Carithers et al v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC et al
Filing
20
ORDER denying without prejudice 8 Motion to Dismiss. The parties are to conduct limited discovery on the issue of workers' compensation exclusivity, and are to contact Magistrate Judge Parker for a scheduling order. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 3/17/2014 (ECW)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
HUGH CARITHERS, BRENDA CARITHERS,
AND JOEY CARITHERS AS WRONGFUL
DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF CATLIN
HUGH CARITHERS, DECEASED
VS.
PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-cv-66(DCB)(MTP)
CCA OF TENNESSEE, LLC, CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, CCA PROPERTIES
OF AMERICA, LLC, AND JOHN DOES 1-10
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the defendants’ motion to
dismiss (docket entry 8).
Having carefully considered the motion
and the plaintiffs’ response, the memoranda and the applicable law,
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds as
follows:
On May 20, 2012, Catlin Carithers (“Carithers”), a senior
correctional
(“ACCC”)
was
officer
at
the
Adams
killed
by
inmates
County
during
a
Correctional
prison
riot.
Center
The
deceased’s wrongful death beneficiaries bring this action against
the named defendants (collectively “the CCA defendants” or “the
defendants”)1 and unknown individuals for assault, battery, and
fraudulent concealment.
The plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges the
following:
The defendants maintained a less than adequate staff at the
1
The CCA defendants own and operate the ACCC in Adams
County, Mississippi. Defendants’ Brief, p. 1.
facility, and provided neither adequate equipment nor adequate
training to the staff, creating a dangerous atmosphere for the
correction officers. Complaint, ¶ 12. In addition, the defendants
created a dangerous atmosphere by depriving the inmates of basic
needs and by treating them inhumanely.
¶ 13.
The staff had put
the defendants on notice of these dangerous conditions prior to the
riot.
¶ 14.
Two days before the riot, an inmate warned a security
officer at the prison of an impending riot and informed him that
inmates had a “hit list” which included Carithers.
¶¶ 17-19.
Carithers was not told he was on the “hit list.”
Carithers
¶ 24.
was not working on the day of the riot, but was called in to work
because of the riot.
¶ 22.
The security officer who called
Carithers in to work knew he was on the “hit list,” and knew the
inmates intended to cause him harm, but the officer did not inform
Carithers he was on the “hit list.”
¶¶ 23-24.
intended
or
to
and
did
cause
harmful
The defendants
offensive
Carithers, and he was killed as a result thereof.
contact
¶¶ 32-34.
to
The
defendants intended to and did cause an imminent apprehension of
harmful or offensive contact to Carithers, and he was killed as a
result thereof.
¶¶ 38-41.
The defendants knew that Carithers was
on the “hit list” and that the inmates would do him harm, but they
intentionally withheld the information from him, and he was killed
as a result thereof.
¶¶ 43-48.
In lieu of an answer, the CCA defendants filed a motion to
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dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).
The defendants contend that they are immune from the
plaintiffs’ claims because the claims are barred by the exclusive
remedy in the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. Specifically,
the defendants allege that Carithers’ death was caused by the
willful conduct of a third party because of Carithers’ employment
status as a correctional officer at ACCC and while he was engaged
in his work.
Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 2.
The CCA defendants also
allege that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for assault
or battery because inmates, not the defendants, assaulted or
battered Carithers.
Further, the defendants contend that they
cannot be liable for fraudulent concealment because the plaintiffs
have failed to allege reliance, proximate causation, and legal
duty.
¶ 3.
The defendants seek dismissal under both Rule 12(b)(1) and
Rule
12(b)(6).
The
plaintiffs,
as
the
party
asserting
jurisdiction, bear the burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss. Ballew v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 668 F.3d 777, 781 (5th
Cir. 2012)(citation omitted). To meet their burden, the plaintiffs
“must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the court has
jurisdiction based on the complaint and evidence.”
omitted).
Id. (citation
The Court may determine whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction based on “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3)
3
the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s
resolution of disputed facts.”
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d
158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)(citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States,
74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)).
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court
accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.’”
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v.
Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)(quoting
Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)).
this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions.
However,
“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
at 570.
Twombly, 550 U.S.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Id. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted).
“A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with
other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)
4
jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.”
Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
However, “federal claims should not be
dismissed on motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when
that determination is intermeshed with the merits of the claim and
when there is a dispute as to a material fact.”
Lawrence v.
Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1990)(citing Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Mississippi’s workers’ compensation statute states:
The liability of an employer to pay compensation shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such
employer to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parents, dependents, next-of-kin, and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages at common
law or otherwise from such employer on account of such
injury or death, except that if an employer fails to
secure payment of compensation as required by this
chapter, an injured employee, or his legal representative
in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim
compensation under this chapter, or to maintain an action
of law for damages on account of such injury or death.
In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense
that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow
servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his
employment, nor that the injury was due to the
contributory negligence of the employee.
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-9.
“The exclusivity provision of the Act is not applicable to an
employee’s claim if: (1) the injury is caused by the willful act of
the employer or another employee acting in the course and scope of
employment and in furtherance of the employer’s business; and (2)
the injury [is] one that is not compensable under the Act.” Hurdle
v. Holloway, 848 So.2d 183, 185 (Miss. 2003)(citing Newell v.
5
Southern Jitney Jungle Co., 830 So.2d 621, 624 (Miss. 2002)).
Furthermore, “[i]f the injuries were caused by an intentional tort,
the exclusivity provision would not apply.”
Id. at 185 n.4.
In response to the CCA defendants’ motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs submit that they have met the pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 by providing “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
p. 4 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554).
Plaintiffs’ Brief,
The plaintiffs allege
that the defendants acted intentionally to injure Carithers, and
point out that “intent to injure .. can be inferred from the
factual circumstances of the case.”
Brief in Response, p. 6.
Although it is appropriate for the Court to decide motions to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted solely on the basis
of the face of the complaint, it is also appropriate to consider
matters outside the pleadings in deciding both
Rule 12(b)(1) and
Rule 12(b)(6) motions, thereby converting them to motions for
summary judgment.
See Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161; In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2011).
See also
Sumwalt v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 2013 WL 6056602, at *4
(W.D.
N.C.
Nov.
15,
2013)(“Where
jurisdictional
facts
are
intertwined with facts central to the substance of a case, a court
6
must find that jurisdiction exists and consider and resolve the
jurisdictional objection as a direct attack on the merits of the
case.”)(citing United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 580
(4th Cir. 1999)); McGowan v. ABM Janitorial Servs. Northeast, Inc.,
2011 WL 2604107, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2011)(suggesting that if
jurisdictional facts and facts central to the merits of the case
are intertwined, a district court may convert the proceeding to one
for summary judgment and consider evidence outside the pleadings).
The plaintiffs seek to conduct discovery, citing Franklin
Corp.
v.
Tedford,
18
So.3d
215,
240
(Miss.
2009)
for
the
proposition that an employer’s intent to injure an employee can be
inferred or shown by the circumstances and facts of the case, and
asserting that circumstances proving intent are fact intensive and
vary from case to case.
Brief in Response, p. 7.
The Court finds that limited discovery should be allowed in
this case.
See Washington v. Tem’s Junior, Inc., 981 So.2d 1047,
1048 (Miss. App. 2008)(noting that trial court denied motion to
dismiss as premature, ordered parties to conduct discovery, and
allowed defendant to file a motion for summary judgment); Peaster
v.
David
New
Drilling
Co.,
Inc.,
642
So.2d
344,
344
(Miss.
1994)(finding that defendant filed a motion to dismiss with the
trial court, then a motion for summary judgment based on identical
grounds, which was overruled without prejudice pending further
discovery); Rivers v. Int’l Matex Tank Terminal, 864 F.Supp. 556,
7
560 n.5 (E.D. La. 1994)(“Until discovery is complete, Mrs. Rivers
could not reasonably be expected to know of all events that
occurred during the course of her husband’s employment.
Because
her husband has died since the filing of this suit, the only means
by which Mrs. Rivers can learn of the underlying facts is through
discovery.”).
The Court therefore finds that the parties shall be allowed to
conduct limited discovery in this case (limited to the issue of
workers’ compensation exclusivity).
The defendants’ motions shall
therefore be denied without prejudice.
At the conclusion of
discovery, the defendants may file a motion for summary judgment
and may renew their Rule 12(b)(1) motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss
(docket entry 8) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may conduct limited discovery
in this case (limited to the issue of workers’ compensation
exclusivity),
and
the
parties
shall
contact
Magistrate
Judge
Michael T. Parker’s office for a scheduling order.
SO ORDERED, this the 17th day of March, 2014.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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