Horton v. Taylor et al

Filing 36

ORDER granting 22 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 22 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 11/6/2015 (ECW)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
TRAESY LYNN HORTON a.k.a.
TRACY LYNN HORTON
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-cv-27(DCB)(MTP)

RONNY TAYLOR AND
ENCANA OIL & GAS (USA) INC.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on defendant Ronny Taylor
(“Taylor”)’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment (docket
entry 22).

Having carefully considered the motion, to which no

response has been filed by the plaintiff, the Court finds as
follows:
Plaintiff

Traesy

Lynn

Horton

(“Horton”)

failed

to

serve

defendant Taylor with process. However, defendant Taylor executed
a waiver of service of process on June 22, 2015, which was filed
with the Court on June 23, 2015.

(Docket entry 20).

On June 24,

2015, Taylor filed his Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment.
Horton had previously filed motions for default judgment against
Taylor on June 2, 2015, June 15, 2015, and June 17, 2015.

The

motions were denied by this Court on October 23, 2015.
Taylor moves for relief under both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Since the Court finds

that the Complaint on its face fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted against Taylor, it is unnecessary to address

the Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court
accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.’”

Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v.

Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)).
However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Id. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted).

“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The Supreme Court’s examination of the issue in Iqbal provides
a framework for examining the sufficiency of a complaint.

First,

the district court may “begin by identifying pleadings that,

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because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.”

Id.

Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.”

Id.

Plaintiff Horton’s Complaint arises from a lawsuit filed in
1996 in the Chancery Court of Amite County, Mississippi, Tracy L.
Horton vs. Natalie Childs, et al., Cause No. 96-0016 (“the Prior
Suit”). The Chancery Court entered an Order (attached to defendant
Taylor’s motion as Exhibit B) dated August 10, 1998, finding that
Horton agreed to convey his interest in 65 acres of the Property to
Richard Durham, who was an adjoining property owner.
¶ 4).

(Exhibit B,

The Prior Suit also reveals that Horton represented to

Richard Durham that he owned 100% of the Property while he really
only owned a fractional interest as one of the many heirs of
McKinley Horton and Wes Horton, both deceased.

(Id.).

The

chancery court dismissed Horton’s Complaint with prejudice and
ordered the chancery clerk to convey Horton’s interest as follows:
That the Chancery Clerk of Amite County, Mississippi, the
Hon. Ronny Taylor, is hereby ordered to execute a deed on
behalf of Tracy L. Horton conveying his interest in the
subject Property unto Richard P. Durham.
(Id.).

The chancery clerk executed the mandated deed.

See

Quitclaim Deed of August 13, 1998 (Docket entry 7-7).
Defendant Taylor’s only involvement in this matter is in his
capacity as chancery clerk following a specific instruction of the
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chancery court judge. Taylor is therefore being sued based on acts
arising out of the performance of his official duties as chancery
clerk.

Like judges, chancery clerks are entitled to absolute

immunity for actions taken pursuant to their office.

Boston v.

Lafayette County, Mississippi, 744 F.Supp. 745, 750 (N.D. Miss.
1990), aff’d. 933 F.2D 1003 (5th Cir. 1991)(“quasi-judicial immunity
shields lower officials, such as clerks, who implement judicial
orders”); Johnson v. Craft, 673 F.Supp. 191, 193 (S.D. Miss.
1987)(“Court clerks are immune from liability when performing
official acts.”).
Ronny Taylor was acting within the scope of his duties when he
executed the deed complained of by the plaintiff.

He is therefore

entitled to the protection of quasi-judicial immunity on the face
of the plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant Taylor’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) shall therefore be granted and
this case dismissed with prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Ronny Taylor’s motion to
dismiss (docket entry 22) is GRANTED, and Taylor’s motion for
summary judgment (docket entry 22) is MOOT.
The Court previously granted defendant Encana Oil & Gas (USA)
Inc.’s motion for summary judgment in its October 23, 2015,
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
A separate Final Judgment dismissing all defendants in this
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case with prejudice shall be entered of even date herewith.
SO ORDERED, this the 6th day of November, 2015.

/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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