Bates v. Sanderson Farms, Inc.
Filing
51
ORDER granting 41 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. A Final Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice shall issue this day in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on May 23, 2018. (JBR)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
JERRY BATES
PLAINTIFF
V.
CAUSE NO. 5:17-CV-80-DCB-MTP
SANDERSON FARMS, INC.,
SANDERSON FARMS, INC. (PROCESSING),
KELVIN HARRELL, CECIL JACKSON, and
JOHN DOES 1-10
DEFENDANTS
ORDER AND OPINION
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 41]
filed
by
Defendants
Kelvin
Harrell,
Cecil
Jackson,
Sanderson
Farms, Inc. (Processing Division), and Sanderson Farms, Inc.1 For
the reasons that follow, the Motion will be GRANTED.
Background
This employment dispute arises from racial discrimination
Jerry Bates contends he endured as a clean-up worker at a McComb,
Mississippi Sanderson Farms plant, and retaliation he says he
experienced after he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Processing Division) is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Sanderson Farms, Inc. Because Bates asserts identical claims against both
Sanderson Farms entities, this Order refers to them collectively as “Sanderson
Farms.”
1
Bates, an African-American, worked on the clean-up crew at
Sanderson Farms’ McComb plant for over twenty years, from May 1995
to December 2015. As a worker on the clean-up crew, Bates cleaned
the plant’s production and processing equipment to prepare the
plant for the day’s poultry processing operations.
Sanderson
Farms
also
employed
Kelvin
Harrell,
Bates’
supervisor, and Cecil Jackson, Division Manager of the McComb
plant. Harrell was the subject of a July 2015 EEOC complaint, in
which Bates alleged that Harrell “constantly harassed” him and
“placed
negative
information
in
[his]
file”
because
Bates
complaint,
Bates
complained about Harrell to Jackson.
Four
months
after
initiating
that
EEOC
attended Sanderson Farms’ annual “Heart & Soul” meeting. Heart &
Soul
meetings
are
mandatory
employment
seminars
conducted
by
Sanderson Farms management. After each Heart & Soul meeting,
employees are asked to complete a survey and submit written
comments to Sanderson Farms’ President. Company policy dictates
that the Division Manager —— in this case, Jackson —— meet inperson with each employee who submits a Heart & Soul meeting
comment.
2
After the November 2015 Heart & Soul meeting, Bates submitted
this comment:
Pay clean-up 40 hrs pay like all other Dept. We do more
than 40 hrs worth of work a week: We actually work a
miracle everyday to make this plant start up on time
everyday.
As Sanderson Farms’ policy required, Jackson arranged inperson meetings with employees who, like Bates, submitted comments
at the Heart & Soul meeting. To facilitate those meetings, Jackson
emailed
clean-up
crew
supervisors
Chad
Robinson
and
Dorsey
Cameron. He instructed Robinson and Cameron to tell eight cleanup crew employees —— including Bates —— to remain at work after
their shift ended on December 4, 2015 so that Jackson could meet
with them about the comments they submitted.
Around midnight on December 4, 2015, Robinson relayed the
message to Bates and other members of the clean-up crew: They were
to remain at work after their shift ended that morning so that
they could speak with Jackson. Bates did not comply. He instead
left work without speaking to Jackson. Sanderson Farms fired Bates
later that day.
Bates sued Sanderson Farms, Harrell, and Jackson, alleging
general negligence and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
(“FLSA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
3
In his Complaint, Bates alleges that Sanderson Farms promoted
white members of the clean-up crew more quickly than AfricanAmerican
members.
Beyond
that,
he
says,
Sanderson
Farms
manipulated the hours the clean-up crew worked so that Sanderson
Farms was not required to pay them overtime. Bates also alleges
that
management,
including
Jackson,
ignored
three
harassment
complaints he filed against Harrell. Finally, Bates alleges that
he was fired in retaliation for his July 2015 EEOC complaint and
the comment he submitted following the November 2015 Heart & Soul
meeting.
Sanderson
Farms,
Jackson,
and
Harrell
move
for
summary
judgment on all of Bates’ claims.
I
Summary judgment is proper if Defendants show that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). If
Defendants show the absence of a disputed material fact, Bates
cannot, in reply, simply direct the Court to conclusory allegations
or a scintilla of evidence favorable to him. Lincoln v. Scott, 887
F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 2018). He must instead “go beyond the
pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a
4
genuine issue for trial.” McCarty v. Hillstone Restaurant Grp.,
Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
The Court views facts and draws reasonable inferences in
Bates’ favor. Vann v. City of Southaven, Miss., 884 F.3d 307, 309
(5th Cir. 2018). As always, the Court neither assesses credibility
nor
weighs
evidence
at
the
summary-judgment
stage.
Wells
v.
Minnesota Life Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 2018).
II
A
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial
discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). It outlaws
both intentional discrimination and unintentional discrimination
that disproportionately adversely affects minorities. Ricci v.
DeStefano,
557
discrimination
U.S.
is
557,
called
577
(2009).
disparate
The
former
treatment,
the
form
of
latter,
disparate effect. Id. at 577. This is a disparate treatment case.
Direct evidence of intentional discrimination is difficult to
come by. A plaintiff without direct evidence may nonetheless
prevail in a Title VII action “by providing circumstantial evidence
sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.” Thomas v.
Johnson, 788 F.3d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 2015).
5
When a Title VII plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence
to prove discrimination, the Court’s analysis is governed by the
McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting analysis. Alkhawaldeh v. Dow
Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017). That analysis places
the initial burden on the employee to prove three things: “(1) he
is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the
position that he held, (3) he was subject to an adverse employment
action, and (4) he was treated less favorably than others similarly
situated outside of his protected class.” Alkhawaldeh, 851 F.3d at
426.
If the employee makes this initial showing, the burden shifts
to the employer to “articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. And if the employer
does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the
employer’s reason is pretextual. Id.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment
on Bates’ Title VII racial-discrimination claim because Bates
cannot offer evidence showing that he was treated less favorably
by Sanderson Farms than other similarly situated white clean-up
workers. The Court agrees.
To satisfy the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement, Bates
must “identify at least one coworker outside of his protected class
who
was
treated
more
favorably
6
under
nearly
identical
circumstances.” Alkhawaldeh, 851 F.3d at 426. Bates has not done
so. He instead directs the Court to conclusory allegations of
racial preference in his Complaint and vague deposition testimony
that he was “overlooked” when management would “come and get the
white guys.”
Bates offers no summary-judgment evidence showing he was
treated less favorably by Sanderson Farms than other similarlysituated white clean-up workers, so he cannot meet his burden of
proving the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement. Summary judgment
is therefore appropriate on Bates’ Title VII racial-discrimination
claim as to all Defendants.
Even if Bates had offered evidence sufficient to satisfy the
fourth
McDonnell
Douglas
requirement,
the
Court
would
grant
summary judgment against him. Defendants have come forward with
evidence showing that Bates was fired for leaving the McComb plant
without permission, in violation of Sanderson Farms’ “Work Rules
for Hourly Employees.”
To this legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason, Bates offers no non-risible rejoinder.
Bates breezily declares that Sanderson Farms invokes its
“Work
Rules
for
Hourly
Employees”
as
pretext
for
racial
discrimination. But other than his conclusory say-so, he offers no
proof that suggests —— much less shows —— that Sanderson Farms’
“proffered
explanation
is
false
7
or
‘unworthy
of
credence.’”
Thomas, 788 F.3d at 179 (quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572,
578 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Also unpersuasive is Bates’ contention that Sanderson Farms’
reasons for firing him are pretextual because he was never told
that he was supposed to meet with Jackson post-shift on December
4, 2015. Taking Bates at his word, Sanderson Farms’ decision to
fire him for not doing something he was not told to do would
perhaps be “wrong.” But it would not be
discriminatory.
See
Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.
1995).
Viewing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Bates’ favor, the Court concludes that, as to Bates’ Title VII
racial-discrimination claim, there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Bates’
Title VII racial-discrimination claim, and DISMISSES the claim
WITH PREJUDICE.
B
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision forbids an employer
from taking adverse employment action against an employee because
the employee has opposed practices made unlawful by Title VII or
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
8
in any Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a).
To prevail on his retaliation claim, Bates must show three
things: (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2)
Sanderson Farms took adverse employment action against him; and
(3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. Fisher v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 847 F.3d
752, 757 (5th Cir. 2017).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
because Bates cannot show a causal connection between protected
activity and Sanderson Farms’ decision to fire him on December 4,
2015. The only protected activity that can support a retaliation
claim, Defendants assert, is Bates’ July 2015 EEOC complaint. And
the
five-month
period
between
the
time
Bates
initiated
that
complaint and Sanderson Farms fired him, Defendants continue, is
too great to show a causal connection. In reply, Bates insists
that his Heart & Soul comment constitutes protected activity, and
that he was fired for submitting it.
i
The
Court
first
addresses
the
conduct
that
constitutes
protected activity under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.
9
Bates argues that his Heart & Soul comment is protected; Defendants
insist that it is not.
To qualify as protected activity, Bates’ comment must have at
a minimum alerted Sanderson Farms to Bates’ reasonable belief that
unlawful discrimination was at issue. Brown v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 406 F. App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
(per curiam). It did not.
Bates’ comment reflects dissatisfaction with the amount the
clean-up crew was paid and the number of hours it was permitted to
work. Bates laments that the clean-up crew does not receive “40
hrs pay like all other Dept,” and as justification says that the
crew “actually work[s] a miracle everyday to make this plant start
up on time.” Discrimination is not mentioned. Because Bates’ Heart
& Soul comment is merely a “vague complaint, without reference to
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII,” it does not
constitute protected activity under Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision. Davis v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist, 448 F. App’x 485, 493
(5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (per curiam).
It
is
constitutes
undisputed
protected
that
Bates’
activity.
So
July
2015
EEOC
complaint
the
Court
next
considers
whether Bates has come forward with enough evidence linking his
firing to that complaint to avoid summary judgment.
10
ii
To recover on his Title VII retaliation claim, Bates must
show a causal connection between his July 2015 EEOC complaint and
Sanderson Farms’ decision to fire him. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
On this point, Bates offers much commentary but little in the
way of admissible evidence. In fact, he fails to direct the Court
to any evidence linking his July 2015 EEOC complaint to his firing
in December 2015. This is the summary-judgment stage: Bates must
come forward with more than his unsworn insistence that his tangles
with Harrell “w[ere] an ongoing issue and . . .
a but-for cause.”
See Doc. 48, p. 7.
Bates suggests that the temporal proximity between his EEOC
complaint and his firing —— five months —— satisfies the causality
requirement. But a five month gap, standing alone, is insufficient
to show a causal connection between the employment action and the
protected conduct. See Ajao v. Bed Bath and Beyond, Inc., 265 F.
App’x 258, 265 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (per curiam).
The Fifth Circuit has addressed the temporal proximity issue,
primarily through unpublished memorandum opinions.
See,
e.g.,
Barkley v. Singing River Elec. Power Ass’n, 433 F. App’x 254, 260
(5th
Cir.
2011)
(unpublished)
(per
11
curiam)
(four
month
gap,
standing alone, held insufficient); Everett v. Cent. Mississippi,
Inc. Head Start Program, 444 F. App’x 38, 47 (5th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished) (per curiam) (five month gap, same).
Though
unpublished
and
therefore
non-precedential,
the
opinions agree on a fundamental point: When a Title VII retaliation
plaintiff’ relies only on the lapse of time between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action to show
a
causal
connection, “the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’” Barkley
v. Singing River Elec. Power Ass’n, 433 F. App’x 254, 260 (5th
Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (per curiam) (quoting Clark Cnty. Dist.
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001)). And a five month lapse
is not close enough. See Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278
F.3d 463, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2002).
Because Bates offers no evidence of a causal connection
between his July 2015 filing of an EEOC complaint and his December
2015
firing,
he
fails
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case
of
retaliation under Title VII. And even if Bates had shown a causal
connection, summary judgment would be warranted. Sanderson Farms
has offered evidence that it fired Bates because he violated its
“Work Rules for Hourly Employees,” a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for its employment action. See McCoy v. City of Shreveport,
492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007).
12
Viewing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Bates’ favor, the Court concludes that, as to Bates’ Title VII
retaliation claim, there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Bates’ Title
VII retaliation claim, and DISMISSES the claim WITH PREJUDICE.
C
The
FLSA
sets
wage,
hour,
and
overtime
standards
that
employers must generally follow. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 (minimum
wage),
207(a)
(overtime).
And
like
other
federal
employment
statutes, it contains an anti-retaliation provision. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3). That provision declares it unlawful to fire any
employee
because
he
has
“filed
any
complaint.”
29
U.S.C.
§
215(a)(3).
To prevail on his FLSA retaliation claim, Bates must show (1)
he participated in a protected activity under the FLSA; (2) an
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Starnes v. Wallace, 849
F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2017).
The
first
prong,
participation
in
a
protected
activity,
requires proof that Bates filed a “complaint.” Lasater v. Texas
A&M University-Commerce, 495 F. App’x 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2012)
13
(unpublished) (per curiam). To qualify as a “complaint” under the
FLSA, the employee’s communication “must be sufficiently clear and
detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of
both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by
the FLSA and a call for their protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14 (2011).
Bates’ Heart & Soul comment does not qualify as a “complaint”
under the FLSA. Because his comment does not allude to a right
protected by the FLSA, and does not suggest that Sanderson Farms
has violated any FLSA-protected right, no reasonable employer
could have understood Bates’ Heart & Soul comment as an assertion
of FLSA-protected rights and a call for their protection. Kasten,
563 U.S. at 14.
Bates’ Heart & Soul comment does two things. First, it demands
that Sanderson Farms permit members of the clean-up crew to work
the same number of hours as other departments. Second, it provides
a
subjective assessment of the value
that the clean-up crew
provides —— “work[ing] a miracle everyday.” But it does not frame
Sanderson Farms’ conduct in terms of “potential illegality,” Hagan
v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008),
nor does it mention FLSA-protected activity such as overtime or
14
minimum-wage payments.2 It cannot therefore qualify as a complaint
under the FLSA, and Bates cannot meet his burden of proving the
first element of his FLSA retaliation claim.3
Viewing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Bates’
favor,
the
Court
concludes
that,
as
to
Bates’
FLSA
retaliation claim, there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court therefore GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion as to Bates’
FLSA retaliation claim, and DISMISSES the claim WITH PREJUDICE.
D
Bates has also sued the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The
same
analysis
that
applies
to
claims
of
intentional
discrimination under Title VII governs claims brought under § 1981.
Raggs, 278 F.3d at 468. Because the theories require the same proof
to establish liability, and the Court has already determined that
Bates’ comment could be construed as a complaint about the number of
hours the clean-up crew is permitted to work relative to other Sanderson Farms
departments. The FLSA, however, does not protect an employee’s right to work a
minimum number of hours. See Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403,
405 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J.). And even if it did, Bates’ comment
would not be actionable because it does not frame Sanderson Farms’ conduct in
terms of potential illegality.
2
Bates’ July 2015 EEOC charge does not qualify as FLSA-protected activity,
either. See, e.g., Maynor v. Dow Chem. Co., No. G-07-CV-504, 2010 WL 11541919,
at *9 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2010); Kassmann v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 473
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (complaints about discrimination and harassment do not qualify
as FLSA-protected activity).
3
15
the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Bates’ Title VII claims, the Court finds that summary judgment is
warranted on Bates’ § 1981 claim. See Outley v. Luke & Assocs.,
Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 216 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2016). The Court therefore
GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Bates’ § 1981 claims, and dismisses
the claims WITH PREJUDICE.
E
Although Bates’ papers do not address the issue, his Amended
Complaint indicates that he seeks to hold Defendants Harrell and
Jackson liable for Title VII violations. Title VII, however, levies
liability on employers —— not individual employees. See Grant v.
Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994). Bates cannot in
good faith contend that Harrell or Jackson is an “employer” under
Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer”). To the
extent Bates asserts Title VII claims against Harrell and Jackson,
the claims are without merit, and Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on them.
F
In his Amended Complaint, Bates advances several state-law
theories of liability. He alleges, for example, that Sanderson
Farms negligently failed to “adequately train and supervise its
employees concerning racial discrimination.” Doc. 12, ¶34. But
16
Mississippi law does not impose tort duties on employers to protect
their employees from, and train them in, racial discrimination.
And even if it did, a claim initiated by an employee for breach of
that duty would be barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the
Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-39. Bates offers neither evidence nor authority to support any
state-law negligence claim against any Defendant.
Viewing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Bates’ favor, the Court concludes that, as to Bates’ state-law
negligence claims, there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Bates’ statelaw negligence claims, and DISMISSES the claims WITH PREJUDICE.
III
This case is not about whether Sanderson Farms’ decision to
fire Bates was a good decision or a bad one; it is about whether
the
decision
was
discriminatory
concludes that it was neither.
17
or
retaliatory.
The
Court
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 41] is GRANTED,
and Plaintiff Jerry Bates’ claims
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A Final Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice, in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, shall issue
this day.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 23rd day of May, 2018.
/s/ David Bramlette_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
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