Bryant v. Pritchett et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER..GRANTING re: 11 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendant Michael Pritchett. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 2/14/17. (MRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
WELDON V. BRYANT,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL PRITCHETT, et al.,
Defendants,

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No. 1:16-CV-181 ACL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Michael Pritchett’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is granted, and
this action is dismissed with prejudice.
Background
Plaintiff brings this action against the Hon. Michael Pritchett, Circuit Court Judge, 36th
Judicial Circuit, (“Pritchett”) and a John Doe sheriff’s deputy. Plaintiff attended the plea hearing
of Alyson Walker before Pritchett in July 2015. Pritchett accused him of “trying to pick up
young jailed women” and told him to leave the courtroom. As he was leaving the courtroom,
Pritchett said he did not want plaintiff in his courtroom unless he had business before the court.
On May 3, 2016, plaintiff attended a proceeding for his fiancé, again before Pritchett. He
says Pritchett called him to the bench and accused him of passing contraband to prisoners.
Pritchett ordered him out of the courtroom again.
Defendant John Doe followed him out of the courtroom and informed him that Pritchett
had banned him from the courthouse. Doe told him not to return to the courthouse unless he was

summoned by the court. Plaintiff does not allege, however, that he subsequently attempted to
enter the courthouse but was denied access.
Standard
To state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading
need not include “detailed factual allegations,” but it is not sufficient to tender “naked
assertion[s]” that are “devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). A complaint must do more than allege “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.
Discussion
Judge Pritchett contends that he is entitled to absolute immunity because he has
jurisdiction over his courtroom and the courthouse in which it is located. Alternatively, he
argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has failed to identify a clearly
established right. The Court agrees.
Judges are “entitled to absolute immunity for all judicial actions that are not ‘taken in a
complete absence of all jurisdiction.’” Penn v. United States, 335 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)). “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from
suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. . . . Accordingly, judicial immunity is not
overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be

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resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citations

omitted). Moreover, allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity. Id.
A judge acts in his judicial capacity when he exercises control over his courtroom and the
courthouse in which it is located. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (“the
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court”). As a result,
plaintiff’s allegations do not show that Pritchett acted outside of his jurisdiction, and Pritchett is
therefore entitled to absolute immunity.
Even if Pritchett were not entitled to absolute immunity, he would be entitled to qualified
immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Plaintiff
has not shown that Pritchett violated his constitutional rights or that any such right was clearly
established.
Moreover, “[t]o state a claim [for denial of meaningful access to the courts, a plaintiff]
must assert that they suffered an actual injury to pending or contemplated legal claims.” Myers
v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any legal
injuries as a result of defendant’s actions. Therefore, he has failed to state a First Amendment
claim for denial of access to the courts. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is
granted.
Additionally, defendant John Doe is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Court

personnel “have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when
they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process unless [they] acted in the clear

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absence of all jurisdiction.” Boyer v. County of Washington, 971 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir.1992)
(internal quotations marks and citation omitted). See also Maness v. District of Logan County–
Northern Div., 495 F.3d 943 (8th Cir.2007) (clerks absolutely immune for acts that may be seen
as discretionary or for acts taken at the direction of a judge or according to court rule). Doe
merely conveyed Pritchett’s message to plaintiff. Therefore, Doe is entitled to immunity as
well.
Finally, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Pritchett’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 11]
is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
An Order of Dismissal will be filed separately.
Dated this 14th Day of February, 2017.

JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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