Hyles v. United States of America

Filing 24

OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 1 MOTION to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (2255) filed by Petitioner Tonya Johnson Hyles. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set aside or Correct Sentence, [Doc. 1], is DENIED.IT IS FURTHER OR DERED that this Court will not issue a Certificate of Appealability as Movant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of afederal constitutional right. A separate judgment is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 1/11/13. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
TONYA JOHNSON HYLES,
Movant,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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No. 1:10CV15 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Movant’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 by a Person in Federal Custody, [Doc. No. 1]. Pursuant to this Court’s
Order, the government has responded to the motion. Movant has filed a reply to
the government’s response. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion under §
2255 is denied without a hearing.
Movant’s Claims
Movant makes the following claims:
Ground One: Ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant was denied
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel advised her to
enter into a proffer agreement and provide statements to the
government and Grand Jury, and incorrectly advised her that all
charges would be dismissed against her and she would received
complete immunity from prosecution.
Ground Two: Ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant was denied
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to give

Movant competent advice regarding whether to accept a guilty plea
offer and failed to accurately inform Movant of a plea offer and the
ramifications of the offer from the government.
Ground Three: Movant claims, as ground three, that she is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing.
Facts and Background
Movant was originally charged in a Complaint with aiding and abetting the
murder for hire of Coy Smith. Movant initially agreed to cooperate with the
investigation and entered into a proffer letter with the government on June 11.
2001. On June 14, 2001, a Grand Jury returned a single count indictment
charging Movant with aiding and abetting murder for hire. These charges were
dismissed, without prejudice on October 24, 2001.
Movant did not testify in the trial of Tyrese Hyles. Movant did not testify
in the trial of Amesheo Cannon.
A grand jury returned an indictment against Movant on May 5, 2005.
Movant was charged with conspiring to commit murder for hire, aiding and
abetting murder for hire, possession of a firearm in furtherance of the murder for
hire conspiracy, and conspiring for a felon to possess a firearm.
Movant filed a motion for specific performance of an alleged cooperation
agreement with the government. Movant sought dismissal of the indictment

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based on her assertion that the government breached a cooperation agreement by
re-indicting her. Movant claimed to have maintained her side of the bargain by
providing truthful answers to questions put to her.
Judge Blanton held two hearings on Movant’s motion. Judge Blanton
concluded that there was no evidence to support Movant’s contention that there
was an agreement that a second indictment would not be filed against Movant.
Indeed, Judge Blanton found the evidence to be contrary to Movant’s claim.
Judge Blanton recommended that the Court deny Movant’s motion for specific
performance.
The Court adopted Judge Blanton’s recommendation. This Court found
that Movant had failed to satisfy the conditions precedent set forth in the
government’s proffer letter before an agreement could be reached.
Movant was tried before a jury on October 10, 2006. A verdict of guilty
was returned on all charged counts on October 13, 2006. The Court imposed a
life sentence on January 9, 2007. Movant appealed the conviction and sentence
that same day.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s convictions. The
Court rejected Movant’s argument that the government had violated a nonprosecution agreement. United States v. Johnson Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 953 (8th
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Cir. 2008).
Thereafter, Movant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court. The petition was denied on January 22, 2009.
This motion was subsequently filed on January 13, 2010. Movant claims
the above stated grounds for relief in this Motion.
Standard for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. 2255
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may seek relief from a
sentence imposed against him on the ground that “the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or law of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Claims brought under § 2255 may also be limited by procedural
default. A Movant “cannot raise a nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional issue in
a § 2255 motion if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal but was not.”
Anderson v. United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Belford v.
United States, 975 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, even
constitutional or jurisdictional claims not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised
collaterally in a § 2255 motion “unless a petitioner can demonstrate (1) cause for
the default and actual prejudice or (2) actual innocence.” United States v. Moss,
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252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 622 (1998)). Claims based on a federal statute or rule, rather than on a
specific constitutional guarantee, “can be raised on collateral review only if the
alleged error constituted a ‘fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice.’” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354
(1994)(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 477 n. 10 (1962)).
The Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to consider claims in a § 2255
motion “unless the motion, files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043
(8th Cir. 1994)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Thus, a “[movant] is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing ‘when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle [movant] to
relief.’” Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996)(quoting Wade
v. Armontrout, 798 F.2d 304, 306 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Court may dismiss a
claim “without an evidentiary hearing if the claim is inadequate on its face or if
the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based.”
Shaw, 24 F.3d at 1043. Since the Court finds that Movant’s claims can be
conclusively determined based upon the parties’ filings and the records of the
case, no evidentiary hearing will be necessary.
Discussion
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Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
It is well-established that a petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.
United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir.2006); United States v. Cordy,
560 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). The burden of demonstrating ineffective
assistance of counsel is on a defendant. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
658 (1984); United States v. White, 341 F.3d 673, 678 (8th Cir.2003). To prevail
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a convicted defendant must first
show counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The
defendant must also establish prejudice by showing “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id., at 694.
Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that his counsel's
performance was both deficient and prejudicial to obtain relief. Id. at
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. That is, “the movant must show that his
lawyer’s performance fell below the minimum standards of
professional competence (deficient performance) and that there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have
been different if his lawyer had performed competently (prejudice).”
Alaniz v. United States, 351 F.3d 365, 367–68 (8th Cir.2003) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “Our scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be ‘highly deferential.’” New v. United
States, 652 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir.2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
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at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
Hamberg v. U.S., 675 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir 2012).
Both parts of the Strickland test must be met in order for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim to succeed. Anderson v. United States, 393 F.3d 749,
753 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 882 (2005). The first part of the test
requires a “showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Id. Review of counsel’s performance by the court is “highly deferential,” and the
Court presumes “counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Id. The court does not “second-guess” trial strategy or
rely on the benefit of hindsight, id., and the attorney’s conduct must fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness to be found ineffective, United States v.
Ledezma-Rodriguez, 423 F.3d 830, 836 (2005). If the underlying claim (i.e., the
alleged deficient performance) would have been rejected, counsel's performance
is not deficient. Carter v. Hopkins, 92 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir.1996). Courts seek
to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight” by examining counsel’s
performance from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error. Id.
The second part of the Strickland test requires that the movant show that he
was prejudiced by counsel’s error, and “that ‘there is a reasonable probability
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that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’ ” Anderson, 393 F.3d at 753-54 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. When determining if
prejudice exists, the court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the
judge or jury.” Id. at 695; Williams v. U.S., 452 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (8th Cir.
2006).
Where a defendant raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance, each
claim of ineffective assistance must be examined independently rather than
collectively. Hall v. Luebbers,296 F.3d 385, 692-693 (8th Cir.2002); Griffin v.
Delo, 33 F.3d 895, 903-904 (8th Cir.1994).
Grounds One
Movant claims her attorney provided Ineffective assistance of counsel,
claiming she was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
advised her to enter into a proffer agreement and provide statements to the
government and Grand Jury, and incorrectly advised her that all charges would be
dismissed against her and she would receive complete immunity from
prosecution. Shockingly missing from Movant’s arguments is the repeated
requirement that Movant provide truthful and complete cooperation. Throughout
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the time leading up to Movant’s re-indictment, Movant was not completely
forthcoming with the information she had and her involvement in the crimes.
Tellingly, Movant provided more complete information when she was asked to
undergo a polygraph. Clearly, Movant’s previous disclosures were not complete
prior to the time preceding the scheduled polygraph. Movant cannot now
challenge the actions of the government in obtaining the indictment when her
actions at the time were contrary to what the proposed agreement would have
been. Movant can in no way establish that her counsel was ineffective with
respect to the proffer agreement. The failure of the agreement was entirely the
result of Movant’s actions. Ground One is therefore denied.
Ground Two
Movant claims she received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial
counsel failed to give Movant competent advice regarding whether to accept a
guilty plea offer and failed to accurately inform Movant of a plea offer and the
ramifications of the offer from the government.
Movant’s argument clearly fails because of her complete failure to accept
any responsibility for her actions vis a vis the murder of Coy Smith. Throughout
the entire proceeding, Movant protested her guilt and argued that she did not
cause “his death.” The record is replete with statements made by Movant
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demonstrating her position. The Court observed, particularly at sentencing, that
the Movant had ample opportunity to secure less of a sentence, but the decision to
continue to proceed to fail to be entirely cooperative was entirely her decision.
Movant made no objection to the Court’s observations at sentencing regarding
the advice of counsel, even after the Court allowed allocution. Movant continued
at that time to profess her belief that she did “nothing.” Ground Two is without
merit and is therefore denied.
Ground Three
As Ground Three of her Motion, Movant seeks an evidentiary hearing. An
evidentiary hearing is required under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “unless the motion, files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief.” Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994)(citing 28
U.S.C. § 2255). Thus, a “[movant] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing ‘when the
facts alleged, if true, would entitle [movant] to relief.’” Payne v. United States,
78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996)(quoting Wade v. Armontrout, 798 F.2d 304, 306
(8th Cir. 1986)). The record before the Court conclusively establishes that
Movant is entitled to no relief. The request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.
Conclusion
Movant has failed to establish that his constitutional right to effective
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counsel was violated. The record fails to establish that but for counsel error, the
result in this matter would have been different. Movant’s motion will be denied
in its entirety.
Certificate of Appealablity
The federal statute governing certificates of appealability provides that “[a]
certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). A substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requires
that “issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the
issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox v. Norris, 133
F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997). Based on the record, and the law as discussed
herein, the Court finds that Movant has not made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set aside or
Correct Sentence, [Doc. 1], is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will not issue a Certificate
of Appealability as Movant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

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federal constitutional right.
A separate judgment is entered this same date.
Dated this 11th day of January, 2013.

_______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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