Kennedy v. Jefferson County, Mississippi et al

Filing 337

ORDER denying 335 Motion to Remand; finding as moot 336 Motion to Stay Proceedings. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on September 17, 2015. (AA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
JERRY L. KENNEDY

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 5:13-cv-226-DCB-MTP

JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s, Jerry L.
Kennedy, Motion to Remand Renewed [docket entry no. 335] and
Emergency Motion to Stay Proceedings [docket entry no. 336]. Having
reviewed the motions, applicable statutory and case law, and being
otherwise

fully advised

in

the

premises,

the

Court

finds as

follows:
On December 12, 2014, the Court previously ruled on a motion
to remand in this case. The Court found that the statutory and
common law factors broke evenly but “that Kennedy’s attempt at
forum manipulation tip[ped] the balance in favor of retaining
jurisdiction.” Order 8, ECF No. 203. Kennedy does not mention this
finding in his renewed motion; instead he argues that an issue
arising from the summary judgment motions and motions in limine in
this case–the preclusive effect of a finding by the Mississippi
Department of Employment Security–justifies remanding this case to
state court. The question before the Court, then as now, is whether

1

it

should

decline

to

exercise

its

continuing

supplemental

jurisdiction. “[T]he decision as to whether to retain [supplemental
jurisdiction

over]

the

pendent

claims

lies

within

the

sound

discretion of the district court.” Brown v. Sw. Bell Telephone Co.,
901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Carter, 618 F.2d
1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1980)).
The Court looks to both statutory and common law factors to
determine whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction. Enochs v.
Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011). The statutory
factors come from 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c) and include whether:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim
or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1990). The common law factors come from
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), and include:
(1) judicial economy, (2) convenience, (3) fairness, and (4)
comity. 484 U.S. at 350. The Supreme Court also cautioned courts to
consider whether a plaintiff has engaged “in any manipulative
tactics . . . to manipulate the forum” in balancing the factors.
Id., at 357. “[N]o single factor is dispositive.” Mendoza v.
Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
The analysis for many of these factors, both statutory and

2

common law, is identical to the Court’s prior analysis, and the
Court will only discuss those factors that have changed or which
the Court feels need to be addressed.
As to the first statutory factor, the Court finds that the
issue to be determined is not a novel or complex issue of state
law. Both federal and state courts in Mississippi have addressed
the preclusive effect given to state agency decisions, and the
Court can follow easily in their footsteps here. Kennedy argues
that this question will be doggedly pursued in this case to the
Mississippi Supreme Court, and the Court notes that Kennedy is not
foreclosed that avenue of appeal by virtue of trial in federal
court. He may request that the federal courts certify a question to
the state court, if he so chooses. Based on the above reasoning for
the

first

factor,

the

Court

finds

that

the

analysis

of

the

statutory factors remains unchanged: two for and two against
retention of the case. Turning to the common law factors, the
Court’s analysis has changed. As to judicial economy, many more
judicial resources have been expended in this case since the
original motion, and the Court “must look at the case as of the
filing of the motion . . . .” Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v.
Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992). Further, the
district judge is now very familiar with this case and involved in
it.

Therefore,

this

factor

weighs

in

favor

of

retaining

jurisdiction. The Court’s analysis of the other factors remains the

3

same. Now, considering the changed analysis of judicial economy,
the common law factors weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction.
Lastly, the Court’s original finding of forum manipulation remains
valid.
Based on the above analysis, the Court will deny the motion to
remand. Having denied the motion to remand, the motion to stay
proceedings pending the resolution of the motion to remand is now
moot. Therefore, the Court will deny that motion, as well.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Motion to Remand is DENIED.
FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Proceedings is DENIED
as MOOT.
SO ORDERED this the 17th day of September 2015.
/s/ David Bramlette
United States District Judge

4