Manning et al v. Manning et al
Filing
67
ORDER granting 54 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join a Required Party. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 1/12/2015. (ECW)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
L. H. MANNING, VIRGINIA WARREN,
JOHN HENRY MANNING, EVA MANNING,
AND GEANNIE JONES
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-cv-238(DCB)(MTP)
JOAN FRITSCHEN MANNING, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
EDWARD RICHARD MANNING, DECEASED, AND
ROBERT PERRY AND WIFE, PAIGE PERRY
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to join a required party (docket entry 54).
Having
carefully
considered
the
motion
and
the
plaintiffs’
response, the memoranda of the parties and the applicable law, and
being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds as follows:
Rule 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party may assert, by motion, the defense of “failure to join
a party under Rule 19.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7). Rule 19, “Required
Joinder of Parties,” provides as follows:
(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.
(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord
complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that disposing
of the action in the person’s absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person’s ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the
interest.
(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been joined
as required, the court must order that the person be made a
party. A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be
made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff.
(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder
would make venue improper, the court must dismiss that party.
(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to
be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine
whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed
among the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for
the court to consider include:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or
avoided by:
(A) protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or
(C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would
be adequate; and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy
if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading the Reasons for Nonjoinder.
for relief, a party must state:
When asserting a claim
(1) the name, if known, of any person who is required to be
joined if feasible but is not joined; and
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(2) the reasons for not joining that person.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 19.
The plaintiffs filed their Complaint on December 26, 2013,
seeking a determination of ownership of land, recovery of land, and
damages against the defendants. The plaintiffs allege jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (amount of controversy in excess of
$75,000,
parties).
and
complete
diversity
Complaint, ¶ 1.
of
citizenship
between
the
The Complaint also recites that
previously a Complaint to Recover Land was filed in the Chancery
Court of Pike County, Mississippi, on August 13, 2013, bearing
Cause Number 2013-0421, and that a Complaint for Injunctive Relief
bearing Cause Number 2013-0081 was filed in the Pike County
Chancery Court, also on August 13, 2013.
Complaint, ¶ 9.
On
December 2, 2013, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their state
court Complaints without prejudice.
In the present action, the plaintiffs allege that on February
22, 2013, a decree was entered by the state court, probating the
Last Will and Testament of Edward Richard Manning and appointing
his widow, Joan Fritschen Manning, as executrix of Edward’s estate.
On June 24, 2013, a Judgment closing the estate was entered,
adjudging Joan to be Edward’s sole heir-at-law and owner of the
land in Pike County which is at issue in this action.
On or about
October 4, 2013, Joan sold the land to Robert and Paige Perry who,
along with Joan, are named defendants in the Complaint.
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The plaintiffs further allege that the land at issue did not
belong to Edward alone, but was being held by him at the time of
his death in an implied (constructive or resulting) trust for
himself and his siblings who are the named plaintiffs in the
Complaint. The plaintiffs contend that when their parents conveyed
the land to Edward by Quitclaim Deed, they intended him to hold the
land in trust for the benefit of himself and his siblings, and to
subsequently
siblings.
divide
the
land
equally
among
himself
and
his
Further, they allege that the land was mistakenly
included in Edward’s Last Will and Testament.
The plaintiffs seek
to have the Quitclaim Deed set aside and have the land conveyed to
them.
On or about October 21, 2013, a deed of trust was recorded
among the land records of Pike County in which the Perrys are named
mortgagors and Pike National Bank the lender and mortgagee.
In
their motion, the defendants contend that Pike National Bank’s
presence is required for the resolution of this action, but that
its presence would destroy complete diversity among the parties,
thus requiring dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7).
Consideration
of a motion to dismiss for failure to join a required party brought
under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with the factors set forth in Rule 19.
The Court recognizes that after the 2007 amendments to the
Rules, Rule 19 no longer asks whether a party is “necessary,” nor
does
it
include
the
term
“indispensable.”
4
See
Republic
of
Phillippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 855 (2008)(noting the
changes to Rule 19).
However, the Advisory Committee’s Notes make
clear that the Amendment, including the change from “necessary” to
“required,” and the omission of the term “indispensable,” were
“intended to be stylistic only.”
Rule 19, advisory committee’s
notes to 2007 amendment.
Rule 19 addresses distinct but related questions concerning
compulsory joinder, and its structure requires a two-step analysis.
First, it sets forth the standard employed to determine whether it
is necessary that a court join an absent party to the action when
feasible.
In order to make this determination, the court must
consider whether a person or entity not presently a litigant is a
“required party.”
A “required party” is one who is “subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rule 19(a)(1). The “required party”
must also satisfy one of Rule 19(a)’s two subsections: “(A) in that
person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among
existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the
action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
because of the interest.”
Rule 19(a)(1)(A)&(B).
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Rule 19(b), in turn, sets forth four factors for deciding
whether the court should allow the litigation to proceed when the
joinder of an otherwise required party is not feasible because it
would
destroy
subject
matter
jurisdiction
or
violate
venue
principles, a question that the court need not reach if the absent
party is not necessary under Rule 19(a).
See Rule 19(b)(1)-(4).
“[T]he criteria set forth in Rule 19(a)(1) are not to be
applied mechanically nor are they to be used to override compelling
substantive interests.”
873 (5th Cir. 1970).
Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869,
“The inquiry contemplated by Rule 19(a) is a
practical one, and is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.”
R-Delight Holding LLC v. Anders, 246 F.R.D. 496, 499 (D.
Md. 2007)(citation omitted).
There is no precise formula for
deciding whether joinder is required under Rule 19(a); instead,
determinations
under
the
Rule
are
particulars of individual cases.
heavily
influenced
by
the
7 Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1604 (3d ed.).
Federal law
controls the question of joinder regardless of whether jurisdiction
is
founded
on
diversity
of
citizenship
or
federal
question.
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102
(1968)(“Provident Bank”).
However, where state law causes of
action are at issue, a court may look to state law in determining
whether an outside party has a sufficient interest in a controversy
to require joinder.
Dore Energy Corp. v. Prospective Inv. &
6
Trading Co., 570 F.3d 219, 231 (5th Cir. 2009); Shell W. E&P Inc.
v. Dupont, 152 F.R.D. 82, 85 (M.D. La. 1993).
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the proper and
complete adjudication of a dispute involving real property cannot
be made in the absence of the persons owning interests in the
property affected.
1988).
Aldridge v. Aldridge, 527 So.2d 96, 98 (Miss.
The federal rules seek to bring all persons that may have
an interest in the subject property together in one forum so that
the
lawsuit
can
be
fairly
and
Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 advisory note.
completely
disposed
of.
See
Rule 19 seeks to bring into a
lawsuit all persons who ought to be there by requiring joinder.
Pike National Bank claims an interest in the subject property
as mortgagee under a deed of trust given by the Perrys.
The Court
cannot accord complete relief among the existing parties in the
Bank’s absence.
Further, the Bank’s absence may impair or impede
its ability to protect its interest, and may leave the existing
parties subject to a substantial risk of double, multiple or
inconsistent obligations.
The Bank is therefore a required party
under Rule 19(a).
In circumstances where the litigation should not proceed
without absent persons, the federal suit should be dismissed.
Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (5th Cir.
1986).
Rule 19(b) guides the court in deciding whether the suit
should be dismissed if the absent person cannot be joined.
7
[T]he factors enumerated in Rule 9(b) may be delineated
as the interests that affect four categories of persons:
the plaintiff, the defendant, the absentees and the
public.
First to be considered is the plaintiff’s
interest in a federal forum, second, the defendant’s
interest
in
avoiding
“multiple
litigation,
or
inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a
liability he shares with another,” third, the absentees’
interest in avoiding prejudice from the proceeding, and
fourth, the interest of the courts and the public in
complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of
controversies.
Id. at 1312 (citing Provident Bank, 390 U.S. at 109-11).
In this
case, the plaintiffs’ interest in the federal forum is weak.
Relief
is
available
to
them
in
the
state
court,
where
they
originally filed suit, and which is as convenient to the parties
and
witnesses
as
is
the
federal
court.
Furthermore,
the
allegations in the plaintiffs’ Complaint involve court proceedings
which took place in the state court, with which that court is more
familiar. The defendants’ interest in avoiding multiple litigation
or inconsistent relief is also clear, as discussed above, as is the
possibility of prejudice to Pike National Bank, which would be
impaired or impeded from protecting its interest in the property.
The Court finds that the prejudice to the parties cannot be
lessened or avoided by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures.
Rule 19 also considers
the public’s interest in efficient dispute resolution. Here, there
is a possibility of multiple litigation and its attendant burdens
on the parties and the court system.
The Mississippi state court
provides an adequate remedy, and there is no special reason the
8
suit should be brought in federal court.
When considering whether joinder under Rule 19 will destroy
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must align the parties
according
to
the
purpose
of
the
controlling matter in dispute.
suit
and
the
primary
and
City of Indianapolis v. Chase
National Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1941).
The Court finds that
Pike National Bank’s interest lies with the defendants.
Both the
Bank and the Perrys have an interest in the property covered by the
mortgage.
The plaintiffs contend that Pike National Bank should be
aligned as a plaintiff.
However, in general only the party who
initiates the lawsuit should be saddled with the procedural burdens
of a plaintiff.
See 7 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1605 (3d ed.).
The Bank should not be
made an involuntary plaintiff because its interest lies with the
Perrys and against the plaintiffs.
See Haas v. Jefferson National
Bank, 442 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1971)(owner of stock who pledged stock
as collateral to bank was aligned with defendant bank and against
plaintiff who was suing the bank for rights to the stock).
The Bank is considered a resident citizen of Mississippi for
jurisdictional purposes, as is plaintiff L.H. Manning.
Thus,
joinder of the Bank is not feasible since it would divest the Court
of subject matter jurisdiction, and this action must be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7).
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss
for failure to join a required party (docket entry 54) is GRANTED.
A final judgment dismissing this case without prejudice shall
follow.
SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of January, 2015.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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