Allen v. Mills et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's official capacity claims against all defendants are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process to issue upon the amended complaint, pursuant to the service agreement the Court maintains with the Missouri Attorney General's Office, as to defendants John Mills, Claude Bagby, Bryan Robinson, Gregory Hancock, Charles Wilson, Jeremiah Brown, Jerry Walls, a nd Unknown Schefer in their individual capacities. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in their individual capacities, defendants John Mills, Claude Bagby, Bryan Robinson, Gregory Hancock, Charles Wilson, Jeremiah Brown, Jerry Walls, and Unknown Schefer shal l reply to the amended complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Tamara Hendrix, Michael Vinson, Dennis Mayberry, Ian Wallace, Bill Sta nge, Paula Reed, Omer Clark, Jefferson Kidd, Darron Hyte, Regina Beggs, Crystal Steward, Bruce Hannabrink, Cynthia Reese, Jane Bucanan, Terry White, Dwayne Kempker, and Brad Clark are dismissed without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A separate Order of Dismissal will be entered herewith. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 11/9/2016. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DISTRICT

RONNIE ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN MILLS, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:16-CV-26 SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon review of the file.

Plaintiff Ronnie Allen,

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this prisoner civil rights action on February 8,
2016, naming 22 defendants. Upon review, the Court determined that it was unclear precisely
what plaintiff’s claims were as to each defendant, and ordered plaintiff to submit an amended
complaint. Plaintiff has complied, and the Court will now review the amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court shall dismiss a complaint filed in
forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A complaint fails to state a claim if it
does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although the factual allegations in the complaint
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need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level
...”. Id. at 555.
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the
Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51.
This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show
more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. The Court must
review the factual allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951. Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, and are held to a less
stringent standard when considering a dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim. See
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 211 n. 3 (8th Cir.
1984). Even so, a pro se complaint must contain specific facts to support its conclusions. Kaylor
v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1183 (8th Cir. 1981).
The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center
(“ERDCC”) alleges that his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause were violated during five incidents that occurred
on March 20, March 23, April 6, April 7, and April 17, 2015. He names 25 defendants: John
Mills, Claude Bagby, Tamara Hendrix, Dennis Mayberry, Michael Vinson, Unknown Schefer,
Jerry Walls, Jeremiah Brown, Brad Clark, Daron Hyte, Jefferson Kidd, Jane Bucanan, Cynthia
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Reese, Charles Wilson, Bryan Robinson, Gregory Hancock, Crystal Steward, Regina Beggs,
Bruce Hannabrink, Terry White, Omer Clark, Paula Reed, Ian Wallace, Dwayne Kempker, and
Bill Stange. All of the defendants are employed by the Missouri Department of Corrections, an
agency of the State of Missouri. Plaintiff states that he sues each defendant in his/her official
and individual capacity, and seeks monetary damages in the amount of $75,000.00.
Discussion
Official Capacity Claims
The Court will dismiss plaintiff’s official capacity claims against all of the defendants.
All defendants are employees of the Missouri Department of Corrections, an agency of the State
of Missouri, and plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. Naming a government official in his or
her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the official.
“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

The amended complaint therefore

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these State of Missouri employees
in their official capacities.
Equal Protection Claims
Plaintiff states that defendants violated his right to equal protection, but he alleges no
facts to support such a claim. Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly
situated individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972).

Because plaintiff

never alleges that he belongs to a suspect class or was treated differently from any other inmate
similarly situated, he fails to state an equal protection claim. See Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (to proceed with equal protection claim, plaintiff

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who is not member of suspect class must allege that he “has been intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment”).
March 20, 2015 – Defendants Mills, Bagby, Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson and Hyte
Plaintiff alleges that, on March 20, 2015, he told defendants Mills and Bagby that his
cellmate, Timothy Rucker, had threatened to harm him, and he asked to be moved to a different
cell. Plaintiff alleges that Mills and Bagby refused to do so, and that Bagby used a racial slur
and stated that Rucker and plaintiff could “kill each other for all we care.” (Docket No. 12 at 9).
Plaintiff alleges that Mills and Bagby slammed his hands repeatedly with the food port door and
pepper-sprayed him after he refused to move his hands out of the food port opening. Plaintiff
alleges that Mills and Bagby later delayed giving him a decontamination shower to wash the
pepper spray from his eyes and skin, threw away some of his personal items, and falsely accused
him of a conduct violation. Plaintiff acknowledges that, following the incident, he was moved to
a different cell with a new cellmate.
The Court views plaintiff’s allegations that Mills and Bagby refused to move him to a
new cell despite actual knowledge that his cellmate had threatened him with harm as a failure-toprotect claim. The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to protect prisoners
from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Perkins v. Grimes, 161 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.
1998) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)). “Because being subjected to
assault is not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders [must] pay for their offenses,’ the eighth
amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires prison officials to ‘take
reasonable measures to guarantee’ inmate safety by protecting them from attacks by other
prisoners.” Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981) and Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). In order to establish an Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must show that the prison official was deliberately indifferent
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to a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). In doing so, a
plaintiff must establish objectively that the deprivation of rights was sufficiently serious (whether
he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm); and subjectively
that the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Whitson v. Stone County Jail,
602 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). “In prison conditions claims,
which include the failure-to-protect allegations before us, the subjective inquiry regarding an
official’s state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). “An official is deliberately indifferent if he or she actually knows of a
substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably.” Id. When assumed true, plaintiff’s allegations
against Mills and Bagby state a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and they
will be ordered to answer the amended complaint as to this claim.
Plaintiff’s allegations that Mills and Bagby repeatedly slammed his hands in the food
port door and pepper sprayed him state claims under the Eighth Amendment. Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (the core judicial inquiry when a prisoner alleges that prison officers used
excessive force is not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether the
force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm). Plaintiff’s allegations that Mills and Bagby delayed allowing him a
decontamination shower to wash the pepper spray from his body also state claims under the
Eighth Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (a prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to
a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Walton
v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1119 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 785
(8th Cir. 1997) (“A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if he knows
that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.”).
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Plaintiff’s allegations that Mills and Bagby removed and destroyed his personal property
do not implicate plaintiff’s constitutional rights because the state of Missouri provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy. Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 527 (8th Cir. 1990)
(citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)); Maples v. United Savings & Loan Assoc.
686 S.W. 2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). Plaintiff’s allegations that Bagby used a racial slur
and said he and Rucker could kill each other, without more, do not in and of themselves invade
any of plaintiff’s federally protected rights. See Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99–100 (8th
Cir. 1986) (usually, mere words, without more, do not invade federally protected right); see also
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338–39 (8th Cir. 1985) (verbal threats and name calling
usually are not actionable under § 1983).
Plaintiff also alleges that Mills and Bagby were involved in plaintiff being issued “false”
conduct violations which resulted in him being placed in disciplinary segregation for twenty days
and given “meal-loaf” (an alternative meal plan) for nine meals do not implicate constitutionally
protected interests. First, plaintiff merely states in conclusory fashion that the conduct violations
were false without offering any evidence in support. See Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452
(8th Cir. 1989) (claim of falsity of the conduct violation, standing alone, does not state a
constitutional claim). Second, plaintiff makes no claim that the punishment he received for the
conduct violations imposed an “atypical and significant hardship … in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (thirty days in disciplinary
segregation not atypical hardship); see also Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (8th Cir.
2002) (thirty days in punitive segregation not an atypical and significant hardship); Kennedy v.
Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 1996) (demotion from administrative segregation to
thirty days punitive isolation was not an atypical and significant hardship).

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Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that defendants Hendrix, Mayberry, and Vinson
approved, condoned and participated in Mills and Bagby’s wrongful actions, authorized that
plaintiff not be given a decontamination shower, ordered other defendants to remove and dispose
of some of plaintiff’s property, and participated in plaintiff being issued a false conduct
violation. Regarding defendant Hyte, plaintiff alleges that he condoned and approved Mills’s
and Bagby’s denial of protective custody and their use of excessive force, and that he
participated in the authorization that plaintiff be issued a false conduct violation.
For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff’s allegations regarding the treatment of his
property and the issuance of “false” conduct violations fail to state constitutional claims.
Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants Hendrix, Mayberry and Vinson “authorized” that he not be
given a decontamination shower, and his allegations that defendant Hyte “condoned and
approved” the actions of Mills and Bagby, do not state claims upon which relief can be granted
because plaintiff fails to set forth any specific factual allegations showing what those defendants
personally did or failed to do that violated his constitutional rights. An actionable § 1983 civil
rights claim “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights”
protected by the constitution. Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007); see
also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). This means that plaintiff is
required to plead specific facts showing each individual defendant’s direct personal involvement
in some alleged constitutional wrongdoing. Ellis v. Norris, 179 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999);
see also Beck v. LaFleur, 257 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding summary dismissal of
civil rights claim, because complaint “failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by any of
defendants to support such a claim”); see also Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (there must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and
the deprivation plaintiff alleges to have suffered). Mindful of plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court
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has liberally construed the amended complaint, and has held it to a less stringent standard than a
pleading drafted by an attorney. Even so, the Court notes that a pro se complaint still must
contain specific facts to support its conclusions, Fields, 661 F.2d at 1183, and plaintiff’s claims
against Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson and Hyte do not.
Plaintiff may be basing his claims against Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson and Hyte upon
the theory of respondeat superior; that is, that their supervisory roles demonstrate their Eighth
Amendment liability. A supervisor is liable for the actions of his subordinates under § 1983 only
if he personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or when there is a causal
connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Brown v. Crawford,
906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). Allegations based solely on a theory of respondeat superior
are insufficient to state a cognizable civil rights claim; instead, plaintiff must plead specific facts
establishing an actual link or connection between each defendant and the alleged constitutional
violation.

In the amended complaint, plaintiff merely alleges, in conclusory fashion, that

Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson and Hyte authorized, condoned and/or approved the actions of other
defendants.

He fails to allege any specific facts regarding how any of these defendants

personally participated in, or were causally connected to, any alleged deprivation of his
constitutional rights. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (vague and
conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations
are insufficient). Finally, plaintiff fails to allege that any of these defendants failed to properly
train, supervise, direct or control the actions of anyone subordinate to them who violated
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or even that any of these defendants had the authority to do so.
The Court therefore concludes that plaintiff has failed to raise an inference of liability under §
1983 as to defendants Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson and Hyte, and will dismiss them pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Twitchell v. Hutton, No. 10–cv–01939, 2011 WL 318827, at *7 (D.
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Colo. Jan. 28, 2011) (dismissing for failure to state constitutional claim based on supervisory
liability where plaintiff made conclusory statement that defendant “adopted, authorized, and
ratified and/or condoned policies and/or customs of the use of excessive force” yet “offer[ed] no
supporting facts in connection with her conclusory allegations”).
March 23, 2015 – Defendants Schefer, Walls, Brown, Clark and White
Plaintiff alleges that, on March 23, 2015, defendant Schefer approached plaintiff’s cell
to distribute the evening meal. On this date, plaintiff shared a cell with Jackie Payne. Plaintiff
alleges that Schefer told plaintiff that, if he wanted to eat, he needed to go to the back of his cell
and get on his knees and face the back wall. When plaintiff refused to comply, Schefer refused
to feed plaintiff or Payne, stating that the two men were not being fed because of plaintiff’s
refusal to follow directions. Payne then told Schefer and defendants Walls and Brown that if he
was not moved to a new cell, he would punch plaintiff in the face. Plaintiff alleges that Schefer,
Walls and Brown ignored Payne’s request and left the two men in the same cell, and Payne
subsequently attacked him. Plaintiff alleges that he and Payne fought, causing him to be injured
and then sprayed with pepper spray. Plaintiff alleges that Schefer delayed giving plaintiff a
decontamination shower for two hours.
As with Mills and Bagby above, plaintiff’s allegations that Schefer, Walls and Brown
left plaintiff in the cell with Payne despite knowing Payne had threatened to harm him state
claims under the Eighth Amendment. Walton, 752 F.3d at 1119) (quoting Coleman, 114 F.3d at
785) (“A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if he knows that an
inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.”). Plaintiff’s allegations that Schefer delayed allowing plaintiff
a decontamination shower also state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 828 (a prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm to an
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inmate violates the Eighth Amendment). The Court will therefore direct Schefer, Walls and
Brown to answer the amended complaint as to those claims.
Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that defendant Clark approved of, condoned and
participated in the behavior of other defendants in refusing to feed plaintiff and Payne, among
other things. Plaintiff fails to plead specific facts showing Clark’s direct personal involvement in
some alleged constitutional wrongdoing. See Norris, 179 F.3d at 1079; LaFleur, 257 F.3d at
766. Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim under any supervisory liability theory, Brown,
906 F.2d at 671, and plaintiff fails to allege with any specificity that Clark failed to properly
train, supervise, direct or control the actions of any subordinate who violated plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. The Court therefore concludes that plaintiff has failed to raise an inference
of liability under § 1983 as to Clark, and will dismiss him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
April 6, 2015 – Defendants Kidd and Bucanan
Plaintiff alleges that, on April 6, 2015, he told defendant Kidd that he was depressed.
Plaintiff alleges that Kidd responded that plaintiff should kill himself, and removed him from his
cell and handcuffed him to a restraint bench. Plaintiff alleges that he remained on the bench for
five hours, during which time he was not fed or allowed to use the bathroom. Plaintiff alleges
that Kidd then returned him to his cell which contained his personal property, despite the fact
that he had requested to be on suicide watch.
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Kidd.

As discussed above, mere words are

insufficient to state a constitutional claim. Burton, 791 F.2d at 99–100; Martin, 780 F.2d at
1338–39.

Plaintiff does not allege that Kidd used unnecessary or excessive force when

handcuffing him to the restraint bench, nor does he allege that Kidd was the party responsible for
leaving plaintiff on the bench for five hours. Plaintiff does not allege that his personal property
contained any items that were actually or potentially harmful, or that being in the cell with his
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personal property caused him any injury or distress. Instead, it appears that plaintiff alleges that
prison regulations were not followed. Such allegations cannot state a constitutional claim. See
Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (there is no federal constitutional liberty
interest in having prison officials follow prison regulations). The Court will therefore dismiss
Kidd pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bucanan approved, condoned and participated in this
behavior. Plaintiff fails to set forth specific factual allegations showing her direct personal
involvement in some alleged constitutional wrongdoing. See Norris, 179 F.3d at 1079; LaFleur,
257 F.3d at 766. Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim under any supervisory liability
theory, Brown, 906 F.2d at 671, and he does not allege with any specificity that Bucanan failed
to properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of anyone subordinate to her who
violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court therefore concludes that plaintiff has failed to
raise an inference of liability under § 1983 as to Bucanan, and will dismiss her pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
April 7, 2015 – Defendants Reese, Wilson, Robinson, Beggs, Hannabrink, White,
Clark, Reed, Wallace, Kempker, and Stange
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Reese knowingly allowed others to place him into his
assigned cell that contained “all kinds of harmful things” and with another suicidal inmate.
(Docket No. 12 at 16). Plaintiff fails to set forth specific factual allegations showing Reese’s
direct personal involvement in some alleged constitutional wrongdoing. See Norris, 179 F.3d at
1079; LaFleur, 257 F.3d at 766.

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim under any

supervisory liability theory, Brown, 906 F.2d at 671, and he does not allege with any specificity
that Reese failed to properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of anyone subordinate
to her who violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court therefore concludes that plaintiff
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has failed to raise an inference of liability under § 1983 as to Reese, and will dismiss her
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Wilson placed plaintiff in a cell with Lockhart even
though he knew Lockhart had threatened to kill plaintiff, and ignored plaintiff’s repeated pleas to
be moved to a new cell. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Robinson left him in a cell with
Lockhart despite hearing Lockhart threaten plaintiff. “A prison official may be held liable under
the Eighth Amendment if he knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Walton, 752 F.3d at
1119) (quoting Coleman, 114 F.3d at 785).
Plaintiff states a claim under the Eighth Amendment via his allegations that Wilson
forcefully pulled plaintiff against a door and pepper sprayed him. See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37
(the core judicial inquiry when a prisoner alleges that prison officers used excessive force is not
whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether the force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm).
Plaintiff’s allegations that Wilson delayed allowing him to take a decontamination shower also
states an Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (a prison official’s “deliberate
indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment).
The Court will therefore direct Wilson and Robinson to answer the amended complaint.
With regard to defendants Beggs, Hannabrink, White, Clark, Reed, Wallace, Kempker,
and Stange, plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion and nearly verbatim for each defendant, that
they were aware of, condoned, and approved the April 7, 2015 process that caused plaintiff to be
placed in a cell with another suicidal inmate.

Plaintiff fails to set forth specific factual

allegations showing direct personal involvement on the part of any of these defendants in some
alleged constitutional wrongdoing. See Norris, 179 F.3d at 1079; LaFleur, 257 F.3d at 766.
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Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim under any supervisory liability theory, Brown, 906
F.2d at 671, and he does not allege with any specificity that any of these defendants failed to
properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of anyone subordinate to them who
violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court therefore concludes that plaintiff has failed to
raise an inference of liability under § 1983 as to Beggs, Hannabrink, White, Clark, Reed,
Wallace, Kempker, and Stange, and will dismiss them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
April 17, 2015 – Defendant Hancock
Plaintiff alleges that he told defendant Hancock that he should not be placed in a cell
with another suicidal person and that Lockhart told Hancock that he (Lockhart) would hurt
plaintiff if left in a cell with him, but that Hancock placed plaintiff in a cell with Lockhart. “A
prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if he knows that an inmate faces
a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures
to abate it.” Walton, 752 F.3d at 1119. The Court determines that plaintiff states a claim against
Hancock for violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, and will direct Hancock to
answer the amended complaint.
Due Process Claims – Defendants Steward, Mills, Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson,
Schefer, Walls, Brown, Clark, and Hyte
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Steward held disciplinary hearings regarding the March
20, March 23, and April 7 incidents, condoned the actions of others, and sanctioned plaintiff on
different occasions to twenty days disciplinary segregation and nine alternative meal service
meals. Plaintiff alleges that various defendants, including Mills, Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson,
Schefer, Walls, Brown, Clark, and Hyte violated his due process rights via their involvement in
the process by which plaintiff was charged with and punished for conduct violations. While
plaintiff does not appear to allege any constitutional deprivation stemming from the hearings
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themselves, the Court notes that prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the
administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see
also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty
interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process).
Plaintiff does allege constitutional violations stemming from the sanctions he received.
The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process of
law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Segregated confinement within prison
implicates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution only if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. The Eighth Circuit has “consistently
held that administrative and disciplinary segregation are not atypical and significant hardships
under Sandin.” Portley–El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming a district
court’s dismissal of prisoner’s due process claims on initial review for failure to meet the Sandin
threshold).
In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that he was placed in disciplinary segregation for
periods of ten to twenty days, and restricted to nine alternative meal service meals. Absent more,
such sanctions cannot be considered “atypical and significant” deprivations that create a liberty
interest under Sandin. See Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847; Portley–El, 288 F.3d at 1063 (8th Cir.
2002); see also Platt v. Brockenborough, 476 F.Supp.2d 467, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“placement in
administrative segregation for a total of eight months, without more, also does not constitute an
atypical and significant hardship.”). Finally, plaintiff does not have a liberty interest to be free
from temporary placement on an alternative meal regimen, Lott v. Roper, No. 4:04-cv-989, 2006
WL 2038635 (E.D. Mo. July 19, 2006), and he makes no allegations that would be necessary to
state a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, such as he received insufficient or
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unsanitary food, or that the food he received failed to meet his nutritional needs or harmed him.
The Court therefore concludes that plaintiff has failed to raise an inference of liability under §
1983 as to Steward or defendants Mills, Hendrix, Mayberry, Vinson, Schefer, Walls, Brown,
Clark, and Hyte related to the issuance of conduct violations, the holding of disciplinary
hearings, or the disciplinary sanctions plaintiff received, and all such claims will be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff also claims that defendants Mills, Bagby, Hendrix, Mayberry, and Vinson
violated his due process rights by either personally removing and destroying property from his
cell, or ordering, authorizing or condoning such removal and destruction. As noted above, these
allegations do not state federal due process claims because Missouri provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Orebaugh, 910 F.2d at 527 (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533); Maples, 686
S.W. 2d at 527.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court will order the Clerk of Court to issue process
upon the amended complaint as to defendants John Mills, Claude Bagby, Bryan Robinson,
Gregory Hancock, Charles Wilson, Jeremiah Brown, Jerry Walls, and Unknown Schefer in their
individual capacities. All of plaintiff’s claims against defendants Tamara Hendrix, Michael
Vinson, Dennis Mayberry, Ian Wallace, Bill Stange, Paula Reed, Omer Clark, Jefferson Kidd,
Darron Hyte, Regina Beggs, Crystal Steward, Bruce Hannabrink, Cynthia Reese, Jane Bucanan,
Terry White, Dwayne Kempker, and Brad Clark will be dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s official capacity claims against all
defendants are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause
process to issue upon the amended complaint, pursuant to the service agreement the Court
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maintains with the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, as to defendants John Mills, Claude
Bagby, Bryan Robinson, Gregory Hancock, Charles Wilson, Jeremiah Brown, Jerry Walls, and
Unknown Schefer in their individual capacities.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in their individual capacities, defendants John
Mills, Claude Bagby, Bryan Robinson, Gregory Hancock, Charles Wilson, Jeremiah Brown,
Jerry Walls, and Unknown Schefer shall reply to the amended complaint within the time
provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Tamara Hendrix, Michael Vinson,
Dennis Mayberry, Ian Wallace, Bill Stange, Paula Reed, Omer Clark, Jefferson Kidd, Darron
Hyte, Regina Beggs, Crystal Steward, Bruce Hannabrink, Cynthia Reese, Jane Bucanan, Terry
White, Dwayne Kempker, and Brad Clark are dismissed without prejudice.

28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2).
A separate Order of Dismissal will be entered herewith.
Dated this 9th day of November, 2016.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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