Ard et al v. Rushing et al
Filing
80
OPINION AND FINAL JUDGMENT: In accordance with the court's opinions dated 8/30/12 and 2/20/13, final judgment is hereby entered as to plaintiff's claims against defendant Rushing, in his individual and official capacities, and against Lincoln County, and these defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 3/20/14 (LWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
AMBER ARD
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13CV249TSL-JMR
STEVE RUSHING, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
This court entered an opinion granting summary judgment to
Lincoln County Sheriff Steve Rushing in his individual capacity on
August 30, 2012.
On February 10, 2014, the court entered summary
judgment for Rushing in his official capacity and Lincoln County.
There remain pending in this cause plaintiff Amber Ard’s claims
against Tim Miller, in his individual capacity.
Presently before
the court is a motion by Ard for entry of final judgment on the
court’s February 10, 2014 memorandum opinion and order granting
the summary judgment motion of defendants Steve Rushing, in his
official capacity, and Lincoln County, Mississippi.
Defendants
Rushing and Lincoln County advise they have no objection to the
motion.
In his motion, plaintiff criticizes the court’s “fail[ure] to
enter an appealable ‘final judgment’ as required by Rules 54(a)
and 58(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Rule 54(a)
merely defines the term “judgment” as including “a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies[,]” and Rule 58(a) provides only
that “[e]very judgment and amended judgment must be set out in a
separate document[,]” with certain exceptions.
Neither of these
rules addresses the situation presented here, i.e., where the
court’s order disposes of fewer than all claims or the claims
against fewer than all parties.
Contrary to plaintiff’s apparent
assumption, such a ruling does not end the action as to any claims
or parties and is not appropriate for entry of a final judgment –
separate or not – unless the court makes an express finding that
there is no just reason for delay in entry of a judgment; and the
court is not required to make such a finding.
Proc. 54(b).
See Fed. R. Civ.
The applicable rule, Rule 54(b) (which plaintiff’s
motion does not even reference), states:
Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple
Parties. When an action presents more than one claim
for relief--whether as a claim, counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all,
claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any
order or other decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end
the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights
and liabilities.
This rule gives the district court considerable discretion in
deciding whether final judgment should be entered where the
court’s ruling adjudicates claims as to fewer than all parties.
See Knatt v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1 of East Baton Rouge
2
Parish, 327 Fed. App’x 472, 481 (5th Cir. May 12, 2009)
(recognizing that “the court has great latitude on this issue”).
While “[t]he rule was adopted to avoid the injustice to a party
that would result from a delay in the appeal[,] ... it was not
intended ‘to overturn the settled rule against piecemeal appeals,’
nor should it be used routinely.”
F.D.I.C. v. McFarland, No.
05–30377, 2008 WL 162882, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2008) (citing
Page v. Gulf Oil Corp., 775 F.2d 1311, 1313 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985)).
See also Brown v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 328,
332 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Although Rule 54(b) requests should not be
granted routinely, ‘[i]t is left to the sound judicial discretion
of the district court to determine the “appropriate time” when
each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for
appeal.’”) (quoting Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446
U.S. 1, 8, 100 S. Ct. 1460, 64 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1980)).
While the court may enter a 54(b) judgment sua sponte, it is
not required to do so.
Indeed, given that the purpose and effect
of a Rule 54(b) certification and judgment is to make the court’s
ruling immediately appealable, and the recognition that this is
something a party may or may not desire, it is typically the
court’s better course to await a request by a party for entry of
judgment under Rule 54(b) rather than to proceed in the matter sua
sponte.
3
Plaintiff Ard has indicated her desire for entry of a final
judgment on her claims against Rushing and Lincoln County, and
these defendants do not oppose her request.
The court agrees in
plaintiff’s assessment that there is no just reason for delay in
the entry of a final judgment and therefore, a final judgment will
be entered as to these claims.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in accordance with
this court’s memorandum opinion and order dated August 30, 2012
and its further memorandum opinion and order entered February 10,
2013, plaintiff’s claims in this cause against defendant Rushing,
in his individual and official capacities, and against Lincoln
County, are dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 20th day of March, 2014.
/s/ Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?