P. 60(b)(3); see also Hesling v. CSC
Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2005). And he has not suggested
that this Court’s judgment is void or that it has in some way been
satisfied. See FED . R. CIV . P. 60(b)(5)-(6). As stated above, Chestang
is essentially arguing that the Court erred as a matter of law in
dismissing his claim, and case law is clear that a judgment cannot be
considered void because of an error in the law. Gulf Coast Buldg. &
Supply Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 460 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir.
1972).
Finally, Rule 60(b)’s catch-all provision, while perhaps most
applicable

to

Chestang’s

Motion,

is

reserved

for

extraordinary

circumstances. Thaler, 630 F.3d at 429.

Chestang’s plea that the

Court

“manifest

alter

its

judgment

to

prevent

injustice”

is

unavailing. The Court earlier found that Chestang failed to allege any
facts to demonstrate that Simpson acted with a discriminatory animus,
and Chestang has not alleged any facts that would upset that finding.

6

His suggestion that he will prove, if allowed to proceed with this
claim, that Simpson’s motive was gender-based is unfounded and is the
sort of conclusory statement on which the Court may not rely.

Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949. Nowhere in the Complaint does Chestang allege that
Simpson

acted

in

with

a

discriminatory

intent

or

treated

him

differently because of his membership in a protected class, and there
are no facts in the record or in the Complaint to support this
allegation. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1999) (“To
state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff
must allege that a state actor intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff because of membership in a protected class.” (citations
omitted)).
III. Conclusion
Because no circumstances exist to warrant the Court’s granting of
Chestang’s Motion, the Court finds that Chestang’s Motion should be
denied.

Further, because the Court has now dismissed all claims

against Simpson, the Defendant’s pending Motion for Entry of Judgment
under Rule 54(d) [docket entry no. 70] will be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion [docket entry
no. 78] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for
Entry of Judgment [docket entry no. 70] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that a final judgment shall be
7

entered

DISMISSING

WITH

PREJUDICE

all

claims

against

the

Defendant.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the _17th_ day of November 2011.

/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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