Kent v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC et al
Filing
83
ORDER denying 78 Motion for Reconsideration Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 1/19/2012 (PL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
DEBRA L. KENT
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:10-CV-195 DCB-RHW
VICKSBURG HEALTHCARE, LLC d/b/a
RIVER REGION MEDICAL CENTER AND
DARLENE WHITE, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
DEFENDANTS
Opinion and Order
This cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Application
for Review of Order Denying Motion to Propound Additional Discovery
and Granting Motion for Protective Order [docket entry no. 78]
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Having
considered said Application, the Defendants’ opposition thereto,
Magistrate Judge Walker’s December 8, 2011 Order (the “Order”),
applicable statutory and case law, and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises, the Court finds and orders as follows:
Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff Debra Kent filed the instant Title VII and § 1981
race discrimination and retaliation suit against River Region
Medical
Center
(“River
Region”)
and
Darlene
White,
in
her
individual and official capacity. Shortly before the period for
discovery had expired, Kent propounded nearly one-hundred requests
for the production of certain documents, a number that exceeded the
thirty permissible requests provided by the Court’s Case Management
Order
(“CMO”)
[docket
entry
no.
13].1
In
response
to
these
requests, Defendants asked the Court to prohibit the discovery of
all materials related to (1) the Mississippi Department of Health’s
(“MSDH”) inspection reports regarding the accreditation of River
Region’s street clinic, and (2) The Joint Commission’s (“TJC”)
similar reports with regard to River Region’s clinical laboratory.2
The Defendants maintained that these documents were not relevant to
Kent’s claims and that Mississippi law renders these accreditation
and inspection documents undiscoverable. MISS . CODE ANN . § 41-63-21,
et. seq.
Kent, in turn, filed a motion requesting the court’s authority
to propound the additional requests [docket entry no. 74], and the
Defendants
opposed
this
Motion.
Noting
that
the
Parties
had
previously agreed that the case should be assigned to the standard
track, Judge Walker determined that Kent’s “vague and general
assertions” as to why to she sought additional discovery failed to
constitute good cause to deviate from the agree-upon scheduling
order.
See
Order
at
2
(citing
FED.
R.
CIV .
PRO .
16(b)(4)).
1
The Court notes that Judge Walker had already modified the
CMO once to extend the deadline for discovery based on latediscovered information.
2
The Defendants explain that the Clinical Laboratories
Improvement Amendments (“CLIA”) to the Clinical Laboratories
Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 263a, require laboratories to obtain
CLIA certification by undergoing biannual inspections. See 49
C.F.R. Pt. 493. The regulations permit qualified independent
organizations or state agencies to complete inspection reports and
certify compliance with the CLIA.
2
Accordingly, he denied her Motion to Propound Additional Discovery.
Id. at 1. Further, Judge Walker ruled that the MSDH and TJC
inspection reports and related materials were not relevant to
Kent’s cause and were not discoverable under Mississippi law. Order
at
4-6.
Therefore,
he
granted
the
Defendants’
request
for
a
protective order. MISS . CODE ANN . § 41-63-23. Kent now appeals these
findings.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that the
district court reviews a magistrate judge’s nondispositive orders
for
clear
error
Mississippi
or
Hosp.
incorrect
Ass’n,
conclusions
No.
of
law.
Hutson
v.
2011
WL
3:11–CV–00113–CWR–FKB,
3793919, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 24, 2011). The clear-error standard
of
review
is
“extremely
deferential.”
Bailey
Metals,
LLC
v.
Superior Boat Works, No. 4:08-CV-153-P-S, 2011 WL 320805, at * 1
(N.D. Miss. Jan. 31, 2011) (quoting Reko v. Creative Promotions,
Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999)). Accordingly, the
Court will only modify or set aside an Order if it is left with the
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Superior Boat Works, 2011 WL 320805, at * 1 (internal quotations
omitted).
Analysis
A. Protective Order
In
her
briefs
before
the
3
Court,
Kent
submits
that
the
Defendants’ stated reason for firing her--the late submission of a
lab report--is a pretext for the unlawful termination of her
employment. Kent’s theory is that White, her direct supervisor at
the laboratory, retaliated against her after she reported to Human
Resources Director Rebecca Colombus that White illegally backdated
certain testing results. Morever, Kent maintains that White lacked
the necessary qualifications to hold her position at the hospital
and attempts to connect White’s alleged lack of credentials to her
argument that White retaliated against her. Accordingly, Kent
primarily sought the inspection reports in order to find evidence
to support this claim.
After considering this argument, Judge Walker found that Kent
failed “by any convincing measure to draw a connection between
Defendant White’s alleged lack of credentials or education to
supervise and the alleged retaliatory and race-based termination of
Plaintiff’s employment.” Order at 5. The Court finds it equally
difficult to see how exposing White’s alleged lack of credentials
would bolster Kent’s retaliation claim. More generally, Judge
Walker found that Kent failed to show that the MSDH or TJC reports
would aid the prosecution of her claim. See id. The Court agrees
that
Kent
has
not
shown
that
her
requests
are
“reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”, FED .
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), and that Judge Walker did not err in concluding
that the requested documents and information therein were not
4
relevant to Kent’s cause. Hutson, 2011 WL 3793919, at *1.
Moreover, there is no merit to Kent’s assertion that the
Defendants’
cursory
reference
to
a
TJC
inspection
report
in
response to Kent’s EEOC claim automatically renders all reports and
correspondence of the MSDH or TJC discoverable.3 To show good cause
for altering the CMO, Kent bore the burden on convincing Judge
Walker that each of her requests was reasonably calculated to lead
to admissible evidence. As demonstrated above, she was unable to
make this showing. If this Court later finds that the Defendants
have relied or intend to rely on materials withheld in discovery in
defense of Kent’s claim, it will revisit Kent’s concerns that the
Defendants are using the TJC inspection report referenced in the
EEOC letter as both “a sword and a shield.”4
Because the Court finds that Judge Walker did not clearly err
in determining that the accreditation and inspection reports are
not relevant to Kent’s cause, the Court finds it unnecessary to
address whether the documents subject to the Protective Order are
undiscoverable under Mississippi law. The Court makes no finding in
this regard.
3
The Defendants assert that Kent misinterpreted River
Region’s response to the EEOC charge. See Defendant’s Response to
Application for Review at 7.
4
Further, with respect to the TJC executive summary
referenced in White’s deposition, see White depo. at 148-54, it was
Kent’s attorney who, having acquired this report--presumably
through discovery--used it to question White. Kent may not now
argue that all reports are discoverable by way of the opposing
counsel’s failure to object to this one particular report.
5
B. Motion to Propound Additional Discovery
As for the discovery requests which fall outside of the
Protective Order, Judge Walker individually examined each of Kent’s
requests, providing reasons why they were not “reasonable and
necessary.” The Court is not inclined to waste its time and
resources by individually reaffirming each reason provided in the
Order, particularly since Kent fails to specify how these documents
would be helpful to her case. The Court has carefully reviewed
Judge Walker’s determination that Kent failed to show good cause
for modifying the CMO to accommodate Kent’s additional discovery
requests and is not left with the “definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Superior Boat Works, 2011 WL
320805, at * 1; see Order at 2-4.
For the foregoing reasons,
It
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
THAT
Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
Reconsideration [docket entry no. 78] of Judge Walker’s Order
Denying Motion to Propound Additional Discovery and Granting
Motion for Protective Order is DENIED.
So ORDERED and ADJUDGED, this the 19th day of January, 2012.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
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