Mosley v. Wallace et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42) is DENIED. An appropriate Judgment is filed herewith. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 3/6/2019. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

DEVIN MOSLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
IAN WALLACE, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:16-CV-297 RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
30) and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42). These matters are fully briefed
and ready for disposition. 1

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Devin Mosley ("Mosley") is an offender m the Missouri Department of
Corrections ("MDOC") and is currently incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center ("SECC")
in Charleston, Missouri. (Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment ("DSUMF"), ECF No. 32, ill). Defendant George Lombardi
was the director of MDOC until he resigned from that position in 2016.

(DSUMF, i!3).

Defendant Paula Reed is the Assistant Warden of SEC. (DSUMF, i!4). Defendant Bill Stange is
the Deputy Warden of SECC. (DSUMF, i!5). Defendant Ian Wallace is the former Warden of
SECC.

1

(DSUMF, i!6).

Medical services provider, Corizon Health ("Corizon"), was under

Plaintiff did not oppose Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment but filed his own Motion
for Summary Judgment, which the Court also construes as an opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment.

contract with MDOC to provide medical services at SECC at all times pertinent to the litigation
(DSUMF, i!7).
On April 2, 2014, SECC prison custody staff noticed that Mosley had been injured and
notified medical staff. (DSUMF, i!l 1). On April 2, 2014, Mosley was assessed by a nurse who
noted Mosley had several burn areas on his face, neck, and chest. (DSUMF, i!12). 2 The nurse
contacted the site practitioner. (Id.). Orders were received to clean the bum areas twice a day,
apply silvadene, and cover with non-stick tefla for 10 days. (Id.). Tylenol was also ordered for
pain, as needed. (Id.).
Mosley's scheduled dressing changes on April 3, 2014 did not occur. (DSUMF, i!13). 3
On April 4, 2014, Family Nurse Practitioner (FNP) Hill admitted Mosley to the Infirmary due to
his infection risk. (Id.). On April 17, 2014, Dr. Massey discharged Mosley from the Infirmary.
(DSUMF, i!14). Mosley was reported to "have done very well while in the infirmary so that he
was released from the Infirmary on April 17, 2014." (DSUMF, i!18). Dr. Massey noted that
Mosley's bums "were healing well and ordered daily dressing changes for lesions that were still
open." (DSUMF, i!14). The last documented dressing change of Mosley's wounds occurred on
April 23, 2014. (DSUMF, ii15).
On April 14, andJuly 14, 2014, Mosley "was evaluated by the optometrist for complaints
of blurred vision following the alleged assault; no comeal/conjunctival damage was noted during
these encounters." (DSUMF, i!16).

2

An inmate allegedly threw hot water on Mosley.

3

Brandi Juden, RN Health Service Administrator, apologized to Mosley because the dressing
changes had not been completed on April 3, 2014. Juden stated that they "have addressed the
issue with the appropriate staff. Measures have been taken to ensure this concern does not
happen in the future. Thank you for bringing this to our attention." (DSUMF, i!l 7).

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DISCUSSION
I.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Citrate, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The substantive law
determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly
preclude summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving
party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of
material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials
of his pleading. Id.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331. The Court's function is not to weigh the evidence but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "'Credibility

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determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge."' Torgerson, 643 F .3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
B. Discussion
"It is well established that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment

extends

to

protect

pnsoners

from

deliberate

indifference

to

serious medical needs." Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir.2000) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); see also Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 862
(8th Cir. 2006) ("Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs is cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."). "Deliberate indifference has both
an objective and a subjective component." Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir.2006).
The objective component requires the plaintiff to show he was suffering from an
objectively serious medical need. E.g., Grayson

v.

Ross, 454

F.3d

802,

808

(8th

Cir.2006); Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam). The subjective
component requires the plaintiff to show the defendant actually knew of, but disregarded, that
need. E.g., Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 568 (8th Cir.2009); Grayson, 454 F.3d at 808-09.
The plaintiff "must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere
disagreement with treatment decisions does not give rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness, which demands more than
negligent misconduct." Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir. 2011);
Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The subjective inquiry
must show a mental state akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the inmate's

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health."). This is an "onerous standard," Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir.2013),
requiring a prisoner to "clear a substantial evidentiary threshold," Nelson v. Shujfman, 603 F.3d
439, 449 (8th Cir.2010). Moreover, because "[l]iability for damages for a federal constitutional
tort is personal, ... each defendant's conduct must be independently assessed." Heartland Acad.
Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2010).
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants because there is no evidence
that Defendants were personally involved in the April 2, 2014 incident when Mosley was injured
or involved in his medical treatment by Corizon.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Mosley argues that Defendant Wallace was
notified that another offender threw hot water on Mosley, personally observed Mosley's injuries,
but did not immediately authorize treatment or transfer of Mosley to the Infirmary. (ECF No. 42
at 2). Mosley states "Defendant Wallace knew about [Mosley's] serious needs and disregarded
them by telling him to talk to his case worker, when addressing his concerns about the lack of
treatment." (ECF No. 42 at 3). Mosley contends "Defendant Wallace had direct knowledge of
the injuries as he saw them first hand with his own eyes but refused to instruct medical to aid
plaintiff with his serious issues." (ECF No. 42 at 4).
However, the evidence before the Court demonstrates that Defendants were not
personally involved in the April 2, 2014 incident or in the medical treatment decisions.
Defendant Lombardi is the former director of the MDOC. He did not work at SECC, has no
involvement or knowledge of the April 2, 2014 incident, and has no personal knowledge of the
medical treatment provided to Mosley. Defendant Paula Reed is the Assistant Warden at SECC.
Defendant Reed did not witness the April 2, 2014 incident. Defendant Reed avers that Mosley's
confinement form shows that on April 2, 2014, Mosley was medically assessed by LPN

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Annessor, a Corizon employee, but Defendant Reed has no personal knowledge regarding
Mosley's treatment. Defendant Bill Stange is the Deputy Warden at SECC. Defendant Stange
did not witness the April 2, 2014 incident.

Defendant Stange has no personal knowledge

regarding Mosley's treatment by Corizon. Defendant Ian Wallace was the Warden for SECC in
2014. Defendant Wallace was not present at the April 2, 2014 incident, but he would have been
notified of the altercation. Defendant Wallace notes that correctional officers alerted Corizon
medical staff when they discovered Mosley's injuries.

Defendant Wallace has no personal

knowledge regarding Corizon's treatment of Mosley. Nothing in the record shows that
Defendants intentionally denied or delayed Mosley's access to medical care or that they were
involved in any treatment decisions. Mosley's deliberate indifference claims against Defendants
fail

because Eighth

Amendment liability

cannot

be

established

solely

on

a theory

of respondeat superior. Mosley alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference when
they did not respond to Mosley's complaints of inadequate medical care. As a nonmedical professional Defendants are not personally liable for his medical staffs treatment
decisions, see Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir.2002), and Defendants cannot be
held vicariously liable for medical professionals' actions. See Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d
1017, 1024 (8th Cir.2012), (citing Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37
(8th Cir.1995)) (plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference under § 1983 must specify how
defendants were personally involved in, or had direct responsibility for, incidents that injured
him); Kenyon v. Dooley, 605 F. App'x 581, 582-83 (8th Cir. 2015).
In addition, Mosley has failed to identify how his medical treatment was deficient. The
medical records confirm that MDOC custody staff obtained medical care for Mosley on April 2,
2014. Two days later, on April 4, 2014, medical staff placed Mosley in the Infirmary "to

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monitor for signs of infections."

Mosley did well and was released from the Infirmary on April

17, 2014. Further, he has not shown that his injuries were exacerbated due to Defendants'
deliberate indifference. Kenyon v. Dooley, 605 F. App'x 581, 582 (8th Cir. 2015) (affirming
summary judgment on Eighth Amendment claim where "there is no evidence that the delay in
providing the occupational therapy recommended by his surgeon resulted in preventable harm");
Moots v. Lombardi, 453 F .3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir.2006) (inmate claiming deliberate indifference

based on delay in treatment must allege that delay caused harm); cf Schaub, 638 F.3d at 921
(official's deliberate indifference clearly exacerbated inmate's wounds). At most, Mosley has
alleged some minor negligence due to his bandages not being changed on April 4, 2014.
However, negligence is not sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50
L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Webb v. Hedrick, 409 F. App'x 33, 34-35 (8th Cir. 2010) (negligence alone
is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment).
Finally, the Court holds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
"Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary actions from
liability in a § 1983 action unless their conduct violated clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Meloy, 302 F.3d at 848
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). To be
clearly established, a right's contours must be clear enough that a reasonable official would
understand his or her conduct was unconstitutional. Meloy, 302 F.3d at 848; Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002). Mosley is unable to show that
Defendants' conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right because Mosley has not
presented any evidence that Defendants were personally involved in Mosley's medical treatment.

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The Eighth Circuit has previously laid out the requiments for supervisory liability under the
Eighth Amendment:
We have held a supervisor is only liable "for an Eighth Amendment violation
when the supervisor is personally involved in the violation or when the
supervisor's corrective inaction constitutes deliberate indifference toward the
violation." Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir.1995)(footnote
omitted). "The supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve
it, condone it, or tum a blind eye [to it]." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Likewise, other courts have stated supervisory officials are liable under § 1983
only if they fail promptly to provide an inmate with needed medical care, they
deliberately interfere with the prison doctors' performance, or they tacitly
authorize or are indifferent to the prison doctors' constitutional
violations. E.g., Mil tier v. Beorn, 896 F .2d 848, 854 (4th Cir.1990). A
prison's medical treatment director who lacks medical expertise cannot be liable
for the medical staffs diagnostic decisions. Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174,
176 (8th Cir.1995). Prison officials cannot substitute their judgment for
a medical professional's prescription. Zentmyer v. Kendall County, 220 F.3d 805,
812 (7th Cir.2000).
Meloy, 302 F.3d at 849.

As previously discussed, Defendants were all wardens and administrators.

Mosley has not

provided any evidence to support a finding that Defendants failed to provide for treatment for
Mosley, interfered with Mosley's treatment, or allowed prison doctors' constitutional violations.
Rather, all records indicate that Defendants were not involved in any medical decisions, and that
Mosley's medical treatment was within constitutional treatment standards. Because the law was
not

clearly

established

that

Defendants

were

deliberately

indifferent

to

Mosley's

serious medical needs, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Meloy, 302 F.3d at 849
(administrators were entitled to qualified immunity because they were not personally involved in
any Eighth Amendment violation).

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Having found no constitutional violations and that Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants and denies Plaintiffs
Motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.

30) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42) is DENIED.
An appropriate Judgment is filed herewith.

Dated thib th day of March, 2019.

~Lldb

ONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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