Glenn et al v. Bank of America, N.A. et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Aminah Glenn, Plaintiff Byron C. Glenn, 9 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendant America Home Loans, Defendant Bank of America, N.A., 11 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint filed by Plaintiff Aminah Glenn, Plaintiff Byron C. Glenn. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 9.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to amend and motion for summary judgment are DENIED as moot. (Docs. No. 11 & 12.) A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/17/13. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
AMINAH AND BYRON GLENN,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and BANK OF )
AMERICA HOME LOANS,
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Defendants.
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Case No. 1:13CV00074 AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendants Bank of America,
N.A., and Bank of America Home Loans (jointly “BANA”) to dismiss the case for
Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, this motion shall be
granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Byron and Aminah Glenn, husband and wife, who are proceeding pro se,
filed this complaint on May 6, 2013. Plaintiffs seek damages for breach of contract, false
representation, fraud, and conversion. Plaintiffs also list 12 federal statutes that BANA
allegedly violated. At the heart of Plaintiffs’ complaint is a dispute over a July 27, 2007
promissory note between Plaintiffs and BANA for $541,500, apparently to secure a
mortgage. Plaintiffs appear to allege that they received nothing in exchange for the note,
and that BANA deceived Plaintiffs into “bequeathing or donating [their] home or
property as a GIFT (de donis) to the Bank.” (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 24). In addition, Plaintiffs

seem to allege that BANA did not give consideration for the loan, breached its fiduciary
duty to Plaintiffs, is not the holder of the note, sold unregistered securities because it did
not register the note, failed to comply with international accounting standards, and
improperly created a trust account in Plaintiffs’ name. Plaintiffs seek $227,760,000 in
actual and punitive damages.
In support of their motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim,
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to plead more than the initial fact that both parties
signed the note for $541,500 on July 27, 2007. Defendants label Plaintiffs claims as “a
series of … legal conclusions,” without supporting facts and assert that it is impossible to
determine the claims that Plaintiffs seek to assert. Defendants argue that even construing
all the ambiguities in the complaint in Plaintiffs’ favor, the complaint states no claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed an “amended complaint” summarily alleging that
BANA defrauded Plaintiffs of $272,000 in a deceptive scheme; and a motion for
summary judgment. In support of the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue
that because Defendants have not disputed any of the statements in the original
complaint, the motion to dismiss should not be granted.1 In addition, Plaintiffs add some
claims, such as the claim that BANA does not possess the original note, and failed to
disclose to Plaintiffs the true nature of the debt.

1

Because Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 12(b),
they are not yet required to file an answer to the specific allegations in the complaint.
2

DISCUSSION
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations contained
in the complaint and grants the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from those allegations. Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872-73 (8th Cir.
2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility, “‘when the plaintiff [has pleaded] factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Cox v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 685 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678).
“Although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, ‘they still must allege
sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.’ Pro se litigants must set a claim forth in
a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.”
Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).
The Court has construed Plaintiffs’ complaint and proposed amended complaint
liberally. Further, although Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
and the time to do so has expired, the Court shall construe Plaintiffs’ motion to amend,
motion for summary judgment, and memorandum in support of summary judgment, as a
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response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, upon liberal review of all such
pleadings, it is hard to find any pleaded claims in the complaint upon which relief can be
granted. See, e.g., Blaylock v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 502 F. App’x 623, 624 (8th Cir.
2013) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims based on a “show-me-the-note” theory
of liability because such theory is “discredited” and failed to state a claim); Karnatcheva
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming the district
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ theories to quiet title “because the plaintiffs’ pleadings,
on their face, have not provided anything to support their claim … other than labels and
conclusions.”)
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 9.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to amend and motion for
summary judgment are DENIED as moot. (Docs. No. 11 & 12.)
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 17th day of July, 2013.

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