Isaac v. Flenoid

Filing 133

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER..IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Timothy Holstens motion for summary judgment (#67) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Harold Isaacs motion to submit awaiting exhibits (#129) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED th at plaintiff Harold Isaacs motion for emergency injunctive request in lieu of false imprisonment[,] staff retaliation[,] and use of state equipment and computors (sic) to force and falsify conduct violation report in attempt to mislead (#130) is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 9/28/18. (MRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
HAROLD D. ISAAC, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DANA COCKRELL and
TIMOTHY HOLSTEN,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:16-cv-00027-SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The following motions are currently before this Court: defendant Timothy
Holsten’s motion for summary judgment (#67); plaintiff Harold Isaac’s “motion to
submit awaiting exhibits” (#129); and Isaac’s “motion for emergency injunctive request
in lieu of false imprisonment[,] staff retaliation[,] and use of state equipment and
computors (sic) to force and falsify conduct violation report in attempt to mislead”
(#130).
The Court has previously granted a portion of Holsten’s motion for summary
judgment, leaving only a single claim for the alleged deprivation of a laundry bag (#101,
p. 9-10). That claim is resolved below. The Court will grant Isaac’s uncontested motion
seeking to submit additional exhibits, as those exhibits respond to Holsten’s motion for
summary judgment. Finally, the Court will deny Isaac’s motion for emergency injunctive
relief, as that motion—requesting the Court to “petition the inspector general’s office to
make a record of [Isaac’s] statements about what actually transpired on 8-23-2018”

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between non-parties and Isaac—appears to have nothing to do whatsoever with the issues
in this case. See De Beers Consolidated Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)
(an injunction should not issue when “it deals with a matter lying wholly outside the
issues in the suit”); Atakpu v. Lawson, 2006 WL 3803193 at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 28,
2006) (detainee’s motion seeking injunctive relief denied as unrelated to his complaint).
I.BACKGROUND
On February 12, 2018, this Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental
briefing on Holsten’s motion for summary judgment (#67), finding:
“[I]n their briefing, both parties analyzed whether Holsten retaliated against
Isaac in violation of the First Amendment and subjected him to conditions
of confinement that violated the Eighth Amendment … [but] on closer
examination of the Amended Complaint (#6), Isaac asserts no retaliation
claim against Holsten. He alleges only that Holsten violated his right to due
process of law … Isaac claims Holsten violated his due process rights by
failing to give him a laundry bag; thus, Isaac was forced to sleep on dirty
bedding for months … As such, the parties are ordered to submit
supplemental briefing to address whether (1) Isaac had a liberty interest to
sleep on cleans sheets; (2) if Isaac did have a liberty interest, he deprived of
it; and (3) Holsten caused the deprivation.”
(#101, p. 8-10).
Holsten submitted supplemental briefing on March 3, 2018 (#102), and Isaac’s
supplemental briefing followed on August 8, 2018 (#127)—after several requests for
extension of time to respond. The parties did not submit supplemental statements of fact,
and, as such, appear content to rely upon their original statements despite many of the
facts being geared towards a retaliation claim (#69, #90). Indeed, on the narrow issue of
Holsten allegedly depriving Isaac of a laundry bag, only one fact is established, with
another fact being disputed. However, both parties provided copious exhibits to explain
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their respective version of what transpired regarding the laundry bag. (#69-4, #69-5,
#127-2). In fact, through a “Motion to Submit Awaiting Exhibits” (#129), Isaac seeks to
provide additional exhibits—this time medical records from the Medical Accountability
Records System (MARS)—that, in his opinion, shows the lack of clean bedsheets (caused
by the lack of a laundry bag) contributed to certain medical conditions.
Fortunately, the actual dispute between the parties—limited to the issue of whether
Holsten deprived Isaac of a laundry bag and, thus, clean bedsheets—is relatively simple
and is recounted below.
On November 24, 2015, Isaac received a conduct violation for having written a
threatening letter to Warden Paula Reed, whereby he called Warden Reed a “bitch,”
demanded she do something about the correctional officers in his housing unit, and
stating “I WILL KILL THEM FUCKING PIGS.” (#69, p. 2; #69-5, p. 8). A hearing was
held regarding this conduct violation on December 2, 2015, in which a three-member
panel ordered Isaac to be placed in the restrictive housing unit (RHU) for disciplinary and
security reasons. (#69, p. 2; #69-5, p. 12-13). Apparently, Isaac lost his laundry bag for
the first time when he was transferred to the RHU, stating “they escorted me to the hole,
and when they brought my property to the hole, they didn’t have a laundry bag with my
property.” (#69-1, p. 30). A few weeks later, on January 3, 2016, Isaac wrote a “kite” (a
prison grievance form) to Holsten asking for a laundry bag. (#69-1, p. 32; #9, p. 3).
Holsten stamped “DENIED” on the kite one day later and asserts that he did so because
Isaac did not follow proper procedures in requesting a new laundry bag; according to
Holsten, Isaac was required to report the laundry bag as lost property and could receive a
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lost property form from third-shift officers who process said forms and forward that
information on to a “functional unit manager.” (#69, p. 5-6; #9, p. 3). Isaac, in turn,
“disputes that he failed to follow proper procedure” because he would “beg and beg and
beg every shift for a lost laundry form only to be told there was none in the bubble.”
(#90, p. 7). Holsten also asserts that Isaac’s Individual Confinement Report (ICR)
indicates Isaac refused linen exchanges on November 26, 2015, December 3, 2015,
December 14, 2015, December 29, 2015, January 8, 2016, and January 15, 2016. (#69, p.
6). Isaac concedes that his ICR reflects that he refused linen exchanges on numerous
occasions; however, Isaac states in his supplemental brief that “at no time during [my]
stay in segregation was there ever conducted a linen exchange … There was, however,
blanket exchanges every 60 days … [T]here was never a time when [I] was offered to
exchange [my] sheets.” (#127, p. 13-14; #90, p. 2). Finally, Isaac attempts to insert a
medical component into the equation, claiming he was forced to use the same set of
sheets for “over 350 days,” which became “contaminated” and caused him to “beg[i]n
seeking medical assistance for a rash.” (#127, p.3-4, 12). However, the medical records
provided by Isaac in support of this medical component appear to indicate Isaac, in fact,
suffers from a chronic rash since the age of twenty-five (Isaac was thirty-seven years old
at the time of the relevant medical appointments) and, moreover, said records notably
predate Isaac’s transfer to the RHU by more than six months—suggesting Isaac’s rash
existed well before the ongoing controversy relating to his bedsheets. (#129-1, p. 1).
Isaac noted in his deposition that he did, finally, receive a laundry bag sometime around
November of 2016 from a caseworker known as “Mr. Jacobs.” (#69-1, p. 33-34).
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II. ANALYSIS
The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth
Amendment, in particular, prohibits punishments that deprive detainees of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities. Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir.
1996); see also Hall v. Dalton, 34 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n this circuit, the
standards applied to Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims have been
the same”).1 These minimal necessities have been construed to include reasonably
adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials, food, and utilities. See, e.g.,
Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996) (reasonable access to adequate
hygiene supplies); Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 1998) (reasonable
access to food, clothing, shelter, and medical care); Cody v. Hillard, 799 F.2d 447, 450
(8th Cir. 1986) (reasonable access to ventilation, water, safety, laundry services, and
utilities).
A prison official will only be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying a detainee of humane conditions of confinement if: (1) objectively, the
conditions constituted a substantial risk of serious harm to health or safety; and (2)
subjectively, the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the detainee’s
health or safety. Washington v. Denney, 900 F.3d 549, 559-560 (8th Cir. 2018). To satisfy

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It is not altogether clear whether Isaac is proceeding under the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.
As part of the original summary judgment briefing, the parties argued as if Isaac was proceeding under the Eighth
Amendment. (#68, p. 2; #91, p. 1). In any event, the standards used in the Eighth Circuit as between the Eighth and
Fourteenth amendment are substantively identical and, therefore, this Court will proceed under the Eighth
Amendment in conformity with the parties’ prior argumentation.

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the objective prong, the court looks to the “totality of circumstances of [a detainee’s]
confinement” and specifically focuses on “the length of [detainee’s] exposure to
unsanitary conditions and how unsanitary the conditions were.” Owens v. Scott County
Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (the objective component is “contextual and responsive to contemporary
standards of decency”). To satisfy the subjective prong, it must be shown the official
“recognized that a substantial risk of harm existed and knew that their conduct was
inappropriate in light of that risk.” Washington, 900 F.3d at 559 (emphasis in original).
The official must “both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 560.
Furthermore, in testing the appropriateness of the official’s response, it is not enough that
the official denied a detainee of humane conditions or was otherwise negligent in
responding, rather it must be shown that the official was “deliberately indifferent in their
response to the perceived risk.” Id.
Regarding the objective prong, this Court disagrees with Holsten that the alleged
conditions Isaac was subject to did not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm to
health or safety. Holsten cites a myriad of cases showing one-to-two-week-long instances
of poor living conditions were inadequate to support the finding of a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Goldman v. Forbus, 17 Fed.Appx. 487, 488 (8th Cir. 2001) (no
constitutional violation where detainee slept on the floor near the toilet for two nights and
was sprinkled with urine by other detainees using the toilet); Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d
265, 268-269 (8th Cir. 1996) (no constitutional violation where detainee was subjected to
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overflowed toilet in his cell for four days); White v. Nix, 7 F.3d 120, 121 (8th Cir. 1993)
(no constitutional violation where detainee was subject to unsanitary cell conditions for
eleven days). However, none of these cases can be extrapolated so far as to apply to the
circumstances here, where the allegation being made is that unsanitary conditions
continued for nearly a year. See Owen, 328 F.3d at 1027 (reversing district court’s ruling
that detainee who had to sleep next to toilet for roughly five weeks was too brief to be
unconstitutional as a matter of law); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-687
(1978) (filthy, overcrowded cell might “be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel
for weeks or months”). Under the guidance of Owen and the cases cited therein, this
Court finds the allegations of Isaac, that he was subject to a year-long deprivation of
clean bedsheets in conjunction with a pre-existing skin condition exacerbated by the lack
of clean bedsheets, constitute an objective risk of substantial harm to health or safety.2
Regarding the subjective prong, this Court finds Isaac has offered no evidence
whatsoever to establish Holsten was “deliberately indifferent in [his] response” to Isaac’s
complaints. Washington, 900 F.3d at 560. The only transaction between Holsten and
Isaac appears to be Holsten’s denial of a “kite” in which Isaac stated “I’ve been without a
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While Holsten points to the ICR (accounting for only a few weeks) as proof that Isaac repeatedly refused linen
exchanges and thus was his own cause for the year-long deprivation of clean bedsheets, the Court notes Isaac refutes
this point—explaining that blankets were regularly offered, but not bedsheets. This Court cannot determine from the
record what “linen exchange” means, in particular whether Isaac’s distinction between bedsheets and blankets is
accurate based on the apparent importance of a missing laundry bag. Isaac also repeatedly argues the lack of said
laundry bag prevented him from receiving clean bedsheets, in specific, blankets notwithstanding—exchanged
apparently without the need for a laundry bag. Holsten has not attached laundry protocols nor an affidavit from
someone knowledgeable with such protocols, and therefore this Court cannot determine whether Isaac is accurately
stating the policy in affect at Southeast Correctional Center. Holsten briefly dismisses Isaac’s argument that the lack
of a laundry bag was preventing him from receiving clean bedsheets (#68, p. 8 (stating, without citation to the
record, “it was not necessary for [Isaac] to have a laundry bag to have clean sheets and clothing”)), but does not
explain where in the record this statement is supported. As the non-movant, this unresolved factual dispute must be
decided in Isaac’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (“[A]t the summary judgment
stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial”).

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laundry bag since 11-24-15 — the staff lost it!!!” (#9, p. 3). Holsten asserts the reason for
his denial was because Isaac did not follow proper procedures for requesting a new
laundry bag, explaining Isaac was to contact third-shift officers and report his bag as lost
property. Isaac apparently understood this message, including the fact that Holsten was
not the proper party to seek a new laundry bag from, because Isaac himself states he
would “beg and beg and beg every shift for a lost laundry form only to be told there was
none in the bubble.” (#90, p. 7). Thus, Isaac’s case, at least as it relates to Holsten, is
essentially predicated on nothing more than a grievance denial, which cannot support an
Eighth Amendment claim in itself. Washington, 900 F.3d at 560 (“a prison official cannot
be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions
of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety”). There are simply no facts to suggest Holsten, in denying Isaac, knew
of Isaac’s chronic skin condition, his struggle to obtain a lost property form, or his yearlong efforts to obtain clean bedsheets—the record reveals only that Holsten knew Isaac
was grieving that he did not have a laundry bag, a complaint that was rejected simply
because Isaac did not follow proper procedures. This scenario, devoid of any allegations
that Holsten understood Isaac’s particular confinement conditions and had the occasion to
deliberately ignore them, is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claims and,
therefore, Holsten’s motion will be granted. See Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 964 (8th
Cir. 1995) (detainee, who was placed in a strip cell for two days without clothing,
bedding, or running water, failed to show that named prison officials had knowledge of
the conditions of his confinement or knew of any excessive risk to his health or safety);
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Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 996 (8th Cir. 2007) (detainee failed to show deliberate
indifference by warden arising from complaints that detainee was battered by two
correctional officers; while warden was aware of one of the officer’s use of excessive
force on a single occasion during seven years of service, that fact was not enough to show
warden thereby had knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm either officer posed
to detainees).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendant Holsten’s motion for summary
judgment will be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Timothy Holsten’s motion for
summary judgment (#67) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Harold Isaac’s “motion to submit
awaiting exhibits” (#129) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Harold Isaac’s “motion for
emergency injunctive request in lieu of false imprisonment[,] staff retaliation[,] and use
of state equipment and computors (sic) to force and falsify conduct violation report in
attempt to mislead” (#130) is DENIED.
So ordered this 28th day of September 2018.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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