Bader Farms, Inc. et al v. Monsanto Company

Filing 288

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER..IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants motions for summary judgment [#218, #221] are DENIED. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 12/31/19. (MRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
BADER FARMS, INC. and
BILL BADER
Plaintiffs,
v.
MONSANTO CO. and
BASF CORP.,
Defendants.

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MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ
Case No. 1:16cv299-SNLJ

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motions for summary judgment
[#218, #221]. The Bader plaintiffs claim their peach orchard was destroyed beginning in
2015 after defendants Monsanto Company (a company that sells crop seed and
herbicide) and BASF Corporation (a company that sells herbicide) conspired to develop
and market dicamba-tolerant seeds and dicamba-based herbicides. Plaintiffs claim both
defendants conspired to create an “ecological disaster,” where Monsanto released its
dicamba-tolerant seed in 2015 and 2016 with no corresponding dicamba herbicide. As a
result, farmers illegally sprayed an old formulation of dicamba herbicide that was
unapproved for in-crop, over-the-top, use and was “volatile,” or prone to drift. Drifting
dicamba would cause damage to neighboring, non-tolerant crops, forcing neighboring
farmers to plant Monsanto’s dicamba-tolerant seed defensively, and that increased
demand for both defendants’ new dicamba herbicide during the 2017 growing season.
Numerous lawsuits have been filed against defendants based on these
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circumstances, and the cases filed in federal court have been consolidated into the In re
Dicamba Herbicides Multi-District Litigation,1:18-MD-2820-SNLJ (E.D. Mo.) (the
“MDL”). The present case was filed on November 23, 2016 and was consolidated into
the MDL. Numerous MDL plaintiffs have joined the Master Crop Damage complaint,
which focuses on soybean growers in several states. The Bader plaintiffs, although part
of the MDL, did not join in the Master Crop Damage Complaint; the Bader case is
following its own Case Management Order and is set for trial in January 2020.
Defendants have filed separate motions for summary judgment.
I.

Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a district court may grant a

motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that
“there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467
(1962). The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc. Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this
burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the
facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that
there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for it. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of
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any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d
844, 846 (8th Cir. 1983). The court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor
of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d
207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976).
II.

Discussion
The Court will address the defendants’ motions together.
A. Causation
“In all tort cases, the plaintiff must prove that each defendant’s conduct was an

actual cause, also known as cause-in-fact, of the plaintiff’s injury.” City of St. Louis v.
Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo. banc 2007). “Once actual causation
has been established, the issue becomes one of legal cause—also known as proximate
cause—that is, whether the defendant should be held liable because the harm is the
reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant's conduct.” Id.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs
lack the necessary evidence to make a submissible case on the issue of causation. This
Court has considered defendants’ causation arguments in this case and in the MDL. “As
this Court explained, causation could be established if it is proved that Monsanto
marketed and sold its dicamba-resistant seed to third-party farmers knowing that they
would spray dicamba that may harm nearby, non-resistant crops.” In re Dicamba
Herbicides Litig., 359 F. Supp. 3d 711, 720 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (the “February MDL
Order”).
1. 2015 and 2016 claims
First, with respect to plaintiffs’ 2015 and 2016 claims, Monsanto argues that it did
not sell a dicamba herbicide and thus cannot be held responsible for damages caused by
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dicamba herbicide. Plaintiffs’ claims for those years, though, are based on Monsanto’s
sale of the dicamba-tolerant (“DT”) soybean and cotton seeds (“Xtend seeds”), not its
herbicide. Nonetheless, defendant Monsanto contends that plaintiffs cannot show even a
single application of dicamba made to an Xtend crop affected their peach trees in 2015 or
2016.
Defendants also suggest that plaintiffs must show analytical testing to prove
dicamba caused their damage. Defendants admit, however, that it is pointless to test for
the presence of off-target dicamba because it is undetectable at the off-target movement
concentrations involved here. Indeed, one of Monsanto’s own researchers commented
that “…the absence of [dicamba] residue is not proof that drift did not occur.”
Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Ford Baldwin, opines that plaintiffs suffered damage from
off-target movement of dicamba that was applied to Xtend seeds in 2015 and 2016.
Although defendants contend this Court should discount or exclude Baldwin’s opinions
for various reasons, those arguments were made in defendants’ motion to exclude
Baldwin’s testimony and have been rejected by this Court. [#275.] Although defendants
also argue that plaintiffs have no other evidence to support these claims, Bill Bader
testified, for example, that he saw and smelled his neighbors spraying dicamba on Xtend
cotton in 2015. This and other evidence present a disputed issue of fact, however, and
must be decided by the jury.
Next, defendants argue that they should be relieved of liability for damages
incurred in 2015 and 2016 because any application of dicamba to an Xtend crop in those
years was unlawful. To be sure, as this Court held in its February MDL Order, such use
of dicamba would constitute an intervening and superseding cause of plaintiffs’ alleged
harm unless plaintiffs prove “Monsanto marketed and sold its dicamba-resistant seed to
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third-party farmers knowing that they would spray dicamba that may harm nearby, nonresistant crops.” 359 F. Supp. 3d at 720. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have not met
this requirement, and that they are entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs respond that
it was foreseeable that growers would spray older formulations of dicamba on Xtend
seeds before new dicamba formulations were on the market. In support, plaintiffs argue
that the defendants knew such spraying would occur, and that such knowledge is evident
from their own documents. For example, in 2013, Monsanto addressed the question of
how to promote the Xtend system to farmers resistant to purchasing Xtend seeds, and a
suggested response was that Xtend offered “protection from your neighbor.” Similarly,
plaintiffs submit evidence that BASF employed a “defensive planting” strategy and that
BASF scaled up its production of “old dicamba” when Xtend was released. And, as this
Court previously observed, why else would defendants sell dicamba-resistant seed if not
to encourage the use of dicamba over the top? This hotly-contested matter is thus
inappropriate for summary judgment.
2. 2017 and 2018
As for 2017 and 2018 claims, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack evidence to
prove defendants’ particular chemicals were the source of their damage. First, Monsanto
argues that plaintiffs’ claims fail because their expert, Dr. Ford Baldwin, must be
excluded. But this Court denied the motion to exclude Dr. Baldwin’s opinions. Second,
Monsanto argues that plaintiffs cannot prove their orchards were exposed to Monsanto’s
dicamba-based herbicide, XtendiMax. Plaintiffs suggest they do not need to prove it was
XtendiMax that harmed their orchards. This Court reiterates its ruling in its May 8, 2018
Order:

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The fact that Monsanto did not manufacture, distribute, or sell the old
dicamba herbicide that actually caused the [2016] damage is irrelevant—it
is not part of the causal link under plaintiffs’ theory of the claim.
In re Dicamba Herbicides Litig., 1:16-CV-299-SNLJ, 2018 WL 2117633, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. May 8, 2018) (the “Bader May 8 Order”). Again, the key to both the preXtendiMax and Engenia and post-XtendiMax and Engenia claims is not the herbicide,
it’s the Xtend seeds.
B. Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes federal law “the
supreme Law of the Land; …any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. It is “Congress rather than the
courts that preempts state law.” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582,
607 (2011) (quotation omitted). Where Congress has enacted an express preemption
provision, courts should “not invoke any presumption against pre-emption but instead
focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Tr., 136 S.
Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (internal quotation omitted).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ 2015 and 2016 claims are expressly and
impliedly preempted by the federal Plant Protection Act (“PPA”). “Congress enacted the
PPA in 2000 to protect against harms to ‘the agriculture, environment, and economy of
the United States’ caused by ‘plant pests’ and ‘noxious weeds,’ while facilitating
commerce in non-dangerous plants. Atay v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 700 (9th Cir.
2016) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 7701(1), (3), (5)). The PPA, inter alia, prohibits the movement
of plant pests except with a permit. 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a). Further, the PPA authorizes the

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Secretary of Agriculture and the United States Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (“APHIS”), to prohibit or restrict the movement in interstate commerce of plants
and other products as “necessary to prevent the introduction…or the dissemination of a
plant pest or noxious weed within the United States.” Id. § 7712(a); see also id. § 7712(f).
As the Atay court stated,
A “plant pest” is defined as any of eight types of listed organisms that “can
directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant
or plant product.” Id. § 7702(14). … However, “a genetically modified
organism is regulated as a plant pest if it is created using an organism that
is itself a plant pest,” [Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 835
(9th Cir. 2016)] (citing 7 C.F.R. § 340.1), or if APHIS “has reason to
believe [that it] is a plant pest,” 7 C.F.R. § 340.1; Vilsack, 718 F.3d at 835,
840. Such GE plants are called “regulated articles” or “presumptive plant
pests.” Id. at 833; see 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a) & n.1; id. § 340.1 (definition of
“regulated article”); id. § 340.2 (groups of organisms that are or contain
plant pests).
Such GE plants are regulated as plant pests “until the agency concludes on
the basis of scientific evidence that the modified plant is not a ‘plant pest.’”
Vilsack, 718 F.3d at 835. Accordingly, with narrow exceptions, APHIS’s
regulations prohibit the introduction—including the movement through the
United States and “use ... outside the constraints of physical confinement
that are found in a laboratory, contained greenhouse, ... or other contained
structure,” 7 C.F.R. § 340.1—of regulated articles without APHIS’s
permission. Id. § 340.0(a).
Atay, 842 F.3d at 700–01. The Administrator of APHIS may be petitioned to deregulate
GE seeds, but only after a strenuous investigation process and only based on sound
science. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6. Any person may petition the Administrator that an article
should not be regulated by APHIS. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6. “To succeed in such a petition, an
applicant must demonstrate, through an extensive evaluation process involving data
collected from APHIS-authorized field tests and other experiments, that the regulated
article is no more likely to cause plant pest harms than its non-GE counterpart.” Atay, 842
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F.3d at 701 (citing Vilsack, 718 F.3d at 835; 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(c)). “Nonregulated status,
or deregulated status, in effect, allows for the commercialization and sale of that product.
The two seeds at issue in this case were formally deregulated by APHIS.” Bader Farms,
Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 1:16-CV-299 SNLJ, 2017 WL 633815, at *1–2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 16,
2017).
The PPA’s express preemption provision states
(b) Regulation of interstate commerce
(1) In general
Except as provided in paragraph (2), no State or political subdivision of a
State may regulate the movement in interstate commerce of any article,
means of conveyance, plant, biological control organism, plant pest,
noxious weed, or plant product in order to control a plant pest or noxious
weed, eradicate a plant pest or noxious weed, or prevent the introduction or
dissemination of a biological control organism, plant pest, or noxious weed,
if the Secretary has issued a regulation or order to prevent the dissemination
of the biological control organism, plant pest, or noxious weed within the
United States.
(2) Exceptions
(A) Regulations consistent with Federal regulations
A State or a political subdivision of a State may impose prohibitions or
restrictions upon the movement in interstate commerce of articles, means of
conveyance, plants, biological control organisms, plant pests, noxious
weeds, or plant products that are consistent with and do not exceed the
regulations or orders issued by the Secretary.
7 U.S.C.A. § 7756. Thus, state law is preempted by the PPA when three conditions are
met: (1) the state law would “regulate the movement in interstate commerce of” an
“article, …plant,…[or] plant pest;” (2) the state law is imposed “in order to
control…eradicate…or prevent the introduction or dissemination of a…plant pest;” and
(3) the Secretary has “issued a regulation or order to prevent the dissemination of the
…plant pest…within the United States.” 7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1). Monsanto argues that the
plaintiffs’ state-law claims would impose prohibitions or restrictions on Monsanto’s

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ability to sell Xtend seeds under state law that are not “consistent with” and “exceed”
APHIS’s expert determination authorizing sale of Xtend seeds in interstate commerce.
Few courts have considered the PPA’s preemption provision. In Atay, the Ninth
Circuit considered an ordinance enacted by the County of Maui, Hawaii, which banned
the cultivation and testing of genetically engineered (“GE”) plants. 842 F.3d at 692. The
plants in question were federally regulated by APHIS at the time. The court found (1)
that the ordinance regulated “movement in interstate commerce” by “banning all testing,
planting, or cultivation of GE plants to prevent their introduction or dissemination;” (2)
that the ordinance “seeks to control GE plants;” and (3) that “APHIS has issued
regulations in order to prevent the dissemination of the class of plant pests at issue, GE
crops.” Id. at 701-02. The ordinance was thus held to be expressly preempted by the PPA
“to the extent that it seeks to ban GE plants that APHIS regulates as plant pests.” Id. at
703.
The Atay court observed, however, that “strict regulation applies to all plant
pests…up until the point they are deregulated, at which point they fall outside of the
preemption clause and APHIS’s jurisdiction under the PPA.” Id. at 703. The Atay court
thus held that “the PPA does not impliedly preempt the Ordinance in its application to
GE crops that APHIS has deregulated. The regulation of commercialized crops, both of
GE and traditional varieties, remains within the authority of state and local governments.”
Id. at 705.
Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not preempted, then, because the Xtend seeds
have been “deregulated” and are thus not subject to the PPA under Atay, 842 F.3d at 703,
705. Defendants respond that whether the PPA’s express preemption provision preempts
state regulation of federally deregulated plants was not raised in Atay and any “musings”
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on the topic are pure dicta. The Ninth Circuit (the only circuit to address the PPA’s
preemption clause) was clear, however, that deregulated plant pests “fall outside of the
preemption clause.” Id. at 703. Defendants further argue that the preemption clause
requires only that the “Secretary has issued a regulation or order to prevent
dissemination” and that plaintiffs do not dispute such an order “has issued.” Defendants
contend that it does not matter that the plant pest was subsequently deregulated. This
Court determines, however, consistent with the Ninth Circuit “musings,” that this effect
of the PPA order permitting dissemination of the Xtend seeds necessarily is to negate the
previous order preventing dissemination. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims are neither
expressly or impliedly preempted, consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Atay,
842 F.3d at 702-05.
C. Joint Venture
Plaintiffs’ Count X asserts that Monsanto and BASF are “jointly liable for all
claims” because they were “joint venturers in the development and commercialization of
the Xtend Crop System.” Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ joint venture liability theory
cannot withstand summary judgment because plaintiffs cannot identify a written
agreement between Monsanto and BASF that establishes a joint venture.
A joint venture is “an association of two or more persons to carry out a single
business enterprise for profit.” Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987
S.W.2d 377, 387 (Mo. App. 1999). The elements of a joint venture are (1) “an express or
implied agreement among members of the association,” (2) “a common purpose to be
carried out by the members,” (3) “a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose,”
and (4) an “equal voice” among all members “in determining the direction of the
enterprise.” Id. In other words, a joint venture is a partnership that is limited to a single
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business purpose. See Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 14-15 (Mo. 1970).
With respect to corporations, however, Missouri courts have declined to imply a joint
venture “where the evidence indicates that the parties created a different business form.”
Ritter, 987 S.W.2d at 387; Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. App. 1995).
Regardless, “[i]ndications of a joint venture include: actively participating and sharing in
the profits, all parties having joint and several control, and having a duty to share the
losses.” Ritter, 987 S.W.2d at 387 (citing Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 16)
BASF and Monsanto entered into multiple agreements pertaining to the
development and commercialization of their dicamba tolerant (“DT”) system. In 2010,
Monsanto and BASF SE entered into an Umbrella Agreement which formed a joint
governing body called the Alliance Management Team (“AMT”) with equal
representation from both parties and alternating chairmanship. Later, Monsanto and
BASF Corp. entered into the March 8, 2011 Dicamba Tolerance System Agreement
(“DTSA”), the June 9, 2014 Amended & Restated Dicamba Tolerance System
Agreement (“ARDTSA”), and the October 2014 Letter Agreement. Plaintiffs contend
that these agreements support that a joint venture was intended by the parties for the
purpose of creating and selling a DT system of seed and herbicide.
Some BASF documents also refer explicitly to the arrangement as a “joint
venture.” A 2015 invoice from BASF to Monsanto, for example, sought $349,922.51 for
“the Dicamba Joint Venture.” Other documents, such as a BASF presentation to the EPA
and others stated that “BASF and Monsanto are engaged in a joint venture.”
Defendants say those statements are irrelevant and that the question of whether the
ARDTSA creates a joint venture between BASF Corp. and Monsanto should be decided
within the four corners of the contracts alone. To that end, defendants point out that the
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ARDTSA states that the parties intend to operate as independent contractors and
disclaims any intent to create a partnership. Moreover, defendants argue that the
ARDTSA’s merger clause states that it is the whole agreement with respect to subject
matter and displaces other oral or written agreements.
Regardless of the ARDTSA’s disclaimer of a partnership or joint venture, “the
question here is whether the evidence shows, by facts and circumstances, that one was in
fact created.” Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc., 454 S.W.2d at 16. “The required intent necessary
to find a partnership existed is not the intent to form a partnership, but the intent to enter
a relationship which in law constitutes a partnership.” Morley v. Square, Inc.,
4:10CV2243 SNLJ, 2016 WL 1615676, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 2016) (quoting Hillme
v. Chastain, 75 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002)) (internal quotation omitted).
None of the cases defendants cite stands for the proposition that they seem to urge; that
is, because the defendants’ written agreements are not labeled “joint venture,” or
expressly disclaim joint venture, no joint venture exists. Although defendants, relying on
Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL 2501138, at *10 (E.D. Mo.
June 9, 2017), argue that an express disclaimer of partnership or joint venture is “fatal” to
plaintiffs’ joint venture claims, this Court did not end its analysis with the existence of
the disclaimer. Rather, the Court looked to the terms of the contract before determining
that the plaintiff there had failed to create a genuine factual dispute as to a joint-venture
theory. 2017 WL 2501138 at *10-11.
To further distance themselves as joint venturers, and dispel the allegations that
there was joint control or “equal voice,” defendants characterize the ARDTSA as a
“licensing and supply” agreement. Plaintiffs counter that the ARDTSA was in fact an
amendment of a Project Agreement under the parties’ pre-existing Umbrella Agreement.
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Under the Umbrella Agreement, according to plaintiffs, the parties agreed to contribute
assets, including intellectual property and know-how to the joint development and
commercialization of agricultural products in areas including seed treatment and weed
control. Defendants, though, contend that the Umbrella Agreement is irrelevant to this
dispute because the DTSA and ARDTSA both contain merger clauses. However, the
parties do not appear to dispute that BASF and Monsanto entered into many agreements
pertaining to the DT project, and that each agreement pertains to its own subject matter—
that is, the project was complex and involved numerous stand-alone agreements, and
some of those agreements refer to each other.
Under the DTSA, in addition to certain obligations to grant reciprocal licenses,
share access to regulatory data, and supply materials (including dicamba herbicide and
dicamba-tolerant seed), the parties agreed Monsanto would make DT Systems Payments
to BASF, which they call “value share payments.” The DTSA also established joint
working groups, through which Monsanto and BASF jointly pursued development,
regulatory, and commercialization efforts pertaining to their DT System. Among other
things, the Regulatory Working Group coordinated registration of herbicides for use in
the DT system; the Development Working Group coordinated field trials and developed
label recommendations and research studies; and the Commercialization Working Group
evaluated operational considerations including forecasts for seed volume and chemistry
volume, developed and coordinated a communications strategy, and developed and
coordinated the commercial launch strategy.
On June 9, 2014, Monsanto and BASF entered into the ARDTSA. The ARDTSA
contains all the same definitions as the DTSA for “Commercial Launch,” “DT System,”
and “Losses.” The ARDTSA, like the DTSA, defines the DT System to include BASF’s
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Clarity, BASF’s “old dicamba” brand. The ARDTSA modifies the value share payments
provided in the DTSA, basing them only on traited acres (“Traited Acres Payments”).
Pursuant to their various agreements, Monsanto and BASF coordinated the strategy and
schedule for commercialization of the dicamba tolerant cropping system—including DT
seed and dicamba formulations—through the Commercialization Working Group, which
in turn reported to the Alliance Management Team (“AMT”), which was established in
the Umbrella Agreement. As discussed above, the AMT includes equal representation
and alternating chairmanship. From March 2010 until the eve of the product launch,
Monsanto and BASF continued to collaborate on and discuss aspects of the dicamba
tolerant crop system at meetings of the AMT under the protocols set forth in the
Umbrella Agreement. In total, there were at least 17 meetings of the AMT in which the
aspects of the dicamba tolerant crop system were discussed. Under these circumstances,
plaintiffs have at least established a question of fact regarding joint control.
Defendants next contend that their value share payments are “fixed-fee payments,”
which are not “profit-sharing” and so do not support a “community of pecuniary
interest.”

For example, in Riley, one party received a “fixed per-delivery fee” for each

successful delivery if the delivering party’s bid was competitive enough, an arrangement
this Court held was not profit sharing. 2017 WL 2501138 at *9. Defendants argue that
BASF receives a similar fixed fee. Moreover, defendants point out that the
DTSA/ARDTSA state neither company has profit-sharing rights as to sales of the other’s
dicamba herbicides.
Plaintiffs insist that the value share payments here are in fact shared profits. In
particular, Monsanto agreed to pay BASF payments based on the number of acres planted
with “traited” seeds—that is, BASF received a portion of the profits from Monsanto’s
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sale of Xtend seeds that it developed with BASF’s help. Plaintiffs add that BASF is
entitled to payments for traited acres even in the event no low-volatility dicamba
formulation was ever registered for sale. This does not appear to the Court to be a “fixedfee” arrangement one would find with, for example, a subcontractor or a supplier. Unlike
in Riley, BASF passively reaps the rewards for sales of Xtend seeds. Nonetheless,
defendants describe these payments as “royalties,” and they argue that they do not
constitute shared profits because they were owed to BASF whether or not Monsanto
made any profit at all. On the other hand, plaintiffs point out that the “value share
payments” were structured so that payments would increase as use of Xtend seed
increased—in contrast to a fixed, guaranteed payment regardless of market penetration or
sales volume. Clearly, the defendants intended to share in the revenue derived from sales
of Xtend seeds created as part of the DT project, which may be an indirect way of sharing
profits. Such an arrangement may not be enough ultimately to show that the parties
intended a joint venture. In Jones v. St. Charles County, for example, a concession
agreement provided the county would receive nine percent of the gross receipts each
month. 181 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005). The court held that such an
arrangement, combined with no obligation to share any losses or control, meant there was
no joint venture. Id. Here, the record is not developed enough for the Court to determine
that the value share payments do not constitute a mechanism for sharing profits. This
Court must review the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and give plaintiffs the
benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Buller, 706 F.2d at
846. Plaintiffs have at least raised an issue of fact with regard to the defendants’
intention to share in the profits of their DT project.

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As for shared losses, plaintiffs point to the October 2014 Letter Agreement, which
states that BASF and Monsanto equally share the costs associated with the dicamba
residue testing, which are projected to exceed $2.6 million. Subsequently, as discussed
above, BASF invoiced Monsanto for $349,922.51 for the “Dicamba Joint Venture.” On
the other hand, the ARDTSA provides that Monsanto and BASF shall indemnify each
other for intellectual property violations and torts of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. Defendants claim such an indemnity provision is inconsistent with joint
ventures because joint ventures result in joint and several liability, and the
indemnification provisions seek to make each party liable for its own specified
misconduct. Regardless, the requirement of “shared losses” is not a strict one under
Missouri law, Morley, 2016 WL 1615676, at *8, and the defendants’ attempt to clarify
who is responsible for certain legal claims is not dispositive under these facts. The
evidence here generates at least a question of fact as to whether the parties shared losses
sufficiently to constitute a joint venture.
Although it is a close call, the evidence supplied by plaintiffs, though disputed by
the defendants, shows there is at least a question regarding whether the defendants shared
control and a “community of pecuniary interests” related to the DT project despite the
defendants’ stated intention not to form a “partnership.” The matter of whether the
defendants were engaged in a joint venture must be left to the jury. See, e.g., In re
Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2009), adhered
to on reconsideration, 4:06MD1811 CDP, 2011 WL 5024548 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 21, 2011)
(reserving joint venture question for jury even where express agreements between
defendants showed companies were operating under their express corporate forms). As a

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result, the Court declines to grant summary judgment to defendants on the question of
whether they were engaged in a joint venture.
D. Conspiracy
To establish a conspiracy, plaintiffs must show the following elements: (1) two or
more persons; (2) with an unlawful objective; (3) after a meeting of the minds; (4)
committed at least one act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (5) plaintiff was thereby
damaged. W. Blue Print Co., LLC v. Roberts, 367 S.W.3d 7, 22 (Mo. banc 2012).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’
conspiracy claims because, they say, plaintiffs cannot establish that there was a “meeting
of the minds.” Defendants of course admit that they agreed to enter into business
arrangements, but they insist such arrangements were lawful. The Missouri Supreme
Court articulates that a meeting of the minds is “a unity of purpose or a common design
and understanding.” Oak Bluff Partners, Inc. v. Meyer, 3 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Mo. banc
1999). Plaintiffs contend that because the defendants’ business dealings were designed to
unlawfully harm third parties to increase defendants’ profits, the defendants’ meeting of
the minds became a conspiracy. In support, plaintiffs cite American Bank of St. Paul v.
TD Bank, N.A., 713 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2013). There, the court addressed a situation in
which a borrower was committing fraud to obtain loans from Mercantile Bank. Id.at
460–61. The bank became concerned about the borrower’s ability to repay the loans,
investigated, and had reason to doubt the borrower’s ability to repay. Id. Rather than
foreclose on the loans, Mercantile chose to forbear and participate in another funding
arrangement for the borrower that resulted in repayment of some of the outstanding loans
to Mercantile and left American Bank bearing the largest portion of the risk. Id.at 461.
The borrower defaulted and American sued the borrower and Mercantile alleging
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conspiracy. Id. The American Bank court found a meeting of the minds between
Mercantile and the borrower based on circumstantial evidence, including participation in
the questionable loan, ignoring employee concerns about the propriety of the business
transaction, and entering into a questionable forbearance agreement while the coconspirator borrower sought funding elsewhere. Id. 465-66.
Defendants contend plaintiffs cite no evidence in support of their argument that
defendants agreed to engage in unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs do cite to evidence. It is not
overwhelming, but it at least creates the question of fact plaintiffs need to defeat
summary judgment on this point. Plaintiffs point to evidence that Monsanto
representatives warned others at Monsanto, in 2010, that widespread use of dicamba was
incompatible with Midwestern agriculture due to its potential to cause widespread crop
damage. Dr. Fold Baldwin asked Monsanto representatives in 2013 how they would
manage off-target issues with dicamba, and the answer was that everyone would have to
plant Xtend crop. Similarly, in a 2016 “Strategic Update” regarding Engenia, BASF
listed “Defensive Planting” as part of BASF’s “Potential Market Opportunity.” Plaintiffs
suggest that BASF further knew that early release of Xtend seeds would drive up demand
for Clarity, the “old” formulation of dicamba, before new, low-volatility dicamba was
approved. As a result, BASF scaled up production of Clarity in 2015. Documents also
suggest that BASF knew that although dicamba would not be labeled for use on Xtend
seed in 2015, that “there is a concern about growers being tempted to use dicamba
illegally.” Indeed, Clarity sales went from $60 million in 2014 and 2015 to $100 million
in 2016.1 Finally, plaintiffs argue that both Monsanto and BASF established corporate
1

The parties dispute whether BASF actually profited from these sales. BASF says that
its own sales went down and that private label sales went up. Additionally, defendants
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positions blaming applicators for off-target damage, and that discussions regarding a
defense strategy began in 2010. Plaintiffs contend that from these facts, a jury could
reasonably find that Monsanto and BASF entered into a conspiracy to increase profits
stemming from an “ecological disaster” of their own making.
As for defendants’ contention that plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim fails because
plaintiffs cannot show that one of their dicamba products caused their harm, plaintiffs
have been clear that their theory is that the sale of Xtend seeds caused their harm. As
discussed above, this is a matter for the jury.
Finally, BASF contends that it cannot have conspirator liability because
Monsanto, not BASF, decided when to release the seed. This argument is a red herring.
The evidence creates at least a question of fact that the defendants, with an unlawful
objective and after a meeting of the minds, committed at least one act in furtherance of
the conspiracy, and that plaintiffs were thereby damaged. See W. Blue Print Co., 367
S.W.3d at 22. No element of conspiracy requires that BASF had control over the timing
of the launch of Xtend seed. “Every member of the conspiracy need not have actually
committed the unlawful act supporting liability.” Brock v. McClure, 404 S.W.3d 416,
421 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing Oak Bluff Partners, Inc., 3 S.W.3d at 780–81).
“Instead, each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable and each defendant is made
responsible for the acts of the other done in pursuance of the common design.” Id.
(internal quotation omitted). Summary judgment is denied as to the plaintiffs’ conspiracy
claim.

argue that Clarity sales increased due to higher visibility for conventional use due to the
launch of the DT trait—not that Clarity was being used illegally.
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E. Design Defect
Monsanto argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Counts I (strict liabilitydesign defect) and III (negligent design) because plaintiffs have failed to designate a
design expert.
Under Missouri law, to prevail in a products liability action under a theory of
defective design, plaintiffs must demonstrate
(1) the defendants sold the product in the course of their business, (2)
the product was then in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
when put to a reasonably anticipated use, (3) the product was used in a
manner reasonably anticipated, and (4) [plaintiffs were] injured as a
direct result of such defective condition as existed when the product was
sold.
Menz v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 507 F.3d 1107, 1114 (8th Cir. 2007)
The parties agree that Missouri law requires expert testimony in a design defect
case where the design at issue is “sufficiently technical and complex to be outside the
common knowledge or experience of a jury.” Davidson v. Besser Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d
1020, 1023 (E.D. Mo. 1999). In Davidson, for instance, the court excluded the proffered
design expert’s testimony regarding the safety features of a concrete block-making
machine. Id. Thus the plaintiff did not have legally sufficient evidence to support his
case, and summary judgment was granted to defendant. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that the jury is capable of answering questions presented
pertaining to the alleged design defect without the benefit of an expert opinion, and,
regardless, plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Ford Baldwin can easily supply an expert opinion as an
herbicide expert. Defendant responds that Baldwin was not disclosed as a design expert.
Although defendant acknowledges that Baldwin’s report concludes that Engenia and
Monsanto are too volatile, they say such testimony does not constitute a design defect
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opinion. Defendant further argues that Baldwin is not even qualified to give a design
defect opinion because he has never designed dicamba herbicides.
The “defective” item in this case, though, is not just dicamba herbicide—it is the
Xtend Crop System, which plaintiffs allege was defective and unreasonably dangerous
due to defendants’ inability to provide a safe herbicide. Even to the extent use of
defendants’ dicamba-based products involved application error or misuse, plaintiffs
allege such error or misuse was reasonably anticipated, rendering the products defective.
Plaintiffs’ case depends not on the specifics of how to chemically design an appropriate
herbicide; rather, it depends on their argument that there was no safe way to use the
Xtend seeds with any dicamba product. Baldwin provides such testimony for plaintiffs.
Although he was not formally designated as a design defect expert, he was, of course,
designated as a causation expert. His testimony on dicamba volatility overlaps altogether
on the design defect issues, and there is no prejudice to defendants by allowing him to
testify on design defect.
F. Failure to Warn
The determinative issue in a failure-to-warn claim is “whether the information
accompanying the product effectively communicates …the dangers that inhere in the
product during normal use and the dangerous consequences that can or will result from
misuse or abnormal use of the product.” Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707
S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. banc 1986). Plaintiffs plead that defendants did not provide
adequate warning of the dangers inherent in their products and that plaintiffs were
damaged as a result of that failure to warn. This failure to warn claim is not directed so
much to product labeling as it is to defendants’ marketing materials and communications

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and contacts with farmers. The substance of the claim, then, is that defendants failed to
warn of the risks of off-target damage to other farmers.
Plaintiffs must show proximate cause by showing “that a warning would have
altered the behavior of the individuals involved….” Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332
S.W.3d 749, 762 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation omitted); Tune v. Synergy Gas
Corp., 883 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Mo. banc 1994). “To satisfy this burden, Missouri, like several
other states, aids plaintiffs in proving this second part of causation by presuming that a
warning will be heeded.” Moore, 332 S.W.3d at 762 (internal quotation omitted). But
that “heeding presumption” requires a preliminary inquiry into whether adequate
information is available without a warning. Id.
In that regard, defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot show that Xtend seed users
did not already know about the dangers inherent to using dicamba, and that expert
testimony is required for that purpose. It is apparent, however, that plaintiffs’ expert
Baldwin will provide testimony from which the jury can conclude farmers spraying
dicamba in-crop did not understand the danger to others. This Court is satisfied that
plaintiffs have sufficient evidence such that the jury will have “guidance and [will not be]
left to speculation and conjecture,” as required by the Missouri Supreme Court. Tune,
883 S.W.2d at 14.
G. Negligent Training
In Missouri, negligent training is a variant of ordinary negligence. Thus, to prevail
on their negligent training claims, plaintiffs must show “(1) a legal duty on the part of the
defendant to use ordinary care to protect the plaintiff against unreasonable risks of harm;
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate cause between the breach and the resulting
injury; (4) actual damages to the plaintiff’s person or property.” Braxton v. DKMZ
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Trucking, Inc., 4:13cv1335 JCH, 2013 WL 6592771, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2013)
(citing Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid–America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Mo.
banc 1984)).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot prove any employee was negligently
trained nor that such a failure to train caused any crop loss. Plaintiffs respond with a
number of disputed facts that they say support that the defendants’ employees were not
properly trained. For example, plaintiffs contend Monsanto sales employee Greg Starling
acknowledges it was his responsibility to prevent off-label spraying, but he took no steps
to do so even though he knew it was occurring. Plaintiffs further contend BASF
employee Dan Westberg witnessed what was probably Engenia being sprayed
improperly, and he did nothing to stop or educate the applicator. Plaintiffs contend these
and other facts could allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the employees had not been
properly trained and that the employees’ indifference caused plaintiffs’ harm. This Court
agrees.
H. Punitive Damages
The test for whether punitive damages are allowed in Missouri is a strict one.
Ford v. GACS, Inc., 265 F.3d 670, 677 (8th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff must show, by clear
and convincing evidence, that “the defendant showed a complete indifference to or
conscious disregard for the safety of others.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation omitted);
Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 111 (Mo. banc 1996). Defendants
contend that the EPA approval, the package label warnings, the training sessions, and
other actions, and also remedial efforts following reports of potential dicamba
symptomology, preclude a showing of complete indifference or conscious disregard. But
plaintiffs set forth evidence that defendants were aware of the serious risk that their DT
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Xtend system would inflict damage to non-DT crops. In any event, this Court, though
well aware of the high standard of clear and convincing evidence, is not now in a position
to determine as a matter of law that plaintiffs cannot make a submissible case for punitive
damages.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ motions for summary judgment
[#218, #221] are DENIED.
So ordered this 31st day of December, 2019.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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