Smith v. Frye et al

Filing 78

ORDER granting 49 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 54 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 58 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on June 17, 2015. (ES)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
KENDRICK DEWAYNE SMITH

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13cv192-MTP

SCOTT K FRYE, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [49] filed by
Defendant Dr. Charles Borum, the Motion for Summary Judgment [54] filed by Defendants Charles
Mayfield and Captain Ed Tucker, and the Motion for Summary Judgment [58] filed by Defendant
Scott Frye. After careful consideration of the motions, the submissions of the parties, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that the Motions [49], [54] and [58] should be GRANTED and this
matter be dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kendrick Dewayne Smith, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the instant
civil rights action on or about September 16, 2013.1 Plaintiff is a post-conviction inmate currently
incarcerated at Walnut Grove Correctional Facility. The alleged events giving rise to this lawsuit
occurred while the Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee housed at the Natchez City Jail (“NCJ”) and in
custody of the Adams County Jail (“ACJ”). Plaintiff’s claims and his requested relief were clarified
and amended through his sworn testimony at a Spears2 hearing held on May 16, 2014.3

1

See Complaint [1] at 4.

2

Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).

3

The contents of the hearing were set forth in the Omnibus Order [33].
1

Plaintiff alleges claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in connection
with the treatment of a gunshot wound and nerve damage. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on June
24, 2011, following his arrest by law enforcement authorities, doctors at Natchez Regional Hospital
(“NRH”) treated him for a gunshot wound to his left shoulder and back. He alleges that he sustained
injuries to his tendons and nerves in the affected area. Following his surgery, Plaintiff alleges that
he was transferred to the University of Mississippi Medical Center (“UMMC”) in Jackson. At
UMMC, Plaintiff alleges that a neurologist prescribed him Endocet (a generic form of Percocet), and
advised him and the officer escorting the Plaintiff that surgery was necessary to prevent nerve
damage. However, the neurologist also stated that UMMC policy required a prisoner to exhaust all
other state hospital options before he could perform the surgery.4
Natchez police officers transported Plaintiff from UMMC to the NCJ on June 26, 2011.
According to the Plaintiff, he was in the custody of the Adam’s County Sheriff’s Department, but
was held in the NCJ for the majority of the time that he was a pre-trial detainee. Plaintiff alleges that
while he was held at the NCJ, a relative made arrangements for him to see Dr. Ibrahem Seki, a
family physician. He alleges that Defendant Captain Frye, a Natchez police officer and captain of
the city jail, escorted him to the appointment. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Seki recommended to Captain
Frye that he locate a doctor to perform surgery on the Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that Frye
and Dr. Seki located a doctor in Vicksburg. The surgery, however, was never performed. Plaintiff
alleges that his brother contacted the Adams County Sheriff’s office regarding the surgery, but that
the Sheriff’s office informed him that a court order would be required.5

4

Id. at 2.

5

Id. at 3.
2

Plaintiff alleges that although he was housed at the NCJ, he received treatment at the ACJ.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Charles Borum examined him on two occasions and prescribed him antianxiety medication. He alleges that he asked Dr. Borum for physical therapy because his medication
was not working, but that Dr. Borum declined to prescribe additional treatment or medication.
Plaintiff claims that Dr. Borum should have known that Plaintiff required further treatment and
should have provided it.6
Finally, Plaintiff asserts claims against Adams County Sheriff Charles Mayfield and ACJ
Captain Ed Tucker. Plaintiff claims that as individuals with supervisory responsibilities, Sheriff
Mayfield and Captain Tucker should have provided him with adequate medical treatment. However,
Plaintiff concedes that he never spoke or corresponded with Mayfield or Tucker regarding his
treatment and does not know whether either of them were aware of his requests for treatment.
Plaintiff also claims that Mayfield should not have implemented a policy that requires a court order
to receive certain medical treatment.7
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the inadequate medical treatment, he has suffered
permanent nerve damage and pain. Plaintiff states that he has brought claims against the Defendants
in their individual capacities. He requests compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of
$300,000.8
STANDARD
A motion for summary judgement will be granted when “the record indicates that there is

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.
3

‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The court must view “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. However, the nonmoving party
“cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or ‘only
a scintilla of evidence.’” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.
2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). In the absence of
proof, the Court does not “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary
facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 ((emphasis omitted). The nonmovant cannot survive a proper motion
for summary judgment by resting on the allegations in his pleadings. Isquith v. Middle South
Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 199 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325-26. Instead, the
nonmovant must present evidence sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issues in his favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
ANALYSIS
At the Spears hearing in this matter, Plaintiff indicated that he is suing the Defendants in
their individual capacities.9 In response, Defendants have raised the defense of qualified immunity.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit “has repeatedly held that objective reasonableness in a qualified immunity context

9

Id.
4

is a question of law for the court to decide, not an issue of fact.” Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp.,
430 F.3d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999); Mangieri
v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994). Courts evaluating Section 1983 claims should
conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
First, “whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged,” and second,
“whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 14, 200 (2001)). In Pearson
v. Callahan, the United States Supreme Court held that while the sequence of analysis set forth in
Saucier “is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009). Thus, the Court is permitted to exercise its discretion in deciding which of the two prongs
of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first. Id.
Once the defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon, 305 F.3d at 323. “The defendant official
must initially plead his good faith and establish that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority.” Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). Because Defendants
have raised the defense of qualified immunity in their motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff “can
no longer rest on the pleadings ... and the court looks to the evidence before it (in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff) when conducting the [qualified immunity analysis]." McClendon, 305
F.3d at 323 (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996)). Accordingly, this Court must
examine the summary judgment record and determine whether Plaintiff has adduced sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact suggesting that Defendants’ conduct violated an
actual constitutional right for each claim, and whether their conduct was objectively unreasonable
in light of clearly established law. McClendon, 305 F.3d at 323.

5

Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dr. Charles Borum, a physician at the ACJ, and Captain
Scott Frye, an administrator at the NCJ, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. First,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Borum denied his requests for additional medication and physical
therapy. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Frye failed to ensure that he received a surgery that
Plaintiff claims was ordered by his physicians.
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with deliberate indifference
to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Domino v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 754
(5th Cir. 2001). Although Plaintiff was a pre-trail detainee as opposed to a post-conviction inmate
at the time of the alleged events, the analysis of his medical claims are governed by the deliberate
indifference standard. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 648 (5th Cir. 1996). For a prison
official to be liable for deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that “the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference is
“an extremely high standard” that encompasses “only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.
1997).
Deliberate indifference is particularly difficult to establish when the inmate was provided
with ongoing medical treatment. “Unsuccessful medical treatments, acts of negligence, or medical
malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his
medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 (citations omitted).

6

The plaintiff must show that the officials "refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally
treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would evince a wanton disregard for
any serious medical needs." Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). Complaints that
more treatment should have been ordered, without more, are insufficient to show deliberate
indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (“[T]he decision whether to provide additional treatment
is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.”).
Defendant Dr. Charles Borum
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Borum provided him inadequate medical care during his detention
at the NCJ and ACJ. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Borum wrongfully denied his requests
for physical therapy and additional medication, despite Plaintiff’s complaints that his medication
did not work and that he suffered from pain in his arm.
In this case, Plaintiff’s sworn testimony at the Spears hearing indicates that Dr. Borum
provided him with at least some medical care. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that Dr. Borum
examined him on two occasions and prescribed him medication for pain and anxiety. He further
testified that Dr. Borum did not refuse to treat him, only that the treatment he was provided was
ineffective.10
In addition to his testimony, a review of Plaintiff’s medical records reveals the full extent
of the substantial medical attention he received in regard to his arm pain and nerve pain. Beginning
in November 2012, Plaintiff began receiving medical treatment from Southern Health Providers
(“SHP”), a company that contracted with the ACJ to provide health care services to the inmates.

10

See Spears Hearing Transcript [49-1] at 26-28.
7

SHP’s contract with the ACJ came into effect on November 1, 2012.11 In turn, Defendant Dr. Borum
contracted with SHP to provide physician services beginning on February 1, 2013.12
On November 2, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a sick call, complaining that he had pain in his
arm and that his medications were not working.13 Plaintiff was seen the same day by Nurse Keith
Sanders. Nurse Sanders performed a physical examination of the Plaintiff, recommended exercises
for his hand to strengthen his muscles and promote blood circulation, and continued his
prescriptions of Neurontin for his nerve pain and Flexeril to treat his muscle stiffness and pain.14
On December 2, 2012, Plaintiff submitted another sick call complaining that he was out of
his medications, and that they were ineffective. The next day, Nurse Stacey Thompson notified the
NCJ to pick up refills for Plaintiff’s medication, and also placed Plaintiff on the list to see the then
jail physician, Dr. Walter Gipson.15 On December 6, 2012, Dr. Gipson examined the Plaintiff. They
discussed the Plaintiff’s medical history, and Dr. Gipson ordered the release of Plaintiff’s medical
information from UMMC. Dr. Gipson also ordered that Plaintiff’s Neurontin dosage be doubled, and
that he continue taking his regular dose of Flexeril.16

11

See Health Services Agreement [49-2].

12

See Independent Contractor Agreement [49-3]. Although Plaintiff was in the custody of
the Adams County Sheriff and housed at the NCJ beginning in 2011, SHP and Dr. Borum began
providing the Plaintiff with medical treatment beginning in November 2012 and February 2013,
respectively. Accordingly, the undersigned will only outline and analyze the treatment provided
to the Plaintiff since that time in respect to his claim against Dr. Borum
13

See Medical Records [53] at 14.

14

Id. at 15.

15

Id. at 12.

16

Id. at 3, 7.
8

On January 8, 2013, Plaintiff submitted another sick call slip stating that his medication was
“not doing the trick [for him].” Plaintiff complained that he was still experiencing pain in this left
arm and fingers, and that he was worried that his fingers were not receiving enough blood
circulation.17 Plaintiff was transported from the NCJ to the medical unit at the ACJ on January 11,
2013, in order to be examined by Nurse Faith Laughlin. Nurse Laughlin noted that Plaintiff
complained of numbness and discomfort in his left arm. She also noted that he was able to move his
arm without difficulty, open and close his left hand, and pull back the fingers on his left hand with
no skin pulling. She noted that Plaintiff had normal coloring in his fingers, and that she could easily
feel the Plaintiff’s pulse in his left wrist. She noted that although Plaintiff claimed the medication
did not work, he wished to continue taking the same medication.18
On May 16, 2013, Plaintiff was examined by Nurse Leah Pounders in response to his
complaints of left arm pain. She noted the Plaintiff’s heart rate, blood pressure and breathing rate,
and placed him on the list to see the new jail medical unit physician, Dr. Borum.19 Five days later,
Plaintiff submitted a sick call request, stating that he had pain in his arm and that he needed to speak
to a psychologist. He claimed that he had been out of his medications for months and that ibuprofen
was not helping his pain.20 Dr. Borum examined the Plaintiff that same day. Dr. Borum noted
Plaintiff’s complaints that Neurontin was not helpful, and that Plaintiff was feeling depressed. He

17

Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff actually submitted two sick calls on January 8, 2013, but they are
virtually identical.
18

Id. at 6, 11.

19

Id. at 5.

20

Id. at 8.
9

prescribed Celexa21 to the Plaintiff to treat his depression.22
Three days later on May 23, 2015, Plaintiff stated that his medication “may be helping a
little.” Nurse Leah Pounders noted that the Plaintiff denied any further needs at that time. She also
noted that the Plaintiff “appear[ed] to be feeling better.”23 Nurse Pounders evaluated Plaintiff again
on June 25, 2013. She noted that Plaintiff was smiling and calm, was able to make a fist with his left
hand and open his left hand with assistance. Plaintiff stated that he was unable to rate his level of
pain. Nurse Pounder recommended that Plaintiff use his right hand to assist in opening his left hand
periodically throughout the day to prevent stiffness. Nurse Pounders discussed her evaluation with
Dr. Borum, who ordered no change in Plaintiff’s treatment, but rather instructed him to notify the
NCJ staff if his symptoms worsened.24
“Medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an
inmate’s allegations of deliberate indifference.” Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir.
1995) (affirming district court’s dismissal of inmate’s deliberate indifference claims as frivolous);
Harris v. Epps, 523 Fed. App’x 275, 275 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curium) (affirming summary judgment
where inmate’s medical records reflected that he had received ongoing medical treatment).
While the Plaintiff clearly is dissatisfied with the Defendant’s attempts to treat him, his own
testimony as well as his medical records indicate that he received constitutionally adequate medical
21

Also known as citalopram, Celexa is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI)
antidepressant. See Citalopram (Celexa), National Alliance on Mental Illness,
https://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Treatment/Mental-Health-Medications/Citalopram-(Celexa)
(last visited June 10, 2015).
22

See Medical Records [53] at 5.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 4, 5.
10

care from Dr. Borum. The record reflects that Dr. Borum saw the Plaintiff on May 21, 2013–the
same day Plaintiff submitted a sick call request. Defendant then performed a physical examination
of the Plaintiff, listened to his complaints, and prescribed medication accordingly. Only three days
later on May 24, 2013, Plaintiff reported he was doing better and that the medication was working.
When Dr. Borum saw Plaintiff again on June 25, 2013, there was understandably no reason for him
to alter Plaintiff’s treatment, as it appeared that the current regimen was successful. The Court notes
that although Plaintiff has responded to the other pending motions for summary judgment,25 he did
not file a response to Dr. Borum’s summary judgment motion, and has submitted no evidence to the
Court contradicting his medical records.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Borum declined to prescribe him additional medication and physical
therapy, which Plaintiff believed that he needed. Plaintiff further alleges that the medications Dr.
Borum prescribed did not work to his satisfaction. Based on the current record, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s assertions are tantamount to a disagreement with his medical care. Such arguments are
not well taken, as the Fifth Circuit has firmly and routinely held that unsuccessful medical treatment,
as well as a prisoner’s disagreement with a course of treatment, fail to establish deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir.
1999); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). Moreover, “the decision whether
to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.” See Domino,
239 F.3d at 756. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that Defendant Dr.
Borum is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

25

In Memorandum [66], Plaintiff only addresses Captain Fyre’s motion for summary
judgment. Likewise, Memorandum [76] only addresses the summary judgment motion of Sheriff
Mayfield and Captain Tucker.
11

Defendant Scott Frye
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Captain Frye was deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs by failing to ensure that Plaintiff received a surgery he claims was ordered by his physicians.
As outlined above, deliberate indifference is “an extremely high standard” that encompasses
“only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
McCormick, 105 F.3d at 1061. The plaintiff must show that the officials "refused to treat him,
ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that
would evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238.
Uncorroborated complaints that more treatment should have been ordered are insufficient to show
deliberate indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756.
In this case, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a violation of a
clearly established constitutional right. First, Although Plaintiff alleges that a UMMC physician
ordered an immediate and mandatory surgery and that Defendant Frye was aware of this need, he
has submitted no medical records or other evidence that supports this contention, and the Court’s
review of the record reveals none. In Plaintiff’s discharge papers from UMMC on June 26, 2011,
a UMMC physician recommended that Plaintiff “follow-up with the outside hospital surgeon who
performed his operation,” and further recommended that he “follow-up with neurosurgery in
approximately 6 weeks to further evaluate his left upper extremity weakness and function at that
time.”26 Moreover, Plaintiff’s treatment notes from his July 7 and July 21, 2011, appointments with
Dr. Seki likewise fail to demonstrate that Plaintiff unequivocally required surgery. Instead, Dr. Seki
recommended “moist heat,” and indicated that a consult with a neurologist or neurosurgeon would

26

See Medical Records [63] at 1.
12

be beneficial.27 Although Dr. Seki indicated that Plaintiff had some possible health problems, he also
noted that Plaintiff was in no acute distress and that Plaintiff’s gunshot wound was healing.28 No
other physician who examined the Plaintiff made any recommendations for surgery. Therefore, as
there is no indication that Plaintiff’s condition necessitated immediate surgery, the Court finds that
Defendant Frye could not have been deliberately indifferent by intentionally ignoring such a need.
See Shafer v. Carmona, 71 Fed. App’x 350, 354 (5th. Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment in
favor of defendant warden where plaintiff produced a memo allegedly written by the warden
outlining plaintiff’s care at local hospital and possible need for future treatment, but where there was
no indication that warden knew plaintiff required immediate surgery).
Second, the record in this case does not suggest that Defendant Frye "refused to treat [the
Plaintiff], ignored his complaints, intentionally treated in incorrectly or engaged in any similar
conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs."Johnson, 759
F.2d at 1238. Rather, the evidence before the Court reflects that Defendant Frye made several
attempts to secure follow-up appointments for the Plaintiff before he was transferred to the custody
of the Adams County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff’s medical records include a memorandum
outlining Frye’s attempts to contact the surgeon who performed Plaintiff’s operation at the Natchez
Regional Hospital, as well as a neurosurgeon recommended by Dr. Seki. Specifically, the
memorandum provides that Defendant Frye called UMMC regarding a neurosurgeon appointment
on July 29, 2011, but that UMMC responded that it did not provide treatment to inmates unless it
was the only facility in the state that could do so. The memorandum also reflects that Frye scheduled

27

See Treatment Notes [63-2] at 3.

28

Id. at 1.
13

an appointment for Plaintiff to see Dr. Kyper, the physician who performed the initial surgery on
his gunshot wound, for July 29, 2011, but that the appointment was rescheduled to August 5, 2011.
Defendant Frye noted that Dr. Seki was able to secure an appointment for the Plaintiff with Dr.
Ilercil, a local neurosurgeon, and was awaiting the date and time.29 Thereafter, Plaintiff was assigned
to the custody of Adams County Sheriff. Captain Frye has submitted a sworn affidavit corroborating
the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s medical records.30
Finally, although the analysis above assumes that Captain Frye was responsible for Plaintiff’s
medical care, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not established this notion as fact. Plaintiff was
transferred from UMMC to the NCJ on June 26, 2011. The Plaintiff appeared in Natchez Municipal
Court on July 29, 2011, where he was assigned to the custody of the Sheriff of Adams County due
to pending charges of aggravated assault of a police officer and armed robbery.31 However,
according to both the Plaintiff and Captain Frye, Plaintiff remained housed at the NCJ due to various
reasons for the duration of his time as a pre-trial detainee.32 Captain Frye avers that from July 29,
2011, the Adams County, and not the NCJ, was responsible for making determinations of Plaintiff’s
medical care, and that barring an emergency situation, all requests for treatment submitted by the
Plaintiff were forwarded to the ACJ.33 Plaintiff does not address this issue in his response to
Defendant Frye’s motion for summary judgment. However, due to the analysis above, and the

29

See Medical Records [63-3] at 13.

30

See Frye Affidavit [58-6] at 1.

31

See Mittimus [58-8].

32

See Spears Hearing Transcript [54-2] at 20-22; Frye Affidavit [58-6].

33

Id.
14

conclusion of the undersigned that Defendant Frye was not deliberately indifferent, the Court finds
it unnecessary to resolve this issue.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding
his Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Frye. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Defendant Frye is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Claims Regarding the Supervisory Responsibilities of Defendants Mayfield and Tucker
Plaintiff names Adams County Sheriff Charles Mayfield and ACJ Captain Ed Tucker as
Defendants in this matter. Plaintiff asserts that, as individuals with supervisory responsibilities,
Sheriff Mayfield and Captain Tucker should have provided Plaintiff with adequate medical
treatment. He also alleges that Sheriff Mayfield should not have implemented a policy that requires
an inmate to obtain a court order to receive certain medical treatment.
Respondeat Superior
It is well settled that § 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.
Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Alton v. Tex. A & M Univ., 168 F.3d 196,
200 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Only the direct acts or omissions of government officials, not the acts of the
subordinates, will give rise to individual liability under § 1983.”); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298,
303-04 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of
subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”). A supervisor may only be held liable if: (1) he
was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation; or (2) there is a sufficient causal
connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Id. (citing
Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1126 (1985)).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants Mayfield or Tucker were

15

personally involved in a constitutional violation, or that there was any causal connection between
the their conduct and a violation. Plaintiff conceded at the Spears hearing that Mayfield and Tucker
are prison administrators, and not medical providers.34 Furthermore, Plaintiff also admitted at the
hearing that he never spoke or corresponded with Mayfied or Tucker regarding his treatment and
does not know whether either of these Defendants were aware of his requests for treatment.35
Defendants Mayfield and Tucker have submitted sworn affidavits stating that they had no
knowledge that Plaintiff required additional medical care.36 In his response to the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Mayfield and Tucker were subjectively aware
of his need for additional medical treatment based on sick call slip he submitted at the ACJ. The sick
call slip contains a handwritten response from an ACJ employee: “Let Smith know he has to bond
out.”37 However, there is no indication that Mayfied or Tucker authored this note or even knew of
its existence. Plaintiff has submitted no other evidence in support of this claim.
Accordingly, for these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants Mayfield and Tucker are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this ground. See Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d 316,
325 (5th Cir. 2000) (“With no evidence indicating that [Defendants] had any direct involvement in
the treatment decisions at issue, there is no way a reasonable jury could find their actions violated
the rights of [the plaintiff].”).
Adams County Jail Policy

34

See Spears Hearing Transcript [54-2] at 20, 24.

35

See Omnibus Order [33] at 3.

36

See Mayfield Affidavit [54-3]; Tucker Affidavit [54-4].

37

See Memorandum [76] at 4.
16

As for Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Mayfield concerning the ACJ policy for inmate
surgical procedures, the Court finds that he has failed to establish a constitutional violation sufficient
to overcome a motion for summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit has held that supervisory liability
may exist if supervisory officials “implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a
repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a the constitutional violation.”
Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304 (internal quotations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has also held that the
“existence of a constitutionally deficient policy cannot be inferred from a single wrongful act.”
O’Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). Thus, Sheriff
Mayfield may not be held liable unless he knew that the ACJ’s policy “was so deficient as to expose
prisoners to substantial risk of significantly unmet serious medical needs–i.e., was
unconstitutional–and failed to properly attempt to correct it.” Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304.
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Mayfield implemented a policy at the ACJ requiring inmates to
obtain a court order before receiving surgery. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff states that his
younger brother called the Adams County Sheriff’s Department regarding Plaintiff’s need for
surgery, and was told that Plaintiff needed a court order.38 Beyond this hearsay statement, Plaintiff
has offered no evidence to support his claim that such a policy even existed, or that Mayfield was
aware of it and failed to correct it.39

38

See Spears Transcript [54-2] at 21; Plaintiff’s Affidavit [76-2] at 6.

39

Although he responded to Defendant Mayfield’s summary judgment motion, Plaintiff
does not address this issue in his brief. See Memorandum [76]. He attaches to the response, inter
alia, his own sworn affidavit reiterating the allegations set forth at the Spears hearing. See
Affidavit [76-2]. The undersigned notes that Sheriff Mayfield has submitted a sworn affidavit
attesting that it is not the policy of the ACJ to require a court order before an inmate may receive
surgery. See Mayfield Affidavit [54-3].
17

At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff can longer rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325-26. Plaintiff has adduced no evidence whatsoever that the ACJ failed to deliver necessary
medical care to any other inmate, and the record reflects no competent evidence that the ACJ’s
policy for inmate medical treatment is constitutionally inadequate. Accordingly, for these reasons,
the Court finds that Sheriff Mayfield is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgment [49], [54] & [58] should be GRANTED.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1.

That Motion for Summary Judgment [49] filed by Defendant Dr. Charles Borum,
Motion for Summary Judgment [54] filed by Sheriff Charles Mayfield and Captain
Ed Tucker, and Motion for Summary Judgment [58] filed by Captain Scott Frye are
GRANTED;

2.

That a separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will
be filed herein.

SO ORDERED this the 17th day of June, 2015.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge

18