Lyons v. USA

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 15 MOTION to Stay filed by Petitioner Corey D. Lyons, 14 MOTION to Reopen Case filed by Petitioner Corey D. Lyons. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that movant's motion to reopen case 14 is granted, and his motions to vaca te, set aside or correct sentence [1, 3] under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that movant's motion to stay 15 is deniedas moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a Certificate ofAppealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. A separate judgment in accord with this Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 12/18/19. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
COREY D. LYONS,
Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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No. 1:16 CV 113 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case was previously stayed pending decisions by the Supreme Court in
several cases involving the definition of “crime of violence.” Ultimately, after the
ruling in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), appointed counsel was
allowed to withdraw and the case was administratively closed with leave for
movant to file a pro se motion to reopen if he believed he was entitled to relief.
Movant Corey Lyons filed a motion to reopen and later filed another motion
to stay, this time asking the Court to withhold ruling pending the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). That case has now
been decided and nothing in it or in the other cases provides any basis for relief for
Lyons because the use of force is an element of bank robbery.
Corey Lyons pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) and one count of carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of

violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). I sentenced him on May 10, 2005 to
180 months for the bank robbery and a consecutive sentence of 84 months for
brandishing the firearm. Case No. 1:04CR45 CDP. The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the sentence. United States v. Lyons, 450 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2006).
After the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551
(2015) and Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016), Lyons filed this motion
seeking to vacate, correct or set aside his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague.
In Davis the Supreme Court held that the “residual” clause of § 924(c) was
unconstitutionally vague. The Court described the statutory definitions:
The statute proceeds to define the term “crime of violence” in two
subparts—the first known as the elements clause, and the second the
residual clause. According to § 924(c)(3), a crime of violence is “an
offense that is a felony” and
“(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or
“(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”
139 S.Ct. at 2324. Following the earlier cases, the Court went on to hold the
residual clause unconstitutionally vague, but that holding did not affect the
“elements” clause, which is also referred to as the “force” clause.
None of these cases provides any basis for Lyons to obtain relief, because an

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element of bank robbery is the use of force or violence. Thus, bank robbery is
covered by the elements/force clause, and has not been affected by the cases
involving the residual clause definition. Bank robbery is a crime of violence
under the statutory definitions. See Estell v. United States, 924 F.3d 1291 (8th
Cir. 2019).
I will grant Lyon’s motion to reopen the case but will deny relief, because
Lyons’ conviction was not affected by any of the recent caselaw discussing the
residual clause definitions of “crimes of violence.”
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that movant’s motion to reopen case [14] is
granted, and his motions to vacate, set aside or correct sentence [1, 3] under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that movant’s motion to stay [15] is denied
as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a Certificate of
Appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
A separate judgment in accord with this Memorandum and Order is entered
this same date.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 18th day of December, 2019.
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