Ciesla v. Christian et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 8 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendant C. B. Christian. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Christian's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is denied without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff' ;s Request for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have 21 days to file an Amended Complaint correcting the deficiencies set out in this Memorandum and Order. (Response to Court due by 3/17/2015.) Signed by Magistrate Judge Abbie Crites-Leoni on 2/24/15. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

ANDREW CIESLA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TROOPER C.B. CHRISTIAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:14CV00165 ACL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants Trooper Christopher Christian, Officer D.
McDaniel, Pemiscot County, Missouri, and City of Hayti, Missouri, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, and a Missouri state law claim for malicious
prosecution. Plaintiff alleges that, on April 27, 2012, he was wrongfully stopped by Defendant
Christian, a Missouri State Highway Patrol officer, for a traffic violation. (Doc. 1, && 3-6)
Plaintiff claims that he was detained and required to undergo a battery of field sobriety tests by
Defendant Christian, was arrested, and was charged with one count of DWI and one count of
operating a motor vehicle in a careless and imprudent manner. (Id. at && 7-16.)
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant Christian’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8.)
The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
LEGAL STANDARD
A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “serves to eliminate actions which are fatally flawed in
their legal premises and deigned to fail, thereby sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary
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pretrial and trial activity.” Young v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim satisfies the plausibility standard “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When ruling
on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept[] as true all factual allegations in the complaint
and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Freitas v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., Inc., 703 F.3d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Christian first argues that he is entitled to dismissal
of Count III, the state malicious prosecution claim, as Plaintiff has failed to plead that his
prosecution terminated in his favor. Defendant next argues that Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI fail
as those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The undersigned will discuss these
claims in turn.
1.

Count III
In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Christian.

Under Missouri law, “a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action 'must plead and prove six
elements: (1) the commencement of a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) instigation by the
defendant; (3) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (4) the want of probable
cause for the prosecution; (5) [that] the defendant's conduct was actuated by malice[;] and (6)

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that the plaintiff was damaged.’” Cassady v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 167 F.3d 1215, 1219 (8th Cir.
1999) (quoting Bramon v. U-Haul, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 676, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)) (alterations
in original); accord White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 815 (8th Cir. 2008); Edwards v. Gerstein,
237 S.W.3d 580, 582 (Mo. 2007) (en banc). “‘Because malicious prosecution suits countervail
the public policy that the law should encourage citizens to aid in the uncovering of wrongdoing
the courts require strict compliance with the requisite elements.’” Id. at 583 (quoting Sanders v.
Daniel In’tl Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)). Also, “Missouri law does not
favor suits in malicious prosecution.” Zahorsky v. Griffin, Dysart, Taylor, Penner, and Lay.
P.C., 690 S.W.2d 144, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Sanders, 682 S.W.2d at 806).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead the third element – termination of the
action in Plaintiff’s favor. “For purposes of malicious prosecution, an underlying action is
deemed terminated when: (1) a final judgment is entered on the merits; (2) the action is
dismissed by the court with prejudice; or (3) the action is abandoned.” Doyle v. Crane, 200
S.W.3d 581, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). “[W]hen a case is
dismissed without prejudice the dismissal constitutes a termination in favor of the defendant – for
the purpose of a subsequent malicious prosecution suit by him – only when the party who
initiated the case manifests an intent to abandon it.” Id. at 589 (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, a prosecutor's dismissal of a case without prejudice does not terminate the case in favor of
a defendant “unless it [can] be shown from the record that the prosecutor, in dismissing without
prejudice, manifested an intent to abandon the prosecutions.” Id. A nolle prosequi “in and of
itself” is not a termination in favor of the defendant. Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was “innocent of all charges and the case was
dismissed by prosecutors.” (Doc. 1, & 17.) Plaintiff also states that the “proceedings were
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terminated in his favor.” (Id. at & 33.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not pled that the
prosecution was dismissed with prejudice and has therefore failed to properly allege that the
underlying proceeding terminated in his favor.
Plaintiff has filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, in which he states that
he has alleged that the charges were dismissed with indicia of innocence, which implies a finding
on the merits. Plaintiff, citing Linnenbringer v. Casino One Corp, No. 4:10CV1774JCH, 2010
WL 4484009 at * 2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 1, 2010), also contends that the underlying criminal action
was abandoned by the prosecuting authorities because the statute of limitations has now passed
for any criminal action regarding the incident.
In Linnenbringer, the plaintiff similarly did not indicate in his Complaint whether the
dismissal of the charges against him was without prejudice. Linnenbringer opposed the
defendant’s motion to dismiss by arguing that the underlying criminal action upon which his
malicious prosecution claim depended was abandoned by the prosecuting authorities because the
statute of limitations had passed. The Court rejected Linnenbringer’s claim, stating that he had
failed to specify the nature of the charges brought against him, thereby making it impossible to
discern whether the applicable statute of limitations had run. The Court, however, allowed
Linnenbringer to file an Amended Complaint addressing this issue.
In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege in his Complaint that the prosecution terminated in his
favor through any of the methods required for a malicious prosecution suit. Plaintiff’s
Complaint, therefore, fails to state a malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Christian.
Plaintiff requests in the alternative that he be granted leave to amend his Complaint to
cure any deficiencies. Under Rule 15(a), a court “should freely give leave [to amend a pleading]
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when justice so requires.” Under this liberal standard, denial of leave to amend pleadings is
appropriate only if “there are compelling reasons such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice
to the nonmoving party, or futility of the amendment.” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532
F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2008).
Here, a scheduling order has not yet issued and there are no allegations of bad faith.
Thus, in the interests of justice, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint
to correct the deficiencies set out in this Memorandum and Order.
2.

Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI
Defendant next argues that the claims Plaintiff alleges in Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI

should be dismissed because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendant contends
that, because Plaintiff’s Complaint is silent as to the capacity in which Defendant Christian is
sued, Defendant Christian is assumed to be sued in his official capacity.
“[I]n order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must
expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the
defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172
F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). Defendant correctly argues that because of the Eleventh
Amendment, Plaintiff cannot recover money damages against a state official acting in his official
capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (“State officers sued for damages in their
official capacity are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the suit [under §1983] because they assume the
identity of the government that employs them.”); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71; 67-68 (1989) (a claim for damages against a state officer in his official capacity is

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“no different from a suit against the State itself,” and is precluded by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity).
Here, Plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which he is suing Defendant Christian,
and he seeks only monetary damages against Defendant Christian. Plaintiff claims in his
Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that the substance of his pleadings reveal that
Defendant Christian is sued in his individual capacity because he refers to Defendant Christian as
an “Individual Defendant.” (Doc. 10, at 6.) Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. The Eighth Circuit
requires that Plaintiff “expressly and unambiguously” state that he is suing Defendant Christian
in his individual capacity. Plaintiff has failed to do so. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state
a claim against Defendant Christian. Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to correct this
deficiency in his Amended Complaint.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Christian’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is
denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint (Doc. 10) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have 21 days to file an Amended
Complaint correcting the deficiencies set out in this Memorandum and Order.

/s/ Abbie Crites-Leoni
ABBIE CRITES-LEONI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of February, 2015.

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