Hill v. Management Training Corporation et al
Filing
68
OPINION AND ORDER granting 52 Motion to Dismiss; granting 53 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying as moot 57 Motion for Summary Judgment; and granting in part and denying in part 59 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on March 7, 2016. (js)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
JAMES IRVIN HILL
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-cv-85-MTP
MANAGEMENT TRAINING CORPORATION, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [52] and Motion for
Summary Judgment [57] filed by Defendant Larry Lee and the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [53] and Motion for Summary Judgment [59] filed by Defendants Management
Training Corporation (“MTC”), Frank Shaw, Gabriel Walker, Tira Jackson, Roscoe Barnes, Ella
Scott, Tracy Arbuthnot,1 and Sheidra Arrington. Having considered the Motions, the record, and
the applicable law, the Court finds that Motions [52] [53] [59] should be granted and Motion
[57] should be denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
On October 8, 2014, Plaintiff James Irvin Hill, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint
occurred while he was a post-conviction inmate at Wilkinson County Correctional Facility
(“WCCF”) in Woodville, Mississippi. In his complaint and as clarified in his testimony at the
Spears hearing, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants Chaplain Roscoe Barnes, Tira
Jackson, and Frank Shaw for violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion;
1
In his Complaint, Plaintiff named “Tracy Arbutknot” as a Defendant, but in her Answer
[35], Defendant Arbuthnot provided the correct spelling of her name.
1
claims against Defendants Shaw, Sheidra Arrington, and Tracy Arbuthnot for violations of his
due process rights; and claims against Defendants Jackson, Shaw, MTC, Gabriel Walker, Ella
Scott, and Larry Lee for exposing him to unconstitutional living conditions.
First Amendment
According to Plaintiff, he was incarcerated at WCCF from August 15, 2013, until August
18, 2014. During that time, WCCF allegedly initiated an expansive lockdown due to several
violent incidents. Plaintiff alleges that he is Catholic and during his incarceration at WCCF he
was only able to attend one religious service. Plaintiff alleges that he discussed the lack of
religious services with Chaplain Roscoe Barnes, and Chaplin Barnes stated, “I can only do what
they let me do.” Plaintiff also alleges that he filed grievances through the administrative
remedies program regarding religious services. Tira Jackson allegedly answered these
grievances, but failed to rectify the situation. Plaintiff also claims that Warden Frank Shaw
should have seen to it that an adequate number of religious services were provided.
Due Process
According to Plaintiff, prior to his transfer to WCCF, he was issued a rule violation
report (“RVR”) for a failed drug test. As a result of the RVR, Plaintiff was allegedly placed in
restrictive custody or “C-Custody” and his trusty status was revoked, making him ineligible to
earn “trusty time.” Plaintiff alleges that this punishment should have lasted for six months and
should have ended by January 29, 2014. Plaintiff alleges that in December, 2013, Sheidra
Arrington issued Plaintiff an unwarranted RVR for threatening a correctional officer, but he was
never afforded a hearing regarding the RVR. According to Plaintiff, his trusty status was not
reinstated because of Arrington’s unwarranted RVR, despite the fact that a hearing was never
2
conducted. Plaintiff alleges that Frank Shaw and Tracy Arbuthnot were aware that his trusty
status should have been reinstated on January 29, 2014. According to Plaintiff, his trusty status
was reinstated on May 27, 2014. Plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully deprived of the ability
to earn “trusty time” between January 29, 2014, and May 27, 2014.
Conditions of Confinement
According to Plaintiff, WCCF is understaffed and lacks sufficient security. Plaintiff
alleges that at certain times, WCCF had pay telephones available to the inmates, but inmates
destroyed the telephones. According to Plaintiff, the telephones were replaced twice, but each
time they were replaced, inmates would destroy them. Plaintiff claims that MTC should have
provided telephones, despite the fact that inmates destroyed them.
According to Plaintiff, inmates at WCCF would also destroy the facilities within their
cells, and the maintenance department was unable to keep up with the rate of destruction.
Plaintiff alleges that during three months of his incarceration at WCCF, the sink in his cell was
broken, and he had no running water in his cell. According to Plaintiff, he was forced to acquire
water by filling water bottles from a spigot outside of his cell in a closet. Plaintiff alleges that on
several days he went without water. Plaintiff alleges that Assistant Warden Gabriel Walker2 and
Security Chief Ella Scott witnessed Plaintiff without water, but failed to rectify the situation.
Plaintiff claims that MTC, Frank Shaw, and Larry Lee3 were responsible for providing Plaintiff
2
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Walker was aware that many fires had occurred at
WCCF.
3
Plaintiff alleges that Larry Lee is the contract monitor for the Mississippi Department of
Corrections and is responsible for ensuring that entities such as MTC provide inmates adequate
services. Plaintiff alleges that he only saw Defendant Lee at WCCF on one occasion.
3
running water.
Plaintiff also alleges that during three months of his incarceration inmates affiliated with
gangs took over responsibility for distributing food to the other inmates. Plaintiff alleges that he
went without food on several occasions. Plaintiff alleges that MTC, Shaw, and Lee should have
ensured that Plaintiff was provided meals at all times.
Plaintiff alleges that he was only allowed to participate in recreational activities on five
occasions. Plaintiff claims that Tira Jackson should have made sure that inmates were able to
participate in recreation time on a regular basis.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $10,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. On July
28, 2015, the Court conducted an omnibus hearing, during which Plaintiff clarified his claims
and the Court ordered certain discovery and set a motions deadline. See Omnibus Order [46].
On September 11, 2015, Defendant Lee filed his Motion to Dismiss [52]. On September 15,
2015, Defendants MTC, Shaw, Walker, Jackson, Barnes, Scott, Arbuthnot, and Arrington filed
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [53]. On November 16, 2015, Defendant Lee filed
his Motion for Summary Judgment [57]. On November 16, 2015, Defendants MTC, Shaw,
Walker, Jackson, Barnes, Scott, Arbuthnot, and Arrington filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment [59]. On December 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Response [63] to the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [53].
4
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A motion for summary judgment4 will be granted only when “the record indicates that
there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The
Court must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
However, the nonmoving party “cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’” Turner v. Baylor Richardson
Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). In the absence of proof, the Court does not “assume that the
nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis
omitted).
ANALYSIS
First Amendment
As previously mentioned, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants Barnes, Jackson,
and Shaw regarding the number of religious services he was able to attend during his
incarceration at WCCF. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires the
4
Although Defendant Lee filed a Motion to Dismiss [52], the Court will construe the
Motion [52] as a motion for summary judgment because matters outside the pleadings are
presented and there is no unfair surprise. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Liles v. TH Healthcare, Ltd.,
2014 WL 1813312, at **1-2 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2014). As Defendants MTC, Shaw, Walker,
Jackson, Barnes, Scott, Arbuthnot, and Arrington filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [53]
based on the identical issue of exhaustion and Plaintiff relies on materials outside the pleadings
to support his position, treating the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment creates
no prejudice or unfair surprise.
5
government to refrain from interfering with the religious beliefs and practices of individuals.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). As a prisoner, Plaintiff retains only those First
Amendment freedoms which are “not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
Therefore, a government regulation may interfere with the religious beliefs and practices of a
prisoner if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89 (1987).
Pursuant to Turner, courts consider four factors in deciding the reasonableness of a
regulation: (1) whether there is a rational relationship between the regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest asserted; (2) whether the inmates have alternative means to exercise the
right; (3) the impact that accommodation of the right will have on the prison system; and (4)
whether ready alternatives exist which accommodate the right and satisfy the governmental
interest. Id. at 89-90. Courts must balance the inmates’ right to free exercise of religion with the
interest of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from administration of the penal
system. Prison officials are afforded great deference in carrying out their complex duties.
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 745 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Turner factors are not weighed equally; the first factor is controlling. See Scott v. Miss.
Dep’t. of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1992); Mayfield v. Texas Dep’t. of Criminal Justice,
529 F.3d 599, 607 (5th Cir. 2008).
According to Plaintiff, an expansive lockdown was imposed at WCCF due to several
violent incidents, and as a result, he was only able to attend one Catholic service during his
incarceration from August 15, 2013, to August 18, 2014. Considering the factors set forth in
6
Turner, it is apparent that prison officials had a legitimate penological interest in restricting
inmate contact in order to gain control within the facility following several violent incidents.5 A
prisoner’s right to free exercise of his religion “may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate
correctional goals or maintain prison security.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348. “[T]he safety and
security of the prison is a legitimate governmental interest, and keeping vulnerable or dangerous
prisoners apart is a rational way to achieve this goal.” Fortner v. Lowndes County Adult
Detention Center, 2014 WL 3746642, at *3 (N.D. Miss. July 29, 2014) (holding that detention
facility had a legitimate penological interest in prohibiting inmates in protective custody from
attending religious services).
Turning to the second factor, Plaintiff has not alleged that prison officials prohibited him
from practicing his religion. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was denied the right to practice his
religion at any time. The record demonstrates that Plaintiff was able to visit and pray with a
Catholic priest. (Chaplain Daily Logs [59-1] at 13, 16.) Plaintiff was able to observe Lent. ([591] at 9.) Furthermore, Plaintiff does not alleges that he was prohibited from freely practicing his
faith in his cell. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was deprived of all forms of
religious expression. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 351-52 (upholding a regulation that prevented
inmates from attending Jum’ah services, and recognizing that although there were “no
alternative means of attending Jumu’ah [since] respondents’ religious beliefs insist that it occur
at a particular time,” inmates were “not deprived of all forms of religious exercise, but instead
5
In his Complaint [1], Plaintiff describes some of the violent incidents that necessitated
an expansive lockdown, including multiple murders and instances of gang members breaking out
and remaining out of their cells. ([1] at 6, 17.) Plaintiff states that he fears an inmate assault and
fears being killed. ([1] at 6.)
7
freely observe a number of their religious obligations”); see also Gauthier v. Anderson, 2010
WL 2718980, at **6-7 (W.D. La. April 21, 2010).
Given the need to restrict inmate contact during a volatile period, allowing inmates to
attend regular religious services would place a burden on the prison and subject officers and
inmates to a greater risk of harm. Plaintiff has not offered ready alternatives that would have
alleviated those concerns, and the Court cannot easily discern alternatives which would allow
inmates to regularly congregate during religious services and assuage the prison officials’
legitimate security concerns. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim that Tira Jackson failed to properly
respond to his grievance fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Dehghani
v. Vogelgesang, 226 Fed. App’x 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s allegation that
warden failed to adequately investigate his grievance did not amount to a constitutional
violation); Charles v. Nance, 186 Fed. App’x 494, 495 (5th Cir. 2006); Woodland v. City of
Vicksburg, 2006 WL 3375256, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 21, 2006) (stating that claim for “failure to
investigate” did not amount to a constitutional violation); see also Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d
371, 374-75 (5th Cir. 2005); Jones v. Shabazz, 2007 WL 2873042, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28,
2007) (holding that inmates do not have a constitutional right to a grievance procedure, and have
no due process liberty interest right to having grievances resolved to their satisfaction).
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claims.
Due Process
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants Arrington, Shaw, and Arbuthnot regarding the
issuance of an allegedly false RVR, which deprived him of the ability to earn “trusty time.”
8
Plaintiff’s allegations amount to claims of violations of his due process rights. “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations
omitted). In determining whether there has been a due process violation, courts consider (1)
whether the party was deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause and, if so, (2) whether the party was deprived of that protected interest without
constitutionally adequate process. LaCroix v. Marshall County, 409 Fed. App’x. 794, 803 (5th
Cir. 2011).
Protected liberty interests “are generally limited to state-created regulations or statutes
which affect the quantity of time rather than the quality of time served by a prisoner.” Madison
v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). A prisoner’s liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause is “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes an atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). The protection afforded by the Due Process Clause does
not extend to every adverse or unpleasant condition experienced by an inmate. Madison, 104
F.3d at 767.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the RVR issued against him, he was wrongfully
deprived of the ability to earn “trusty time” between January 29, 2014, and May 27, 2014. This
punishment, however, does not amount to an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life. A restriction in privileges or a change in classification does not
implicate due process concerns. Id. at 767-68; Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir.
1999). Additionally, the denial of the opportunity of an inmate to reduce his sentence through
9
the accrual of earned time credit does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995). Because Plaintiff was not deprived of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, he cannot maintain a claim under the Due Process
Clause. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s due
process claims.
Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants MTC, Walker, Scott, Shaw, Lee, and Jackson
regarding the conditions of his confinement as WCCF. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies for his claims based on the conditions of confinement. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires prisoners to exhaust any
available administrative remedies prior to filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Whether a
prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies is a mixed question of law and fact.” Dillon v.
Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Circuit has held that “[s]ince exhaustion is
a threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether litigation is being conducted in
the right forum at the right time, . . . judges may resolve factual disputes concerning exhaustion
without the participation of a jury.” Id. at 272. Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense,
Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies. Id. at 266.
The Fifth Circuit takes “a strict approach” to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
Johnson v. Ford, 261 Fed. App’x 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d
863, 866 (5th Cir. 2003)). A prisoner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement “by filing an
untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” because
10
“proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 8384 (2006). It is not enough to merely initiate the grievance process or to put prison officials on
notice of a complaint; the grievance process must be carried through to its conclusion. Wright v.
Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).
Mississippi Code § 47-5-801 grants the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”) the authority to adopt an administrative review procedure at each of its correctional
facilities. Pursuant to this statutory authority, the MDOC has set up an Administrative Remedy
Program (“ARP”) through which an inmate may seek formal review of a complaint relating to
any aspect of his incarceration. See MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HANDBOOK6 at
Ch. VIII. The ARP is a two-step process.7
Pursuant to the ARP, an inmate is required to submit his initial grievance or request, in
writing, to the Legal Claims Adjudicator within thirty days of an alleged incident. If, after
screening, the request is accepted into the ARP, it is forwarded to the appropriate official, who
will investigate and issue a First Step Response. If the inmate is unsatisfied with the First Step
Response, he may continue to the Second Step by using ARP Form ARP-2 and sending it to the
Legal Claims Adjudicator. A final decision will be made by the Superintendent, Warden, or
Community Corrections Director. If the inmate is not satisfied with the Second Step Response,
he may file suit in state or federal court. See MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
HANDBOOK at Ch. VIII.
6
See http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Inmate-Info/Pages/Inmate-Handbook.aspx. (Last visited
March 3, 2016).
7
Effective September 19, 2010, the ARP was changed from a three-step process to a twostep process. See Threadgill v. Moore, 2011 WL 4388832, at *3 n.6 (S.D. Miss. July 25, 2011).
11
In support of their Motions [52] [53], Defendants submitted Plaintiff’s ARP records.
(ARP Records [52-1] [53-1].) Those records demonstrate that Plaintiff submitted several
grievances. In the grievances, however, Plaintiff did not mention the conditions of confinement
at issue in this action. On August 18, 2015, Plaintiff also submitted certain ARP records. (ARP
Records [49-1] [49-2] [49-3].) These records demonstrate that Plaintiff filed a grievance
regarding the religious services at the prison; however, he did not complain about the allegedly
unconstitutional living conditions at issue in this action.
On December 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Response [63], stating that he “did send both
steps to the 2 step process of the Administrative Remedy Program . . . .” Plaintiff does not state
when he allegedly completed this process or whether he mentioned the conditions of
confinement at issue in this action. Plaintiff did not provide any additional ARP records.
Plaintiff’s bare, unsubstantiated allegation simply is not enough to withstand a properly
supported motion for summary judgment. Ryan v. Phillips, 558 Fed. App’x. 477, 478 (5th Cir.
2014) (inmate’s “conclusory and unsubstantiated assertion that he initiated the applicable
grievance procedure is insufficient to refute the lack of evidence that he filed any informal or
formal grievance.”).
The allegations contained in Plaintiff’s grievances were insufficient to put prison officials
on notice of his specific conditions of confinement claims. Plaintiff did not present sufficient
information in his grievances to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to these claims.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and Plaintiff’s conditions
12
of confinement claims should be dismissed without prejudice.8
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
The Motion to Dismiss [52] is GRANTED,
2.
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [53] is GRANTED,
3.
The Motion for Summary Judgment [57] is DENIED as moot,
4.
The Motion for Summary Judgment [59] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part,
5.
This action is dismissed,
6.
Plaintiff’s claims based on the alleged conditions of his confinement are
dismissed without prejudice.
6.
Plaintiff’s claims based the alleged violations of his First Amendment and Due
Process Clause are dismissed with prejudice.
7.
A separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will
be filed herein.
SO ORDERED, this the 7th day of March, 2016.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge
8
In his Motion for Summary Judgment [57], Defendant Lee argues that he is entitled to
judgment based on the merits of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims. In their Motion
for Summary Judgment [59], the remaining Defendants argue, inter alia, that they are entitled to
judgment based on the merits of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims. As the Court has
found that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to these claims,
Defendant Lee’s Motion [57] will be denied as moot and that portion of the remaining
Defendants’ Motion [59] regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims
will be denied as moot.
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?