Mitchell et al v. Robinson et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER..IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Unilever and Met Life's motion to dismiss, #27, is GRANTED, and Counts II, III, and IV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint are DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs shall have until March 27,2012, to amend their complaint, should they choose to allege a further cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). ( Response to Court due by 3/27/2012.). Signed by Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 3/13/12. (MRS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

JERRY MITCHELL, IREAN MITCHELL,
individually and as Next Friends of Mq. R.,
M. R., Jr., and Mk. R.,

)

)

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
MARCUS TYRONE ROBINSON, SR., et al. )

)

Defendants.
)

No.l:IICVI30SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants Unilever United States, Inc. ("Unilever"),
and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's ("Met Life") motion to dismiss Counts II, lU, and
IV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Plaintiffs Jerry Mitchell and Irean Mitchell are the
grandparents and Next Friends of minor plaintiffs Mq. R., M. R., Jr., and Mk. R. J who allege a

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claim of wrongful death against defendant Marcus T. Robinson, Sr., for killing Shekiah Mitchell
Robinson, allege state law claims against defendants Unilever and Met Life for negligent
payment of life insurance benefits and breach of contract, and allege a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as alnended, 29
U.S.c. § lOO 1, et seq. ("ERISA"). Plaintiffs allege that the decedent was employed by Unilever
and/or by certain other unknown persons or firms designated here as "John Doe.'; Plaintiffs
further allege that decedent was eligible for $121,000 in l, fe insurance benefits through a policy
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or policies issued by defendant Met Life and/or John Doe, and that the policy or l'olicies were
administered by defendants Unilever, Met Life, and/or John Doe.

I.

Background
In their complaint, plaintiffs claim that defendants Unilever and Met Life (hereafter

"defendants") failed to properly investigate the circumstances of the decedent's death, which
resulted in their wrongfully paying $121,000 in death benefits to defendant Robinson. Plaintiffs

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allege that defendant Robinson was ineligible for receipt of those death benefits due to his
involvement in his wife's death pursuant to Missouri's "slayer law." Defendant Unilever filed its
motion to strike plaintiffs' jury demand with respect to Count II, #7, and thereafter, plaintiffs
amended their complaint. Unilever then argued that plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury on
Counts II and III because those state law claims are pre-empted by ERISA; and on December 22,
2011, the Court granted defendant's motion and struck plaintiffs' jury demands with regard to
those claims. Defendants have now moved to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV.

II.

Legal Standard
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The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the

legal sufficiency of a complaint so as to eliminate those actions "which are fatally flawed in their
legal premises and designed to fail, thereby sparing litigants the burden of

unnec~ssary pretrial

and trial activity." Young v. City oiSt. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001 (quoting

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S . 319, 326-27 (1989)). The "tenet that a court must accept as true all

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of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Tpreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice." Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U. l at 555
(pleading offering only " labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action" will not do)).

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To survive a motion to dismiss, "a claim must be facially plausible, meaning that the
'factual content ... allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the respondent is liable
for the misconduct alleged.'" Cole v. Homier Dist. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d 856,861 (8th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.C!. at 1949). When determining the facial plausibility of a 1laim, the
Court must "accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (quoting Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039
(8th Cir. 2005)). Finally, where a court can infer from those factual allegations no F ore than a
"mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint must be dismissed. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
at 1950). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to defendants' motion.

III.

Discussion
Plaintiffs characterize their Counts II and III as arising under Missouri's "slayer law" and

not under ERISA. Defendants argue that these state common law claims are completely pre­
empted by ERISA and that the only remedy available to plaintiffs under ERISA is a claim for

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plan benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B). In its prior Order of December 22, 2011, striking
plaintiffs' jury demands for Counts II and III, this Court held that under Aetna Health, Inc. v.

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Davila and Kentucky Association ofHealth Plans, Inc. v. Miller, plaintiffs are limited to alleging
ERISA claims under 29 U.S.C. § I I 32(a)(l)(B) because claims for breach of contract or
negligence are duplicative of the remedies available under ERISA. I See Aetna Hearth, Inc. v.

Davila, 542 U.S. 200,209 (2004); Kentucky Association ofHealth Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S.

lIn its Order, the Court found that plaintiffs had alleged an ERISA claim pursuant to §
1 132(a)(l)(B), and thus, their state law claims are duplicative of and pre-empted by ERISA's
exclusive remedial system. Although the Court found at that time that plaintiffs had alleged a
claim pursuant to ERISA, it now holds that plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek
pursuant to their ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim but will grant them leave to amend their
complaint.
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329,342 (2003). Thus, plaintiffs' state law claims of negligent payment and breach of contract
are pre-empted by ERISA and must be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court will grant plaintiffs
leave to amend their complaint to allege available claims pursuant to ERISA.
The Court now turns to Count IV of plaintiff's second amended complaint, a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Plaintiffs allege that defendants breached their fiduciary
duty, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 11 04(a)(1), by failing to exercise the care, skill, and diligence
that a prudent person would employ in the payment of life insurance benefits. Defendants argue
that Count IV must be dismissed because the only cause of action cognizable under ERISA for
breach of fiduciary duty is provided in § 1132(a)(2). That section, defendants assert, provides
relief only to the benefit plan, not to individual beneticiaries. Since plaintiffs are sJeking money
damages only on behalf of themselves, and not the plan, their claim for breach of fi huCiary duty,
as alleged, is not cognizable under ERISA. Plaintiffs concede in their response that § 1132(a)(2)
authorizes "a claim that the plan administrator has breached its fiduciary duty to the plan itself."
Plfs' Response, #31, p. 7. Plaintiffs further state that claims pursuant to § 1132(a)(l )(B) are not
usually described as actions for breach of fiduciary duty, but that Count IV serves to put
defendants on notice that plaintiffs are entitled to the life insurance benefits at issue and are
seeking to recover them.
ERISA's civil enforcement remedies, which include a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1109, are found in § 1132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109 1132(a);

Jensen v. AT&T Corp., 2007 WL 2199714, *2 (E.D. Mo. July 27,2007), unpublished Section
1009 provides that a fiduciary who
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan
any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan
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any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the
plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or reme~ial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiducIary.

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29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (emphasis added). It has been established in this Circuit an~ District that §
1109(a) does not provide relief for breach of fiduciary duty to individual beneficiaries, only to a
plan. Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 176 F.3d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999) (" § 11 09(a) provides relief
only to a plan and not to individual beneficiaries"); Jensen, 2007 WL 2199714 at *3; Oecalone

v. Metropolitan LVe Ins. Co., 2011 WL 1344061, *2 (E.D. Mo. April 8,2011), unpublished;

Jordan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 274693, '6 (E.D. Mo. Jan . 31, 2012),

un~UbIiShed. This

Court has held that an individual plan participant or beneficiary has "no right of action for
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recovery of extra-contractual compensatory or punitive damages for breach of fidl Ciary duty
under ERISA," and that "recovery for a violation of § 1109 inures to the benefit of the plan as a
whole, not the individual beneficiary." Jensen, 2007 WL 2199714 at *3 (citing

Iassachusetts

Mut. LVe Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985)).
Plaintiffs rely on the Southern District of Ohio's decision in In re Cardinal Health, Inc.

ERISA Litigation in support of their claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 424 F.Supp.2d 1002
(S .D. Ohio 2006). In Cardinal Health, the plaintiffs, a class of participants in a Health
corporation's 401 (k) benefit plan, sued plan administrators on behalf of themselves and the plan
pursuant to §§ 1132(a)(2) and 1132(a)(3). Id. at 1010,1014. The court noted that defendants did
not challenge the plaintiffs' right to recover losses on behalf a f the benefit plan pr suant to §
1132(a)(2). Id. at 1024 n.19. The court explained that § 1 132(a)(2) affords a plan participant a
"right to sue on behalf of a plan for alleged breach of fiduciary duty where any recovery goes to
the plan itself," while § i 132(a)(3) "creates a right of action to sue for ' other appropriate
equitable relief to remedy violations of ERISA. '" Id. at 1024. The court further clarified that

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ERISA "distinguishes between [beneficiaries, administrators, and the Secretary of Labor] in the
types of relief it makes available to them." Id. at 1025. The Secretary of Labor and plan
administrator "are entitled to seek the full gamut of legal and equitable relief' un er § ll32(a),
but "in contrast, ERISA restricts plan beneficiaries to equitable relief with no reci Ufse to money
damages." Id.; see also Jordan, 2012 WL 274693 at *7 ("a plan participant can raise a claim
under § lI32(a)(3) in his individual capacity, but relief is limited" to equitable relief); Jensen,
2007 WL 2199714 at *3. Thus, plaintiffs' reliance on Cardinal Health is misplaced, since they
are not seeking legal relief on behalf of the plan or equitable relief on behalf of themselves.
Plaintiffs' cause of action on behalf of themselves as beneficiaries of the plan is not
cognizable under ERISA. Count IV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleges that
defendants "owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs, as actual or potential beneficiaries of said life
insurance policy(ies)." Plfs' Sec. Amended Compl., #20,

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33. H is clear from the amended

complaint that plaintiffs claim relief for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of themselves,
individually, and not on behalf of a plan, for money damages, not injunctive relief. Therefore,
Count IV fails to state of claim pursuant to ERISA upon which relief can be granted and must be
dismissed. See Ciecalone, 2011 WL 1344061 at *2 (claim for breach of fiduciary duty dismissed
because plaintiff failed to "allege the loss at issue was to the Plan, rather than to Plaintiff
herself') (emphasis in original); Conley, 176 F.3d at 1047.

IV.

Conclusion
Because plaintiffs state law claims against defendants Unilever and Met ife are pre­

empted by ERISA, and because ERISA does not provide a cause of action for monetary damages
on behalf of individual beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty, as plaintiffs have alleged here,
the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.
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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Unilever and Met Life's motion to dismiss,
#27, is GRANTED, and Counts II, III, and IV of plaintiffs' second amended comr laint are
DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs shall have until March

2L, 2012, to

amend their complaint, should they choose to allege a further cause of action under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a).
Dated this ~ day of March, 2012.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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