Shirrell v. St. Francis Medical Center et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 14 MOTION to Strike 11 Answer to Complaint, 12 Answer to Complaint filed by Plaintiff Rebecca Shirrell. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Strike (#14) is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 7/9/13. (CSG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
REBECCA SHIRRELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER, et al.
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:13-cv-42 SNLJ
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this action on March 4, 2013 against two defendants, her employer St.
Francis Medical Center (“SFMC”) and her supervisor Lisa Miller. Plaintiff alleges that
defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Missouri
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). Defendants filed their answers and affirmative defenses on April
3, 2013. Plaintiff moved to strike certain of defendants’ affirmative defenses on April 23, 2013
(#17). Defendants responded, but plaintiff has not filed a reply memorandum, and the time for
doing so has now passed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) states that the Court “may strike from a
pleading...any...immaterial...matter...on motion made by a party.” Because they propose a
drastic remedy, motions to strike are not favored and are infrequently granted. Stanbury Law
Firm, P.A. v. Internal Revenue Service, 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). As courts have
observed in the past, “motions to strike can be nothing other than distractions. If a defense is
clearly irrelevant, then it will likely never be raised again by the defendant and can be safely
ignored. If a defense may be relevant, then there are other contexts in which the sufficiency of the
defense can be more thoroughly tested with the benefit of a fuller record-such as on a motion for
summary judgment.” Morgan v. Midwest Neurosurgeons, LLC, 1:11-CV-37 CEJ, 2011 WL
2728334, *1 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2011) (quoting Van Schouwen v. Connaught Corp., 782 F. Supp.
1240, 1245 (N.D.Ill. 1991)); see also Speraneo v. Zeus Tech., Inc., 4:12-CV-578-JAR, 2012 WL
2117872, *1 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2012) (quoting same).
Resolution of a motion to strike lies within the broad discretion of the Court. Stanbury
Law Firm, 221 F.3d at 1063. “In ruling on a motion to strike, the Court views the pleadings in
the light most favorable to the pleader.” Speraneo, 2012 WL 2117872, at *1 (citing Cynergy
Ergonomics, Inc. v. Ergonomic Partners, Inc., 2008 WL 2817106, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 21,
2008)). “A motion to strike an affirmative defense should not be granted ‘unless, as a matter of
law, the defense cannot succeed under any circumstances or is immaterial in that it has no
essential or important relationship to the claim for relief.’” Id. (quoting Cynergy Ergonomics,
2008 WL 2817106, at *2, and citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coble, 720 F. Supp. 748, 750
(E.D. Mo.1989)). A motion to strike should not succeed unless the party shows that it is
prejudiced by the inclusion of a defense or that a defense’s inclusion confuses the issues.
Cynergy Ergonomics, 2008 WL 2817106, at *2. “The prejudice requirement is satisfied if
striking the defense would, for example, prevent a party from engaging in burdensome discovery,
or otherwise expending time and resources litigating irrelevant issues that will not affect the
case’s outcome.” Id.
Here, plaintiff moves to strike all but one of SFMC and Miller’s defenses. Plaintiff seeks
to strike the following of SFMC’s affirmative defenses:
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims in the Complaint
which were not asserted by Plaintiff in a timely Charge of Discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights.
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3. All or part of Plaintiff’s claims are barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
4. Plaintiff’s claims are barred in whole or in part by the relevant statute of
limitations.
5. Any action by Saint Francis toward Plaintiff has been for lawful, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory business reasons unrelated to Plaintiff’s religion or alleged
protected activity.
6. At all times relevant hereto, Saint Francis acted in good faith with regard to
Plaintiff, had reasonable grounds for believing its actions were not in violation of
Title VII, the Missouri Human Rights Act, or any anti-discrimination laws, and
Saint Francis would have made the same decisions regardless of Plaintiff’s
religion or alleged protected activity.
7. Saint Francis exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
alleged harassment in the workplace.
8. Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by Saint Francis or to avoid harm otherwise.
9. Plaintiff’s damages, if any, must be offset for failing to be available for work,
by failing to actively and earnestly search for work, by foregoing wages and
benefits which could have been earned with reasonable diligence, and/or her
successful mitigation by obtaining other employment for which she earned income
and received other benefits.
10. Plaintiff cannot allege or establish sufficient facts to permit or entitle Plaintiff
to recover punitive damages and any award of punitive damages would violate
Saint Francis’ rights under the United States Constitution, including without
limitation, the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause and/or the Equal
Protection Clause.
11. Plaintiff’s allegations and prayer for punitive damages are subject to the
limitations imposed by Mo. Rev. Stat. 510.265.
12. Saint Francis asserts its rights and requests a bifurcated trial with respect to
Plaintiff’s allegations and prayer for punitive damages, pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat.
510.263.
14. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Missouri
Human Rights Act inasmuch as Saint Francis is not an employer within the
meaning of the Missouri Human Rights Act.
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15. Saint Francis reserves the right to amend its answers and to add additional
defenses as Plaintiff’s claims are more fully disclosed in the course of this
litigation.
Defendant Miller’s thirteen affirmative defenses are substantially similar to SFMC’s, thus the
Court will not recite them here.
Here, it cannot be said that the defendants’ affirmative defenses could not succeed under
any circumstances, nor are the defenses properly labeled as immaterial or non-essential. Finally,
plaintiff has failed to establish that the inclusion of the affirmative defenses would prejudice or
confuse the issues in any way. As a result, the motion to strike will be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (#14) is DENIED.
Dated this
9th day of July, 2013.
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STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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