Henderson v. Pulaski County Courthouse
Filing
2
Memorandum Opinion and Order re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on August 16, 2012. (lda)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
DANIEL HENDERSON, #20000-045
PETITIONER
VERSUS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12cv113-DCB-JMR
PULASKI COUNTY COURTHOUSE
RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
BEFORE THE COURT is pro se Petitioner Daniel Henderson’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He is incarcerated with the Federal Bureau of
Prisons and challenges a detainer lodged by the State of Missouri. He seeks dismissal of the
Missouri criminal proceedings. The Court has considered and liberally construed the pleadings.
As set forth below, this case should be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
On August 10, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant action. He is currently housed at the
Federal Correctional Institution–Yazoo City. He alleges that he was convicted in the Western
District of Missouri for possession of firearms by a felon and in connection with drug trafficking.
Missouri lodged a detainer against him based on State charges arising from the same incident.
He currently has an interlocutory appeal before the Missouri Court of Appeals challenging the
State charges on the same grounds he brings here.
Before this Court, Petitioner complains the detainer violates the Interstate Agreement
Act, his right to a speedy trial, and double jeopardy. The double jeopardy, he claims, is from
being convicted in federal court and yet facing the same charges in State court. He further
claims that the detainer keeps him from being placed in a federal halfway house. He asks the
Court to order the State court to dismiss the charges.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks dismissal of the State court charges on grounds of the Interstate
Agreement Act, speedy trial, and double jeopardy. Absent “special circumstances,” federal
habeas corpus is not available “to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state
criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir.
Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973). An exception is drawn based on the type of relief sought
by the petitioner. Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (5th Cir. 1976). The distinction is
“between a petitioner who seeks to ‘abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning
of state judicial process’ by litigating a speedy trial defense . . . prior to trial, and one who seeks
only to enforce the state’s obligation to bring him promptly to trial.” Dickerson v. Louisiana,
816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Brown, 530 F.2d at 1283). Generally, the Court is
without authority to abort the State criminal trial. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226. On the other
hand, a federal court “may generally consider a habeas petition for pretrial relief from a state
court only when the accused does not seek a dismissal of the state court charges pending against
him.” Green v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, 693 F. Supp. 502, 508 (E.D. La. 1988).
Petitioner first asks that the State charges be dismissed on the basis of the Interstate
Agreement Act and Speedy Trial Clause. Under both of these claims, he maintains that Missouri
has failed to prosecute him timely. He does not seek to force the State to bring him to trial.
Since federal habeas corpus is not available to abort the State trial on these grounds, they are
dismissed without prejudice.
As for the third claim, double jeopardy can be considered a special circumstance
2
warranting pretrial habeas relief and prevention of a State criminal trial. Justices of Boston Mun.
Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 303 (1984); Showery v. Samaniego, 814 F.2d 200, 201 n.5 (5th Cir.
1987); Davis v. Herring, 800 F.2d 513, 514 (5th Cir. 1986) (aff’g injunction prohibiting state
criminal trial on double jeopardy grounds). This is because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
“against being twice put to trial for the same offense. . . . [and] a requirement that a defendant
run the entire gamut of state procedures, including retrial, prior to consideration of his claim in
federal court, would require him to sacrifice one of the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.” Justices, 466 U.S. at 303.
However, Petitioner can bring a federal habeas claim only if he has exhausted the claim
in State court. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228. This gives “the State the ‘opportunity to pass upon
and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27,
29 (2004) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). According to the Fifth Circuit:
[A]lthough section 2241 establishes jurisdiction in the federal courts to consider
pre-trial habeas corpus petitions, federal courts should abstain from the exercise
of that jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved either by trial on the
merits in the state court or by other state procedures available to the petitioner.
Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225. In order to exhaust his double jeopardy claim, he is required to seek
relief from the highest court of the State. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 840 (1999). See,
D.D. v. White, 650 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1981). Petitioner admits that the Missouri Court of
Appeals is currently reviewing this claim on interlocutory appeal, which he filed March 21,
2012. He has not yet sought relief from the highest State court, the Missouri Supreme Court.
Therefore, it is clear that he has not yet exhausted this claim.
Even if Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim is exhausted, it fails, because double jeopardy
does not protect against separate trials from two different sovereigns. Heath v. Alabama, 474
3
U.S. 82, 92 (1985). “This Court has plainly and repeatedly stated that two identical offenses are
not the ‘same offence’ within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause if they are prosecuted
by different sovereigns.” Id. (holding Alabama could try petitioner for the same murder he was
convicted of in Georgia). “As a sovereign, [Missouri] ‘has the right to decide that a [federal]
prosecution has not vindicated a violation of the “peace and dignity” of the [State]
government.’” United States v. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Heath, 474
U.S. at 93). Because there is no double jeopardy violation, this claim is dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the foregoing reasons,
the double jeopardy claim should be and is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The
remainder is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. A separate final judgment shall issue
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
SO ORDERED, this the 16th day of August, 2012.
s/David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?