Haley v. CMS

Filing 216

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 147 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Deborah Vinson, Defendant Stephanie Kasting, Defendant Glen Babich, 156 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Samuel E. Haley, Jr., 151 MOTION for Sum mary Judgment filed by Defendant Dan Martinez, Defendant Charles Reed. Summary judgment will be granted to all remaining defendants on all claims. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 9/19/12. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

SAMUEL E. HALEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CMS, et. al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:09-CV-144-SNLJ

MEMORANDUM
This matter is before the Court on three motions for summary judgment: (1) “Medical
Defendants” Dr. Glen Babich, Stephanie Kasting, and Deborah Vinson’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (#147), (2) “Officer Defendants” Bryan Boskin, Dan Martinez, and Charles Reed’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (#151), and (3) Plaintiff Samuel Haley’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (#156). After an extended briefing schedule, these matters are ripe for adjudication.
I.

Factual Background
The following facts are undisputed except where indicated.1 Plaintiff Samuel Haley is a

prisoner in the Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) system currently — and at all
relevant times for the purposes of this lawsuit — incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional
Center (“SECC”). Plaintiff filed his complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against more than
1

The Court notes that the plaintiff has not specifically and appropriately responded to the
medical defendants’ statements of uncontroverted material facts as required by Local Rule 74.01(E). Plaintiff indicates in other filings that he thought the defendants’ statements of facts
were excessively long. This Court does not agree. Because plaintiff did not respond to the
statements of facts, the Court might properly deem all the defendants’ statements of facts as
admitted. Although pro se plaintiffs are required to follow the court’s rules, and this rule is no
exception, the Court has examined the evidence for any genuine disputed facts.

30 defendants, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. The Court dismissed
plaintiff’s claims against most of those defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); however,
several claims survived frivolity review. The Court eventually appointed counsel for plaintiff,
and two successive appointed attorneys each filed an amended complaint on behalf of plaintiff.
After the most recently-appointed attorney filed the Third Amended Complaint, however, due to
plaintiff’s unwillingness to cooperate with appointed counsel (and at plaintiff’s own request, see
Doc. #95), appointed counsel was permitted to withdraw. The Third Amended complaint, the
most recent properly-filed complaint in this matter, contains two counts: Count I, Eighth
Amendment Violations of Contemporary Standards of Decency, and Count II, Retaliation.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from serious medical conditions including diabetes,
diabetic neuropathy, hypertension, a pinched nerve in his neck, and a severe hiatal hernia. As a
result, plaintiff alleges that he suffers from severe chronic pain, severe swelling in his legs and
feet, and unstable blood sugar levels. These conditions are known to the medical department
defendants --- Nurse Vinson, Nurse Kasting, and Dr. Babich. Plaintiff alleges that, because of
his medical conditions, he was placed on a “medical lay-in” status, which included a lifting
restriction of 20 pounds, no prolonged standing, and a bottom bunk walk designation for
November 7, 2007 to November 6, 2008.
On October 1, 2008, the Warden of SECC began requiring plaintiff to pick up his
medicine at 9:00 p.m. Plaintiff claims that he was forced to refuse his medication due to his
inability to attend the 9:00 p.m. pick-up because of swelling and pain in his legs during that time
of day. On October 11, 2008, plaintiff attended his 5:30 p.m. insulin shot and medicine pickup;
he indicated that the swelling in his legs and feet would prevent him from returning for a 9:00
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p.m. pickup and signed a refusal of treatment. A corrections officer wrote a conduct violation up
for Haley for disobeying an order. At the October 15 hearing regarding that conduct violation,
defendant Holsten ordered plaintiff to put on an orange jumpsuit and assigned him a cell
restriction. Plaintiff refused to wear the jumpsuit, so defendant Holsten wrote him up for another
conduct violation. Plaintiff was then assigned to a top walk cell and a top bunk in contravention
of his medical lay-in order. Plaintiff was only sent to the cell with one pair of socks, one pair of
underwear, one pair of shorts, and one t-shirt. He also had only a light blanket for at least 30
days. He remained in that cell from October 15, 2008 until February 6, 2009 and was denied a
fresh change of clothing or linens during that time. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants’
actions amounted to violations of contemporary standards of decency and that the defendants
subjected him to those conditions in retaliation for his lawsuits, grievances, and other complaints.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
Courts have repeatedly recognized that summary judgment is a harsh remedy that should

be granted only when the moving party has established his right to judgment with such clarity as
not to give rise to controversy. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 554 F.2d 896, 901 (8th
Cir. 1977). Pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56(c), a district court may grant a motion
for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that “there is no
genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962). The burden is on the
moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc. Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th
Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more
than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting

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forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow a jury to return a
verdict for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences
that logically can be drawn from those facts. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 8th Cir.
1983). The court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.
Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976).
III.

Discussion
A.

Summary Judgment Motion by Medical Defendants

Dr. Glen Babich, Nurse Stephanie Kasting, and Nurse Deborah Vinson (the “medical
defendants”) worked, at all relevant times, for Correctional Medical Services, which provides
medical care for MDOC inmates at SECC.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the medical defendants knew or should have known
that the conditions in his cell were below the contemporary standards of decency and that they had
the power to remedy the situation. However, Dr. Babich has submitted an affidavit stating that
medical staff has no involvement in the issuance of bedding or clothing to inmates in
administrative segregation. To the extent plaintiff contends otherwise, plaintiff has not submitted
any evidence to support such a contention. As a result, there undisputed facts show that the
medical defendants are not responsible for plaintiff’s allegedly unconstitutional living conditions.
Plaintiff has not pleaded claims specifically arising from the medical care provided to
treat his chronic medical problems. However, he seems to attempt to claim that the medical
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his requests to change his medication pickup

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because of alleged pain and swelling in his legs and feet at night. A prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights are violated if a prison official exhibits deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s
serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
(1994). The Eighth Circuit defined a “serious medical need” as “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th
Cir. 1995). Medical malpractice, inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, or simple
negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234,
1343 (8th Cir. 1997). Prison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment when, in the exercise
of their professional judgment, they refuse to implement a prisoner’s requested treatment. Kayser
v. Caspari, 16 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1994). A mere difference of opinion between plaintiff and
his treating physician about what treatment is appropriate does not give rise to a colorable claim
under § 1983. Warren v. Fanning, 950 F.2d 1370,1373 (8th Cir. 1990).
Here, plaintiff’s medical records are replete with his refusing medical care, and plaintiff
himself testified that he refused medical care offered by the defendants. Plaintiff even refused to
take the insulin necessary to treat his diabetes on the day he was admitted to SECC. Although it
was plaintiff’s right to refuse medical care, he cannot blame the medical defendants for his own
refusals to accept treatment. To the extent plaintiff complains that the medical defendants
enforced the Warden’s policy in requiring him to pick up his medications at 9:00 p.m., there is no
medical evidence or findings to prove that plaintiff’s alleged leg swelling precluded him from
walking at 9:00 p.m. Plaintiff may disagree with defendant Babich’s medical decisions, but such

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disagreement does not support a § 1983 claim.2
Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Kasting or Vinson were personally involved in
providing any of his medical care. Rather, it appears plaintiff’s claims against those defendants are
based upon their involvement in his inmate grievances and presumably their denials of his
grievances seeking to change his medication pick-up time and for any alleged conspiracy against
defendant Vinson.
The denial of grievances, in and of itself, cannot support a substantive constitutional
claim. Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2002). The IRR responses and grievance
responses submitted by the medical defendants provided plaintiff with a detailed summary of his
medical status and basis for the medication time change. They concluded that plaintiff’s grievance
could not be supported based upon medical records and available information, and therefore,
denied the grievance. Based upon the undisputed material facts, plaintiff cannot show that
defendants Kasting or Vinson’s involvement in the inmate grievance process deprived him of his
constitutional rights.
With respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claim, plaintiff cannot establish that any of the
medical defendants retaliated against him for exercising a constitutionally protected right. A
prison official's action violates § 1983 when performed in retaliation for “the exercise of a
constitutionally protected right ...even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have
been proper.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). A
plaintiff must first show that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and then show that

2

Plaintiff’s briefing in opposition to the medical defendants’ motion is mainly a rehashing
of the facts and procedural history of this case. He does, however, appear to argue that the
defendants were somehow deliberately indifferent by preparing his insulin outside of his
presence. Because this claim was not included in his complaint, the Court will not address it
here.
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the official’s adverse action caused her to suffer an injury which would “chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing” in that activity, and that the adverse action was motivated in party by
exercise of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 928 (8th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2001). To avoid summary
judgment on a retaliation claim, a prisoner must submit “affirmative evidence [of] a retaliatory
motive.” Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007). The burden is also on the plaintiff
to establish the defendant was causally connected to the alleged retaliatory conduct. Naucke, 284
F.3d at 928; see also Webb v. Hendrick, 409 Fed. Appx. 33, 35 (8th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff alleges he was retaliated against or allegedly “threatened” for his utilization of the
grievance procedures and alleged legal actions regarding his medical treatment at the SECC.
Plaintiff has not set forth any admissible or competent evidence which could show that defendants
retaliated against him. Plaintiff was issued multiple conduct violations by MDOC staff for failing
to adhere to the prison rules. As a result, plaintiff was sentenced to Administrative Segregation for
a period of time. When he was notified of his release, plaintiff refused to leave Administrative
Segregation because he alleged he feared, without support, that defendants Vinson and Kasting
would issue him conduct violations or require him to obtain his medication at 9:00 p.m. The
undisputed facts demonstrate that neither Kasting nor Vinson have the authority to issue conduct
violations and it was the Warden who determined plaintiff’s 9:00 p.m. pick-up time for security
reasons. Plaintiff was issued subsequent conduct violations by MDOC staff for his failure or
refusal to leave Administration Segregation. Moreover, plaintiff continued to refuse medication
brought to him while in Administrative Segregation allegedly as a form of protest or because he
was mad. Accordingly, the undisputed evidence shows Plaintiff has not stated a claim for
retaliation and that he is unable to present sufficient evidence to create an issue for fact that any

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medical defendant retaliated against him for exercising a constitutional right.
B.

Summary Judgment Motion by Officer Defendants

Defendant Dan Martinez served as the Functional Unit Manager at SECC. Defendants
Bryan Hoskins and Charles Reed served as Sergeants at SECC. Plaintiff claims that these
defendants violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when
they assigned him to a “top walk” and “top bunk” against his “medical lay-in” order and provided
him with no change of clothing or bedding for the three months he was in Administrative
Segregation.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (1)
plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act; (2) plaintiff’s conditions of confinement did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation;
(3) defendants were not personally involved in the alleged deprivations, and (4) the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.
1.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted to them on all of plaintiff’s
claims because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to exhaust all available administrative remedies before
bringing an action challenging prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
“Exhaustion of available administrative remedies is required for any suit challenging prison
conditions.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 82 (2006). “[T]he PLRA exhaustion requirement
requires proper exhaustion.” Id. at 93. “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s
deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]” Id. at 92. Furthermore, “the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

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circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Porter v. Tussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002)(internal citations omitted). Further,
exhaustion is required “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.”
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). If all available administrative remedies have not
been exhausted as to all claims before the suit is filed, dismissal of the complaint is mandatory. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003).
Defendants assert that plaintiff did not exhaust the available administrative remedies, and,
in fact, they insist that he did not even initiate the grievance process for any of his claims against
Defendants. Defendants assert that plaintiff did not file any IRRs or grievances against Defendant
Martinez, Hoskins, or Reed regarding either his bunk assignment or his clothing/linen complaint.
Defendants note that plaintiff does not allege in his complaints that he instituted or exhausted the
IRR/grievance process regarding the conditions of his confinement, and they submitted an
affidavit confirming that plaintiff did not file a single grievance concerning the allegations
in the Third Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff denies that he failed to initiate or exhaust his administrative remedies. However,
the plaintiff is required to do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts --- plaintiff is
required to set forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow a
jury to return a verdict for it. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., 475 U.S. at 586; Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Plaintiff has failed to do so. Thus, the allegations
against these individuals must be dismissed as a matter of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
2.

Conditions of Confinement

Even if plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his condition-ofconfinement complaints, the defendants would be entitled to summary judgment. The conditions

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of a prisoner’s confinement in a state facility implicate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment only if the prisoner is “deprive[ed] of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “[T]he
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons” and “persons convicted of serious crimes,
cannot be free of discomfort.” Id. at 349.
“A prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must prove both an objective and
subjective element.” Revels v. Vincent, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). First, the defendants’ conduct must be proven, objectively,
sufficiently serious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving the plaintiff of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. See Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir.
1995). With regard to the objective element, the Supreme Court has held that “extreme
deprivations” are required to establish a conditions of confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Second, the defendant’s conduct must also reflect a subjective state of mind,
evincing deliberate indifference to the “prisoner’s health or safety.” Aswegan, 49 F.3d at 464
(quoting Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1995)). This requisite deliberate
indifference is established only when the plaintiff shows that “the defendant was substantially
aware of but disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Revels, 382 F.3d at 875.
Claims under the Eighth Amendment require a compensable injury to be greater than de
minimis. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008). No clear line divides de minimis
injuries from others. Id. See Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 496-97 (8th Cir. 2000); Wyatt v.
Delaney, 818 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1987).
As discussed further below, plaintiff has failed to establish that an assignment to the top
bunk or denial of an exchange of clothing and linens constitutes a violation of his Eighth

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Amendment rights. Plaintiff fails to prove he had an objectively serious need, or that he was
deprived of that need. Further, plaintiff cannot establish that defendants acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind because he has set forth no evidence showing that he brought his
complaints to defendants’ attention. Thus, plaintiff does not show that the Officer Defendants
caused him to suffer the sort of “extreme deprivation” required to establish a conditions of
confinement claim. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
Finally, plaintiff does not establish that he suffered any injury, or that an alleged injury
was greater than de minimis. Although he states he experienced discomfort in his sleeping
arrangements, he does not allege that he experienced any new injury.
a.

Clothing and Linen Exchange

Turning specifically to plaintiff’s claims regarding his lack of clean clothes or linens, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “humane conditions of confinement” include “adequate
clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). However,
there is “no absolute Eighth Amendment right not to be put in a cell without clothes or bedding.”
Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Circuit held, for example, that
there was no Eighth Amendment violation where an inmate was placed in a cell for four days
without clothes, running water or mattress and was refused tooth brush, tooth paste, deodorant,
soap, sheets, blankets, pillow cases, pillows, mattresses, his legal mail, and clothing. Id. The
Eighth Circuit held that because inmate had the basic necessities of food and shelter, there was no
constitutional violation. As that court stated, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons; it prohibits inhumane ones.” Id. at 445 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 832).
Here, plaintiff was provided with adequate clothing, including a jumpsuit, underwear,

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socks, t-shirt and shorts, and adequate bedding, including one sheet and one blanket. Plaintiff
never was deprived of clothing, and he admitted as his deposition that he was able to wash his
clothes by hand in the sink or the shower. Further, plaintiff fails to establish how washing
clothing by hand rises to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving Haley of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Aswegan, 49 F.3d at 464. Plaintiff does not
demonstrate that any of the three defendants was substantially aware of but disregarded an
excessive risk to his health or safety. In addition, plaintiff did not establish that he suffered any
injury from the alleged deprivations.
Further, and tellingly, plaintiff received an order to return to general population on at least
two separate occasions, but he refused to go. Any claim that the conditions of confinement
violated his constitutional rights are severely undercut by the fact that plaintiff chose to ignore an
order to leave administrative segregation and instead chose to remain housed there.3
b. Medical Lay In
Plaintiff also alleges he was assigned to a cell in Housing Unit 2 in which conditions fell
below the contemporary standards of decency. He further claims that the standards directly placed
him “in serious and immediate risk of physical harm.”
To the extent that plaintifff’s claim of placement in a cell contrary to a medical lay-in
order may be construed as a claim of deliberate indifference to a medical need, “it is well
established that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment extends to
protect prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Vaughn v. Greene Cty.,
Ark., 438 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal punctuation omitted). To establish an Eighth

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Plaintiff’s explanation for his refusal to return to the general prison population was that
he believed certain prison officials would “make sure” he got “a couple of more violations” and
would be sent back to administrative segregation.
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Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must show that
the prison official was deliberately indifferent to a “substantial risk of harm.” See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 828. A deliberate indifference claim must include an objectively serious medical need or a
deprivation of that need, and the need or the deprivation either must be supported by medical
evidence or must be so obvious that a layperson would recognize the need for a doctor’s attention.
Aswegan, 49 F.3d at 464; Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he had a serious medical need. He complains of
suffering from a “medical condition” for which he takes medicines and an insulin shot, and that
suffers from “swelling and pain in his legs.” Yet he offers no verifiable medical evidence of any
medical diagnosis. Haley further makes reference to a medical lay-in order; however, a lay-in
order “is not the same as showing a serious medical condition.” Rothman v. Lombardi, No. 4:11CV-639 CEJ, 2011 WL 1743831 (E.D. Mo. May 4, 2011).
Even if plaintiff could establish he had a serious medical need, he fails to prove that
defendants Martinez, Hoskins or Reed knew about his medical condition or consciously
disregarded his medical needs. In his Complaint, plaintiff asserts that his medical conditions
“were known to the medical department,” including Defendants Vinson, Kasting and Babich. But
he does not claim that his medical conditions were known to Defendants Martinez, Hoskins or
Reed, nor does he allege that defendants acted with a conscious disregard for his medical needs.
Finally, plaintiff fails to prove that he actually suffered any physical injury from the
alleged constitutional violations. In his deposition, he said he had felt discomfort due to the
conditions of his cell. However, mere discomfort does not rise to the level of a Constitutional
violation. Plaintiff fails to show that he was in serious and immediate risk of physical harm
based on a cell placement which did not take into account his medical lay-in. As a result,

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summary judgment will be granted to the Officer Defendants.
Because the Court has found ample basis on which to base summary judgment for the
defendants, the Court need not address defendants’ remaining arguments.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his claims against defendants. However, his motion

discusses a telephone status conference between the Court and defendants’ attorneys and
subsequent changes to deadlines for dispositive motions. Plaintiff complains that he (having
recently fired his lawyer despite being given an opportunity to reconcile with his court-appointed
attorney) was a pro se plaintiff at the time of the status conference, that he was not represented on
the phone call, and that he is entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff’s motion is nonsensical. He does not appear to seek summary judgment on any
claim at issue in his case. Rather, he seems to seek relief for some un-explained injury he
perceives stemmed from the telephonic conference and change in deadlines. Plaintiff’s motion
will be denied.
V.

Conclusion
Summary judgment will be granted to all remaining defendants on all claims. Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment will be denied.

Dated this

19th

day of September, 2012.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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