Alonso v. Adams County Correctional Institution

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and will be counted as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If the Plaintiff recei ves three strikes he will be denied IFP status and be required to pay the full filing fee to file a civil action or appeal. Any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting will be dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on March 21, 2012. (lda)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
ENRIQUE MARTINEZ ALONSO , #28264-177
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-cv-171-DCB-JMR

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. On November
10, 2011, Plaintiff Alonso, an inmate of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), currently incarcerated at
the Big Spring Correctional Institution, Big Spring, Texas, filed this pro se civil rights action
against the Adams County Correctional Institution (“ACCC”).1 Upon liberal review of the
Complaint and Response [11] the Court has reached the following conclusions.
I. Background
Plaintiff states that on April 7, 2010, he injured his lower back while working in the
kitchen at the ACCC.2 Plaintiff claims that he “asked right away for [ ] medical treatment which
[was] never . . . provided.” Compl. [1] at 4. Plaintiff complains that he “submitted all kind[s] of
administrative forms to resolve this problem but [ ] they never answered them” or “they gave me
ibuprofen.” Id. Plaintiff states that he spent 1 year and 2 months at ACCC “waiting for medical
assistance.” Id. As relief in this suit, Plaintiff is requesting monetary damages.
On January 4, 2012, the Court entered an Order [10] advising the Plaintiff that the ACCC
is not a person or a separate legal entity that may be named as a Defendant in a civil rights action.
Plaintiff was directed to file a written response to “provide a viable Defendant by naming a
This case was transferred to this Court by the Northern District of Texas on December 5, 2011.

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The Adams County Correctional Institution is located in Natchez, Mississippi.

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person or persons that are responsible for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights” and
Plaintiff was directed to “specifically state how each newly named Defendant violated his
constitutional rights.” Order [10] at 1. Plaintiff filed his Response [11] naming the following
individuals as Defendants: Vance Laughlin, Warden at ACCC; Dr. Burke, medical doctor at
ACCC; Dr. Arnold, medical doctor at ACCC; Dr. Frye, medical doctor at ACCC; Jasson
Russel, Nurse at ACCC; and Unknown Daniels, Nurse at ACCC. Plaintiff states that all of these
people “were involved in some way with my medical problems and none of them wanted to take
care of my case.” Resp. [11] at 1. Plaintiff further claims that his constitutional rights have been
violated because the Defendants did not provide adequate medical treatment for his serious
problem but instead “they thought . . . ibuprofen was the solution.” Id.
II. Analysis
Title 28 U.S.C. §1915 applies to prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis in this Court.
Section 1915(e)(2) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal -- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” The law “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of
the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Macias v. Raul A., 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). “[I]n an action proceeding
under Section 1915(d), [a federal court] may consider, sua sponte, affirmative defenses that are
apparent from the record even where they have not been addressed” or raised in the pleadings on
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file. Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990). “Significantly, the court is authorized to test
the proceeding for frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of process or before the
filing of the answer.” Id. The Court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in this
action, therefore his Complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff submitted his Complaint on forms provided to
prisoners filing a Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to obtain
relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States and demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Daniel v.
Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1988). Defendants are employees of the ACCC
which is a facility owned and operated by the private corporation, Corrections Corporation of
America, that houses inmates on behalf of the Bureau of Prisons, a federal agency. Since
employees of a privately run correctional facility operated under contract with the federal
government are not state actors for purposes of § 1983, Plaintiff cannot maintain this case under
§ 1983. See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 471 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Sandoval v.
Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. 93-8582, 1994 WL 171703, at *2 n.3 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 1994)).
However, a federal inmate may assert a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his
confinement in a civil rights complaint, also known as a Bivens complaint. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971) (a victim who has suffered a
constitutional violation by a federal actor can recover damages in federal court). In order to state
a Bivens claim, a Plaintiff must allege that an individual acting under federal law deprived him of
a right secured by the United States Constitution. Id. However, the Supreme Court has declined
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to extend the Bivens right of action to suits against private entities acting under color of federal
law. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001)(federal inmate may not seek
relief under Bivens against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with
the BOP). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain a Bivens action against the ACCC or Corrections
Corporation of America.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the application of Bivens to a claim asserted by a
federal prisoner seeking relief against the individual employees of a private prison. See Minneci
v. Pollard, ---U.S.---, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012). In Minneci, the Plaintiff was a
federal inmate, housed at a facility operated by a private company, who sought relief against
prison employees for the deprivation of adequate medical care. Id. at 620. The Court also
declined to extend the Bivens right of action in this situation, finding that extension was not
warranted because the Plaintiff could seek a remedy under state tort law. Id. at 623-26.
Specifically, the Court stated:
[W]here ... a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately employed
personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the
conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and
where that conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of
traditional state tort law (such as the conduct involving improper medical
care at issue here), the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law.
We cannot imply a Bivens remedy in such a case.
Id. at 626. The Court also noted that specific authority exists “in every one of the eight States
where privately managed secure federal facilities are currently located,” which includes
Mississippi, “indicating that state law imposes general tort duties of reasonable care (including
medical care) on prison employees.” Id. at 624-25 (citing Farmer v. State ex rel. Russell, 224
Miss. 96, 105, 79 So.2d 528, 531 (1955)). Since Plaintiff’s claim mirrors the claim rejected by
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the Supreme Court in Minneci, he cannot maintain this Bivens action against the individual
employees of the ACCC.
III. Conclusion
In sum, Plaintiff cannot assert a Bivens claim or seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for
the alleged denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment against the ACCC or the
individual employees of the ACCC. Consequently, this Complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). Any state law
claims Plaintiff may be asserting will be dismissed without prejudice.
Since this case is dismissed pursuant to the above mentioned provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, it will be counted as a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If the
Plaintiff receives “three strikes” he will be denied IFP status and required to pay the full filing fee
to file a civil action or appeal.
A Final Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued.
SO ORDERED, this the 21st

day of March, 2012.
s/David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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