Welch v. Coatings and Systems Integration, Ltd.

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 3 MOTION to Dismiss Case Rule 12 (b)(2) filed by Defendant Coatings and Systems Integration, Ltd.; motion is DENIED without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 6/21/2012. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEITHLAND WELCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COATINGS AND SYSTEMS
INTEGRATION, LTD., et al.
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:12-cv-49 SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Coatings and Systems Integration, Ltd.’s
Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss, filed on April 20, 2012 (#3). Plaintiff filed a response in
opposition, but defendant has not replied, and the time for doing so has now passed. As noted
below, the defendant’s failure to file a reply is of some import given that the plaintiff responded
with a affidavit and filed an amended complaint adding additional parties, which this Court
permitted. This matter is now ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff Keithland Welch alleges that he was injured when his right hand became caught
in a conveyor system while he was working at HAVCO Wood Products (“HAVCO”). Four of
plaintiff’s fingers were partially amputated as a result. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against
Coatings and Systems Integration, Ltd. (“CASI”) alleging that defendant had designed,
manufactured, caused to be assembled, and fabricated the conveyor system in question; plaintiff
claims that CASI is liable under strict liability and negligence theories for his injuries.
CASI filed the instant motion and states that plaintiff has named the wrong defendant
because CASI did not design, manufacture, cause to be assembled, or fabricate the conveyor
system. Further, CASI states that it is in the business of “integrating manufacturing systems,”

but that it does not manufacture equipment. CASI states it has never done business in Missouri,
and that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it as a result.
“To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must state
sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that the defendants can be
subjected to jurisdiction within the state. Once jurisdiction has been controverted or denied, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving such facts” through affidavits. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings,
Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). The Court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to, and resolve disputes in favor of, the nonmoving party.
K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 592 (8th Cir. 2011); Stanton v. St. Jude
Medical, Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq
Telecommunications, Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1996); Wallow Elec. Mfg. v. Patch Rubber
Co., 838 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that written submissions are viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, but that at trial, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence).
In a diversity action such as this one, the Court “may assume jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendants only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state and
by the Due Process Clause.” Romak USA, Inc. v. Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2004).
The Missouri long-arm statute was “intended to provide for jurisdiction...to the full extent
permitted by the due process clause.” State ex rel. Metal Serv. Ctr. of Ga., Inc. v. Gaertner, 677
S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
“Due process requires that the defendant purposefully establish ‘minimum contacts’ in
the forum state such that asserting personal jurisdiction and maintaining the lawsuit against the
defendant does not offend ‘traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice.’” K-V

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Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464,
474–477 (1985)). “The defendant must have engaged in some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.... This purposeful-availment requirement is met
where the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” K-V Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592 (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
The Eight Circuit employs a five-factor test in determining whether personal jurisdiction
exists, giving “significant weight” to the first three factors: (1) the nature and quality of
defendant’s contacts with Missouri; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause
of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of Missouri in providing a forum for its residents; and
(5) the convenience of the parties. Romak USA, Inc., 384 F.3d at 984 (quoting Dever v. Hentzen
Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2004)).
The Missouri Long-Arm statute states that “the transaction of any business within the
state” and the “commission of a tortious act within the state” subjects a person or corporation to
jurisdiction in Missouri. § 506.500 R.S.Mo. Although defendant CASI is not located in
Missouri, it is alleged to have designed, manufactured, and sold directly to HAVCO the conveyor
system that caused plaintiff’s injury; thus, CASI’s actions are alleged to be squarely within the
“business” and “tortious act” provisions of the long-arm statute. See Insituform Technologies,
Inc. v. Reynolds, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (noting that the “phrase
‘commission of a tortious act within this state” has been interpreted by Missouri courts as
including extraterritorial acts which produce actionable consequences in Missouri”) (internal
quotations omitted).

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Defendant CASI does not argue that the act of conducting business with HAVCO and
supplying the conveyor (which allegedly resulted in a tort) does not subject it to jurisdiction in
Missouri. Rather, CASI, by way of its CEO’s affidavit, simply denies that it had anything to do
with the conveyor system in question. Plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion with an
affidavit from HAVCO’s human resources manager, who states that CASI did furnish the
conveyor system in question to HAVCO. Plaintiff also amended his complaint to add as
defendants (1) Cole Oehler, the chief executive officer for CASI; (2) One Finale, Ltd., the
predecessor corporation to CASI; and (3) Coating Application Specialists, Inc., a sister
corporation to CASI and of which Mr. Oehler is also president,1 because “based on Oehler’s
affidavit filed herein, the possibility exists that plaintiff has, as suggested by defendant, named
the wrong defendant.” (#6 at 2.) Plaintiff thus appears poised to proceed against all four
defendants.
Whether CASI is responsible for the conveyor system remains disputed: CASI’s CEO
states that CASI did not supply the conveyor system, while HAVCO’s human resources manager
avers that her investigation led her to the conclusion that the conveyor system was obtained from
CASI. It is telling that, when faced with plaintiff’s HAVCO affidavit and the amended
complaint (and associated memorandum) adding additional defendants, the defendant chose not
to file a reply memorandum. Regardless, the Court resolves disputes in favor of the plaintiff at
this stage. K-V Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592. As a result, the motion will be denied without
prejudice.

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In plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint (but not in an affidavit submitted in
response to defendant CASI’s motion, and not in the amended complaint itself), plaintiff states
that defendant Oehler made numerous trips to Cape Girardeau relating to the installation of the
conveyor system at HAVCO.
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Coatings and Systems Integration, Ltd.’s
Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss, filed on April 20, 2012 (#3), is hereby DENIED without
prejudice.
Dated this

21st day of June, 2012.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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