Wingfield v. Claiborne County Family Health Center
Filing
35
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 4/22/2013 (PL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
QUINDOLYN WINGFIELD
PLAINTIFF
vs.
5:12cv13DCB-JMR
CLAIBORNE COUNTY FAMILY HEALTH CENTER
DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Claiborne County Family Health
Center’s (“CCFHC”) Motion for Summary Judgment [docket no. 27],
which is opposed by Plaintiff Quindolyn Wingfield. Having carefully
considered
the
Parties’
arguments,
evidence
produced
thereto,
applicable statutory and case law, and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises, the Court grants the Motion in part and
denies the Motion in part.
RELEVANT FACTS
Wingfield is a former eighteen-year employee of CCFHC. On
August 1, 2010, Wingfield had knee replacement surgery, which
required
a
prolonged
absence
from
work.
CCFHC
knew
about
Wingfield’s absence and apparently expected her to return to work
by
December
1,
2010,
but
it
did
not
provide
Wingfield
with
individualized notice that her leave would count against her
twelve-week Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) entitlement. When
she did not return to work by December 1, 2010, CCFHC asked
Wingfield to provide written documentation regarding when she
planned to return to work. Wingfield provided documentation stating
that she could not return at present, but there is no indication as
to whether she provided CCFCH with an expected return date. In
March 2011, CCFHC’s CEO, James Oliver, met with Wingfield, who
still had not returned to work, to discuss the matter. Sometime
shortly
thereafter,
Wingfield’s
employment
with
CCFHC
was
terminated (CCFHC provides two different dates for Wingfield’s
termination). Wingfield now brings suit to recover against CCFHC
for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is apposite “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a).
“A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law. An issue is
‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Ginsberg 1985 Real
Estate P’ship v. Cadle Co., 39 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted). The party moving for summary judgment bears
the initial responsibility of apprising the district court of the
basis for its motion and the parts of the record which indicate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
“Once the moving party presents the district court with a
properly supported summary judgment motion, the burden shifts to
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the
non-moving
party
to
show
that
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate.” Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d
377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
But the nonmovant must “do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Moreover, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is
insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Summary judgment must be
rendered when the nonmovant “fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
ANALYSIS
1. Wingfield Does Not Qualify as Disabled Under the ADA
Wingfield’s ADA claim is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas
framework. See Patterson v. Yazoo City, Miss., 847 F. Supp. 2d 924,
940-41 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (citing McInnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll.
Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2000)). CCFHC focuses its
argument exclusively on the first requirement of the prima facie
test, that is, whether Wingfield has a disability under the ADA.
Patterson, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 941. CCFHC contends that Wingfield’s
3
claim is (or must be) based on the fact that she has lupus. In
support of its argument, CCFHC references Wingfield’s deposition in
which she admits that she suffers from lupus but that the condition
did not affect her ability to return to work. In the alternative,
CCFHC
argues
that
temporary
complications
resulting
from
Wingfield’s knee replacement surgery also would not qualify her as
disabled under the ADA. In response, Wingfield contends that she is
(or was) disabled as a result of complications from her knee
replacement surgery. But she supports her ADA claim with citations
to Oliver’s deposition in he which suggests that he dismissed her
because she was adversely affected by lupus. The difficulty the
parties
have
in
pinpointing
the
exact
nature
of
Wingfield’s
disability initially suggests that her ADA claim is meritless, and
further investigation confirms this suggestion.
In order to qualify as disabled under the ADA, Wingfield must
show that her knee replacement surgery caused an impairment that
“substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 235 (5th
Cir. 2010). For the Court to make this determination, it must
consider the following factors: “(1) the nature and severity of the
impairment;
(2)
the
duration
or
expected
duration
of
the
impairment; and (3) the permanent or long term impact of the
impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j); see also Brown v. Bd. of Trs.
Sealy Indep. Sch. Dist., 871 F. Supp. 2d 581, 605 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
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Under these factors and Fifth Circuit precedent, a temporary
impairment does not constitute a disability. Chollett v. PattersonUTI Drilling Servs., LP, LLLP, 2011 WL 4592378, *6 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
30, 2011) (citing EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., LP, 570
F.3d 606, 619 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Focusing first on the knee replacement surgery, Wingfield does
not allege that this surgery resulted in a permanent or long-term
impairment that substantially limits her ability to perform a major
life activity. Instead, she provides evidence to suggest that her
knee replacement surgery temporarily limited her ability to return
to work because she was unable to walk pain-free up to one year
after her
surgery.
See
Wingfield
Aff. ¶
3.
Underscoring
the
temporary nature of her ailments, Wingfield now claims that she is
ready to return to work and does not claim to currently have any
limitations, significant or otherwise, on her ability to work.
Wingfield
Aff.
¶
4.
Contrary
to
her
assertion,
Wingfield’s
inability to stand, sit, or walk without pain for eight months
after her knee replacement surgery does not qualify her as disabled
under the ADA. See Wingfield Depo. at 70.
To the extent that Wingfield contends in her brief that she
was “regarded as” disabled because of lupus, this claim also
fails.1 “An individual is regarded as disabled when either (1) a
1
Wingfield does not argue that she is disabled because of
lupus but does suggest with her references to the record that she
was terminated because of a perceived disability related to lupus.
5
covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment
that
substantially
limits
one
or
more
major
life
activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an
actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more
major life activities.”
Hodges v. ISP Techs., Inc., 427 F. App’x
337, 341 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted). In other words, what matters is how the employer views
the employee’s ability to perform a life activity, e.g. walking,
sitting, standing, working, not whether the employer believes the
employee cannot perform a particular job. Hodges, 427 F. App’x at
341.
Although Oliver did state that Wingfield’s pre-surgery medical
condition
(probably
lupus)
factored
into
his
decision
that
Wingfield would be unable to return to her former job, he explained
that the nervousness attendant to this condition was causing her to
“stick different patients” while administering shots. See Oliver
Depo. at 34-35. Oliver’s statements are not completely understood
by the Court, but they do not suggest that he or anyone else from
CCFHC regarded her as substantially limited in her ability to
perform “a broad range of jobs.” Hodges, 427 F. App’x at 341. They
simply
indicate
that
Oliver
regarded
Wingfield
as
unable
to
In fact, she was clear in her deposition that her knee replacement
surgery is the basis of her ADA claim. Wingfield Depo. at 70.
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competently perform her former job. Accordingly, Wingfield’s ADA
claim also fails on this ground, and therefore CCFHC is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
2. Wingfield May Have a Viable FMLA Claim
But Wingfield may have a viable FMLA claim because CCFHC
failed to provide her with individualized notice that her leave
would count against her twelve-week FMLA entitlement. 29 CFR §
825.300(b) provides that “[w]hen an employee requests FMLA leave,
or when the employer acquires knowledge that an employee’s leave
may be for an FMLA–qualifying reason, the employer must notify the
employee of the employee’s eligibility to take FMLA leave within
five business days, absent extenuating circumstances.” (emphasis
added);2 see also Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding that the now-revised FMLA notice requirements were
valid and enforceable in the Fifth Circuit, even though the United
States Supreme Court in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.,
535 U.S. 81 (2002), invalidated the then-applicable regulatory
punishment
in
the
event
that
the
employer
fails
to
provide
notice). As the Court understands it, CCFHC argues that it is
exempt from this notice provision because its employee handbook
placed the burden on the employee to notify it of the need for
2
The regulations cited in this opinion are the ones effective
from January 16, 2009 to March 13, 2013. This is potentially
significant because new regulations became effective on March 13,
2013 and because the notice requirements in place before January
16, 2009, have been revised.
7
FMLA leave in order to trigger its duty to provide the employee
with notice. That argument is wrong. “[T]he rights established by
the [FMLA] may not be diminished by any employment benefit program
or plan 29 CFR § 825.700(a).” Thus, CCFHC’s handbook cannot
disclaim the right to notice conferred upon Wingfield by the FMLA.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or
the
attempt
to
exercise,
any
right
provided
under
this
subchapter.”). Since CCFHC’s handbook argument is the sole basis
for summary judgment as to Wingfield’s FMLA claim, see Def.’s Br.
at 8-9, the Court will deny the Motion as to this claim.
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The
Plaintiff’s ADA claim is dismissed with prejudice, but her FMLA
claim may proceed under 29 U.S.C. § 2617. The Court is uncertain
about what theory of liability the Plaintiff is asserting in her
“failure to train on the FMLA,” but to the extent that the
Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim outside of the FMLA,
e.g., § 1983 liability, that claim is dismissed with prejudice
because the Plaintiff did not rebut the Defendant’s assertion that
such a theory of liability does not exist in this context. In
addition, the Plaintiff has conceded that the facts do not support
a wrongful discharge claim under Mississippi law, so that claim is
8
also dismissed with prejudice. In sum, the Plaintiff has a FMLA
claim only.
So ORDERED, this the 22nd day of April, 2013.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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