Collier v. Adams County, Mississippi et al
Filing
55
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on September 29, 2014. (AA)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
CAMILLA COLLIER, individually as the Wrongful
Death Heir and Beneficiary of Brandon Diaz,
Deceased, as the Administratrix of the Estate
of Brandon Diaz, Deceased
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO: 5:12-cv-133-DCB-MTP
ADAMS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; CHARLES R. “CHUCK”
MAYFIELD, JR., Sheriff of Adams County,
Mississippi, in his individual and official
capacities; and UNKNOWN DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOHN
DOES 1-10
DEFENDANTS
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is the Defendant’s, Charles R. “Chuck”
Mayfield, Jr., Motion for Summary Judgment [docket no. 33] based on
qualified immunity, which is opposed by Plaintiff Camilla Collier.
Having carefully considered the motion, the parties’ arguments and
evidence, applicable statutory and case law, the record in this
case, and
being
otherwise
fully
advised,
the
Court
finds as
follows:
I. RELEVANT FACTS
On May 6, 2011, the Adams County Sheriff’s Department (“ACSD”)
arrested Brandon Diaz on charges of burglary of a commercial
building and resisting arrest. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, p. 1-2, ECF No.
1
33-2. On June 22, 2011, he committed suicide while incarcerated.
Diaz had previously been diagnosed with Intermittent Explosive
Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder along with Mild Mental
Retardation.
On
June
18,
2007,
Diaz
underwent
a
psychiatric
consultation through Southwest Mississippi Mental Health Complex
(“SMMHC”). According to the report: “[a]t this time there is no
evidence of psychosis, and [Diaz] is not suicidal . . . .” Decl.
Camilla Collier Ex. A, p. 6, ECF No. 37-1. Diaz returned to SMMHC
in May 2009 and received treatment there continually until March
2010.1 Decl. Camilla Collier Ex. A, p. 1-5. The report from May 1,
2009,
indicated
that
Diaz
suffered
from
“low
self
esteem,
hopelessness, fatigue, lack of concentration, suicidal ideation
occasionally,
[and]
irritab[ility].”
Id.
The
reports
from
subsequent consultations show that Diaz denied having any further
suicidal thoughts.
Diaz was incarcerated, as a pre-trial detainee,2 from his
arrest until his death. Although it is unclear exactly when Diaz
ran out of his medication, it is uncontested that Diaz did not have
1
The Plaintiff submitted medical records of psychiatric
consultations on June 18, 2007, May 1, 2009, June 4, 2009,
September 3, 2009, December 3, 2009, and March 4, 2010. Decl.
Camilla Collier Ex. A, p. 1-6, ECF No. 37-1.
2
The Court recognizes the distinction drawn between the
constitutional protections afforded to pre-trial detainees and
convicted inmates. See Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers
of City of Houston, Tex., 791 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1986).
However, this distinction is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis.
2
enough Zoloft for each day of his incarceration and that the Adams
County Jail (“ACJ”) never refilled his prescription. The Plaintiff
brought her son a thirty (30) day supply of his medication on
either May 8 or 9 to the ACJ and never delivered any further
refills. Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n, p. 12, ECF No. 39. Assuming the ACJ
began giving Diaz his medication on May 9 or 10, he went without
his medication from June 9 or 10 until June 22, totaling 13 or 14
days.
On the morning of June 22, 2011, Diaz argued with another
inmate. As a result, a deputy separated the two inmates by placing
them in their separate cells. Several hours later, Brandon Diaz was
found dead of an apparent suicide in his cell.
The Adams County Jail and the ACSD policies relating to
inmates’ prescription medications and suicide prevention came from
the standard operating procedures manual maintained by the ACSD.3
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. D, p. 10, ECF No. 33-4.
The prescription medication policy begins: “it is the jailer’s
responsibility
dispensed
to
exactly
ensure
as
that
[prescription]
prescribed.
Deviations
medicine(s)
in
are
administering
medicines will not be tolerated.” Notice Supplemental Exs. Supp.
Pl.’s Supplemental Mem. Opp’n (“Pl.’s Supp. Exs.”) Ex. A1, p. 1,
ECF No. 54-2. According to the policy, the ACJ maintained a
3
The policies have since changed because the Sheriff’s
Department has outsourced its medical services. Mot. Summ. J. Ex.
D, p. 10, ECF No. 33-4.
3
medication log sheet for each inmate on prescription medication.
The written policy was supplemented by an unwritten policy for
refilling medications prescribed by a doctor other than the county
physician. If medication had originally been brought in by family
members, then the ACJ would let the family refill it. Pl.’s Supp.
Exs. Ex. A, p. 5, ECF No. 54-1 (“Q. And what happens when an inmate
runs out of medicine? A. Okay. It depends. If we had ordered the
medication, [our pharmacy] would have automatically shipped it. Had
the medicine been brought in by the family members then we would
have waited for them to bring it.”). When an inmate’s prescription
ran out, the jailer dispensing medication would inform the jail
administrator or the assistant jail administrator. After the jail
administrator was notified that
an inmate was out of medication that was prescribed by an
outside physician, [the jail administrator] would first
notify the inmate’s family that the inmate was out of
that medication and request that they follow up with the
inmate’s physician to determine whether or not the
medication needed to be refilled. The family would then
bring the medication to the [ACJ] where the Jail nurse
would review the medication and medication instructions
to make certain that the medication was what it purported
to be and that the prescription was valid. The medication
would then be administered.
Def.’s Rebuttal Ex. M, p. 3, ECF No. 42-2. No one informed the jail
administrators that Diaz was out of Zoloft. Pl.’s Supp. Exs. Ex. A,
p. 6 (“Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether any jailer or
deputy notified you that Brandon Diaz had run out of medication? A.
I don’t remember getting a sick call slip on that . . . . And if it
4
was not in the record, then it didn’t happen.”).
The suicide prevention policy begins: “jail officers are
responsible for preventing suicides,” and “[c]onfinement in a jail
and
the
circumstances
desperation
in
that
inmates,
led
to
prompting
it
can
some
to
cause
feelings
seriously
of
consider
suicide.” Pl.’s Supp. Exs. Ex. A1, p. 3, ECF No. 54-2. The policy
identifies three suicidal types: (1) an inmate facing a crisis
situation,
(2)
an
inmate
in
a
serious
depression,
and
(3)
manipulative and impulsive inmates. In addition, it lists behaviors
which jailers should look out for to identify suicide risks:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Anyone obviously under the influence of either
drugs or alcohol.
Anyone returning to the jail who has demonstrated
suicidal tendencies during previous periods of
incarceration.
People who seem to be extremely withdrawn or
distant.
Anyone who makes comments such as: “What is the use
of living anymore?” or “Nobody cares about me
anyway!”
Persons who seem overly-anxious.
Id. These behaviors are identified at the intake stage through a
screening questionnaire, and any concerns are to be immediately
reported to a supervisor. Id.; Pl.’s Supp. Exs. Ex. B, p. 3-4, ECF
No. 54-3. These procedures were also supplemented by unwritten
policies. “At intake . . . jailers consider a number of items . .
. . One item considered is whether or not an inmate has expressed
suicidal tendencies during a previous incarceration . . . Jailers
. . . constantly assess inmates based on [their] interaction with
5
that particular inmate, sick calls or grievances submitted by the
inmate, and the advice of medical providers.” Def.’s Rebuttal Ex.
L, p. 2.
II. STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law. An issue is
‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Ginsberg 1985 Real
Estate P’ship v. Cadle Co., 39 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citations
omitted).
The
moving
party
bears
the
initial
responsibility of apprising the district court of the basis for its
motion and the parts of the record which indicate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986).
“Once the moving party presents the district court with a
properly supported summary judgment motion, the burden shifts to
the
non-moving
party
to
show
that
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate.” Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d
377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be
6
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
But the nonmovant must meet his burden with more than metaphysical
doubt, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or a
mere scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A party asserting a fact is “genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular
parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Summary judgment must be rendered when the nonmovant “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests–the need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction,
and
liability
when
they
perform
their
duties
reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “A
qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden
of proof. Once an official pleads the defense, . . . [t]he
7
plaintiff bears the burden of negating the qualified immunity, but
all inferences are drawn in his favor.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d
249,
253
(5th
Cir.
2010).
In assessing a
claim
of qualified
immunity, courts apply the two pronged analysis established in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), but the court may address the
prongs in any order, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 225.
One prong asks “whether Plaintiff’s allegations establish a
constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The
second prong asks “whether the right was clearly established.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “[T]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Under the facts presented, Sheriff Mayfield may be held liable
only on a theory of supervisory liability. There are two theories
of supervisory liability: (1) failure to train or supervise the
officers involved, Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447,
459 (5th Cir. 2001), and (2) implementation of “a policy so
deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional
rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation,”
Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal
quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
8
A. State Law Claims
The Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed several of the counts
of her claim against the Defendant in his individual capacity,
including her state law negligence claim and her unlawful arrest
claim. Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n, p. 2 n.2, ECF No. 39; Id., at p. 13 n.17.
Collier, however, maintains her state law wrongful death claim
against
Sheriff
Mayfield
in
his
individual
capacity.
Sheriff
Mayfield contends this claim is subject to the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act and should be dismissed. Def.’s Rebuttal, p. 1 n.1, ECF
No. 42.
The Court finds that neither party has adequately addressed
this issue in its briefing. See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n, p. 2 n.3 (“The
defendants
did
not
address
plaintiff’s
wrongful
death
claim.
Therefore, the plaintiff will not address that claim.”). Therefore,
the Court denies this motion without prejudice so far as it
concerns the Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
B. Failure to Train
All jailers at the ACJ were required to complete training at
a state mandated “jail certification school.” Dep. Charles “Chuck”
Mayfield, Jr., p. 12, ECF No. 33-4. They received no further formal
training. See Dep. Joseph West, p. 3, ECF No. 54-3. If the jailers
were only required to complete a state mandated training program,
then the plaintiff must prove the state training was inadequate.
9
See Benavides v. Cnty. of Wilson, 955 F.2d 968, 973 (5th Cir.
1992). Also, mere proof that the injury would not have occurred if
the officer had received better or additional training cannot,
without more, support liability. Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397
F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, Collier has not provided any
evidence that the state training is inadequate, and the plaintiff
is only attempting to argue that the injury would not have occurred
had the jailers received additional training. Therefore, Sheriff
Mayfield cannot be held liable on a failure to train theory.
C. Deficient Policy
1. Inadequate Medical Treatment
It is clearly established law that prisoners are entitled to
adequate medical treatment, and jailers violate this right when
they are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976). The standard
is the same whether applied to “prison doctors in their response to
the prisoner’s needs or [to] prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering
with the treatment once prescribed.” Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
The Third Circuit has established a serious medical need as one
which has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring medical
treatment. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326,
347
(3rd
Cir.
1987).
The
10
evidence
shows
that
Diaz
was
prescribed Zoloft; therefore this is a serious medical need.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
the Court finds for the purposes of this motion that the evidence
is likely to show Diaz’s prescription ran out roughly two weeks
before his death.
Based on the nature of this case, the Court will only look to
the second prong of Saucier. See Morgan v. Swanson 659 F.3d 359,
384-85 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s ongoing
retreat
from
Saucier’s
mandatory
order
of
battle
and
active
discouragement of district courts from “unnecessarily deciding the
merits of a constitutional issue”). In Thompkins, the court ruled
that an official could only be held liable through a deficient
policy if the official knew the jail’s policy was so deficient that
it exposed prisoners to a substantial risk of significantly unmet
serious medical needs and failed to correct it. Thompkins, 828 F.2d
at 304. The existence of a constitutionally deficient policy cannot
be inferred from a single wrongful act. Id.
Collier has put on no evidence that the policy required a
written sick call slip, whereas Sheriff Mayfield has personally
sworn that the policy accepted oral requests. “[T]he nonmoving
party may
not
rest
upon
the
mere
allegations
.
. .
in
its
pleadings, but must instead set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Recile,
10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). Therefore, based on the facts
11
on the record, the Court finds that the policy is not facially
unconstitutional. Further, “a single incident of unconstitutional
activity is not sufficient to impose liability . . . unless proof
of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
unconstitutional . . . policy. . . .” City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plurality opinion). Collier has
only alluded in her briefing to prior complaints filed against
Sheriff Mayfield but has not produced any evidence of their content
or their similarity to Diaz’s inadequate medical care. Therefore,
Sheriff Mayfield is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
2. Failure to Protect
Collier has pled that Sheriff Mayfield failed to protect her
son from himself, leading to his suicide, and failed to protect him
from others, leading to his rape. To establish a failure to protect
claim,
a
prisoner
must
show
that
he
is
incarcerated
under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for
protection. Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To act with
deliberate indifference, “the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837; see also Neals, 59 F.3d at 533. “The failure to
12
protect[ inmates] from their known suicidal impulses is actionable
under § 1983. . . .” Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 391
(5th
Cir.
1992).
Although
actionable,
courts
have
previously
recognized the fundamental dilemma of suicide prevention. “Suicide
is inherently difficult for anyone to predict, particularly in the
depressing prison setting.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice,
239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Evans v. City of
Marlin, Tex., 986 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that
because
police
personnel
lack
the
expertise
of
medical
professionals with psychiatric training they are not required to
detect suicidal tendencies with perfect accuracy).
Here, Diaz indicated to his jailers that he was not suicidal
at the time of his incarceration and the history of psychiatric
evaluations at SMMHC, although unknown to the jailers, confirmed
that Diaz’s treatment was effective and that he had not been
suicidal. It follows that there was nothing for the jailers to note
about Diaz which would have alerted them to the potential of his
suicide at intake. It further follows that Diaz would not have
demonstrated any signs of suicidal thoughts before he ran out of
his medication.4 Thus the only time the jailers could have or
4
The declaration of an inmate housed with Diaz supports
this analysis of Diaz’s behavior. Duck stated Diaz was
“interactive with [him] and other inmates [and] . . . appeared
happy and regularly talked with [him] and other inmates in the
cell block” from the beginning of his incarceration until he ran
out of medication. Decl. Willie Duck, p. 2, ECF No. 38.
13
should have seen a self-destructive change in Diaz’s behavior is in
the two weeks between his last dose of medication and his death. An
inmate housed in the same cell block as Diaz, Willie Duck, stated
Diaz “became withdrawn and stopped talking to [him] and other
inmates . . . [and] appeared to be sad rather than happy” after he
ran out of his medication. Duck further stated “[t]he jailers could
see” Diaz’s change in behavior. Decl. Willie Duck, p. 2, ECF No.
38.
However, the test for deliberate indifference is subjective,
requiring the “conscious[] disregard of a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-39. The knowledge of such a
risk may be inferred from circumstantial evidence where the risk is
obvious. Id., at 842. Collier implies in her briefing that the jail
should have been aware Diaz was suicidal at intake because he had
been
previously
suicidal.
The
jail’s
policy
of
continuing
evaluation based on multiple factors, of which previous known
suicidal behavior is just one, does not violate the Constitution
because it is not deliberately indifferent. The jail evaluates
suicide risk, but it is not possible to identify and prevent every
suicide risk.
Even accepting that the change in Diaz’s behavior did occur
and that the jailers were aware of it, Collier has not provided any
evidence this behavior demonstrates a substantial risk of suicide.
Not every human moment of despondency means an individual is
14
planning to take his life. A verbal argument with another inmate
does not, in itself, indicate feelings of suicide. Therefore,
Sheriff Mayfield is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
jail’s suicide prevention policy was not deliberately indifferent
to Diaz’s need for protection from himself.
Prior to his death, Diaz wrote his mother a letter stating he
was raped in jail. Decl. Camilla Collier, p. 2, ECF No. 37. Having
discovered the letter in a bag of dirty laundry she was taking home
to wash, Collier showed it to three deputies at the jail. The
deputies denied that Diaz could have been raped in jail. Pl.’s
Supp. Exs. Ex. D, p. 21, ECF No. 54-7; Pl.’s Supp. Exs. Ex. A1, p.
17, ECF No. 54-2.
Collier has produced little evidence beyond mere allegations
that Diaz was raped in the ACJ. Further, Collier has put on no
evidence that any policy implemented by Sheriff Mayfield was
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of rape. Therefore,
the Court finds that Sheriff Mayfield is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on this issue.
IV. Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Charles “Chuck” Mayfield,
Jr.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry 33) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
the
15
motion
is
DENIED
as
to
the
Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
FURTHER ORDERED that all of the Plaintiff’s other state law
claims are voluntarily dismissed.
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
the
motion
is
GRANTED
as
to
the
motion
is
GRANTED
as
to
the
inadequate medical care claim.
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
the
Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim.
So ORDERED, this the 29th day of September 2014.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
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