Guyton v. Pemiscot County Special School District et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 31 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Pemiscot County Special School District motion is GRANTED. A seperate Judgment will accompany with memorandum and order. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 3/5/14. (MRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
SHEREETA GUYTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
PEMISCOT COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

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No. 1:12-CV-106-JAR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc.
No. 31) Plaintiff has failed to file any opposition to the motion.1 Because the undisputed facts
demonstrate that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the motion for summary
judgment will be granted.
Background
Plaintiff, a former employee of Pemiscot County Special School District (“the District”),
brought this pro se action for employment discrimination in the form of alleged retaliation
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.
(Complaint, Doc. No. 1, ¶ 10) Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for filing a claim with the
ACLU, the District refused to accommodate her college class schedule and passed her over for
promotion to other teaching positions for which she was qualified, ultimately forcing her to
resign. (Id.)

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On February 19, 2014, the Court gave Plaintiff until February 28, 2014 to respond to the motion. (Doc. No. 36)

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The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff was employed as a paraprofessional teaching
assistant in the District from September 2007 until January 2012. From 2008 through 2011,
Plaintiff was enrolled in classes at Southeast Missouri State University at the Kennett, Missouri
center. To accommodate her class schedule, the District approved Plaintiff leaving early one day
a week. On September 15, 2010, Plaintiff requested additional time off from work to complete
her required college coursework. The District denied her request. Plaintiff filed a discrimination
complaint against the District with the ACLU for denying her the opportunity to attend classes
during certain work hours, while allowing a Caucasian coworker to do so. Following the filing of
her complaint, Plaintiff continued to teach as a paraprofessional in the District.
After earning her general studies degree in May 2011, Plaintiff applied for a transfer to
several open teaching positions in the District but was denied transfer.
In January 2012, Plaintiff requested two days off per week to complete the requirements
for her Block III college courses in elementary education. The District denied her request, stating
it could not accommodate her schedule at the expense of instructional support for its students.
Plaintiff resigned her position with the District on January 18, 2012.
Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists in the
case and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Roan v. Chrysler Group LLC,
2013 WL 5433430, 2 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 27, 2013) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986). The initial burden is placed on the moving party. Id. (citing City of Mt. Pleasant,
Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988)). If the record
demonstrates that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute, the burden then shifts to the non-moving
party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing a genuine dispute on

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that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate in a particular case, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 616, 619
(8th Cir.1988). Even if a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the district court must still
determine that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Interstate Power Co.
v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 992 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir.1993).
Discussion
Plaintiff’s claim of unlawful retaliation fails as a matter of law because she fails to
establish a prima facie case for this claim. To do so, Plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a
protected activity, (2) suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse action
occurred because she was engaged in the protected activity. 42 U. S .C. § 2000e-3(a). See also
Wilkie v. Department of Health and Human Services, 638 F.3d 944, 955 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing
Devin v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., 491 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir.2007)). “Constructive discharge
is an adverse employment action that will support an action for unlawful retaliation.” West v.
Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 497 (8th Cir. 1995). To prove constructive discharge, “a
plaintiff must show (1) a reasonable person in [her] situation would find the working conditions
intolerable, and (2) the employer intended to force [her] to quit.” Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653
F.3d 745, 752 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1083 (8th
Cir. 2010)). A plaintiff may satisfy the intent requirement through evidence that her resignation
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer's actions. Id.
Assuming that the filing of a complaint with the ACLU is a protected activity, Plaintiff
has failed to provide, and the record does not reveal, any evidence that the District was aware
that she had filed such a complaint. (Manley Aff., Doc. No. 32-1, ¶ 5) Thus, Plaintiff cannot

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establish the requisite causal connection between the filing of her ACLU complaint and the
District’s actions. See Rogers v. Frank, 782 F.Supp. 91, 93 (E.D. Mo. 1992), aff’d, 972 F.2d 354
(8th Cir. 1992) (employment applicant failed to demonstrate sufficient causal connection between
his employment discrimination action against Postal Service and decision of Postal Service not
to rehire him to establish prima facie case of retaliation, where officials who made decision
testified they had no personal knowledge of suit and that documents they reviewed did not
apprise them of applicant's legal activities). “[I]f the employer did not know of the protected
activity a causal connection to the adverse action cannot be established.” Ross v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 n. 9 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other
grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Further, there is no evidence the District intended to force
Plaintiff to quit or that it could have reasonably foreseen that she would do so.
Even if Plaintiff made her prima facie case, her claim still fails. The District has
articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to approve Plaintiff’s
request for additional time off, namely, that it would not accommodate her schedule at the
expense of instructional support for its students. (Manley Aff., Doc. No. 32-1, ¶¶ 9, 18) With
regard to her claim that the District failed to promote her (she was in fact seeking a transfer), the
District has demonstrated that other applicants who were hired for the open positions either had
more experience, better credentials or more than a general studies degree and were, therefore,
more qualified that Plaintiff. (Manley Aff., Doc. No. 32-1, ¶32, 33) Moreover, the District’s
hiring decisions are based on the recommendations of each school’s administrator, and none of
the schools, after interviewing Plaintiff, recommended her for a teaching position. (Manley Aff.,
Doc. No. 32-1, ¶¶ 25-30)

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Where an em
W
mployer prod
duces a legit
timate nondi
iscriminatory explanatio for its act
y
on
tions,
the employee bears the ultima burden of proving retaliation by demon
s
ate
nstrating tha the
at
r’s
d
p
M
orp.
n,
employer proffered reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Co v. Green 411 U.S. 792,
802-05 (1973). Plain
ntiff has not responded to the summ
mary judgme motion. Therefore, b
ent
based
on the ad
dmitted facts her claim fails as a ma
s,
atter of law. See Davis v Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n 685
v.
n,
F.3d 675 684 (8th Cir.2012) (af
5,
C
ffirming gra of summ
ant
mary judgmen on retalia
nt
ation claim w
where
the only evidence to support the claim was th plaintiff's allegation in his verified complaint).
he
n
Accordingly,
A
IT IS HERE
T
EBY ORDE
ERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary J
D
r
Judgment [3 is
31]
GRANT
TED.
A separate Ju
udgment wil accompany this memo
ll
y
orandum and order.
d

Dated thi 5th
is

day of March, 2014.
y
2

____
__________
___________
__________
___
JOHN A. ROSS
N
UNIT
TED STATE DISTRIC JUDGE
ES
CT

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