Blackmon v. Metlife Insurance Company, USA

Filing 71

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 66 Motion in Limine. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on 7/18/16 (scp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
TOMMIE JO BLACKMON
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-33-KS-MTP

ECONOMY PREMIER ASSURANCE COMPANY

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Economy Premier Assurance Company’s
Motion In Limine [66]. After considering the submissions of the parties, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that this motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This action centers around a car accident occurring on February 2, 2014. Plaintiff Tommie
Jo Blackmon (“Plaintiff”) was riding as a passenger in an automobile owned by her and ensured by
Defendant Economy Premier Assurance Company (“Defendant”). The car was driven by Jenny
Netterville, Plaintiff’s daughter and a named insured under the Plaintiff’s automobile insurance
policy with Defendant. Liability is not contested in this case. The only issues in dispute are
Plaintiff’s damages.
Defendant filed its Motion In Limine [66] on July 7, 2016, asking that the Court to exclude
the existence of insurance coverage and its presence as a party from the case and to enforce its
previous Order [63] precluding Plaintiff’s treating physicians from giving expert testimony.
Plaintiff’s submitted her response on July 12, 2016, and the Court is now ready to rule.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has conceded that the testimony of her treating physicians at trial will be limited to
factual testimony as required by the Court’s previous Order [63]. The Court will therefore grant

Defendant’s motion as to this issue in light of this concession. Plaintiff does, however, contest the
exclusion of the existence of insurance coverage and the hiding of Defendant’s presence as a party
at trial.
Defendant’s argument for relies on Federal Rule of Evidence 411. Rule 411 states that
“[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible to prove whether
the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully,” but explicitly allows evidence of insurance
to be introduced to show “bias or prejudice or prov[e] agency, ownership, or control.” Fed. R. Evid.
411. Because it is an insurance company, Defendant asks the Court to exclude evidence that it
provided automobile coverage to Plaintiff and to hide its presence at trial on the basis of this rule.
Putting aside the practical difficulty in hiding the presence of the only defendant at trial,
Defendant misconstrues the applicability of Rule 411. As the Practice Comment for the rule states,
“Rule 411 excludes evidence that a person was (or was not) insured against liability insofar as it
would be used to indicate his proclivity (or lack of proclivity) to rely on insurance and relax his care
or otherwise act wrongfully.” Fed. R. Evid. 411 practice comment. This rule is applicable to
instances where a party is attempting to introduce evidence that an opposing party is or is not
insured in order to prove that party’s negligence or wrongdoing. It is not applicable in disputes
between the insured and the insurer where the insurance coverage itself is in dispute. Rule 411 does
not, then, support the exclusion of existence of insurance coverage or the presence of Defendant as
a party.
Defendant further argues its position is supported by the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
decision in Heflin v. Merrill, 154 So.3d 857 (Miss. 2014), where the fact that the motorist defendant
was insured and that the insurer was a named party of the case was found to be properly excluded
under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Even if this decision were binding on a federal court
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determining the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it does not apply in this case. In
Heflin, the insurer, Nationwide, was not the only named defendant in the case, and the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that the fact that Nationwide insured the defendant motorist was not admissible
because Nationwide’s role was irrelevant and allowing the jury to know of the role would have been
tantamount to “allowing the plaintiff to use insurance to prove the defendant’s negligence.” Heflin,
154 So.3d at 861. There are no similar concerns here. First, the Court fails to see how the identity
of the sole party defending Plaintiff’s claims would not be relevant to a jury’s understanding of the
case. Furthermore, the fact that Defendant is an insurance company is not being used to prove the
negligence of another party. Therefore, the Court does not find that Heflin applies in this case.
Because neither Rule 411 nor Heflin require the exclusion of the fact that Defendant
provided insurance coverage to Plaintiff or the fact that Defendant is a party in this case, the Court
will deny Defendant’s motion with respect to this issue.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion In Limine [66]
is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted in that Plaintiff has conceded that she will limit
the testimony of her treating physicians to factual testimony as required by the Court’s previous
Order [63]. It is denied in that the fact that the Defendant is an insurance company who has
provided automobile coverage to Plaintiff will not be excluded.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 18th day of July, 2016.

s/ Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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