Kennedy v. Jefferson County, Mississippi et al

Filing 237

ORDER denying 210 Motion to Deny or Continue Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on February 24, 2015. (AA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
JERRY L. KENNEDY

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 5:13-cv-226-DCB-MTP

JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER DENYING RULE 56(D) MOTION AND
GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’, Board of
Trustees of Jefferson County Hospital, Jefferson County Hospital,
and Regina Reed, Motion to Deny or Continue Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment under Rule 56(d) [docket entry no. 210].
Defendant
Defendants’

Jefferson
motion.

County,
Having

Mississippi

reviewed

the

has

joined

motion

and

in

the

response,

applicable statutory and case law, and being otherwise fully
informed in the premises, the Court finds as follows:
On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff Jerry L. Kennedy moved for
partial summary judgment related to his employment contract and the
circumstances of his termination. Mem. Supp. 1, ECF No. 208. In
lieu of response, Defendants Board of Trustees of Jefferson County
Hospital, Jefferson County Hospital, and Regina Reed (collectively,
“the Hospital”) moved to deny or continue the motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Resp. ¶1, ECF No. 211.
Discovery in this case is set to close on March 2, 2015. Case
1

Management Order, ECF No. 49.
Rule 56(d)1 provides that a court may defer or deny a motion
for summary judgment when the nonmovant has shown “that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition” to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “[A] party must
indicate to the court by some statement, preferably in writing (but
not

necessarily

in

the

form

of

an

affidavit),

why

he

needs

additional discovery and how the additional discovery will create
a genuine issue of material fact.” Krim v. BancTexas Grp, Inc., 989
F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in origianl). Rule 56(d)
insures

against

a

premature

or

improvident

grant

of

summary

judgment. Massey v. United States, No. 5:11cv60, 2013 WL 594886, at
*9 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 14, 2013) (citing Union City Barge Line v.
Union Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir. 1987)). Although
the Hospital argues that a Rule 56(d) motion should be granted as
a matter of course when the defendants have diligently pursued
discovery, this is only true when “its diligent efforts to obtain
evidence from the moving party have been unsuccessful.” Int’l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir.
1991). This is not the case here. The Hospital seeks evidence and
testimony under the control of neither party.
In truth, the party seeking a continuance cannot merely argue

1

All references in this opinion are to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
2

the

necessity

of

additional

discovery

without

explaining

how

specific and as yet undiscovered evidence will create a genuine
issue of material fact. Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442. The Hospital argues
that discovery is “ongoing” on the issues raised in Kennedy’s
motion and that both sides are still in the process of discovery on
them.

Mot.

Deny

insufficient

to

Continue
overcome

¶9.
the

But
Rule

this
56(d)

“vague

assertion”

burden.

See

is

Secs. &

Exchange Comm’n v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th
Cir. 1980) (“The nonmovant may not simply rely on vague assertions
that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified,
facts.”).

The

significance”

Hospital
board

identifies

minutes

and

as

the

being

“[o]f

employment

particular

contract

(in

addition to the deposition of former board members), but it fails
to explain how these pieces of evidence will create a genuine
dispute of material fact. See Mot. Deny Continue ¶11.
Based

on

the

above

reasoning,

the

Court

will

deny

the

Hospital’s motion. The Hospital requested alternatively if the
Court denied its motion that it be allowed two weeks from the close
of discovery to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The
Court interprets this request as a typical request for enlargement
of time to respond and will grant it over any potential objection
of Kennedy. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Continue or
Deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment under Rule

3

56(d) is DENIED.
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall file their responses to
the pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment no later than March
16, 2015.

SO ORDERED this the 24th day of February 2015.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4