Woods v. City of Natchez Police Department, et al

Filing 43

ORDER ADOPTING 40 Report and Recommendation. The claims Plaintiff Casey Shelton Woods asserts under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All state-law claims Plaintiff Casey Shelton Woods asserts are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 3/27/18 (RRL) [copy mailed to plaintiff]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
CASEY SHELTON WOODS, #81862

PLAINTIFF

V.

CAUSE NO. 5:17-CV-4-DCB-MTP

CITY OF NATCHEZ POLICE DEPARTMENT,
DISPATCHER MACK JAMES, CHIEF OF POLICE
DANNY WHITE, JOHN AND JANE DOES, and
CITY OF NATCHEZ

DEFENDANTS
ORDER AND OPINION

This cause is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Michael T.
Parker’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 40] that the Court dismiss
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed by pro se plaintiff Casey
Shelton Woods, proceeding in forma pauperis, and Woods’s Objection
[Doc. 41] to that Report and Recommendation.
I
Nineteenth months after he shot and killed Pierre Tenner,
Woods sued the City of Natchez, Dispatcher Mack James, and Chief
of Police Danny White

for failing to timely dispatch

police

officers to the scene at which Woods murdered Tenner.1

1
The Court dismissed the Natchez Police Department, which Woods
originally named as a defendant, and liberally construed Woods’s allegations
against it as allegations against the City of Natchez. See Doc. 12.

The murder occurred on May 24, 2015 at the home of Pierre
Tenner’s wife, Doris. Woods alleges he and Doris Tenner were at
her home when Pierre arrived. Pierre threatened Woods, and Doris
or Woods twice called the Natchez Police Department (“NPD”). Woods
alleges that NPD Dispatcher Mack James twice told them that an
officer was en route when that was not so.
The crux of Woods’s Complaint is Dispatcher James’s alleged
failure

to

Magistrate

timely
Judge

send

Parker

an
held

officer
a

to

Spears

Doris
hearing

Tenner’s
and

home.

liberally

construed Woods’s Complaint as attempting to allege state-law
negligence claims

and § 1983 claims for violations of equal

protection and substantive due process.
II
On February 2, 2018, Magistrate Judge Parker determined that
Woods’s suit should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and entered a Report and Recommendation so reflecting.2
First, the Report and Recommendation advises that the Court
dismiss with prejudice Woods’s equal protection-based § 1983 claim
because

Woods

fails

to

allege

that

he

was

intentionally

discriminated against because of his membership in a protective

2 Section 1915 empowers the Court to dismiss on its own motion the
complaint of a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis when —— as here —— it fails
to state claims on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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class or that he was intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated without rational basis.
Second, the Report and Recommendation advises that the Court
dismiss with prejudice Woods’s substantive due process-based §
1983 claim because Woods failed to plead the “special relationship”
necessary to show a violation of the Due Process Clause on a
failure-to-protect theory.
Finally, the Report and Recommendation advises that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Woods’s statelaw

negligence

claims

because

all

claims

within

the

Court’s

original jurisdiction should be dismissed.
Woods timely objects to the Report and Recommendation and
raises these issues in these terms:
1) 911 calling transcript proved beyond doubt that a socalled special relationship did exist.
2) Dispatcher's
policy
proved
dispatcher was negligent.

beyond

doubt

that

3) Elements of negligence, duty, breach, and causation
were all exposed.
4) Along with any cause plaintiff may have left out that
surrounds this Motion to Object to Recommendation,
plaintiff pleads this Court to reconsider.
See Doc. 41.3

3 Although it contains four statements, Woods’s Objection attacks only
two conclusions: that Woods lacked the “special relationship” necessary to
support his § 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause and that discretionary

3

III
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings
and recommendations, the Court reviews de novo the recommendations
to which an objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court
need

not

consider

frivolous,

conclusory,

or

generalized

objections. Battle v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam). After its review, the Court may accept,
reject, or modify the recommendation of the magistrate judge,
receive further evidence in the case, or return the matter to the
magistrate with further instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
IV
Charitably read, Woods’s Complaint attempts to plead three
types of § 1983 claims —— one sounding in equal protection, another
grounded in substantive due process, and a third premised on
supervisory

liability.

As

to

each,

Woods

must

allege

(1)

a

violation of a right secured by the Constitution,(2) committed by
a person acting under color of state law. James v. Texas Collin
Cty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008).

dismissal of his state-law negligence claim was appropriate. The Court in any
event reviews the entirety of the Report and Recommendation de novo.

4

A
The Court turns first to Woods’s attempt to plead a claim
against the City of Natchez, Dispatcher Mack James, and Chief of
Police Danny White under § 1983 for violations of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause forbids a
state from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
A § 1983 plaintiff may plead an Equal Protection Clause
violation in at least two ways. He may allege that a state actor
intentionally discriminated against him because of his membership
in a protected class. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705 (5th
Cir.

1999).

Or

he

may

allege

he

was

intentionally

treated

differently from others similarly situated without rational basis.
Integrity Collision Ctr. v. City of Fulshear, 837 F.3d 581, 586
(5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Woods

nowhere

alleges

that

any

Defendant

intentionally

failed to timely dispatch an officer to the Tenner residence
because of his membership in a protected class. Nor does Woods
allege that, in failing to timely dispatch an officer, Defendants
intentionally

treated

him

situated

callers

without

911

differently
rational

from

other

basis.

similarly

Thus,

Wood’s

Complaint fails to plead a § 1983 claim based on a denial of equal
5

protection, and the Report and Recommendation correctly concludes
that the claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
B
The Court next considers Woods’s attempt to plead a claim
against the City of Natchez, Dispatcher Mack James, and Chief of
Police Danny White under § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause on a failure-to-protect theory.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a
state from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. One piece of
Due Process Clause doctrine is termed “substantive due process”
and

“protects

individual

liberty

against

certain

government

actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
A state’s failure to protect a citizen from private violence
does not violate substantive due process. DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cty. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). But a Due
Process Clause-derived duty to protect arises if a state creates
a “special relationship” with a citizen. Doe ex rel. Magee v.
Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 856 (5th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200).

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A state creates a “special relationship” when it “takes a
person into its custody and holds him there against his will.”
DeShaney,

489

U.S.

at

199-200.

The

common

examples

are

an

incarcerated prisoner or a person that is involuntarily committed
to an institution. Doe ex rel. Magee, 675 F.3d at 856 (internal
citations omitted).
No “special relationship” exists here. As the Report and
Recommendation observes, Woods was not in anyone’s custody at the
time he faults NPD for failing to timely dispatch an officer to
protect him; he was, rather, at Doris Tenner’s home of his own
accord.

Still,

Woods

urges

the

Court

to

divine

a

“special

relationship” from the transcript of a 911 call. The Court has
reviewed the transcript, Doc. 36-2, and finds that it fails to
create a “special relationship” through which Defendants could
have assumed a constitutional duty to protect Woods from private
violence.
Woods’s Complaint fails to plead a § 1983 claim based on a
violation

of

Recommendation

substantive
correctly

due

process,

concludes

dismissed with prejudice.

7

that

and

the

the

claim

Report
should

and
be

C
The Court next considers the supervisory liability of the
City of Natchez and Chief of Police Danny White under § 1983 for
the alleged misconduct of Dispatcher James.
Section

1983

liability

requires

some

form

of

personal

involvement in the alleged deprivation. Anderson v. Pasadena Ind.
Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999). So a supervisor is
not

vicariously liable for the actions of a subordinate under §

1983. Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir.
2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A

§ 1983

plaintiff suing a supervisor must instead allege (1) the police
chief failed to train or supervise the officer; (2) a causal link between
the chief’s failure to supervise or train and the violation of the
plaintiff’s

rights;

and

(3)

the

failure

to

supervise

constituted

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id.
(citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)).
Woods’s Complaint does not allege any direct misconduct by the City
of Natchez or Chief of Police Danny White. Rather, it attempts to impute
to them Dispatcher James’s alleged federal-law violations. The Complaint

therefore fails to plead a § 1983 claim based on a supervisory
liability theory, and the Report and Recommendation correctly
concludes that the claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

8

V
Having concluded that all of Woods’s federal-law claims should be
dismissed, the Court turns to his state-law claims.
The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claims if, as here, it has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the Court has
determined that all claims within its original jurisdiction should be
dismissed, the Court will follow the Fifth Circuit’s “general rule” and
“decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims.”
Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cty., Texas, 826 F.3d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 2016)
(per curiam) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Report and Recommendation correctly concludes that all of
Woods’s federal-law claims should be dismissed, and correctly applies
the Fifth Circuit’s “general rule” to advise that the Court decline
jurisdiction over Woods’s remaining claims and dismiss them without
prejudice.
VI

The Court has independently reviewed the entire record and
reviewed de novo the matters raised by Woods’s Objection. For the
reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Woods’s Objection
lacks merit and should be overruled.

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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker’s
Report and Recommendation [Doc. 40] is ADOPTED as the findings and
conclusions of this Court;
FURTHER ORDERED that all claims Plaintiff Casey Shelton Woods
asserts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
FURTHER ORDERED that all state-law claims Plaintiff Casey
Shelton Woods asserts are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
A

Final

Judgment

dismissing

this

action

will

follow

in

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
SO ORDERED, this the 27th day of March, 2018.
/s/ David Bramlette_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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