Estate of Troy Ray Boyd et al v. Pike County, Mississippi et al
Filing
55
Memorandum Opinion and ORDER granting 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 3/15/2018. (JD)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
ESTATE OF TROY RAY BOYD, et al.
v.
PLAINTIFFS
Civil No. 5:15-cv-107-HSO-JCG
PIKE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT TERRY
BEADLES’ MOTION [42] FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PREMISED ON
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion [42] for Summary Judgment Premised
on Qualified Immunity filed by Defendant Terry Beadles. This Motion is fully
briefed. After due consideration of the record, the submissions on file, and relevant
legal authority, the Court finds that the Motion should be granted.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
The undisputed facts in this case establish that on March 15, 2015, Deputy
Terry Beadles of the Pike County Sheriff’s Department (“Deputy Beadles”) and the
rest of his shift were searching for a shooting suspect in the outskirts of the City of
McComb, Mississippi, Beadles Trial Tr. [42-4] at 139-40, when Deputy Beadles
received a call from dispatch requesting medical assistance for a man who was seen
slumped over a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”), bloodied with a possible head
injury, and who may have been dead, id. at 140, 142. Deputy Beadles and Officer
McDonald responded to the call.
Deputy Beadles testified that while he and Officer McDonald were en route,
dispatch advised them that the reporting party, Anna Cutrer (“Ms. Cutrer”), had
stated that the man had several edged weapons on his vehicle. Id. at 140. Ms.
Cutrer later testified that the man, Troy Ray Boyd (“Mr. Boyd”), was not holding a
weapon and that she saw only a machete on the ATV. Cutrer Trial Tr. [48-2] at 94.
Ms. Cutrer testified that she never mentioned that fact to dispatch. Id. Ms. Cutrer
did not know if Mr. Boyd was too impaired to drive or if the ATV itself was “kind of
wobbly.” Id. at 95.
Deputy Beadles and Officer McDonald traveled to the area “not knowing
what the situation was” to try to contact the individual because they “didn’t know
what the ambulance crew was going to be running into.” Beadles Trial Tr. [42-4] at
140. Dispatch later informed Deputy Beadles that the man was now at the
intersection of McEwen Swamp Road and Highway 570 East. Id. at 141. Deputy
Beadles first saw Mr. Boyd driving on McEwan Swamp Road, id. at 142, and “pulled
up behind him” and “realized that he wasn’t running from me, but he also was not
stopping,” id. Deputy Beadles “thought maybe [Mr. Boyd] just was not aware of his
surroundings.” Id.
Deputy Beadles parked his marked patrol vehicle in front of Mr. Boyd’s ATV
and exited his vehicle to attempt to speak with Mr. Boyd. Id. Mr. Boyd rode
around Deputy Beadles’ SUV and stopped in front of it. Id. Deputy Beadles asked
Mr. Boyd to get off the four-wheeler and speak with him to assess the situation, but
Mr. Boyd just stared at him. Id. at 142-43. At that time, Deputy Beadles did not
2
intend to arrest Mr. Boyd, nor did he suspect Mr. Boyd of committing a crime. Id.
at 160. Deputy Beadles’ intent was to determine why Mr. Boyd was injured. Id.
As Deputy Beadles was attempting to speak with Mr. Boyd, Mr. Boyd
accelerated his ATV. Id. at 143. Deputy Beadles “reached out to grab [Mr. Boyd’s]
wrist and stay ahold of him to say – to tell him, ‘Hey, I need you to talk to me and
tell me what’s going on.’” Id. Before Deputy Beadles could do so, Mr. Boyd grabbed
Deputy Beadles’ left sleeve, tucked the officer’s arm under his arm, and fully
accelerated the ATV. Id. at 143-44. To avoid being dragged on the asphalt, Deputy
Beadles grabbed the back of Mr. Boyd’s sweatshirt and rested his abdomen on the
ATV. Id. at 144. Deputy Beadles saw a machete strapped to the four-wheeler’s
back rack. Id. After being dragged for about fifty feet, Deputy Beadles freed
himself from Mr. Boyd’s grasp, pushed off the back bar of the ATV, and landed on
the road. Id. at 144-45. Officer McDonald pursued Mr. Boyd as Deputy Beadles
returned to his patrol vehicle. McDonald Trial Tr. [42-5] at 103.
Deputy Beadles radioed to Officer McDonald that he “didn’t care how far
[Deputy Beadles] had to chase [Mr. Boyd], [the officers] were going to charge him
with assault on a police officer.” Beadles Trial Tr. [42-4] at 162. Deputy Beadles
testified that his “training kicked in,” and his job at that point “was to stop
somebody who committed a violent crime.” Id.
The officers pursued Mr. Boyd for two to two-and-a-half minutes. McDonald
Trial Tr. [42-5] at 103; Beadles Trial Tr. [42-4] at 146-47. Deputy Beadles testified
that he chased Mr. Boyd at speeds between forty-five and fifty miles an hour and
3
that Mr. Boyd “t[ook] corners at such a high rate of speed on the four-wheeler that
he was actually getting it up on two wheels at points.” Beadles Trial Tr. [42-4] at
146-47. Robbie Travis (“Mr. Travis”), an eyewitness to the shooting who owns a
similar ATV and has driven the same ATV model as Mr. Boyd’s, later stated his
opinion that Mr. Boyd’s ATV could go only as fast as twenty-five or thirty miles per
hour. Travis Trial Tr. [48-6] at 13-15.
Eventually, Deputy Beadles passed Mr. Boyd and unsuccessfully attempted
to conduct a rolling stop of the ATV. McDonald Trial Tr. [42-5] at 106; Beadles
Trial Tr. [42-4] at 148. Deputy Beadles then drove further ahead and parked his
vehicle at an angle across the road, leaving “[a]n avenue of escape for anybody who
needed to get by.” Beadles Trial Tr. [42-4] at 148-49. At this point, the parties’
versions of events diverge.
1.
Deputy Beadles’ Version
Deputy Beadles exited his vehicle and stood at the front left side of his SUV
to observe Mr. Boyd’s approach. Id. at 149-50. Mr. Boyd approached slowly at first,
but then rapidly accelerated when he was twenty-five yards from Deputy Beadles.
Id. at 150. Deputy Beadles drew his gun and “continu[ed] to yell for him to stop”
when he “realized [Mr. Boyd] was not going to slow down.” Id. at 150-51. Upon
Deputy Beadles drawing his firearm, Mr. Boyd “turned the four-wheeler slightly
towards [Deputy Beadles] and began to come directly at [him].” Id. at 151. “At that
point when [Deputy Beadles] felt that [he] had no other option, that [his] life was in
jeopardy, [Deputy Beadles] began to take defensive actions and defend [his] own life
4
by firing at the suspect.” Id. Deputy Beadles fired six rounds, with approximately a
“second-and-a-half” elapsing between the first and last shot. Id. at 152. Deputy
Beadles testified that he ceased firing when he realized he was no longer in
jeopardy and Mr. Boyd was no longer threatening him. Id. at 153.
Deputy Beadles got back into his vehicle and pursued Mr. Boyd. Id. Officer
McDonald later found Mr. Boyd face down in a ditch a short distance away.
McDonald Trial Tr. [42-5] at 127. Officer McDonald informed Deputy Beadles that
Mr. Boyd was breathing but unresponsive. Beadles Trial Tr. [42-4] at 153. Deputy
Beadles radioed dispatch for an ambulance, id. at 154, then he and Officer
McDonald began performing life-saving measures on Mr. Boyd until an emergency
medical technician arrived, id. at 155. Unfortunately, Mr. Boyd passed away. Id.
at 156. An autopsy report found bullet “entrance wounds to the right side of the
back and left lower leg.” Autopsy [42-8] at 2.
2.
Plaintiffs’ Version
Mr. Travis lives on Archie Boyd Road in Pike County, Mississippi, Travis
Trial Tr. [48-6] at 12, and was at home on March 15, 2015, id. at 13. Mr. Travis
heard sirens “coming through the swamp,” so he “stepped out on the porch” and saw
“two officers following a four-wheeler.” Id. Deputy Beadles sped up, passed Mr.
Boyd, and parked his vehicle before stepping out of it. Id. According to Mr. Travis,
Deputy Beadles was beside his car on the right side of the road, at “[a]bout the
middle” of his car. Id. at 17, 21. Mr. Boyd was in the far left lane, on the far inside
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of the curve in the road, and Mr. Travis testified that if a car would have been
coming in the other direction, it would have run over Mr. Boyd. Id. at 17.
Deputy Beadles “hollered” at Mr. Boyd to “[s]top, stop, stop,” id. at 16, but
Mr. Boyd kept driving on the inside of the curve, id. at 16-17. Mr. Travis saw
Deputy Beadles draw his weapon “[r]ight before Troy was up even with him.” Id. at
17. Mr. Travis testified that the officer never appeared to be in any danger and he
did not see Mr. Boyd make any moves towards the officer. Id. at 18.
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs Estate of Troy Ray Boyd and minors Z.B. and G.B., by and through
their mother Amy Boyd (“Plaintiffs”), are Mr. Boyd’s wrongful death beneficiaries.
Am. Compl. [6] at 1-2. On February 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this
Court against Deputy Beadles and Officer McDonald in their individual capacities
and against Pike County, Mississippi, advancing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
Plaintiffs claim that the individual defendants: (1) “violat[ed] Troy’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by chasing him without
cause, then using unreasonable, deadly force by shooting Troy four times in the
back, thereby causing his death;” and (2) “failed to provide Boyd with adequate
medical care as requested by the 911 caller” in violation of Mr. Boyd’s Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 Id. at 5-6.
1
Plaintiffs have acknowledged that there are no state-law claims set forth in their Complaint
and that they are only asserting federal constitutional claims. Order [32].
6
On April 13, 2016, Officer McDonald filed a Motion [25] to Dismiss Based on
Qualified Immunity, which the Court construed as a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. Order [33] at 3. The Court found that Officer McDonald was entitled to
qualified immunity and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against him on June 24, 2016.
Id. at 1. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint did not
sufficiently allege that Officer McDonald seized or used any force at all against Mr.
Boyd. Id. at 6, 7. Regarding Plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims,
the Court concluded that Officer McDonald was never constitutionally required to
provide Mr. Boyd with medical care and that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts that
showed Officer McDonald responded in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id. at
9.
On July 11, 2016, Deputy Beadles filed a Motion [35] to Stay Case Pending
Criminal Prosecution, on grounds that a grand jury of Pike County, Mississippi, had
returned an indictment on September 9, 2015, against Deputy Beadles on the
charge of manslaughter related to the same set of facts as in this civil litigation.
Mot. [35] at 1; Indictment [35-2]. The Court entered an Order [39] staying the case,
including a stay of all discovery, pending final resolution of the parallel criminal
proceedings. Order [39] at 1. A jury trial was held in the criminal case on
September 27 and 28, 2016, in the Circuit Court of Pike County, Mississippi.2 Mot.
2
It is from that criminal trial that the parties submitted, in support of their respective
positions regarding the present Motion [42], the trial transcripts of several witnesses’ testimony,
including that of Deputy Beadles, Officer McDonald, Ms. Cutrer, and Mr. Travis.
7
[40] at 1-2. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, Def.’s Mem. [43] at 2, and on
April 5, 2017, the Court lifted the stay of proceedings.
On June 2, 2017, Deputy Beadles filed his Motion [42] for Summary
Judgment Premised on Qualified Immunity. Deputy Beadles contends that his first
encounter with Mr. Boyd should not be considered a stop, but even if so construed,
there existed reasonable suspicion to pull Mr. Boyd over for illegally operating his
vehicle, and that Deputy Beadles was justified in pursuing Mr. Boyd after he
assaulted the officer. Def.’s Mem. [43] at 10. Deputy Beadles argues that his use of
deadly force was objectively reasonable because Mr. Boyd posed a threat of serious
harm to Deputy Beadles and others, and that no controlling precedent has clearly
established that Deputy Beadles’ actions were unconstitutional. Id. at 11-12, 14.
Deputy Beadles asserts that this Court’s analysis in its prior Order [33] is equally
applicable to Deputy Beadles with regard to Plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims.3 Id. at 16.
Plaintiffs counter that Deputy Beadles violated Mr. Boyd’s right to be free
from unreasonable seizures because he has acknowledged that the 911 call
requested medical assistance, Mr. Boyd was not suspected of any crime during the
initial stop, and officers usually do not ticket for driving a four-wheeler on the road.
Pls.’ Mem. [49] at 8. Plaintiffs argue that Deputy Beadles’ use of force violated Mr.
3
On March 5, 2018, Deputy Beadles filed a Motion [53] for Leave to File Supplemental
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. In a text order entered on March 6, 2018,
the Court granted the Motion [53] and directed Plaintiffs to file any response by March 13, 2018. To
date, Plaintiffs have not filed a response.
8
Boyd’s constitutional rights because Deputy Beadles created the danger to Mr. Boyd
by blocking the road, Deputy Beadles should have known that Mr. Boyd would be
traveling in his direction when he passed Mr. Boyd, Deputy Beadles did not fire his
weapon until Mr. Boyd was beside him, and Mr. Boyd could not travel at high
speeds on an old four-wheeler. Id. at 8-9, 13-14.
Deputy Beadles notes in his Reply that Plaintiffs failed in their Response to
argue in support of their Eighth Amendment claim and made only a conclusory
allegation that Deputy Beadles violated Mr. Boyd’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Reply [50] at 1-2. Deputy Beadles further posits that Mr. Travis’ testimony does not
raise a triable issue of fact as to excessive force. Id. at 6.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Relevant Legal Standard
1.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the movant carries this burden, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc).
To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing
party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that there exists a genuine
issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir.
9
2000). “A genuine dispute of material fact means that evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Royal v. CCC&R
Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is
appropriate. Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. ENI U.S. Operating Co., 671
F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249 (1986)). In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court
views facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. RSR
Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 858 (5th Cir. 2010).
2.
Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Ramirez
v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “To determine
whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity, we decide (1) whether the
facts that the plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right; and
(2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's
alleged misconduct.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). A court may
conduct the two-pronged qualified immunity inquiry in any sequence. Manis v.
Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009).
“A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of
proof. Once an official pleads the defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff,
10
who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the
official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Brown v.
Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
“A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that,
even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the
circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)
(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). While a case directly on point is
not required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
B.
Analysis
1.
Deputy Beadles’ Initial Encounter with Mr. Boyd
Deputy Beadles contends that his initial encounter was not a stop, but that
even if it was he had reasonable suspicion that Boyd was operating his vehicle in
violation of Mississippi law. Def.’s Mem. [43] at 10. Plaintiffs counter that Deputy
Beadles unreasonably seized Mr. Boyd during the initial stop because the 911 call
was only for medical assistance, Mr. Boyd was not suspected of any crime at that
11
time, and officers usually do not ticket for driving four-wheelers on roadways. Pls.’
Mem. [49] at 8.4
The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be “secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] law enforcement officer’s reasonable
suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to
stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further.”
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). “The Fourth
Amendment requires only some minimum level of objective justification for the
officers’ actions – but more than a hunch – measured in light of the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 1994).
“Reasonable suspicion must be supported by particular and articulable facts, which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant an
intrusion.” Id.
Section 63-7-7 of the Mississippi Code states: “It is a misdemeanor for any
person to drive . . . on any highway any vehicle . . . which is in such unsafe
condition as to endanger any person[.]” Section 63-31-3 of the Mississippi Code
permits operation of off-road vehicles upon public property if certain conditions are
4
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint initially claimed that Deputy Beadles is “liable to the
Plaintiffs for violating Troy’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by
chasing him without cause[.]” Am. Compl. [6] at 5. However, Plaintiffs’ Response only mentions
once, in conclusory fashion, that Deputy Beadles was “unreasonable in stopping [Mr. Boyd], chasing
him, . . . .” Pls.’ Mem. [49] at 1. Plaintiffs’ Response makes it clear that their claim is that “Beadles’
initial stop of Troy Boyd was unreasonable,” but nowhere in their Response do Plaintiffs explain how
it was unreasonable for Deputy Beadles to pursue Boyd after Boyd fled from the initial encounter.
12
met, but subsection (6) provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to
authorize operation of an off-road vehicle on a public road or highway of this state.”
The Mississippi Attorney General has opined that “an operator of an ATV on the
public roadway may be charged with operating a motor vehicle upon a public road
without the proper safety equipment, (see Mississippi Code Sections 63-7-1 et. seq.),
or without an inspection5 sticker.” Re: Three and Four Wheelers, 2003 WL
22348870, at *2 (Miss. A.G. Sept. 12, 2003). The undisputed facts reveal that
Deputy Beadles first observed Mr. Boyd on his ATV on McEwan Swamp Road, a
public road. Deputy Beadles therefore had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Boyd
had violated Mississippi law and it was reasonable to stop Mr. Boyd for a brief time
and take additional steps to investigate further.
Plaintiffs note that Deputy Beadles testified that he only stopped Mr. Boyd to
find out why Mr. Boyd was injured and that he did not suspect Mr. Boyd of any
crime. Pls.’ Mem. [49] at 8. “An action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify the action. The officer’s subjective motivation is
irrelevant.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (citations and
quotations marks omitted). Deputy Beadles is entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim arising out of the initial stop.
5
At the time of this encounter, Mississippi law required “that every motor vehicle . . .
registered in this state be inspected and that an official certificate of inspection and approval be
obtained for each such vehicle. Each such vehicle must display at all times a certificate of inspection
and approval duly issued for such vehicle[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-13-7, repealed by Laws of 2015,
Ch. 417, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.
13
2.
Plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Deputy Beadles contends that Plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims should be dismissed. Def.’s Mem. [43] at 15-16. In their Response, Plaintiffs
do not address their Eighth Amendment claim and merely allege that Deputy
Beadles violated Mr. Boyd’s “rights under the, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, while acting under the color of law.” Pls.’ Mem. [49] at 1. “[M]ere
conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and such
allegations are insufficient, therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Eason v. Thaler, 73 F .3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Because
Plaintiffs do not adequately contest Deputy Beadles’ motion for summary judgment
on their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, those claims are deemed
abandoned, and summary judgment is appropriate. See Black v. Panola Sch. Dist.,
461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff abandoned retaliation claim when
she failed to defend claim in response to motion to dismiss); Vela v. City of Houston,
276 F.3d 659, 678–79 (5th Cir. 2001) (limitations defense not raised in response to
motion for summary judgment or supplemental answer was abandoned).
Regardless, any argument by Plaintiffs on this issue would be unpersuasive.
“The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments is
violated by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” City of
Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). The Eighth Amendment protects only those formally convicted of a
14
crime and does not protect pretrial detainees. Id. It is undisputed that Mr. Boyd
was not a convicted prisoner, and the Eighth Amendment never applied to him.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “require[s] the
responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to persons .
. . who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.” Id. “The plaintiff
must show that an officer acted with subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious medical harm, followed by a response of deliberate indifference.” Mason v.
Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 279 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff must show that the officials
refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly,
or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for
any serious medical needs.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The undisputed facts show that Deputy Beadles tried to speak with Mr. Boyd
to assess the situation regarding his injuries in order to prepare the area for
emergency personnel. Instead, Mr. Boyd assaulted Deputy Beadles and fled. After
Mr. Boyd was shot, Deputy Beadles radioed for an ambulance and attempted lifesaving measures. Plaintiffs have not created a genuine dispute of fact that Deputy
Beadles violated Mr. Boyd’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, Deputy
Beadles is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
15
3.
Plaintiffs’ Excessive Force Claim
a.
Whether a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Exists that Deputy
Beadles Violated Mr. Boyd’s Constitutional Rights
“The use of deadly force for apprehension is a seizure subject to the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507
F.3d 312, 320 (5th Cir. 2007). “To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff
must show (1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force
that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly
unreasonable.” Manis, 585 F.3d at 843 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “An
officer’s use of deadly force is not excessive, and thus no constitutional violation
occurs, when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of
serious harm to the officer or to others.” Id. Specifically,
[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is
not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly
force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there
is probable cause to believe that he committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force
may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
“The question is one of ‘objective reasonableness,’ not subjective intent, and
an officer’s conduct must be judged in light of the circumstances confronting him,
without the benefit of hindsight.” Manis, 585 F.3d at 843. Moreover, “[t]he calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
16
and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
As Plaintiffs are the nonmoving party, the Court must view the facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to them. Therefore, the Court will accept as
true, for purposes of this Motion, Mr. Travis’ testimony that Deputy Beadles was
beside his car on the right side of the road, that Mr. Boyd was on the left side of the
road, that Deputy Beadles drew his gun right before Mr. Boyd was even with
Deputy Beadles, and that Mr. Boyd did not make any moves towards Deputy
Beadles.
Plaintiffs allege in their Response that Deputy Beadles shot Mr. Boyd four
times in the back. Pls.’ Resp. [48] at 2. However, Plaintiffs do not cite any record
evidence to support this allegation, which is their burden at summary judgment.
See Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2006) (“conclusory allegations” or
“unsubstantiated assertions” do not create a fact issue on summary judgment)
(citation omitted). Plaintiffs made this same allegation in their Complaint, but at
this stage, Plaintiffs must move beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts
demonstrating a genuine dispute of material fact. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
In their Memorandum Brief, Plaintiffs contend that Deputy Beadles’ “use of
excessive force was totally unreasonable and unlawful” given the fact that Deputy
“Beadles did not shoot until Troy was beside him.” Pls.’ Mem. [49] at 9. This
comports with Plaintiffs’ recitation of Mr. Travis’ testimony that “as soon as Troy
got about even with Beadles’ SUV, Beadles started shooting[.]” Id. at 6 (citing
17
Travis Trial Tr. [48-6] at 17). Deputy Beadles argues that of the six shots he fired,
only one was fired when Mr. Boyd drove “immediately past the patrol car.” Def.’s
Mem. [43] at 13. However, Deputy Beadles’ Memorandum Brief cites the autopsy
report which states that Mr. Boyd sustained “entrance wounds to the right side of
the back and left lower leg.” Id. at 5-6; Autopsy [42-8] at 2. It is not clear whether
the autopsy report’s use of “wounds” means Mr. Boyd suffered one shot to the back
and a second to the left leg, or he sustained multiple wounds to the back and
multiple wounds to the leg. Viewing the inferences in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, the nonmoving party, the Court will assume for purposes of this Motion
that Mr. Boyd sustained multiple gunshot wounds to the back.
Based upon these facts, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not carried
their burden of showing that Deputy Beadles acted unreasonably. Deputy Beadles
had probable cause to believe that Mr. Boyd posed a threat of serious physical harm
to himself and to others. The undisputed facts show that Mr. Boyd, just minutes
prior to the shooting, grabbed Deputy Beadles’ arm and fully accelerated the ATV,
dragging Deputy Beadles and reasonably placing him in fear for his safety. Mr.
Boyd had refused to stop despite multiple, escalating efforts to have him do so and
he was operating an ATV on a public road. There was no reason to think that Mr.
Boyd, having already assaulted a law enforcement officer, was not also a threat to
others.
It is further undisputed that Mr. Boyd had a machete on the ATV and that
Deputy Beadles was aware of that fact. Even accepting Mr. Travis’ testimony as
18
true that Deputy Beadles stood on the right side of the road and that Mr. Boyd
drove on the left side, it was not objectively unreasonable for Deputy Beadles to
believe that Mr. Boyd presented an ongoing threat of serious harm to Deputy
Beadles or others. Plaintiffs point the Court to pictures of the road where the
shooting occurred, Pls.’ Mem. [49] at 5-6, but a review of the photographs reflects
that the road appears to be somewhat narrow and lacks any centerline stripe,
Photographs [48-7]. Given that Mr. Boyd had already assaulted Deputy Beadles,
did not yield to a rolling stop, and did not heed Deputy Beadles’ later commands to
stop, Deputy Beadles was forced to make a split-second judgment in tense and
uncertain circumstances as Mr. Boyd drove in Deputy Beadles’ general direction.
There has been no dispute created that the shots were fired in a very brief time
span, according to Deputy Beadles, within one-and-a-half seconds. Plaintiffs have
not shown a genuine dispute that Deputy Beadles’ use of force was clearly excessive
to the need or clearly unreasonable.
b.
Whether Deputy Beadles Violated Clearly Established Law
In the alternative, summary judgment should be granted to Deputy Beadles
on Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim because Plaintiffs have also failed to carry their
burden on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. To defeat summary
judgment here, Plaintiffs must show that Deputy Beadles’ conduct violated clearly
established law by pointing the Court to “any cases of controlling authority” or “a
consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not
have believed that his actions were lawful.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617
19
(1999); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2016 (2014). Plaintiffs have
not done so. In fact, Plaintiffs’ Memorandum [49] is sparsely briefed and contains
little analysis of the facts applying them to any relevant caselaw. What Plaintiffs
have presented is three categories of arguments, which are not persuasive either
individually or collectively.
First, Plaintiffs merely identify the broad rule for excessive force cases set
forth in Graham and Saucier that “the use of force is contrary to the Fourth
Amendment, if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness.” Pls.’
Mem. [49] at 10 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). The difficulty facing Plaintiffs
here is that the broad tests set out in “Graham and Garner . . . are cast at a high
level of generality.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199. The Supreme Court “ha[s]
repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742) (internal
quotation marks and ellipses omitted). “The dispositive question [of] whether the
violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established . . . must be undertaken
in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id.
(citations and quotation marks omitted). “Such specificity is especially important in
the Fourth Amendment context,” because “it is sometimes difficult for an officer to
determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the
factual situation the officer confronts.” Id. (citation omitted).
True, “in an obvious case, these standards [in Graham and Garner] can
‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.” Brosseau,
20
543 U.S. at 199. Such general tests are not sufficient in this case, however, given
the apparently undisputed fact that Mr. Boyd had previously assaulted Deputy
Beadles on his ATV, had a machete on his vehicle, refused to yield to a rolling stop
or to Deputy Beadles’ demands to stop, and continued to drive in Deputy Beadles’
general direction. “The present case is far from the obvious one where Graham and
Garner alone offer a basis for decision.” Id. Plaintiffs have not pointed the Court to
specific facts that would make this case an obvious one. The “correct inquiry,”
therefore, is “whether it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the officer’s conduct in the situation [Deputy Beadles] confronted.”
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309. With respect to the specific inquiry at issue here,
Plaintiffs have failed to “identif[y] a single precedent – much less a controlling case
or robust consensus of cases – finding a Fourth Amendment violation ‘under similar
circumstances.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 (2018) (quoting
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)).
Second, Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish cases on which Deputy Beadles
relies and cite Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992), and
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309, all of which are cases where courts held that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity. “But the mere fact that courts have approved
deadly force in more extreme circumstances says little, if anything, about whether
such force was reasonable in the circumstances here.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312.
In other words, it is not sufficient for Plaintiffs to carry their burden to simply
21
argue that this case is distinguishable from other cases where courts have granted
law enforcement officers qualified immunity.
Third, Plaintiffs rely on Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 442
(5th Cir. 1998), but that case is of limited value here because factual disputes
prevented the Gutierrez court from determining the reasonableness of the officers’
conduct. In that case, two police officers hog-tied Gutierrez after he kicked the
driver’s seat, metal cage, and windows of the patrol car as the officers transported
him to the hospital. Id. at 443. The threat, if any, posed to the officers or others
was thus considerably less than the facts of this case show. The facts of Gutierrez
are quite dissimilar from those here and the case offers little guidance on whether
Deputy Beadles violated clearly established law. Plaintiffs cite no other cases to
support their position that Deputy Beadles violated clearly established law.
Even if Plaintiffs had identified a clearly established right in this specific
context and provided the Court with a pertinent controlling case or robust group of
persuasive cases, there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Deputy
Beadles was plainly incompetent or knowingly violated the law. In Thompson v.
Mercer, 762 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2014), Keith Thompson stole a vehicle,
kidnapped its sleeping occupant, and then fled for two hours at speeds of over 100
miles per hour. Dispatchers heard Keith state that he would kill himself when he
reached his destination. Id. Dispatchers also learned there was a firearm in
vehicle. Id.
22
Sheriff Mercer laid in wait with an assault rifle on the shoulder of a rural
road. Id. When Keith’s vehicle came into view, Mercer fired into the hood, striking
the radiator. Id. Keith did not appear to slow down. Id. Mercer then aimed
directly into the windshield and fired twelve rounds. Id. Keith was struck three
times in the head and neck and died. Id. 435, 436. Mercer conceded that “there
were no bystanders in the area, and that he had seen no traffic in the vicinity.” Id.
at 436. The district court granted qualified immunity to Mercer. Id. at 435.
The Fifth Circuit concluded it was “clear that Mercer’s use of deadly force
was justified” based on the “grave risk” Keith presented. Id. at 438. The
Thompsons argued that their son was no longer a risk because he was driving on a
lonely road. Id. at 439. The Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court had
“rejected the defense that ‘the roads were mostly empty.’” Id. (quoting Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). The Fifth Circuit stated that it similarly
“recognizes the ‘inherent danger’ of vehicular flight, ‘even when no bystanders or
other motorists are immediately present.’” Id. (quoting Pasco ex rel. Pasco v.
Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 580 (5th Cir. 2009)). Moreover, “governing standards
allow law enforcement and the courts to take into account passersby that ‘might
have been present.’” Id. (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 384).
The Thompsons further argued that Mercer’s decision was unreasonable at
the time because Keith’s truck did not pose a threat after Mercer struck the
radiator with three bullets. Id. at 439. The Court of Appeals found otherwise:
23
[T]he Thompsons’ argument counterfactually presumes that Keith was
only a threat to the extent that the truck was operational. Yet the truck
was not the only deadly weapon at Keith’s disposal. On the contrary, it
is undisputed that he was in possession of a stolen firearm and that
Mercer was aware of that fact. No one knows whether Keith had any
intention of using the gun, but assume for the purposes of summary
judgment that he did not. Even so, Mercer had no way of ascertaining
Keith’s intent, and there was no visible sign of surrender. Given that
this unidentified suspect was admittedly suicidal and had already acted
with utter desperation in attempting to evade law enforcement, Mercer
was justified in assuming that there was an ongoing threat of serious
harm to the officer or others, even if Keith’s vehicle was already
disabled.
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit concluded that
Mercer’s use of deadly force did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 440.
In Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2009), a deputy responded to
a report that a known car thief had violently threatened his ex-girlfriend. Id. at
407. The deputy learned that the suspect was driving a stolen Ford Taurus and
was on bond for theft and unlawfully carrying a weapon. Id. When the deputy later
spotted a Taurus at a known drug location, id., he followed it and activated his
sirens after the Taurus changed lanes without signaling, id. The Taurus did not
stop but accelerated. Id. After a brief chase, the Taurus took a right turn too
widely and collided with a vehicle in the oncoming lane. Id. After the deputy pulled
his car twelve to fifteen feet behind the Taurus, it backed up toward the deputy’s
police cruiser and then began to drive away, making it three or four houses down
the block. Id. at 407, 409. There were no bystanders in the vehicle’s path. Id. at
409. The deputy fired twice at the Taurus, id., and one shot struck and killed
Heather Lytle, who was sitting in the back of the car, id. at 408. The district court
24
concluded that a genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment on
qualified immunity. Id. The deputy filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. Id.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, id. at 418, finding that the deputy’s conduct
weighed against a conclusion of reasonableness because firing at the rear of a
fleeing vehicle some distance away was not clearly a reasonable method of
addressing the threat, the deputy was not aiming to shoot the driver, and firing in a
residential area risked striking an unintended target, id. at 412-13. Furthermore,
“by the time the Taurus was three or four houses away, a jury could conclude that
any immediate threat to O’Donnell had ceased.” Id. at 413. The Court of Appeals
inferred “that sufficient time might have passed for O’Donnell to perceive that the
threat to him had ceased.” Id. at 414. The Fifth Circuit further stated that a jury
could conclude “that the Taurus did not pose a sufficient threat of harm” because
“there were no children or bystanders in the path of the vehicle” and due to the
short time the deputy pursued the Taurus. Id. at 416.
Also relevant here is Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005).6 As
Waterman drove over the speed limit through the Baltimore airport, an officer
activated his sirens and pursued. Id. at 473. Waterman did not stop, and another
officer joined in the chase. Id. The officers in pursuit communicated by radio with
officers at a toll plaza at an upcoming tunnel. Id. at 474. One of the pursuing
6
Though Waterman is not a Fifth Circuit case, the Fifth Circuit quoted its holding in Lytle,
560 F.3d at 413, and discussed it at length in Hathaway, 507 F.3d at 321. Though Waterman itself is
not controlling authority, to the extent the reasoning espoused by the Waterman court has been cited
with approval by the Fifth Circuit in two cases, these cases together represent “a consensus of cases
of persuasive authority.”
25
officers radioed to the appellants – Officers Batton, Keel, and Heisey – that
Waterman tried to run the officer off the road. Id.
Waterman drove through the tunnel and toward the toll plaza. Id.
Waterman drove at a “normal speed” and five officers, including the three
appellants, emerged. Id. With guns drawn, the officers approached Waterman’s
vehicle from the front and passenger side and yelled at him to stop. Id. Waterman
coasted for one second at eleven miles per hour, then accelerated in the general
direction of the toll plaza and the officers ahead of him. Id. At the instant of
acceleration, Officer Keel was seventy-two feet ahead of the vehicle; Officer Heisey,
thirty-eight feet ahead; and Officer Batton, sixteen feet ahead. Id. None of the
officers stood directly in front of Waterman’s vehicle, but stood a few feet to the
passenger side of the car’s projected path. Id. at 474-75. The Court of Appeals
described the events as follows:
Perceiving the lurching of the vehicle and Waterman’s
acceleration as the beginning of an attempt to run them over,
[a]ppellants began firing their weapons as soon as Waterman
accelerated. As the officers shot at him, Waterman’s vehicle reached a
top speed of approximately 15 miles per hour. Waterman’s vehicle then
passed all of the officers, avoiding them by several feet and temporarily
stopping behind another vehicle blocking its path. As [a]ppellants
scrambled toward Waterman, they continued to fire their weapons at
him from the passenger side of the vehicle and from behind, ceasing
their fire as he passed through the toll plaza.
Id. at 475.
The appellants fired a combined eight shots within a six-second period. Id.
Waterman sustained five gunshot wounds and died. Id. Waterman’s estate
26
brought a § 1983 claim against the appellants, id., and the district court denied
appellants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, id. The
officers immediately appealed. Id.
The Fourth Circuit noted facts in the record that weighed both in favor of and
against the conclusion that Waterman was trying to run over the officers. Id. at
477-78. However, “the critical reality here is that the officers did not have even a
moment to pause and ponder these many conflicting factors.” Id. at 478. The
Fourth Circuit found that “if the officers paused for even an instant, they risked
losing their last chance to defend themselves” because “the vehicle could have
reached Officers Batton and Heisey in about one second.” Id.
The court concluded that appellants “had probable cause to believe that
Waterman’s oncoming vehicle posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm
at least to Officers Batton and Heisey,” id. (footnote omitted), and observed that the
district court had “relied heavily on the fact that none of the officers were directly in
the path of Waterman’s vehicle” when the officers fired, id. at 479. The Fourth
Circuit determined, however, that “the closeness of the officers to the projected path
of Waterman’s vehicle is crucial to our conclusion that deadly force was justified.”
Id. First, “Waterman was accelerating in [a]ppellants’ general direction and . . .
Officers Batton and Heisey could have been run over in about one second if
Waterman had turned slightly toward them.” Id. Second, because Waterman “had
used his vehicle as a weapon against another officer just minutes before,”
“[a]ppellants had reason to believe that Waterman’s aggressiveness toward officers
27
trying to capture him suggested he was about to turn toward officers not yet in his
path.” Id. at 480. The foregoing led to a conclusion that the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity with respect to “the initial group of shots.” Id.
Waterman’s estate pointed to witnesses’ statements that “Waterman’s vehicle
did not appear to be a threat to the officers ahead.” Id. at 479 n.8. The court found
that such “opinions do not create a genuine issue of fact because the witnesses were
unaware of the fact most critical to the probable cause analysis: that Waterman had
reportedly attempted to use his vehicle as a weapon in order to avoid being captured
only minutes before entering the toll plaza.” Id. (citing Pace v. Capobianco, 283
F.3d 1275, 1280 & n.11 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that lay witness opinion that
approaching vehicle “did not appear to be a threat to any officer on the scene” did
not preclude summary judgment because witness was not aware of events preceding
the shooting that gave officers reason to believe that suspect would attempt to
assault them)). The Fourth Circuit then engaged in a “separate analysis” for the
shots fired after Waterman’s vehicle passed the officers, id. at 480, and concluded
that “the threat to their safety was eliminated and this could not justify the
subsequent shots,” id. at 482.
Turning to the particular facts of this case, Plaintiffs have not shown that
Deputy Beadles violated clearly established law in this context, or that every
reasonable officer in Deputy Beadles’ situation would have understood that he was
violating clearly established law. First, there appears to be some tension in this
Circuit regarding the reasonableness of using deadly force to protect others from a
28
violent suspect fleeing in a vehicle, even though others may not be immediately
present. Deputy Beadles asserts that Mr. Boyd posed a threat of serious harm to
others, Def.’s Mem. [43] at 12, 14, though there appears to be no evidence that
Deputy Beadles knew of any bystanders or motorists who were actually near Mr.
Boyd at that moment. Lytle found that a jury could conclude that deadly force was
unreasonable because there were no bystanders present. 560 F.3d at 416.
However, as stated more recently in Thompson, the Fifth Circuit recognizes the
“inherent danger” of vehicular flight, even when others are not present. 762 F.3d at
439. Thompson also posited that law enforcement may account for passersby who
might be present. Id. Mr. Travis testified that Mr. Boyd would have collided with
any oncoming vehicles from the opposite direction, and as such it was objectively
reasonable for Deputy Beadles to believe that Mr. Boyd posed a serious risk for
anyone who might be present.
Second, the case law does not clearly dictate the conclusion that Deputy
Beadles was unjustified in perceiving danger to himself or others and responding as
he did even if, as Mr. Travis maintains, Mr. Boyd drove his ATV on the side of the
road opposite from Deputy Beadles. Mr. Boyd was driving in Deputy Beadles’
general direction, Mr. Boyd had already used his vehicle as a weapon to assault
Deputy Beadles just minutes before, and Mr. Boyd could have easily turned and
reached Deputy Beadles very quickly on what appears to be a relatively narrow
road. Furthermore, the ATV “was not the only deadly weapon at” Mr. Boyd’s
disposal. Thompson, 762 F.3d at 439. It is undisputed that Mr. Boyd possessed a
29
machete and that Deputy Beadles was aware of that fact. Deputy Beadles had no
way of ascertaining whether Mr. Boyd intended to use that machete if he was forced
to stop, and Mr. Boyd had to that point exhibited no visible sign of surrender, even
after Deputy Beadles’ multiple attempts to stop him. While Mr. Travis did testify
that in his view the officer never appeared to be in any danger, courts have found
such opinions to be irrelevant under circumstances similar to those presented here.
See Waterman, 393 F.3d at 479 n.8; Pace, 283 F.3d at 1280 & n.11. There is no
evidence that Mr. Travis was aware that Mr. Boyd had a machete on his ATV or
that he had used his ATV as a weapon against Deputy Beadles just minutes prior to
the shooting. Thus, the Court cannot say that it was clearly established at that
time that Deputy Beadles was unjustified in assuming Mr. Boyd presented an
ongoing threat of serious harm to Deputy Beadles or others, even if Mr. Boyd was
on the other side of the road.
Lastly, cases have not clearly established that deadly force is unreasonable
when a fleeing suspect headed in an officer’s general direction is “right before up
even” with an officer. In Waterman, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity
when they stood anywhere from sixteen to seventy-two feet ahead of Waterman’s
accelerating vehicle when they began shooting. 393 F.3d at 474. The officers were
denied immunity only for the shots fired after the vehicle had passed. Id. at 482.
This set of shots was fired as the officers “scrambled toward Waterman” after
Waterman’s vehicle had passed all of them. Id. at 475. The officers fired all of their
shots within an “approximately-six-second period after Waterman’s vehicle lurched
30
forward.” Id. The Fourth Circuit found that it was not justified to fire after the car
had passed because “after the vehicle had passed the officers, the officers had access
to new information regarding the perceived threat and should therefore have
changed their response accordingly.” Hathaway, 507 F.3d at 321 (discussing
Waterman, 393 F.3d at 481). Similarly, in Lytle, the court denied summary
judgment because the officer fired shots at the car “three or four houses away” as it
was headed in the opposite direction. 560 F.3d at 413.
Here, Mr. Travis testified that Deputy Beadles began to fire right before Mr.
Boyd was “up even” with the officer. With respect to this first shot fired, not only is
there not a case directly on point for this factual circumstance, existing precedent
has not removed this particular question beyond debate. Though Deputy Beadles
did not violate clearly established law with the initial shot, this is not necessarily
dispositive of whether he is entitled to qualified immunity on all of the shots fired.
It is true that “an exercise of force that is reasonable at one moment can become
unreasonable in the next if the justification for the use of force has ceased.” Lytle,
560 F.3d at 413 (citing Waterman, 393 F.3d at 481). Deputy Beadles fired a total of
six shots, and the autopsy report indicates that Mr. Boyd sustained bullet wounds
to the right side of the back and left lower leg. However, Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that at the moment when Deputy Beadles fired this last shot, he had
sufficient access to new information, and time to react, regarding the perceived
threat such that he should have altered his response accordingly.
31
Rather, there is no factual dispute in the evidence that, as Deputy Beadles
testified, all six shots were fired within a second and a half. This is materially
different from Waterman, where the officers fired a combined eight shots within a
six-second period, and continued to fire multiple shots after Waterman passed as
the officers “scrambled toward Waterman.” 393 F.3d at 475. In Lytle, the driver
was twelve-to-fifteen feet in front of O’Donnell and began backing up towards the
deputy. The driver then began to drive away and made it three or four houses down
the block before the deputy fired at the rear of the Taurus. Here, the “extremely
brief period of time” Deputy Beadles had to react was insufficient for him to
perceive “new information indicating the threat was past.” Hathaway, 507 F.3d at
322. “Instead, the entirety of the officer’s actions were predicated on responding to
a serious threat quickly and decisively. That his decision is now subject to secondguessing – even legitimate second-guessing – does not make his actions objectively
unreasonable given the particular circumstances of the shooting.” Id. There are no
facts from which to infer that sufficient time passed for Deputy Beadles to perceive
that the threat to him had ceased.
Plaintiffs have not argued that Mr. Boyd driving his ATV could not pose the
same “threat of serious physical harm” as a driver in a car, Garner, 471 U.S. at 11,
nor have they cited any cases that require this Court to analyze the threat posed by
Mr. Boyd in this case differently merely because he drove an ATV rather than a car.
Taken together, the legal authority does not “clearly establish” that Deputy Beadles
violated the Fourth Amendment under the facts presented here. Rather, the cases
32
suggest that Deputy Beadles’ actions fell in the “hazy border between excessive
force and acceptable force.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 600. Deputy Beadles is therefore
entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim.
III. CONCLUSION
To the extent the Court has not addressed any of the parties’ arguments, it
has nevertheless considered them and determined that they would not alter the
result. The Court concludes that Defendant Terry Beadles is entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiffs have not shown that Deputy Beadles’ conduct violated
clearly established law or was objectively unreasonable.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Terry
Beadles’ Motion [42] for Summary Judgment Premised on Qualified Immunity is
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Terry Beadles are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED that the stay of proceedings is lifted. The
parties are directed to contact the Magistrate Judge within ten (10) calendar days
to schedule a Case Management Conference as it relates to Plaintiffs’ claims against
Defendant Pike County.
SO ORDERED this the 15th day of March, 2018.
s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
33
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