Chadd v. Cape Girardeau County Jail et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) filed by Plaintiff John Alan Chadd. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORD ERED that the Clerk shall not issue process orcause process to issue, because the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum andOrder. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 2/10/15. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
JOHN ALAN CHADD,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.

)

No. 1: 15-CV-25-JAR

)
CAPE GIRARDEAU COUNTY JAIL, )
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of John Alan Chadd
(registration no. 29454-044) for leave to commence this action without payment of
the required filing fee.

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that plaintiff

does not have sufficient funds to pay any portion of the filing fee at this time, and
therefore, the motion will be granted.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l).

Furthermore,

based upon a review of the complaint, the Court will dismiss this action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 u.s.c. § 1915(b)(l)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l), a prisoner bringing a civil action in
forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee.

If the prisoner

has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court

must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent
of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2)
the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month
period.

After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to

make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The agency having custody of

the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time
the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid.
Id.

Plaintiff.has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account
statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his
complaint.

A review of plaintiffs account indicates an average monthly deposit

of $0 and an average monthly balance of $0.
pay any portion of the filing fee.

Plaintiff has insufficient funds to

Accordingly, the Court will not assess an initial

partial filing fee at this time.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint
filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
2

is immune from such relief.
either law or in fact."

An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 {1989).

An action

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

To determine whether an action fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step
inquiry.

First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.
(2009).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51

These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements."
Id. at 1949.

Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a

plausible claim for relief.

Id. at 1950-51.

This is a "context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
Id. at 1950.

The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere

possibility of misconduct."

Id.

The Court must review the factual allegations in

the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id.
at 1951.

When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct,

the Court may exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiffs proffered

3

conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct
occurred.

Id. at 1950-52.

In reviewing a prose complaint under§ 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give
the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction.
519, 520 (1972).

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the

plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless.

Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
The Complaint

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Cape Girardeau County Jail, seeks monetary relief
in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Named as

defendants are the Cape Girardeau County Jail, John Jordan (Sheriff), and the U.S.
Marshal Service.
Plaintiff alleges that the U.S. Marshal Service arrested him on December 16,
2014, and placed him in the Cape Girardeau County Jail as a federal pre-trial
detainee.

Plaintiff states that during his incarceration, he was bitten by a spider,

which "turned into 'staph."'
leg was "lanced and packed."

Plaintiff was taken to St. Francis Hospital, where his
Plaintiff claims that he was given an antibiotic and

was denied clean clothes for fourteen days.
4

Plaintiff states that the spider bite

wound is no longer draining, but he fears it may become infected or infect another
prisoner, because he does not have a clean pair of pants.

Plaintiff generally

claims that the U.S. Marshal Service failed to oversee his health and welfare.
Discussion

Plaintiff brings this action against defendant Sheriff John Jordan in his
official capacity.

See Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619

(8th Cir. 1995) (where a complaint is silent about defendant's capacity, Court must
interpret the complaint as including official-capacity claims); Nix v. Norman, 879
F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Naming a government official in his official
capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the
official, which in this case would be the municipality of Cape Girardeau, Missouri.
Will v. Michigan Dept of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

To state a claim

against a municipality or a government official in his or her official capacity, a
plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the government entity is responsible
Monell v. Dept of Social Services, 436

for the alleged constitutional violation.
U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

The instant complaint does not contain any allegations

that a policy or custom of a government entity was responsible for the alleged
violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Furthermore, mere negligence does

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and supervisors cannot be held
5

vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of a subordinate. See Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)

(mere negligence is not cognizable as Eighth Amendment violation); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203,

1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct
responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under§ 1983 where plaintiff fails
to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents
that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat
superior theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits).

As a result, the complaint is legally

frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to defendant
John Jordan.
The complaint is also frivolous as to defendant U.S. Marshal Service,
because a Bivens action for monetary damages cannot be maintained against the
United States or a federal agency.
(1994).

See FDIC v. Myer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-85

Moreover, the Court notes that an action brought against a federal

official, such as a U.S. Marshal, in his or her official capacity is, in essence, a suit
against the United States of America.

Because the doctrine of sovereign

immunity prevents courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the
6

United States, suits against officers in their official capacities are typically barred,
as well.
The complaint is also legally frivolous as to the Cape Girardeau County Jail,
because jails are not suable entities. See Marsden v. Fed. Bureau ofPrisons, 856 F.
Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) Gails are not entities amenable to suit); Ketchum v.
City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (departments or

subdivisions of local government are "not juridical entities suable as such"); Dean v.
Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[s]heriffs departments and

police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit"); McCoy
v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788 F.Supp. 890 (E.D.Va. 1992) (local jails are

not "persons" under § 1983). For these reasons, this action will be dismissed,
without prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma
pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or
cause process to issue, because the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

7

A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and
Order.
Datedthis

/d'~dayof ~

8

,2015.