Bridges v. Cain
Filing
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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 13 Report and Recommendations, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHPREJUDICE. A Final Judgment shall be entered of even date herewithpursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by District Judge David C. Bramlette, III on 1/27/2025 (PG)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
ANTONIO LARON BRIDGES
V.
PETITIONER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:21-CV-96-DCB-LGI
BURL CAIN
RESPONDENT
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge
LaKeysha Isaac’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”) [ECF No.
13], concerning Antonio Laron Bridges’s (“Petitioner”) Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 and Burl Cain (“Respondent”)’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
9] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Report was entered on
October 25, 2024, and objections to the Report were due by
November 8, 2024. Petitioner filed Objections [ECF No. 14] to
the Report [ECF No. 13] and Respondent has filed his Response
[ECF No. 16] to the Objections.
Upon examination of the Petitioner's Objections [ECF No.
14] to Judge Isaac’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 13], in
conjunction with a comprehensive review of the record and
relevant legal authorities, the Court finds that Petitioner’s
Objections [ECF No. 14] should be overruled, that the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 13] should be
adopted, that the Motion to Dismiss should be granted, and that
the Petition [ECF. No. 1] should be dismissed with prejudice.
I.
Background
Judge Isaac recommends that the Court dismiss with
prejudice Bridges’s petition for habeas corpus relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF No. 13]. Bridges brings his petition on
three grounds: first, that he was denied due process, second,
that he was illegally sentenced as a habitual offender, and
third, that his sentencing unconstitutionally resulted from
harmful errors. [ECF No. 1] at 15, 20, 24. Each of these claims
stems from Bridges’s contention that the sentencing court
deprived him of his constitutional rights by illegally imposing
a habitual offender enhancement to his sentence. Id.
Bridges was convicted by a Pike County Circuit Court jury
for two counts of attempted murder, one count of possession of a
firearm by a felon, and one count of shooting into a motor
vehicle. [ECF No. 1] at 26. Due to Bridges’s previous
convictions of manslaughter and felony drug possession, the
sentencing court adjudged him to be a habitual offender as
described in Miss. Code. Ann. Section 99-19-83 and sentenced him
to serve four concurrent sentences of life imprisonment in the
custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Id. Miss.
Code. Ann. Section 99-19-83 provides that if a criminal
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defendant has twice previously served more than a year for two
different felonies, one of which qualifies as “violent,” that
defendant must be sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.
II.
Standard of Review
Where a petitioner has submitted a timely written objection
to a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation, a court
“make[s] a de novo determination of those portions of the report
or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(3); Walker v. Savers, 583 F. App'x 474, 474-75 (5th
Cir. 2014). In conducting a de novo review, the district court
makes its “own determination based upon the record and
unrestrained by the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate.”
United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1222 (5th Cir. 1989).
However, the Court is not “required to reiterate the findings
and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge.” Koetting v. Thompson,
995 F.2d 37, 40 (5th Cir. 1993). Where no timely objection is
filed, as well as to those portions of a report and
recommendation to which there are no objections, a court is to
apply a “clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion and contrary to
law standard of review.” Wilson, 864 F.2d at 1221 (quotation
omitted).
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A district court “need not consider frivolous, conclusive,
or general objections.” Gooding v. Colvin, No. 1:15CV20-LG-RHW,
2016 WL 660932, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 18, 2016) (citing Battle
v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987)).
“Moreover, where the objections are repetitive of the arguments
already made to the Magistrate Judge, a de novo review is
unwarranted.” Id. (citing Koetting, 995 F.2d at 40). “Instead,
the report and recommendation is reviewed by the district judge
for clear error.” Id. (citing Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005)); see also
Hernandez v. Livingston, 495 F. App'x 414, 416 (5th Cir. 2012);
Jackson v. Berryhill, No. 1:17CV48-LG-JCG, 2018 WL 4046512, at
*1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 24, 2018); Robertson v. Berryhill, No.
1:16CV295-HSO-JCG, 2018 WL 1336054, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 15,
2018).
III. Analysis
Petitioner objects to the Report on four grounds, each of
which is discussed below. First, he argues that the Magistrate
Judge incorrectly applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) standard to her evaluation of his
habeas petition. [ECF No. 14] at 1. Second, he maintains that
the Magistrate Judge misinterpreted Mississippi law by ignoring
the requirement of proof of time served for prior convictions
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under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83. Id. at 2. Third, Petitioner
posits that the Magistrate Judge overlooked Bridges’s due
process claims by failing to address the alleged errors in
sentencing. Id. Fourth, he argues that the Report incorrectly
characterizes his claims as procedurally defaulted, failing to
address the merits. Id. In his objection, Bridges refers to the
Magistrate Judge as “respondent,” but he clearly intends to
refer to Judge Isaac and to object to her report.
A. AEDPA Standard
Petitioner claims that Judge Isaac “incorrectly asserts that
AEDPA’s restrictive standard applies to Bridges’s claims,
despite lacking full adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 1.
Under the AEDPA standard in 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d), a federal
habeas court may grant relief to a state prisoner whose claim
has previously been adjudicated on the merits in state court
only if
“the adjudication of the claim:
(1)
(2)
Resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
Resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
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In her Report, Judge Isaac describes the procedural
history of Bridges’s case. [ECF No. 13] at 6. She
explains that once he had exhausted his appeal, Bridges
sought post-conviction relief. [ECF No. 13] at 6.
Specifically, he asserted “that his counsel was
ineffective; he was denied due process in sentencing; and
the State failed to prove his habitual offender status.”
Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied Bridges’s postconviction relief application on each of the above
grounds. Id.
In federal court, Bridges seeks habeas corpus relief on
the grounds that (1) he was denied due process in
sentencing; (2) he was illegally sentenced under Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-19-83; and (3) his sentencing was
unconstitutional and the result of harmful errors. [ECF
No. 1]. The first two grounds are identical to those upon
which he sought post-conviction relief at the state
court, which were denied by the Mississippi Supreme
court. Therefore, each of these claims has been
adjudicated on the merits at the state court level and
therefore is subject to the AEDPA standard.
As to the third ground upon which Petitioner seeks
habeas relief, he alleges the convicting court committed
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harmful error by sentencing him as a habitual offender
under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 despite insufficient
evidence. [ECF No. 1] at 24. Because the “harmful error”
Bridges alleges was improper application of the habitual
offender sentencing statute, and because the state court
adjudicated his claim that he was illegally sentenced
under this statute, the third ground upon which
Petitioner seeks habeas relief has also been adjudicated
on its merits in state court. Thus, Judge Isaac properly
applied the AEDPA standard to her analysis of each of
these claims.
To the extent that Bridges’s petition could be
construed as alleging that his sentence was
disproportionate to his crime in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, he does raise a claim which was not
adjudicated on its merits in state court. However, the
Report acknowledges that this claim was not previously
brought, and therefore reviews it under a de novo
standard, which a court may use when it is unclear
whether a state court adjudication on the merits
occurred. [ECF No. 13] at 10, citing Olivier v. Prince,
719 F. App'x 389, 390 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Berghuis
v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 176 L.
Ed. 2d 1098 (2010) (citing § 2254(a)). Judge Isaac
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ultimately concluded that Bridges was not entitled to
relief under either standard of review. Therefore, the
Report correctly analyzes those of defendants’ claims
previously adjudicated on the merits by the state court
under the AEDPA standard, and his disproportionality
claim, which had not been adjudicated at the state level,
under a de novo standard.
B. Misrepresentation of Mississippi Law
Bridges also objects to the Report due to an alleged
“misrepresentation of Mississippi law” in the discussion of
Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-19-83. Bridges does not point to any
specific language in the Report misrepresenting the statute at
issue, nor does he offer any case law which supports his
position. The only case to which he refers is Watts v. State, in
which the Court of Appeals of Mississippi reversed Watts’s
habitual offender sentence because the State attempted to prove
that he had previously served two one-year sentences by
introducing into evidence “certified copies of two sentencing
orders.” Watts v. State, 132 So. 3d 1062, 1065 (Miss. Ct. App.
2014). The court found that the sentencing orders “did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Watts served a term of at least
one year on each sentence,” and therefore held that the trial
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court erred in sentencing Watts as a habitual offender under
Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-19-83. Id.
The result in Watts has no bearing on Petitioner’s case,
because the evidence offered to prove Bridges’ prior time served
did not merely consist of sentencing orders. Instead, at the
sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted into evidence
certified “pen packs,” or “penitentiary packets” which contained
information about Bridges’s prior felony convictions from
Mississippi and Louisiana, including a computation of his
imprisonment and release dates. [ECF No. 13] at 11; [ECF No. 9]
at 15. This same evidence was introduced at a hearing to amend
the indictment to reflect his habitual offender status. [ECF No.
13] at 11. Pen packs are the records maintained on inmates
sentenced by the department of corrections and are considered
self-authenticating evidence of prior convictions under
Mississippi law. Id. (citing Jasper v. State, 858 So. 2d 149,
152 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 871 So. 2d 729 (Miss. 2004);
Miss. R. Evid. 902; McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th
Cir. 1992); Frazier v. State, 907 So. 2d 985, 989–92 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2005)).
The Report asserts that contrary to Bridges’s claims, his pen
packs confirm “a manslaughter conviction, for which he served
approximately ten years, and a drug conviction, for which he
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served a little over four years.” [ECF No. 13] at 12.
Furthermore, the Report emphasizes that Bridges does not now,
nor has he ever, denied his prior convictions or the time he
spent serving them. Id. After conducting a de novo review of the
procedural history of this case and supporting case law, the
Court agrees with Judge Isaac that the pen packs provided
sufficient evidence to prove that Petitioner previously served
two one-year sentences. Therefore, Bridges’s objection to the
Report’s misrepresentation of Mississippi law fails.
C. Failure of Report to address alleged sentencing errors
Next, Petitioner claims that the Report failed to address
Bridges’s due process claims, specifically the alleged errors in
sentencing. [ECF no. 14] at 2. He simply claims that “Bridges’s
sentencing raises due process concerns” and cites to Gideon v.
Wainwright, a U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court held
that the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
extends the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel to indigent
state criminal defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). Bridges has not raised
any claims before this court regarding a failure by the State to
appoint him counsel, and “issues raised for the first time in
objections to the report of a magistrate judge are not properly
before the district judge.” Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 219
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n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d
626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Petitioner’s assertion that the Report failed to address his
due process claims is untrue. Judge Isaac’s report extensively
discussed the requirements in the sentencing of a defendant
under Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-19-83 and the sufficiency of
the evidence which the state presented to support Bridges’s
habitual offender sentence. [ECF No. 13] at 8-12. Petitioner’s
due process claims stem from his assertion that the state court
illegally applied the violent habitual offender statute when
sentencing him. After analyzing Bridges’s due process claims,
the Report concludes that “his sentence enhancement was
established by the evidence, mandated by law, and not grossly
disproportionate to his crime.” [ECF No. 13] at 14. Therefore,
the Court finds without merit Petitioner’s claim that the Report
failed to address his due process claims.
D. Procedural Default Mischaracterization
Finally, Bridges alleges that the Report incorrectly
characterizes his claims as procedurally defaulted, ignoring the
merits. [ECF No. 14] at 2. He does not specify which claims the
Report failed to discuss, but presumably he refers to the
argument that “his life sentence is grossly disproportionate to
the gravity of the offense in violation of the Eighth
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Amendment.” [ECF No. 13] at 10. This is the only part of the
Report’s analysis which mentions a possibility of procedural
default but, as outlined below, the Report nevertheless conducts
an analysis of the merits of this claim.
The Report begins the relevant analysis by stating that “it is
not readily apparent from his state court filings that he
squarely presented, and the state courts adjudicated, such a
claim . . . This would indicate that such a claim is unexhausted
and procedurally defaulted.” Id. (citing Sones v. Hargett, 61
F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1995) (if a petitioner fails to exhaust
state remedies, and the state court would now find claim
procedurally barred, the claim is procedurally defaulted for
purposes of federal habeas review)). However, the Report notes,
“the State appears to have waived the procedural default issue
by failing to raise it.” Id. Therefore, Judge Isaac evaluates
the merits of Petitioner’s disproportionality claim under a de
novo standard of review, as it was not previously adjudicated on
its merits by the state court.
In the analysis of Bridges’s disproportionality claim, the
Report explains that “when a state sentence is within the
statutory limits, as it is here, a federal habeas court will not
upset the terms of the sentence unless it is shown to be grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Id. at 12
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(citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 993–95, 111 S. Ct.
2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
290–91, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)). Judge Isaac
explains that while the United Supreme Court has admitted that
it has not “established a clear or consistent path for courts to
follow,” it has made clear that the gross disproportionality
principle is “applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and
‘extreme case.’” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
72-3 (2003)). Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that when
conducting a gross disproportionality review in a recidivist
context, “we must place on the scales not only [petitioner’s]
current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism.
Any other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the
policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s
choice of sanctions.” Id. (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 29, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003)).
Applying this Supreme Court precedent, Judge Isaac considered
not only Bridges’s current conviction, but his prior convictions
as well, in her analysis of his disproportionality claim. She
explains that “Bridges was sentenced as a recidivist for
attempting to murder two people after previously serving more
than a year each for two prior felonies, one of which was
manslaughter—another violent crime.” Id. at 14. Because it was
proper for the trial court to consider Petitioner’s prior
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convictions when sentencing him under Miss. Code Ann. Section
99-19-83, Judge Isaac found that the life sentence imposed under
the statute was not disproportionate to his crime.
As outlined above, the Report thoroughly addresses the merits
of each of Defendant’s claims, and does not dismiss any of them
on the basis of procedural default. Therefore, Petitioner’s
argument that the Report failed to address alleged errors in his
sentencing fails.
IV.
Conclusion
After conducting a de novo review of the aspects of the Report
to which Petitioner objects and reviewing the remainder of the
report for clear error, the Court agrees with Judge Isaac’s
recommendation. Accordingly, the Report is ADOPTED and Bridges’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
A Final Judgment shall be entered of even date herewith
pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of January, 2025.
_/s/ David Bramlette _______
DAVID C. BRAMLETTE III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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