Dennis v. Byrd et al

Filing 63

ORDER granting 45 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Larry Lee and granting 49 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Raymond Byrd. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on July 29, 2014. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
DARIUS JARQUES DENNIS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:13-cv-57-MTP

RAYMOND BYRD and LARRY LEE

DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [45] filed by
Defendant Larry Lee and the Motion for Summary Judgment [49] filed by Defendant Raymond
Byrd. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the Court finds
that the Motions [45] [49] should be granted.
BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2013, Plaintiff Darius Jarques Dennis, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint and as clarified in
his testimony at the Spears1 hearing, Plaintiff alleges that on December 12, 2012, a violent
incident occurred at the Wilkinson County Correctional Facility (“WCCF”) which resulted in an
inmate being stabbed.2 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Raymond Byrd and Investigator Artist3
interrogated him regarding the incident. Plaintiff alleges that, during the interrogation, Byrd and
Artist assaulted him and threatened to poison him if he reported the assault. Plaintiff also alleges
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Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).

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Plaintiff’s claims arose while he was incarcerated as a post-conviction inmate at WCCF.
Plaintiff, however, is currently incarcerated at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution
(“SMCI”).
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Plaintiff originally named Investigator Artist as a defendant, but at the Spears hearing,
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Investigator Artist from this action.
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that Byrd and Artist denied him the opportunity to be seen by medical professionals following
the assault. See Omnibus Order [36].
According to Plaintiff, he was issued four false Rule Violation Reports (“RVRs”) for the
stabbing and placed on “lockdown” (administrative segregation). Allegedly, Plaintiff remained
on “lockdown” for twenty days before all four RVRs were dismissed without a hearing, and he
remained on “lockdown” after the RVRs were dismissed. According to Plaintiff, he sent a letter
to Defendant Larry Lee (Mississippi Department of Corrections Contract Monitor for WCCF)
informing him about the assault and the false RVRs, but Defendant Lee did not respond or
rectify the situation. Plaintiff allegedly sent a second letter to Defendant Lee, and as a result,
Defendant Lee confronted Plaintiff and instructed him to stop writing letters because Plaintiff’s
issues were unimportant. Id.
Plaintiff claims that, as a result of Defendants actions, he was kept on “lockdown” and
deprived of opportunities to see his family. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages
from the Defendants. On February 25, 2014, Defendant Lee moved for summary judgment, and
on March 3, 2014, Defendant Byrd moved for summary judgment. On July 14, 2014, Plaintiff
responded to the Motions for Summary Judgment.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment must be rendered “after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322-23. The movant bears the initial
responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of
the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 323.
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate, by
affidavit, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
At the summary judgment stage, the Court must consider the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). “However, a nonmovant may
not overcome the summary judgment standard with conclusional allegations, unsupported
assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” McClure v. Boles, 490 Fed. App’x
666, 667 (5th Cir. 2012).
ANALYSIS
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on certain
claims. Indeed, at his Spears hearing, Plaintiff conceded that he did not file a grievance through
the Administrative Remedy Program (“ARP”) regarding the allegations that Defendant Byrd
assaulted him, threatened to poison him, and denied him medical treatment. According to
Plaintiff, he only filed an ARP grievance regarding his placement on “lockdown.” See Omnibus
Order [36].
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires prisoners to
exhaust any available administrative remedies prior to filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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“Whether a prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies is a mixed question of law and fact.”
Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Circuit held that “[s]ince
exhaustion is a threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether litigation is being
conducted in the right forum at the right time, . . . judges may resolve factual disputes
concerning exhaustion without the participation of a jury.” Id. at 272. Because exhaustion is an
affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies. Id. at 266.
The Fifth Circuit takes “a strict approach” to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
Johnson v. Ford, 261 Fed. App’x 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d
863, 866 (5th Cir. 2003)). The “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006). It is not enough to merely initiate the grievance
process or to put prison officials on notice of a complaint; the grievance process must be carried
through to its conclusion. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).
Exhaustion is mandatory, irrespective of the relief sought by Plaintiff. “[A] prisoner must now
exhaust all administrative remedies even where the relief sought–monetary damages–cannot be
granted by the administrative process.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84 (citing Booth v. Churned, 532
U.S. 731, 739 (2001)).
In his response [62], Plaintiff invites the Court to exercise its discretion and consider his
claims despite that fact that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. However,
“[e]xhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is mandatory.” Id. at 85
(citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 739). The Fifth Circuit has confirmed that “the PLRA pre-filing
exhaustion requirement is mandatory” and that “district courts have no discretion to waive the

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PLRA’s pre-filing exhaustion requirement.” Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 787-88 (5th Cir.
2012)
Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning his allegations
that Defendant Byrd assaulted him, threatened to poison him, and denied him medical treatment,
Plaintiff may not proceed with these claims in this cause of action. Accordingly, these claims
should be dismissed without prejudice.
Due Process
Plaintiff’s remaining claims relate to the alleged false RVRs and his confinement in
administrative segregation. Plaintiff’s allegations amount to a claim against Defendants for
violations of his due process rights. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). In determining whether there has been a
due process violation, courts consider (1) whether there has been a “liberty or property interest
which has been interfered with by the State,” and, if so, (2) whether that process was
“constitutionally adequate.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990).
Protected liberty interests “are generally limited to state-created regulations or statutes
which affect the quantity of time rather than the quality of time served by a prisoner.” Madison
v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). A prisoner’s liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause is “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes an atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). The protection afforded by the Due Process clause does
not extend to every adverse or unpleasant condition experienced by an inmate. Madison, 104

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F.3d at 767.
Plaintiff alleges that he was issued false RVRs, placed in administrative segregation, and
held there after his RVRs were dismissed. These allegation, however, do not amount to atypical
and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. “[A]dministative
segregation, without more, does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable
liberty interest.” Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Sharp v. Anderson,
2000 WL 960568, at *1 (5th Cir. June 15, 2000) (concluding inmate’s claim that he was kept in
administrative segregation for 112 days after he was found not guilty of a disciplinary charge did
not implicate the protections of the Due Process Clause); King v. Sims, 2009 WL 2497154, at *5
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2009) (finding that reclassification, reassignment, and loss of commissary,
phone, and visitation privileges did not constitute a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights).
In his response, Plaintiff argues that he has a constitutional right to his custody status.
The law does not support Plaintiff’s argument. “A reduction in class or a change in custody
status does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Kennedy v.
Enler, 2014 WL 2761556, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 18, 2014) (citing Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d
953, 958-59 (5th Cir. 2000), Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995)).4
Plaintiff’s liberty interests were not infringed upon by the punishment he received as a
result of the RVRs. Thus, Plaintiff has not suffered a violation of his due process rights
cognizable under Section 1983. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of

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Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ actions constituted violations of MDOC policy.
Plaintiff, however, does not explain how the policy violations infringed upon his liberty interests.
Furthermore, “a prison official’s failure to follow the prison’s own policies, procedures, or
regulations does not constitute a violation of due process . . . .” Myers v. Kelvenhagen, 97 F.3d
91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).
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law.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Lee failed to respond to his complaints
does not give rise to a constitutional claim. See Dehghani v. Vogelgesang, 226 Fed. App’x 404,
406 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s allegation that warden failed to adequately
investigate his grievance did not amount to a constitutional violation); Charles v. Nance, 186
Fed. App’x 494, 495 (5th Cir. 2006); Woodland v. City of Vicksburg, 2006 WL 3375256, at *3
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 21, 2006) (holding that a claim for failure to investigate did not amount to a
constitutional violation).
Although Defendants have raised the defense of qualified immunity, “if it becomes
evident that the plaintiff has failed to state or otherwise establish a claim, then the defendant is
entitled to dismissal on that basis.” Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1991)); see also Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234,
236 (5th Cir. 1999). Because the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable as
constitutional claims, it need not address the issue of whether the Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgement [45] [49] should be granted.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.

Defendant Larry Lee’s Motion for Summary Judgment [45] is GRANTED,

2.

Defendant Raymond Byrd’s Motion for Summary Judgment [49] is GRANTED,

2.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants for violations of his due process rights are
dismissed with prejudice,
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3.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Byrd for excessive force and denial of
adequate medical care are dismissed without prejudice, and

4.

A separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will
be filed herein.

SO ORDERED this the 29th day of July, 2014.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge

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