Shorty v. Sparkman et al

Filing 83

ORDER granting 75 Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 77 Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on October 30, 2014. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
EDDIE JAMES SHORTY

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:12-cv-114-MTP

EMMITT L. SPARKMAN, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [75]
and Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [77].
Having considered the Motions, applicable law, and case record, the Court finds that
Defendants’ Motion [75] should be granted, Plaintiff’s Motion [77] should be denied, and this
action should be dismissed with prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2012, Plaintiff Eddie James Shorty, proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint
[1] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint occurred while he was
a post-conviction inmate at Wilkinson County Correction Facility (“WCCF”) in Woodville,
Mississippi, where he is currently incarcerated. In his Complaint and as clarified in his
testimony at the Spears1 hearing, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional
rights by failing to provide adequate protection from harm.
According to Plaintiff, other inmates are harassing him for his property and are also
stealing his property. Plaintiff alleges that although he has not been physically harmed, he lives
in fear and does not want to be housed near or come into contact with other inmates. Plaintiff

1

Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
1

claims that protective custody will not adequately protect him because he will come in contact
with other inmates when he goes to the commissary, medical unit, and other prison buildings.
Plaintiff allegedly informed Defendant Emmitt Sparkman about his situation, but
Sparkman did not provide him additional protection. Plaintiff also asserts a claim against
Defendant Larry Lee because Lee is allegedly responsible for denying Plaintiff’s requests for
transfer. As relief, Plaintiff seeks to be transferred to another facility where he can be housed in
a one-man cell and not be in contact with other inmates.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only when “the record indicates that
there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The
Court must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
However, the nonmoving party “cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’” Turner v. Baylor Richardson
Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). In the absence of proof, the Court does not “assume that the
nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis
omitted).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s claims are before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
“neither provides a general remedy for the alleged torts of state officials nor opens the federal

2

courthouse doors to relieve the complaints of all who suffer injury at the hands of the state or its
officers.” White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1981). Rather, “[i]t affords a remedy
only to those who suffer, as a result of state action, deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the
following two elements: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
In this case, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to protect him from harm at the hands
of his fellow inmates. Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect
inmates from violence by fellow inmates. Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)). However, every injury suffered by
one prisoner at the hands of another does not amount to a constitutional violation by prison
officials. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To prevail on a failure to protect claim, Plaintiff must show
that “he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection.” Jones v. Greninger, 188
F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference consists of the official being aware of both the “facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference “‘is an extremely high standard
to meet.’” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Domino v. Texas
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)). Negligent failure to protect an
inmate does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60

3

(5th Cir. 1990). The test for establishing deliberate indifference is “one of subjective
recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Defendants’ actions and/or inactions do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff has not identified any specific or obvious threat or danger. Plaintiff’s allegations
amount to a generalized fear of coming into contact with other inmates. Essentially, Plaintiff
claims that by virtue of being housed in a penitentiary he suffers from a potential risk to his
safety. Plaintiff’s generalized fear is insufficient to show that Defendants should have inferred a
substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety, much less that Defendants actually drew such an inference
as required for a finding of deliberate indifference.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that prison officials investigated his
complaints. In fact, Plaintiff was placed in a one-man cell in the protective custody unit for a
period of time.2 Plaintiff may disagree with the decisions made by prison officials regarding his
custody, but such does not form the basis for a civil rights action for failure to protect. See Neals
v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, requiring prison officials to transfer Plaintiff based on the allegations in this
case would be an unreasonable interference with the administration and management of the
prison. See Jones v. U.S., 534 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1976) (prison officials have broad discretion,
free from judicial interference, in determining prisoner assignments); Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d
948, 950 (5th Cir. 1988) (courts defer to prison administrators concerning day-to-day prison
operations); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983) (prisoners have no constitutional

2

Plaintiff alleges that he has been returned to general population as of February, 2014.
([78] at 3.)
4

right to be incarcerated in a certain facility). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Plaintiff’s requests for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction will also
be denied. To prevail on a request for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, a
party must demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial
threat that failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened
injury outweighs any damage that the injunction will cause to the adverse party; and (4) that the
injunction will not have an adverse effect on the public interest. Women’s Med. Ctr. of NW
Houston v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2001). An injunction “should not be granted unless
the party seeking it has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” PCI
Transportation Inc. v. Fort Worth & Western Railroad Co., 418 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff has not prevailed on the merits of his claims and has not shown that he is entitled to
injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [75] should be granted and Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction [77] should be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
[77] is DENIED.

2.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [75] is GRANTED and this action is
dismissed with prejudice.

2.

A separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will
be filed herein.
5

SO ORDERED, this the 30th day of October, 2013.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge

6