Felton et al v. Wells Fargo Bank et al
Filing
15
ORDER granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment as to claims against defendants Warrington, Westbrook, and individual members of Yazoo County Board of Supervisors, in their individual capacities Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 9/27/2013 (ECW)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
CEASAR FELTON and MARY FELTON
PLAINTIFFS
vs.
CAUSE NO. 5:12-cv-139(DCB)(MTP)
WELLS FARGO BANK; MORRIS & ASSOCIATES;
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY;
SEAN SOUTHERN, Individually and as
Trustee under the Substituted Trustee’s
Deed; DEMETRIUS WEATHERBROOK, Individually
and in his Capacity as Justice Court Clerk
for Yazoo County; BENNIE WARRINGTON,
Individually and in his Capacity as Justice
Court Judge for the Southern District of
Yazoo County; YAZOO COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS; and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-100
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This
cause
is
before
the
Court
on
defendants
Bennie
Warrington, Demetrius Westbrook (incorrectly named “Weatherbrook”
in the plaintiffs’ Complaint), and the Yazoo County Board of
Supervisors’ Motion for Summary Judgment Premised on Immunity
(docket entry 12).
Having carefully considered the motion, to
which no response has been filed, and the applicable law, as well
as the record in this case, the Court finds as follows:
The plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed on August 29, 2012, and
alleges
that
the
Yazoo
County
Justice
Court
did
not
have
jurisdiction over eviction proceedings brought before the justice
court and styled Wells Fargo Bank, NA vs. Ceasar L. Felton and Mary
L. Felton / All other occupants, Cause No. 29-769.
The plaintiffs
allege that Judge Warrington presided over the justice court
proceeding,
that
Justice
Court
Clerk
Westbrook
accepted
and
recorded the Complaint filed by Wells Fargo, and that the Yazoo
County Board of Supervisors failed to train and/or supervise Judge
Warrington and Clerk Westbrook regarding their duties.
The plaintiffs allege federal constitutional claims against
Judge Warrington and Clerk Westbrook for denial of due process,
equal protection, and right to privacy, brought pursuant to the
procedural vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Complaint, ¶¶ 56, 58.
They also allege state law claims against Judge Warrington, Clerk
Westbrook, and the Yazoo County Board of Supervisors for unlawful
eviction,
negligent
trespass
to
land,
negligent
trespass
to
chattel, negligent abuse of process, reckless indifference to the
plaintiffs and failure to train and supervise.
Judge Warrington claims that he is entitled to absolute
immunity, or, in the alternative, qualified immunity, from any and
all federal claims, since the rendering of judgment in the justice
court action was a judicial function and was not taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.
He also alleges that he is
entitled to judgment on all state law claims on immunity grounds.
Clerk Westbrook claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity on
all federal claims, and that he is entitled to judgment on all
state law claims on immunity grounds.
The members of the Yazoo
County Board of Supervisors, in their individual capacities, assert
qualified immunity as to all federal claims against them on grounds
2
that
the
plaintiffs
have
not
alleged
that
they
personally
participated in any of the actions alleged in the Complaint, and
that there is no evidence they were deliberately indifferent to any
need for training or supervision with regards to Judge Warrington
and/or Clerk Westbrook.
The individual supervisors also assert
that they are entitled to judgment on all state law claims based on
immunity grounds.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) “mandates the entry of
summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.”
(1986).
must
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
consider
the
record
evidence
and
draw
all
reasonable
inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Paz v. Brush Engineered
Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir.2009).
The
party
seeking
summary
judgment
bears
the
burden
of
“informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of [the record evidence] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
“A genuine issue of material
fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Paz, 555 F.3d at 391
(quoting Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th
3
Cir. 2000)).
Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party
must then “come forward with specific facts showing a genuine
factual issue for trial.”
Harris ex rel. Harris v. Pontotoc Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 685, 690 (5th Cir. 2011).
The nonmoving party
cannot rely on metaphysical doubt, conclusive allegations, or
unsubstantiated assertions but instead must show that there is an
actual controversy warranting trial.
Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(internal citations omitted).
As
the 2010 amendments to Rule 56 make clear, a party asserting that
a fact “is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions,
affidavits
documents,
or
electronically
declarations,
stored
stipulations
...,
interrogatory answers, or other materials ....”
information,
admissions,
Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1)(A).
The plaintiffs have failed to respond to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. The local rules of this Court require
a response to a motion within fourteen days, L.U.C.R. 7(b)(4),
which is not optional.
Blackard v. City of Southaven, 2012 WL
827192, *3 (N.D. Miss. March 9, 2012).
The plaintiffs, who are
represented by counsel, neither responded to the motion nor moved
for additional time to respond.
The Court notes that it may not grant summary judgment by
4
default, i.e., merely because there is no opposition to the motion.
Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 362 n.3 (5th Cir.
1995).
However, the Court may accept as undisputed the movant’s
version of the facts and grant the motion where the movant has made
a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment.
Eversley v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988);
Romberger v. United Transp. Union, 930 F.Supp. 1131, 1132 (N.D.
Miss. 1996).
In other words, the defendants must still meet their
burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists concerning the plaintiffs’ claims and that the defendants
are entitled to entry of judgment as a matter of law.
The Plaintiffs’ Complaint relates to an eviction proceeding
before the Justice Court of Yazoo County, Mississippi, which was
filed by defendant Wells Fargo Bank on March 2, 2011.
In the
Complaint for Eviction, Wells Fargo made the following allegations
against Ceasar and Mary Felton:
The basis for the Plaintiff’s claim against the
Defendant[s] is [that] they are wrongfully occupying the
property following a foreclosure sale held on the 2nd day
of February, 2011. That proper and lawful notice has
been given to the Defendant[s]
according to statute
prior to initiating this eviction proceeding.
Justice Court Pleadings, YC000001, ¶ 4.
Summons was issued on March 2, 2011, directing Ceasar and Mary
Felton to appear before the Yazoo County Justice Court on March 24,
2011. After the hearing, the following judgment was entered by the
Justice Court:
5
This cause this day coming on to be heard the court
hereby ordered and adjudged that judgment be entered in
favor of Plaintiff by consent. Defendants are to vacate
the premises / be removed from 1937 Barnwell Circle Yazoo
City on or before April 25, 2011.
Id. at YC000020.
On April 29, 2011, Wells Fargo moved the Yazoo County Justice
Court for a warrant of removal, which was issued on May 6, 2011.
Id. at YC000015, YC000018.
2011, at 8:00 am.
The eviction took place on May 11,
Id. at YC000018.
On May 11, 2011, Ceasar
Felton, represented by Steven E. Waldrup, and Mary Felton, pro se,
filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and a
Preliminary Injunction with the Mississippi Supreme Court.
MSC
Docket (Exhibit C attached to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment).
This Motion was dismissed by the Mississippi Supreme
Court on May 11, 2011, due to the Feltons’ failure to comply with
Miss.R.App.P. 21.
See Justice Court Pleadings, YC000016.
The plaintiffs allege in their present Complaint that the
Yazoo County Justice Court did not have jurisdiction over the
eviction proceedings.
They allege the following federal claims
brought pursuant to the procedural vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against Judge Warrington and Clerk Westbrook:
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
. . .
56. The actions of the Defendants denied the Plaintiff[s]
of [their] property rights without due process.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
6
. . .
58. The Plaintiffs[’] Fourth Amendment Rights were
violated as a result of the actions of [defendant Bennie
Warrington] when their right of privacy was invaded ....
Complaint, ¶¶ 56, 58.
The plaintiffs also allege state law claims
against Judge Warrington, Clerk Westbrook and the Yazoo County
Board of Supervisors for unlawful eviction, negligent trespass to
land, negligent trespass to chattel, negligent abuse of process,
reckless indifference to the Plaintiffs, and failure to train and
supervise.
The plaintiffs allege that Clerk Westbrook should not
have accepted the Complaint filed by Wells Fargo, due to lack of
jurisdiction, that Judge Warrington should not have ruled on the
Complaint filed by Wells Fargo, due to lack of jurisdiction, and
that the Yazoo County Board of Supervisors “were negligent in
[their] failure to supervise and train Justice Clerk Demetrius
Westbrook and the Honorable Judge Bennie Warrington that [the
Justice Court] did not have jurisdiction over unlawful entry and
detainers due to the existence of a County Court in Yazoo County.”
Complaint, ¶ 29.
Judge Warrington, Clerk Westbrook, and the individual members
of the Board of Supervisors move for summary judgment as to all
claims against them in their individual capacities, based on
immunity defenses.
7
I. JUSTICE COURT JUDGE BENNIE WARRINGTON
Judge Warrington claims that he is entitled to absolute
immunity, or, in the alternative, qualified immunity, from any and
all federal claims, since the rendering of judgment in the justice
court action was a judicial function.
Judges enjoy absolute
immunity from liability in damages for their judicial acts or “in
the exercise of their judicial functions.”
Boyd v. Biggers, 31
F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315,
317 (5th Cir.1993); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)).
Such absolute immunity “can be overcome only by showing that the
actions complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing that
the
actions
jurisdiction.”
were
taken
in
the
complete
Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284-85 (citing
absence
of
all
Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 220–21)(“holding
that a state judge’s dismissal of a subordinate court employee is
not a judicial act entitled to absolute immunity.”)).
“A judge’s
acts are judicial in nature if they are ‘normally performed by a
judge and the parties affected dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity.’” Boyd, at 285 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12; Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).
In addressing whether Judge
Warrington acted outside the scope of his judicial capacity, the
Court considers:
(1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal
judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the
courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the
judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered
8
around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether
the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in
his official capacity.
Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)(quoting Malina
v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993)).
have
not
alleged
any
facts
that
would
The plaintiffs
indicate
Warrington was performing a nonjudicial function.
that
Judge
The Justice
Court order to vacate the premises was entered following a hearing
before the court and in the courthouse, and entering orders and
issuing warrants are typical functions of judges. See Ballard, 413
F.3d at 516.
As to the second prong for the application of judicial
immunity, “‘[w]here a court has some subject matter jurisdiction,
there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.”
994 F.2d at 1125 (citation omitted).
Malina,
“If [a] Judge ... ‘merely
acted in excess of his authority,’ [he] is still protected by
judicial immunity.”
F.2d at 1125).
Ballard, 413 F.3d at 517 (quoting Malina, 994
“Only in the clear absence of jurisdiction will
‘[a] judge ... be deprived of immunity because the action he took
was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority.’”
Lewis v. City of Waxahachie, 465 Fed. Appx. 383, 384
(5th Cir. 2012)(holding that if a judge “had at least some subjectmatter jurisdiction,” immunity applies); see also Davis v. Bayless,
70 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 1995)(“For purposes of immunity the
judge’s jurisdiction is construed broadly and a judge is not
9
deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was
done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he
will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.”)(internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Under Mississippi law, a complaint for eviction can either be
taken as an unlawful entry and detainer claim, pursuant to Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-25-1, or, in certain circumstances, can be taken
under either Miss. Code Ann. § 89-7-1 et seq., or Miss. Code Ann.
§ 89-8-1 et seq.
A justice court will have jurisdiction over an
unlawful entry and detainer action brought pursuant to § 11-25-1,
except where a county court is present in the jurisdiction.
Where
a county court is present in the jurisdiction, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-21 provides:
[County courts] shall have exclusively the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the justice court in the
following matters and causes: namely, eminent domain, the
partition of personal property, and actions of unlawful
entry and detainer, provided that the actions of eminent
domain and unlawful entry and detainer may be returnable
and triable before the judge of said court in vacation.
Miss. Code Ann. § 9-9-21.
Wells Fargo Bank brought an action entitled “Complaint for
Eviction” before the Justice Court of Yazoo County, Mississippi.
The movants in the case sub judice quote from a recent Mississippi
Attorney General’s Opinion on the subject of eviction:
If removal is sought by use of the remedy of unlawful
entry and detainer and there is a county court in the
10
jurisdiction the action must be filed in the county
court.
See MS AG Op., Mullen (May 2, 2008) citing
Section 9-9-1 of the Mississippi Code which grants
exclusive jurisdiction of unlawful entry and detainer to
county court when such a court is available.
If the facts of the particular case allow for an eviction
proceeding pursuant to Section 89-7-1 et seq or Section
89-8-1 et seq. of the Mississippi Code then the action
may be filed in justice court or county court.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8 (quoting
Miss. A. G. Opinion No. 2008-00459, Erby (Sept. 5, 2008)(2008 WL
4560056)).
Pursuant to the foregoing statutes and interpretation, this
Court
finds
that
a
justice
court
at
least
has
conditional
jurisdiction over eviction proceeding such as the one complained of
by the plaintiffs.
Even when there is a county court within the
same jurisdiction as the justice court, the justice court may still
maintain jurisdiction over eviction proceedings dependant upon the
claims made and the statute under which the proceedings are filed.
Because the justice court has some subject matter jurisdiction over
eviction
proceedings,
Fifth
Circuit
precedent
dictates
that
judicial immunity applies to Judge Warrington’s rulings.
In the alternative, the movants assert that Judge Warrington
is entitled to qualified immunity, which protects public officials
from liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established
statutory
or
constitutional
reasonable person would have known.”
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
rights
of
which
a
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
“Qualified immunity balances two important
11
interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
“The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether
the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of
fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.”
Id.
(citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)(Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)(quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) for
the proposition that qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in
judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law”)).
A
district
court
undertakes
a
two-pronged
analysis
in
determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified
immunity, inquiring: (1) whether the facts that the plaintiff has
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2)
whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of
the defendant’s alleged misconduct.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232
(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
Prior to
Pearson, Saucier mandated that whether “the facts alleged show the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right ... must be the
initial inquiry” in every qualified immunity case.
Saucier, 533
U.S. at 201. However, in Pearson, the Supreme Court concluded that
while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often
appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as
mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the
courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their
12
sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first
in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
“There are cases in which it is plain
that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from
obvious whether in fact there is such a right.”
Id. at 237.
“Saucier’s two-step protocol ‘disserve[s] the purpose of qualified
immunity’ when it ‘forces the parties to endure additional burdens
of suit - such as the costs of litigating consitutional questions
and delays attributable to resolving them - when the suit otherwise
could be disposed of more readily.’” Id. (quoting Brief for Nat.
Assn. of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 30).
In this case the plaintiffs allege that the Yazoo County
Justice Court did not have jurisdiction over the proceedings at
issue, and that Judge Warrington therefore deprived them of their
property
rights
without
due
process
of
law.
It
is
well-
established, however, “that neither negligent nor intentional
deprivations of property violate due process where there is an
adequate state tort remedy available.” Stafford v. Dillon, 2012 WL
6599922, *6 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 18, 2012)(citing Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)).
The plaintiffs had the right to appeal any judgment from the
Justice Court of Yazoo County to the County Court of Yazoo County,
provided all necessary appeal documents were filed within thirty
days of the judgment.
See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-81.
13
The
plaintiffs were provided at least 30 days to appeal the March 24,
2011, ruling of the Justice Court, but failed to do so.
Instead,
they waited until May 11, 2011, to file an appeal with the
Mississippi
Supreme
procedurally barred.
Court,
which
that
court
determined
was
Because the adequate state court remedy of
appeal to County Court was available to the plaintiffs, they cannot
maintain a due process claim based on an alleged deprivation of
property rights.
The plaintiffs have also generally alleged an equal protection
claim.
The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
“[A] violation of equal protection occurs only when the government
treats someone differently than others similarly situated; if the
challenged
government
action
does
not
appear
to
classify
or
distinguish between two or more relevant persons or groups, then
the action - even if irrational - does not deny them equal
protection of the laws.”
(5th Cir. 1988).
Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257
The Equal Protection Clause is violated by
intentional discrimination, which implies that the decisionmaker
singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected
his course of action, at least in part, for the purpose of causing
an adverse effect on an identifiable group.
604 (5th Cir.1996).
14
Vera v. Tue, 73 F.3d
To successfully make a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause,
a
§
1983
plaintiff
must
prove
that
a
state
actor
intentionally discriminated against him because of membership in a
protected class.
See Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 277
(5th Cir. 1997).
“Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection
context implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course
of action at least in part because of, and not simply in spite of,
the adverse impact it would have on an identifiable group.”
Id.
In the case sub judice, the plaintiffs have not identified their
protected class, nor stated any facts in support of their claim.
Like their due process claim, the plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim is without merit.
Regarding the plaintiffs’ property and privacy interests, “the
Fourth Amendment protects only those expectations of privacy that
society recognizes as ‘legitimate.’”
Freeman v. City of Dallas,
242 F.3d 642, 653 (5th Cir. 2001)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 338 (1984)).
of
course,
with
“‘What expectations are legitimate varies,
context
...
[and]
...
may
depend
individual’s legal relationship with the State.’”
upon
the
Freeman, 242
F.3d at 653 (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 654 (1995)).
“After a foreclosure sale, ‘the debtor is
divested of all legal and equitable interest in the foreclosed
property.’”
Moore v. Marathon Asset Management, LLC, 973 So.2d
1017, 1221 (Miss. App. 2008)(quoting In re Applewhite, 106 B.R.
15
468, 469-70 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989); Anderson v. Kimbrough, 741
So.2d 1041, 1047 (¶ 22) (Miss. App. 1999)).
According to the pleadings filed by Wells Fargo with the
Justice Court of Yazoo County, a foreclosure sale had already been
perfected; therefore, the plaintiffs did not have any legitimate
rights to the property, including a right to privacy, and the
plaintiffs have no constitutional claim under the Fourth Amendment
against Judge Warrington.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendant
Judge Bennie Warrington is entitled to absolute immunity and/or
qualified immunity from any and all federal claims brought against
him in his individual capacity.
As for the state law claims, the Mississippi Tort Claims Act
(“MTCA”),
Miss.
Code
Ann.
§
11-46-1,
et
seq.,
provides
the
exclusive remedy against a governmental entity and its employees
for acts or omissions which give rise to a suit.
Lang v. Bay St.
Louis/ Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Miss. 1999).
To
the extent that Judge Warrington was acting pursuant to and within
the
scope
liability.
of
his
employment,
he
is
immune
from
individual
The “exclusive remedy” portions of the MTCA provide in
pertinent part a follows:
(1) The remedy provided by this chapter against a
governmental entity or its employee is exclusive of any
other civil action or civil proceeding by reason of the
same subject matter against the governmental entity or
its employee . . . for the act or omission which gave
rise to the claim or suit; ....
16
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1).
The MTCA is the sole authority -
statutory or otherwise - governing the rights and liabilities of
the parties as to the plaintiffs’ state law claims.
According to
§ 11-46-5 of the MTCA:
(2) For the purposes of this chapter an employee shall
not be considered as acting within the course and scope
of his employment and a governmental entity shall not be
liable or be considered to have waived immunity for any
conduct of its employee if the employee’s conduct
constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or
any criminal offense other than traffic violations.
(3) For the purposes of this chapter and not otherwise,
it shall be a rebuttable presumption that any act or
omission of an employee within the time and at the place
of his employment is within the course and scope of his
employment.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5.
Absent admissible and competent proof
of fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal
offense, Judge Warrington is entitled to complete immunity.
Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2) states:
An employee may be joined in an action against a
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the
act or omission complained of is one for which the
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall
be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring
within the course and scope of the employee’s duties.
For the purposes of this chapter an employee shall not be
considered as acting within the course and scope of his
employment and a governmental entity shall not be liable
or be considered to have waived immunity for any conduct
of its employee if the employee’s conduct constituted
fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal
offense.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2).
Under Mississippi law, one who is
performing his job duties as a governmental employee is not subject
17
to personal liability.
Roderick v. City of Gulfport, 144 F.
Supp.2d 622 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Conrod v. Holder, 825 So.2d 16
(Miss. 2002); Mallery v. Taylor, 805 So.2d 613 (Miss. 2002); Cotton
v. Paschall, 782 So.2d 1215 (Miss. 2001). To the extent that Judge
Warrington
was
acting
within
the
course
and
scope
of
his
employment, he cannot be held liable in his individual capacity on
the basis of the plaintiffs’ state law claims.
In addition, judicial immunity is well-established under
Mississippi law.
1990).
See Loyacono v. Ellis, 571 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.
Judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are
not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such
acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and alleged to have been
done maliciously or corruptly.
Id.
“Public policy mandates that
a judge should have the power to make decisions without having to
worry about being held liable for his actions.”
Id.
“If someone
believes a judge has acted either contrary to or in excess of her
authority, the primary remedy is to file a complaint with the
Mississippi
Commission
on
Judicial
Performance.”
Vinson
v.
Prather, 879 So.2d 1053 (Miss. App. 2004)(citing Miss. Comm’n of
Jud. Perform. v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 947 (Miss. 1997)).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendant
Judge Bennie Warrington is immune from any and all state law claims
brought against him in his individual capacity.
18
II. JUSTICE COURT CLERK DEMETRIUS WESTBROOK
Like Judge Warrington, Clerk Westbrook asserts the two types
of immunity defenses recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in the context of § 1983 claims.
Under qualified immunity,
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct
does
not
violate
clearly
established
statutory
or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “‘Absolute
immunity’ denies a person whose federal rights have been violated
by a government official any type of remedy, regardless of the
conduct.”
O’Neal v. Mississippi Board of Nursing, 113 F.3d 62, 65
(5th Cir. 1997).
“[T]he Supreme Court has been ‘quite sparing’ in recognizing
absolute immunity.” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
224 (1988)).
Officials whose duties require a full exemption from
liability include
judges
performing
judicial
acts
within
their
jurisdiction, Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S.
335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871), prosecutors in the performance
of their official functions, Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S.
503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927), and certain
“quasi-judicial” agency officials who, irrespective of
their title, perform functions essentially similar to
those of judges or prosecutors, in a setting similar to
that of a court. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17,
98 S. Ct. 2894, 2913-16, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978).
Id.
Court clerks are entitled to absolute immunity from actions
19
“for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do
under court order or at the judge’s discretion.”
242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001).
Clay v. Allen,
They are entitled to only
qualified immunity from actions for damages arising out of the
performance of their routine duties.
Id.
Miss. Code Ann. § 9-11-27 provides:
The [justice court] clerk and deputy clerks shall be
empowered to file and record actions and pleadings, to
receive and receipt for monies, to acknowledge
affidavits, to issue warrants in criminal cases upon
direction by a justice court judge in the county, to
approve the sufficiency of bonds in civil and criminal
cases, to certify and issue copies of all records,
documents and pleadings filed in the justice court and to
issue all process necessary for the operation of the
justice court. The clerk or deputy clerks may refuse to
accept a personal check in payment of any fine or cost or
to satisfy any other payment required to be made to the
justice court. All orders from the justice court judge
to the clerk of the justice court shall be written. All
cases, civil and criminal, shall be assigned by the clerk
to the justice court judges of the county in the manner
provided in Section 11-9-105 and Section 99-33-2.
Miss. Code Ann. § 9-11-27.
In the case sub judice, the plaintiffs allege that Clerk
Westbrook did nothing more than receive and file-stamp pleadings
filed by the parties in the Wells Fargo Bank vs. Felton case.
other
words,
they
allege
that
this
defendant
merely
In
entered
pleadings in accordance with the statute, i.e., carried out his
routine duties according to Mississippi law.
Therefore, although
Westbrook is not entitled to absolute immunity, he is entitled to
qualified immunity.
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“[G]overnment
20
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”).
As for the state law claims against defendant Westbrook, he,
like Judge Warrington, is entitled to immunity in his individual
capacity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act where it is alleged
that he acted within the course and scope of his employment.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5, § 11-46-7.
See
In addition, it is well
established under Mississippi law that court clerks are immune from
civil liability when performing official acts.
Vinson v. Benson,
805 So.2d 571, 575 (Miss. App. 2001)(citing Johnson v. Craft, 673
F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D. Miss. 1987)).
Because the plaintiffs’
allegation against this defendant is that he was performing the
quintessential
official
act
of
a
justice
court
clerk,
i.e.
receiving, filing and recording court documents, Clerk Westbrook is
immune from state law liability in his individual capacity.
III. YAZOO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
“[U]nder Mississippi law, a county board of supervisors acts
in an official, not individual, capacity.
Any neglect or failure
in the discharge of its duties is the default of the board itself,
not [of] the individual members who comprise the board.”
Bruns v.
Garber, 2007 WL 1141503 *5 (S.D. Miss. April 17, 2007).
21
A
supervisor may only be liable in his individual capacity if he
actively participated in the constitutional deprivation, or if he
personally implemented a policy that caused the plaintiff’s injury.
Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987).
In this
case, the plaintiffs do not allege personal involvement by any
individual member of the Board of Supervisors, nor do they allege
that any individual supervisor was causally connected to the
alleged deprivation in any way.
Since the Complaint contains
allegations against the Board of Supervisors in its official
capacity
only,
the
individual
board
members
are
entitled
to
qualified immunity from any and all federal claims brought against
them in their individual capacities.
The individual supervisors, like Judge Warrington and Clerk
Westbrook, are also entitled to immunity from any state law claims
since it is not alleged that they acted outside the course and
scope of their employment.
See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-5 and 11-
46-7.
The defendants’ motion is well taken, and all claims against
them
in
their
individual
capacities
shall
be
dismissed
with
prejudice.
The Court notes that the defendants’ motion does not address
the claims against them in their official capacities and/or claims
against Yazoo County.
Accordingly,
22
IT
IS
Demetrius
HEREBY
Westbrook
ORDERED
that
(incorrectly
defendants
named
Bennie
Warrington,
“Weatherbrook”
in
the
plaintiffs’ Complaint), and the Yazoo County Board of Supervisors’
Motion for Summary Judgment Premised on Immunity (docket entry 12)
is GRANTED;
FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against defendant Bennie
Warrington in his individual capacity are dismissed with prejudice;
FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against defendant Demetrius
Westbrook in his individual capacity are dismissed with prejudice;
FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against defendants members of
the
Yazoo
County
Board
of
Supervisors
in
their
individual
capacities are dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this the 27th day of September, 2013.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?